The Future of Employee Representation in Organisations - Case Study Example

Student’s Name] [Instructor’s Name] [Course Title] [Date] THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN ORGANISATIONS INTRODUCTION The main purpose of a trade union is to improve workers' working conditions and their economic and social status through collective bargaining. According to Galenson, the emergence of unions was a reaction to the hardship experienced by the working class in the process of industrialization. This was further fueled by the common law doctrine that workers have the freedom to enter into a contract of service with their employers and should bear the responsibility of ensuring that they only accept terms and conditions that are acceptable to them. With limited resources, workers therefore might find it more expedient and effective to secure better terms and conditions of employment via collective bargaining. Traditionally, such collective bargaining rights have been restricted to bargainable (rank-and-file) employees only (Arthur, 2004). Non-bargainable employees, typically managerial, professional, and confidential employees directly involved in the formulation and implementation of management decisions, are not eligible for union protection in most market economies. AIM The main aim of this paper is to evaluate the options on the future of employee representation in organizations, with particular reference to the implications for trade unions. This article contributes evidence of some positive outcomes for employees associated with co-operation in an 'alliance of insiders' model but also highlights limitations to a co-operative approach. The article is divided into seven sections. In the first of these, various perspectives on co-operation and conflict are outlined (Bacon, 2000). Following this we describe the methodology of our study, explaining the measures, survey and industrial context. In the third section we report the issues driving co-operation and conflict and in the fourth the relationship with changes in terms and conditions (Bacon, 2000). The fifth section considers types of workplace restructuring and HRM indicators. BACKGROUND The employment relationship encapsulates both convergent and divergent interests, with the result that, in practice, relations between the industrial relations parties contain elements of both conflict and co-operation (Arthur, 2004). In some of the most visible and key aspects of the employment relationship - notably wage rates and other basic terms and conditions of employment - interests are at their most divergent and this, together with the visibility and impact of industrial (particularly strike) action, tends to give prominence to the conflict, rather than the more co- operative aspects of industrial relations. Yet at different times, the argument has been advanced for developing less conflict and more co-operative industrial relations (Bacon, 2000). DISCUSSION The most significant question is to find out the true purpose of a trade union. Reflecting the economic progress and the lack of need for protection through union representation among bargain able employees in UK, the proportion of workers with union membership dropped steadily from the 1970s to the 1980s but had regained some ground since the mid-1980s. In terms of absolute numbers, total union membership increased from about 201,000 in 1986 to about 255,000 in 1996, and to over 290,000 in 1999. However, during the same period, the labor force expanded from 1.3 million in 1986 to 1.9 million in 1999 (on top of over 700,000 foreign employees) (Blyton, 2003), and has remained at about the same level since then. This lethargic trend in union membership not only would result in a weaker labour movement in UK, but also would limit the labour movement's ability to source and develop capable union leaders for the future (Bacon, 2000). This is undesirable from the policy-making perspective as it may lead to a shift in the balance of power in favor of employer’s vis-à-vis rank-and-file employees in the industrial relations system (Blyton, 2003). On the other hand, in the past decades, there has been an increase in the proportion of technical, managerial, and professional employees in the UK labour force. These high-end employees accounted for about 39.3 per cent of the total workforce in 1999, compared with 12.5 per cent in 1974 (Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years). In line with the practices in many other countries, most of these better educated and better paid employees are not given union protection. Such employees typically would have to resort to their own means, such as initiating civil court proceedings, to protect their employment interests should the need arise (for example, when they are unfairly dismissed) (Blyton, 2003). In response to the low rate of participation in the labour movement among bargainable employees and the rising proportion of executive employees in the workforce, scholars have been calling for a change in employer orientation, so as to allow up to 80 per cent of the company workforce to join a trade union (including executive employees who will be given certain bargaining rights, such as grievances arising from unfair dismissals and negotiation of retrenchment benefits; (Blyton, 2003). More recently, this concept is has been accepted by the Government and hence, many well-educated and well-trained executive employees will be able to join a trade union and enjoy union protection (Clegg, 2001). On the other hand, various trade union movements are generally identified as having been severely weakened both in terms of their access to political power and as a result of membership decline, making them less capable of extracting maximum advantage from a conflictual relationship with management, and potentially more likely to gain greater involvement and possibly influence through a more co-operative approach to industrial relations (Clegg, 2001). In the UK, this has underpinned arguments for a 'stakeholding' approach to management, ideas of social partnership and a 'new deal' for employees. This 'new deal' involves increased co-operation focused around high involvement or 'high commitment work systems' (Clegg, 2001). However, few studies have thus far systematically explored the implications of contemporary workplace co-operation, and more information is needed on whether, and the contexts in which, co-operation delivers 'mutual gains' for managers and employees. PERSPECTIVES ON CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE NEW WORKPLACE It follows from the above discussion that the main dimensions to be considered are the nature of employment relations (co-operative or conflictual) and the outcomes of those relations for unions and employees (beneficial or detrimental) (Darlington, 2004). Examining the possible relationships between these two dimensions gives rise to six different workplace types. The first workplace type occurs when co-operation delivers substantial benefits for employees as part of an HRM or 'high commitment' approach. Managers and unions enter an alliance jointly to develop skills and increase employee commitment recognizing a shared interest in particular aspects associated with the 'new industrial relations' agenda, such as training, health and safety, quality improvement and plant performance (Darlington, 2004). Certain US authors argue that 'new deals' in transformed high performance workplaces are the 'best hope' for 'good wages, employment security and interesting work' with a greater guarantee of a share for employees in perfonnance gains. New partnership deals at plant level deliver 'mutual gains' through two processes. First, co-operative industrial relations and high performance work systems are seen to form a virtuous circle in some unionized plants (Darlington, 2004). 'Integrative bargaining' ensures that employees receive a share of the rewards from increased organizational performance that results from a particular HRM configuration of flexible working, multi-skilling, teamworking, training, doing more with fewer employees, greater employee responsibility and high involvement in the work process. Several studies in the United States have quantified the positive impact of co-operation in such workplaces on quality and manufacturing performance suggesting a 'powerful connection' between co-operation and competitive advantage (Gall, 2004). Second, partnership can improve the strategic capacity of trade unions to influence management policy and ensure employees benefit from change. Key mechanisms for turning union co-operation into employee benefits include a greater role for unions in planning workplace change and stronger job security provisions (Gall, 2004). A second type of workplace co-operation occurs where an 'alliance of insiders' significantly protects employee interests. In the alliance of insiders model,’ pragmatic' employees, often under economic coercion, recognize a 'new balance of power' and accept reduced influence and the extension of management prerogative (Gall, 2004). In return, companies maintain or increase existing earnings and do not challenge head-on certain customs and practices (for example, seniority-based promotion or the retention of work in-house rather than being subcontracted). The insiders then are the survivors of the process of restructuring. However, the survivors also incur costs as such alliances can involve job losses, harder work for those that survive and increased stress and health problems . In these alliances trade unions resign themselves to accepting management-driven change believing 'any agreement .. . better than no agreement', (Gall, 2004)that too confrontational a stance could 'invite reprisals' and identify as 'folly .. . Overusing their diminishing power'. Although unions continue in a traditional role, they face increased risks of, shop steward magnetization and, by reducing opposition to management excesses, they damage union credibility among members (Hyman, 2001). A third type of workplace is where co-operation does not deliver any, or only very limited, benefits for employees, thereby representing a 'hollow shell' of union incorporation. Union incorporation involves union leaders accepting a manage- ment perspective and sacrificing members' interests. In such workplaces managerial attitudes have changed little (Hyman, 2001). As unions co-operate on terms set unilaterally by managers only, managers benefit from this zero-sum power relationship. Accepting a management agenda results in unions 'concession bargaining', with members losing hard-fought gains, while wresting few concessions from management and often working harder for less pay. Overall, such 'hollow shell' contexts fall considerably short of a basis upon which to develop social partnership. Corresponding to these three workplace types based on co-operative industrial relations, three types of workplace may be identified where industrial relations conflict has different effects on employees' terms and conditions (Bacon, 2000). First, in some workplaces trade unions can utilize industrial relations conflict to 'mark up' the outcomes and deliver significant benefits for their members. Kelly (1996), for example, argues that union militancy delivers benefits for employees through high member commitment to unions, which in turn provides the organizational strength to extract concessions from management. However, in other workplaces conflict forms part of a 'bleak house' scenario where managers do not invest in employee development and offer poor terms and conditions, giving rise to continuing unrest (Hyman, 2001). Finally, in other confliction workplaces trade unions may be seen to remain at 'arm's length' from management, recognizing a limited ability to influence decisions and increase meager employee terms and conditions. Typical of this relationship are those trade unions marked by low levels of membership density and recalcitrant employers, as exist for example in parts of the UK retail sector (Hyman, 2001). In drawing up this framework of six workplace types, we recognize that there are workplaces with both co-operative and confliction industrial relations with good and poor terms and conditions. The key questions, however, are: what are the dominant patterns in different industries and what do these imply for union and management industrial relations actors? (Hyman, 2001) THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION The evidence is as yet far from conclusive that co-operation in the majority of cases leads to better outcomes than conflict for employees. The association between co-operation and improved terms and conditions of employment alone does not indicate whether co-operation was more strongly associated with workplaces of the 'mutual gains' or 'alliance of insiders' type (Bacon, 2000). It is a further condition of mutual gains partnerships that co-operation develops not only at the institutional levels between management and unions but also at the individual level between employees and supervisors. The finding that union-management relationships of co-operation or conflict do not appear to facilitate or inhibit a broader restructuring along HPWS lines may indicate an 'Achilles' heel' in the current industrial relations consensus. Managers do not appear necessarily to act strategically to take advantage of co-operation to develop high performance, even where they eschew a drive towards reducing terms and conditions (Hyman, 2001). The 'alliance of insiders' appears to be a relatively comfortable option for both managers and trade unions. As far as we can deduce from trade union responses, managers in the plants involved did not appear to be utilizing workplace co-operation strategically as a means of introducing workplace change, as has been indicated in the US literature. The evidence points instead more towards an 'alliance of insiders', with co-operation delivering some gain-sharing (Hyman, 2001). There was little evidence of union-management conflict where managers had improved terms and conditions. This may help explain our finding that the steel companies were implementing important workplace restructuring without allowing trade unions a greater role in business planning or necessarily fundamentally altering traditional attitudes and relationships. Although significant improvements in productivity have been pursued through de-manning, generating conflict over workplace restructuring issues (redundancies, workloads, job protection and job restructuring), conflict has co- existed with co-operation to improve plant performance? (Hyman, 2001)Whereas in general job security has been identified as a key aspect in developing HPWSs the companies and plants in this survey appear to have been able to secure co-operative industrial relations while pursuing aspects of a job-cutting strategy rather than a strategy centered on skills-based competition. These findings suggest organizations can secure performance improvements through co-operation with aspects of HRM(more training and employee involvement techniques) and maintaining terms and conditions, rather than necessarily enacting a fundamental change in the role of unions or the employment relationship (Bacon, 2000). Although trade unions have formally insisted upon job security as a key condition for co-operating with workplace change, in the workplace managers have been able to secure co-operation through protecting terms and conditions. Managers thus appear to be securing productivity improvements through selective co-operation, without necessarily offering unions a more constructive role even where co-operation is forthcoming. One reading of this could be that both sides are maintaining a studied distance over more fundamental changes in work redesign precisely because of the lack of job security, and thereby maintaining aspects of a traditional arm's length relationship. An alternative is that managers simply do not value union involvement in work redesign and do not seek a more fundamental partnership (Hyman, 2001). They appear to be securing co-operation through some improvements in terms and conditions with continued restructuring by job reduction rather than seeking a fundamentally different basis for employee relations. CONCLUSION Correctly placed inside its wider political wealth context (Hyman, 1989), a supplementary qualitative approach to the 'labor problem' and unification revitalization appears from the future of employee representation within an organization. In summary, the above discussion focuses on a diverse set of value-laden concerns regarding executive unionism (Bacon, 2000). Because of the traditionally different positions taken by union leaders and top managers, these two groups of actors in the industrial relations system are likely to express significantly different views. Union leaders are likely to advocate the need, desirability, and logic for executive employees to join a trade union, emphasize the positive and de-emphasize the negative outcomes of executive unionism, and hold the view that people other than union leaders are responsible should executive employees choose not to join a trade union (Hyman, 2001). Top managers, on the other hand, are likely to downplay the need, desirability, and logic for executive employees to join a trade union, de-emphasize the positive and emphasize the negative outcomes of executive unionism, and deny that they should be responsible if executive employees decide not to join a trade union. WORKS CITED Uploaded in other document Read More