Crowd Dynamics & Management in an Event - Essay Example

Abstract Events have been part of human life, with evidence of the first events being traced back to about 2,000 years back. Most of the evidence points at Egypt, Greece, and China as the most probable areas where the earliest events were held. An event may attract crowds in their tens to billions depending on the type of access that is provided and the nature of the event amongst others. In the light of these, understanding crowd dynamics and crowd management suffice as mandatory aspects of every event. This is because the crowds can be hard to understand thus control, especially during times of excitement, panic, or anger. Major events have happened in the world where issues such as stampedes lead to death and injuries, or people suffocate due to congestion and commotion. This study will elaborate on effective crowd dynamics and event management by evaluating the Hajj, an annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca which attracts millions of people. In 2006, a stampede led to the death of over 340 people. Keywords: stampede, crowd, crowd collapse, crowd dynamics, panic Introduction Since the first events were organized about 2,000 years ago, they have been increasing in number by the day owing to the effect they have on our lives. They affect our political, environmental, economic, social, and cultural aspects. An event can have negative and positive impacts on the stakeholders and host communities, and that has made understanding of crowd dynamics and event management an important part of events. Today, events are increasingly researched and well documented to optimize their benefits and enhance their outcomes. One of the biggest challenges to crowd management is that minor factors such as bad behavior, substance abuse or criminal behavior can alter the agenda of an event and lead to unintended consequences. An event manager should therefore be equipped with skills to predict and come up with measures to mediate in the event that an unintended occurrence emerged before, during, and after an event. To elaborate how effective crowd management should be structured, the following study text will highlight the causes of fatalities and injuries at the 2006 Hajj where 340 people died and 1,000 injured. Following these, crowd reactions to situations and environments at public events will be discussed with regards to crowd management and control. Context In January 2006, pilgrims at the Mecca Hajj pilgrimage event numbering millions went rushing through the city streets towards al-Jamarat, three large stone walls made of stone which represent the devil. Pilgrims are supposed to pelt the walls with stones during the annual event in the belief that they can be purged of their sins. Reports indicated that as they rushed towards al-Jamarat, luggage from moving buses had strewn into their path causing most of them to trip. Owing to their huge numbers and speed towards their destination, they fell over each other in the thousands resulting in a stampede. By the time the stampede had been calmed, about 345 pilgrims lay dead as above 1,000 sustained injuries. Sad to note is that this was not the first stampede to claim lives at Mecca; in 2004, 244 pilgrims died in a similar manner. In 1990, another stampede claimed the lives of 1,426 pilgrims (Oliver 2006, n.p.). Evidently, there was more to the stampede than just “falling luggage from buses”. Rather, the continued disasters point at failure in crowd management. Before the 2006 Hajj stampede Following the similarity in the manner that the stampedes continually occur, it is evident that the events’ planning was missing something. As Bowdin, et.al (2012, p.213) state, crowd control plans has three stages; pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. As such, it is possible that the stampede was caused by a failure in the pre-crisis planning stage. According to Moscovici’s approach to crowd psychology; “mass behavior is characterized by the persistence of mythologized perceptions of the past in the form of collective representations” (Reicher 1984, p.4). This means that the event organizers should have first put this consideration; that the crowds would be controlled by what they had always understood of the event. As such, mass movement was expected. If the issue of falling luggage is anything to go by, then it means proper planning had not been done. If so, the buses should not have been in the same place with the people. The other failure was that if the event managers had crisis management skills, they would have strategies to minimize injury and death during stampedes. For instance, if they had considered the expected numbers and maybe made wide enough walkways for the pilgrims, the stampede would not have caused so many fatalities. In short, they should have learnt from the 1990 and 2004 disasters. During the 2006 Hajj stampede In crowd dynamics, it has been proven that when in a crowd, an individual’s rationalities, motivations, and identities dissolve and take up the collective form of the crowd. It is because of this that the crowd phenomenon has always been perceived of as dangerous. Additionally, studies have shown that the structuring of crowd behavior is influenced by pre-existing social relationships. In the Hajj’s case, religion was the relationship. Following these revelations, the event should have been structured to the models of crowd behavior which show that; First, if the exit from a gathering can accommodate people in their groups as a whole, they were bound to be much smoother. Second, if during a gathering, members of the same group split, they are likely to try and reconstitute their group thus impede the normal [intended] flow of the crowd as a whole. Third, groups will behave similarly (McPhail & Wohlstein 1986, p.447). In the light of the above, the stampede can be better understood that as the pilgrims rushed towards the al-Jamarat, they were guided by previous events where everyone rushed to reach the stone walls and pelt them with stones. The collective thinking was to reach the stone walls and be purged of sin. Second, the group was united in that all of them were Muslim pilgrims attending the annual Hajj at Mecca. As such, if anything happened to any of them, the other would attempt to help them [reconstitute group]. The stampede happened as explained by NBC (2006, n.p.) below: The tens of thousands of Muslim pilgrims were rushing towards al-Jamarat to beat the deadline of throwing stones at the walls before dusk set in on the third (final day) of the pilgrimage. This matches to the theory of a crowd with a single thought in mind; that is to adhere to their religious requirement. As such, they all focused on reaching their destination. The event organizers should have therefore ensured the roads and tunnels were clear of any barriers. However, as most news reported, buses mingled with the pilgrims as they rushed towards al-Jamarat. Unfortunately, some luggage from the overcrowded buses spilled into the street, tripping the running pilgrims. This was another failure. The crowd theory of reconstituting groups applies here. As pilgrims saw their fellows on the ground, they might have tried to help them up, resulting in those behind them tripping and falling as well. According to NBC (2006, n.p.), a witness said, “I heard people screaming and jumping over each other… the bodies were piled up. I couldn’t count them, they were too many”. This statement is justified that indeed, there was a barrier to the crowd flow that led to the stampede. Brainwashed by the deadline they had to beat, people jumped over others, causing more stampedes and injuring others. After the stampede had begun, it was further clear that the planning lacked measures to contain the crisis stage. The crisis stage is when preventive measures have failed. Panic set in when the pilgrims realized that things had gone amiss. Here, the irrationalist tradition applied in crowd psychology emerged (Arora & Arora 2013, p.450). Panic resulted in the overwhelming of reason by the threat. This explains why people were jumping over all others in a bid to rescue themselves. At this phase too, collective identity dissolves meaning collective thinking breaks down. In short, every affected pilgrim sought to find their way out of the situation and not all of them were focused at pelting at the al-Jamarat. The breakdown of collective identity leads to selfish behaviors (Simon 1982, p.117) in an occurrence termed as bounded rationality. In it, during emergencies, one’s safety comes before anyone’s or anything else’s. At this point, it can be understood why some pilgrims jumped on others, others were kicking in all directions, while others began running in different directions. The measures that had been set up to contain such occurrences were insufficient. According to NBC (2006, n.p.), the police deployed to control the crowds were overwhelmed by the turn of events. Concisely, the number of pilgrims outdid theirs by far. This was furthered by the theory of non-adaptive crowd behavior. The theories state that when crowds panic, they are overridden by their unconscious personalities which in turn force them to act irrationally (Bryan 2003, p.2). In this case, for instance, the pilgrims did not listen to the police, but pushed them away as they sought for safety. It is also indicated that there are two pillars used as entries into the pillars, and two are meant for the exit. This planning explains that the same number of people was expected to be going in coming out. In this case, however, the cycle reversed as more people rushed to get out. This might have resulted in congestion at the exit ramps. To worsen matters, NBC (2006, n.p.) reveal that the pilgrims ignore the exit and entrance ramps and use them as they wish. In a nutshell, they use the exit ramps for entrance and vice versa. This is likely to have complicated matters, thus the ensuing brutal stampede. After the stampede After the 2006 stampede, Saudi Arabia installed some measures to prevent the occurrence of similar disasters. According to the USA Today, Saudi Arabia first widened the ramps leading to the al-Jamarat. This was to facilitate space, thus reduce overcrowding. Additionally, extra ramps were built. Security officials are deployed to control the movement of crowds through the tunnels. For example, the entrance and exit ramps are used accordingly. In addition, they deploy approximately 60, 000 troops to control the flow of crowds and patrol the area. The flow of events is monitored by a control room through closed circuit television, and helicopters provide overhead patrol. They also restrict the selling of souvenirs and food on the roads leading up to al-Jamarat. However, the most effective measure taken by Saudi Arabia is to increase the time when the pilgrims can visit the al-Jamarat. Traditionally, they were allowed between midday and sunset. The new legislations allow them three days when they can visit al-Jamarat for three days from dawn until dusk (CBC 2006, n.p.). Recommendations To further prevent the recurrence of such disasters, the Saudi officials should conduct as crowd management, risk assessment (Bladden, et.al 2012, p. 212). This assessment should predict the expected numbers, thus provide equivalent security, ramps, and police. Second, it should assess how many visitors are expected. They should install measures such as sign posts to direct them within Mecca. The characteristics of the crowds should be considered in terms of gender, age, or structure. In this way, they may set different visiting times for them. If aggressive behavior such as gate crashing is expected, legal measures can be installed such as deploying extra security personnel at entry and exit points. The pilgrims should then be expected to adhere to the authorities’ rules, especially during times of crisis. For instance, they should not run or scream. Rather, they should be calm and cooperative as normalcy is restored. Finally, during times of high emotions such as the approach to the deadline, the roads and tunnels should be clear of any disruptions such as people selling merchandise or vehicles. This would prevent events such as luggage falling off into the pilgrims’ paths and resulting in fatalities. Conclusion Events, which are now inseparable from human living, play key roles in our lives. Events can result in positive or negative consequences. As such, managing events and the crowds that come with them is paramount. In the past, disasters, emerging from ineffective event management have resulted in deaths and injury of many people; as is the case with the Hajj in 1990, 2004, and 2006. In 2006, 345 people died and 1,000 were injured. The disaster was caused by, among other things, lack of proper planning before and during the event and insufficient crisis resolution measures. Following the disaster, measures such as pre-event crowd risk management measures were put up. They include predicting the expected numbers and providing sufficient facilities, preparing the pilgrims psychologically to act during disasters, applying legal legislations, and finally incorporating more guides in controlling crowds unfamiliar with the place. Collectively, these measures would safeguard crowds from fatalities during events by implementing effective crowd management and control. Bibliography Arora, R, & Arora, P 2013, Disaster Management: Medical Preparedness, Response, and Homeland Security, CABI. Bladden, C, Kennell, J, Abson, E, & Wilde, N 2012, Event Management, New York: Routledge. Bowdin G, Allen J, Harris R, McDonnell I, & O’Toole W 2012, Events Management, New York: Routledge. Bryan, J 2003, “Human Behavior and Fire”, National Fire Protection Association, 4(1): 4-32. CBC News 2006, “Hajj Stampede Kills 345, Injures Hundreds More”, CBC News, Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hajj-stampede-kills-345-injures-hundreds-more-1.583410 [4 December 2014] McPhail, C & Wohlstein, R 1986, “Collective Locomotion as Collective Behavior”, American Sociological Review, 51 (1): 447-463. NBC News 2006, “Hundred killed in stampede at Pilgrimage” NBC NEWS, available from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/10818604/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/hundreds-killed-stampede-pilgrimage/#.VIAoKldibcs [4 December 2014]. Oliver, M 2006, “Hundreds killed in Hajj Stampede”, The Guardian, Available from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/12/saudiarabia.religion [4 December 2014]. Reicher, S 1984, “The St. Paul’s Riot: An Explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of social identity model”, European Journal of Social Psychology, 14(1), 1-21. Simon, H 1982, Models of Bounded Rationality, Cambridge: MIT Press. USA Today, World 2006, “Hajj stampede death toll rises to 363, at least 85 women”, Available from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-01-13-hajj_x.htm [9 Dec. 2014] Read More