Intervention: Transforming Change - Case Study Example

Intervention: Transforming Change Instructions The nature of the interventions that CAIB recommended for NASA inits extensive diagnostic report NASA (National Aeronautic and Space Administration) commenced the Space Shuttle Columbia in the year 2003. While the space shuttle was descending and after completing its mission it broke apart over the northeastern Texas killing all the crew members. Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was appointed. The board was authorized to carry out investigations on that accident which they did and came up with the recommendation which is the central part of this paper (Logsdon, 2012 p. 13). The CAIB report illustrated that the Manned Space Flight program had perplexed lines of power, responsible and answerable in a manner that closely flout explanation. The report came to the conclusion that the organizationally structure was major contributor to the pessimistic culture and the organizational transformations are important to invalidate these aspects (Laurence Jr. and Carolyn, 2008 p. 44). Specifically, CAIB report recommended that; NASA should come up with a sovereign Technical engineering Authority liable for the technical needs and all waivers to them. This institution was bestowed with responsibility of coming up with disciplined, strategic approach to the identifying, scrutinizing and managing the hazards via the life series of the Shuttle strategy. Despite the fact that the strategy of the institution is positive, sensitive measures need to be taken into account to achieve the goals successfully (Logsdon, 2012 p. 112). The following principles have to be taken into consideration for better placement for wellbeing activities within the management structure. First, the system safety requires a direct connection to the policy makers and influence on the decision making. Another principle is, to have an independent system safety from the project management, and also have a direct communication channels in most parts of the organization (Laurence Jr. and Carolyn, 2008 p. 106). These principles are meant to ensure that the system safety stand to obtain necessary information directly from a variety of sources conveniently and avoiding the potential conflict of interests. The principles are also meant to ensure unify and coordinate the system safety (Barbara et al, 2010 p. 31). Relationship and impact of President Bushs 2004 vision and Chief Griffins new leadership to the findings and recommendations in the CAIB report In January 2004 president George w. Bush announce a new aspiration for the NASA to go back to the moon by the year 2020, Mars and beyond. The president therefore requested the NASA to withdraw the space shuttle by the year 2010, complete the international the International Space Station and build up a shuttle successor. This shuttle would be in a position to go to ISS but also onto the moon (Barbara et al, 2010 p. 60). The former manager of NASA Sean O’Keefe took the initiative to establish the moon mars mission and acquired initial funds from the congress. O’ Keefe was succeeded by Michael Griffin in 2005 he has maintained NASA and added to its development to-date. The goal of NASA was clear but the challenge was how to implement it simultaneously with the subsisting courses in the human space flight and upholding other unmanned space activities (Barbara et al, 2010 p. 61). Griffin was one of the NASA associate manager for the discovery in the early 90’s. President Goerge H.W Bush opposed to the NASA ideologies and the proposal to go back to the Moon and Mars on the late 80’s which one of the reasons was why Griffins had joined NASA. The subsequent democratic government led by President Clinton was no better to the ideologies of the NASA and this led to its termination. The comeback of griffin in NASA was a second opportunity and this provided a perfect chance to fulfill the long term objects of exploration of the program (Rajiv and Irma, 2010 p. 16). The time at which griffin came back to NASA was full of economic constrain due the war in Iraq and also the Hurricane Katrina which had hit the Gulf Coast. As such Griffin Mission in NASA fell out of favour in the national budget. As President Bush regime came to an end Griffin complained to the Office of Management and Budget and also Office of Science and Technology Biology of overlooking the efforts of NASA. This explain that the system safety requisite of, the direct connection to the policy makers and influence on the decision making. NASA efforts were disregarded on the grounds on financial constraints however, both the Bush regime and Clinton regime failed NASA by no supporting its ideologies (Rajiv and Irma, 2010 p. 95). The other principle of the safety system is to have the have an independent management free from influence. Influence from any of the sphere in its management. The system to fulfill its goal requires funds and the same should be managed by the same institution free from any interference. Connected to this is the principle of ensuring that the safety system obtain necessary information and conveniently without conflict of interests (Rajiv and Irma, 2010 p. 34). Approaches to implementing interventions, what should NASA do or have done One of the issues is that NASA did not have the organizational characteristic that could have enabled to prevent this disaster. Another thing is that a high reliability theory is necessary for describing the culture that should subsist in the person space flight institute. There should be a substitute structure for evaluating reliability and safety. Another thing is that NASA had been operating with a defective peril philosophy. This in return was a barrier to proper investigations of the mistakes that emerged from the shuttle flights. There was also faulty decision making structure; the makers of the O ring were of the view that the cold temperatures could ruin the O-rings to work effectively. Various engineers raised concern with NASA management of the likelihood of severe damage to thermal protection system. These views were disregarded, further investigations were never carried out and the NASA went ahead with its operations (Rajiv and Irma, 2010 p. 7). According to the CAIB commission and the Rogers commission, NASA had no in place safety culture. NASA overlooked the safety concerns. One of the prerequisite NASA would taken into account is first consider dealing with the obvious mistakes or weaknesses. The successes of the past of the NASA lured its staff to believing that they perfect, that they can even be able to counter even the impossible. According to the CAIB report, there were better channels of to reduce the dangers and curtail the number of the accidents (Rajiv and Irma, 2010 p. 271). Revisiting the higher reliability theory which entails the assessment of the findings and limits is another thing that the NASA would have taken onto consideration. Overlooking of this theory means that thousands of lives would be lost both inside and outside the organization. Higher reliability organization has recognized particular set of dealings that should never be precluded. They must be prevented technologically, through the organizational strategy and the management (Rajiv and Irma, 2010 p. 137). NASA is expected to seek reliability. The reliability should be based on the national interests, personal risks and the huge expenses. Criteria’s should be set on how organizations like NASA are supposed to operate (Icon Group International, 2006 p. 45). Most of the errors-focused criteria can definitely be observed in the Higher Reliability Organizations. NASA must not overlook these standards but should endeavor to support the area of the operation of these standards. The standards are not hollow but they are as a result of long operational experience and previous formal analysis. However this has not been the case with the NASA. NASA enjoyed high level support during the Apollo years but this was not steady support. And it was based on the euphoria after accomplishment of manned flight. The technology of shuttle over the years has never been resolved such as to allow the customized of the flight. There was no galvanizing object of moon landing, which is a validation of the failures in the development of the technology (Icon Group International, 2006 p. 65). List of References Logsdon, J. M. et al (2012). Space Shuttle Columbia STS-107 Tragedy: Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Final Report, Gehman Board Report to NASA. London: Progressive Management, Publishers. Laurence, Jr E. L. and Carolyn, J. H. (2008). Public Management: A Three-Dimensional Approach. Washington: CQ Press. Barbara, G. K. et al (2010). Crew Resource Management. london: Academic Press Rajiv, S. and Irma, B. F. (2010). Business Intelligence. California: Wiley. Icon Group International (2006). Sain: Websters Timeline History, 1369 - 2007. London: ICON Group International, Inc. Read More