Incident Command System and Implementation at Major Incident - Coursework Example

Incident Command Incident Command System and implementation at major incident What is Incident Command System (ICS) and its history The incident command system (ICS) is a particular approach to assembly and control of the highly reliable temporary organizations employed by many public safety professionals to manage diverse resources at emergency scenes. An ICS-based organization appears able to capitalize on efficiency and control benefits of bureaucracy, while avoiding or overcoming the considerable tendencies toward inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 2003) usually thought to accompany bureaucratic systems. ICS-based organizations may perform more reliably under extreme conditions than organizations founded on alternative approaches (for stance, organic systems). They appear able to structure and restructure themselves on a moment-moment basis and to provide members with means to oscillate effectively between various preplanned organizational solutions to the more predictable aspects of a disaster circumstance and improvised approaches for the unforeseen and novel complications that often arise in such situations. The term "ICS" is the official designation for an approach used by many public safety professionals, including firefighters and police, to assemble and control the temporary systems they deploy to man- age personnel and equipment at a wide range of emergencies, such as fires, multi-casualty accidents (air, rail, water, roadway), natural disasters, hazardous materials spills, and so forth. The ICS was originally developed through a cooperative effort among a number of federal, state, and local governmental agencies made in response to the harmful disorder that occurred among various organizations, including municipal and county fire departments, the California Department of Forestry, in the state government, and the federal government, at- tempting to suppress massive wild land fires in California during the 1970s. It represented a significant departure from previous large-scale emergency management methods. (Hanssen-Bauer, 1996) Bronze, Silver and Gold A Bronze Commander directly controls the organizations resources at the incident and will be found with their staff working at the scene. The Gold Commander is in overall control of their organization’s resources at the incident. They will not be on site, but at a distant control room. The Silver Commander is the tactical commander who manages the strategic direction from Gold and makes them into sets of actions that are completed by Bronze. ICS and Fire Services The importance of civilian disaster command became a significant focus of attention in the United States during the early 1970s after a series of major wildfires in Southern California highlighted recurrent difficulties in coordinating disaster response across multiple jurisdictions and agencies. The FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies) project subsequently was initiated under the direction of the National Interagency Incident Management System to integrate proven management concepts into a standardized system for directing decision-making and resource utilization. (FIRESCOPE, 2004) Development of the Incident Command System (ICS) was the result of this cooperative local, state, and federal interagency effort to provide a consistent approach to preparedness, response, and recovery. Although this organizational structure originally was developed specifically for fire hazard response, the original ICS model has been adapted and applied by a wide range of response agencies and to emergencies of varying type, size, and complexity, including natural disasters, hazardous materials accidents, mass gatherings, and terrorist incidents. (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2000) ICS Flexibility though highly bureaucratic, the incident command system seems to serve as the basis for the exceptional organizational flexibility required for reliable performance under highly variable and risky circumstances. Consider the account of the rapid coordination by the ICS of diverse resources in response to an immense California fire. The event spanned ten days, and the fire was fought under volatile conditions both over treacherous or difficult-to-access wildlands and in various residential areas. From the outset, resource deployment proceeded at a torrid pace. Three minutes after the first call was received, approximately 65 people, 7 engine companies, 2 water-dropping helicopters, and 1 bulldozer were dispatched to the scene. Within 80 minutes, the deployment had escalated to over 950 people and several hundred pieces of equipment. In the end, approximately 839 engines and 44 aerial units (consisting of both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft) were called into service. Firefighters responded from 458 fire agencies across 12 states and ultimately numbered more than 7,000. (Roberts, 2004) Furthermore, as the incident evolved, the dimensionality and uncertainty of the task environment increased substantially. Although fire suppression was the original focus, other operational imperatives rapidly emerged, including search and rescue, medical aid, residential evacuation, and hazardous materials containment. Moreover, personnel from many other types of agencies (for instance, law enforcement, Red Cross, city and county governments, National Guard, Federal Aviation Administration, and Federal Emergency Management Agency, for example) became involved with the emergency management effort, and their diverse contributions were coordinated through the ICS. ICS-based organizations can coordinate diverse resources to achieve specific objectives under turbulent, severely time-constrained and hazardous conditions. Yet, despite its increasingly wide- spread use, its attractive qualities (for instance, flexibility, adaptively, and reliability), and its apparent suitability to a broad array of organizational contexts, the ICS approach has not been the focus of much social science research. Sectorisation In general, the ICS is constructed around five major functions: command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration. These building blocks purportedly apply in both routine and non-routine situations and for ICS structures of all sizes. According to ICS logic, even when a system is very small, involving as few as two individuals, all five elements are likely to be relevant to some extent. When the system is small, however, one person may be able to manage all five elements. Large-scale incidents usually require that components be relegated to their own "sections," each of which can be managed separately. In addition, a section can be divided into smaller functions as needed. Incident commander is the highest-ranking position within the ICS and the one functional position always filled. The person occupying this position is ultimately responsible for all activities that take place at an incident, including the development and implementation of strategic decisions and the ordering and releasing of resources. Up to four sections report directly to the incident commander. The operations section is responsible for the development and execution of all tactical operations directly related to the primary goals and objectives of the ICS. The planning section develops the action plan to accomplish the system's objectives. It collects, evaluates, and disseminates information about the development of the incident and status of resources. The logistics section provides facilities and services to support ICS personnel. The finance/administration section provides accounting, procurement, and cost analysis. Finally, in addition to these four primary activities, the incident commander has responsibility for several other important functions, including release of information to external constituents, safety of personnel, and liaison to assisting agencies. Again, the incident commander may find it necessary to delegate authority for performing these functions to others. Span of control To limit the number of responsibilities and resources being by any individual, the ICS requires that any single person's span of control should be between three and seven, with five being ideal. In other words, one manager should have no more than seven people working under them at any given time. If more than 7 resources are being managed by an individual, then they are being overloaded and the command structure needs to be expanded by delegating responsibilities (e.g. by defining new sections, divisions, or task forces). If fewer than three, then the position’s authority can probably be absorbed by the next highest rung in the chain of command. Advantage of Incident Command System and use for high buildings Although initially developed in response to problems associated with wildland fire fighting, the ICS evolved into an "all-risk" system supposedly suitable for almost any type of emergency (such as natural disasters, riots, and terrorist at- tacks) and for emergencies of nearly any size, ranging from a minor incident involving a single small team, such as a fire engine company, to a major event involving numerous agencies. Consequently, the use of fundamental ICS principles has expanded rapidly. For instance, the ICS was adopted by the National Fire Academy as its standard for incident response. Federal law now requires the ICS to be used for management of hazardous materials emergencies. Many states have adopted the ICS as their model for responding to all types of incidents. Finally, the ICS is a cornerstone of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS). The IEMS has the objective of developing and maintaining a credible, nationwide emergency management capability involving all levels of government and all types of hazards. ICS Structure The basic structure of a fully elaborated ICS appropriate for large-scale emergencies or disasters, such as massive wildland fires or powerful earth- quakes occurring in highly populated areas. The system is highly formalized, characterized by extensive rules, procedures, policies, and instructions. Jobs within the system are specialized, are based on standardized routines, and require particularized training. Positions are arranged hierarchically and related to one another on the basis of formal authority. Basic system objectives and plans are established at or near the top of the hierarchy and used as bases for decisions and behaviors at lower levels. In general, the ICS is constructed around five major functions: command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration. These building blocks purportedly apply in both routine and non-routine situations and for ICS structures of all sizes. (Hannan, 2003) According to ICS logic, even when a system is very small, involving as few as two individuals, all five elements are likely to be relevant to some extent. When the system is small, however, one person may be able to manage all five elements. Large-scale incidents usually require that components be relegated to their own "sections," each of which can be managed separately. In addition, a section can be divided into smaller functions as needed. Incident commander is the highest-ranking position within the ICS and the one functional position always filled. The person occupying this position is ultimately responsible for all activities that take place at an incident, including the development and implementation of strategic decisions and the ordering and releasing of resources. Up to four sections report directly to the incident commander. The operations section is responsible for the development and execution of all tactical operations directly related to the primary goals and objectives of the ICS. The planning section develops the action plan to accomplish the system's objectives. It collects, evaluates, and disseminates information about the development of the incident and status of resources. The logistics section provides facilities and services to support ICS personnel. The finance/administration section provides accounting, procurement, and cost analysis. Finally, in addition to these four primary activities, the incident commander has responsibility for several other important functions, including release of information to external constituents, safety of personnel, and liaison to assisting agencies. Again, the incident commander may find it necessary to delegate authority for performing these functions to others. (Hannan, 2003) Harrow Court incident The investigation identified serious inadequacies in the provision of training for the Hertfordshire Firefighters that attended the Harrow Court incident. The circumstances and events of the Harrow Court Incident on 2nd February 2005 exposed wider concerns of the apparent under-provision of training in incident command. Between them, it is apparent that the Firefighters and supervisory officers in the initial attendance at Harrow Court had received insufficient formal Incident Command training, Crew Command training, Dynamic Risk Assessment training, Breathing Apparatus (heat and smoke) Refresher training and separately dedicated, practical and theoretical Compartment Fire Behavior training to deal safely and effectively with the situation they were confronted with. Specifically, the FBU notes the lack of practical attack training for compartmental fires. In addition, it is clear that any basic awareness of High Rise Incident procedures was not sufficiently underpinned with practical High Rise Incident training at either the Training & Development Centre or at fire stations. Incident Command System leading to organizational reliability The organizational approach must continually map to the requisite variety of a dynamic and risky situation. The system in use must be able to expand and contract, change strategic orientation, modify or switch tactics, and so forth, as an incident unfolds. Compounding the challenge are hazardous task contingencies that may not have been previously experienced or predicted. Furthermore, system and task complexities coupled with the need for immediate local adjustments may preclude the possibility of adequate or timely direction from superior hierarchical positions. (Weick, 1993) Structure elaborating denotes the highly specified and fundamental processes of organization construction. The ICS places considerable emphasis on methods of system assembly for several reasons. First, an ICS-based organization is typically built at the scene. Addition- ally, these systems must be capable of rapidly organizing a few to several thousand people under demanding circumstances. These design requirements bring organizing processes themselves to the fore. The ICS structure elaboration process is well developed, with the initial construction of all ICS’s commencing in approximately the same way. The structure-elaborating process may persist until the emergency begins to abate. Within the most reliable systems, objectives and corresponding structural elements and relationships are adjusted swiftly in accordance with changing environmental contingencies. In fact, we noted that an incident commander's goals and plans might be revised completely, over the course of minutes or hours, depending on the evolution of a particular situation. Role switching complements the structure elaboration processes. ICS roles are activated and role relationships are established in accordance with the functional requirements of a situation, as assessed by the incident commander. Positions are also deactivated when goals and plans no longer require them. Role switching involves the reassignment of personnel to different positions within the organization. Whenever the appropriate role structure for an emergency situation changes, personnel are either moved into newly created roles or discharged. Given that well-defined expectations and reporting relationships are attached to ICS roles, transferring individuals among roles represents a fairly efficient way of reorienting them to evolving conditions. Finally, ICS members improvise with regard to the execution and coordination of their routines. Standard routines, such as hose laying or ladder throwing, may have to be adjusted to accommodate local circumstances. Furthermore, the coordination of routines among companies may require improvisation. As resources arrive at an incident, they are assigned to particular tasks. At a building fire, for example, an engine company may be directed to enter the building and start firefighting, and a truck company may be given the job of ventilating the structure. As building burns, substantial smoke and heat can accumulate in its interior. Without proper ventilation, the firefighters assigned to at- tack the fire from within the building may be at considerable risk, because smoke reduces visibility and heat buildup can result in spontaneous combustion. Teams such as these may have to coordinate their activities in unusual situations, such as when building construction is peculiar. In sum, appropriate improvisation with tools, rules, and routines augments contingent structuring mechanisms, thereby enhancing organizational resilience and responsiveness. The detailed pattern of behaviors occurring within an ICS at any point in time is a consequence of the interplay between relatively centralized and explicit structuring and more diffuse local accommodation and improvisation. The ICS must achieve a balance between, and resolve the tensions associated with, more pre- planned and imposed versus more spontaneous and emergent task-structuring activities. If the incident commander or some other high- ranking member of an ICS is able to achieve and maintain a quality operational representation, the system is more likely to be able to match environ- mental demands and forestall catastrophic system failures. Quality operational representations increase the potential of commanders to effect both small adjustments and major reorganizations when necessary. According to Weick and Roberts (1993), the capacity for system flexibility is enhanced to the degree that overlapping representations can be established and maintained among system members. ICS participants whose operational representations exhibit similarity in important areas (especially the basic situational definition) can work together effectively to achieve a viable balance between explicit and implicit structuring processes. However, given the array of factors potentially impinging on individuals' perceptual and cognitive processes, fragmented and divergent perspectives are likely to arise. In those ICS-based organizations possessing superior response potential, members work hard to establish and update mental models. They also try to shift and nest representations in attempts to overcome the limits on their cognitive resources. Conclusion Systems constructed at emergency or disaster scenes on the basis of ICS principles have been categorized as high-reliability organizations (Grawboski & Roberts, 2000). High-reliability organizations exhibit continuous, nearly error-free operation, even in multifaceted, turbulent, and dangerous task environments (Roberts, 1990). Several classic examples of organizations that should be highly reliable are naval aircraft carriers (Weick & Roberts, 1993), nuclear power generation plants, air traffic control systems, space shuttles, and maritime systems. Some high-reliability organizations are designed for the express purpose of mitigating crises (such as air- craft carriers); others must be capable of performing under crisis conditions, even though their primary operations are more mundane (such as nuclear power generation). Since some social science scholars have identified the high-reliability organization as an unusual type of organization, questions about the generalizability of re- search on such organizations to more mainstream organizations appear warranted. Ideally, the gold standard for ICS evaluation would involve a detailed, quantitative analysis including specific assessment of all of the command functions. However, during even a modest event simulation, it is impractical to monitor, record, and interpret the numerous simultaneous decisions and communications taking place in every geographic location between responders, Unit Commanders, and the Incident Commander. Read More