The Goals of the Federal Emergency Management Agency - Term Paper Example

?Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Part The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is an agency under the Department of Homeland Security established by the Presidential Plan No. 3 of 1978 (FEMA, 2012a). The primary purpose of this agency is to establish a coordinated response to disasters occurring within the United States which may overwhelm the actions of the local and state authorities (FEMA, 2012a). The FEMA usually takes over as soon as a state of emergency is declared by the governor of the state; the formal request of the governor expressed to the president would authorize the FEMA to respond to the disaster (FEMA, 2012a). Where the disaster or emergency occurs in a federal building or to a federal resource, the request from the governor would not be needed. The FEMA also secures state and local governments with the resources and the expertise in specific areas where help is needed (FEMA, 2012a). They also provide funds for rebuilding; and release funds for infrastructure relief by allowing affected individuals to secure low interest loans. This agency also secures funds for the training of emergency response personnel within the US and other territories (FEMA, 2012a). The FEMA’s mission is to support citizens and “first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate all hazards” (FEMA, 2012b). The goals of the FEMA include the preparation of communities for emergencies. In effect, it secures resources to improve the capacity of federal, state, and local government agencies in order to secure best practice and secure grants for local communities (Malcolm, 2012). Another goal of the FEMA is to mitigate the damage caused by disasters. These mitigation goals come about before and after disasters occur; this is when risk management is carried out before disasters and grants are offered for affected individuals in order to mitigate the impact of such disasters (Malcolm, 2012). Another goal is to protect communities from external threats and more importantly to respond to disasters and emergencies. Supporting recovery in communities impacted by disaster is also a significant goal for the FEMA (Malcolm, 2012). The objectives of this organization include the securing the participation of agency employees for the renewal process; emphasizing mitigation as a means of reducing the risks to people, property and communities of disasters; securing a culture of assistance among citizens by ensuring national emergency management partnerships; establishing an all-hazards resource in emergency management; maintaining close relationships with federal agencies in most areas of emergency management; establishing flexibility in the state and local emergency management programs; securing a quick and effective administration in assistance claims; and establishing means by which the efficacy of the FEMA programs can be assessed (FEMA, 2012c). The structure of the FEMA leadership is primarily lodged with the President of the United States from whom main orders for the mobilization of the organization resides (FEMA, 2012d). The FEMA is headed by an administrator, assisted by a deputy administrator and the chief of staff. Staff members would include the directors for the following offices: Executive Secretariat, and the Office of the National Advisory Council. The Chief Counsel would also form part of the administrative staff, including the senior advisor to the Secretary for Emergency Management and the Deputy Administrator of the office for Protection and National Preparedness (FEMA, 2012d). Under the Protection and National Preparedness office are the following assistant directors in specific areas: national preparedness, grant programs, national continuity programs, and the Office of National Capital Region Coordination. The Administrator for the US Fire Administration would also form an office under the FEMA administration (FEMA, 2012d). An associate administrator for the Mission Support Bureau is also part of the FEMA Administration. Under this office are the following officers: deputy association administrator, chief administrative officer, chief procurement officer, acting chief information officer, chief component human capital officer, and the chief security officer. Under the FEMA administration is the associate administrator for response and recovery, and the following officers come under this jurisdiction: deputy associate administrator; an assistant administrator for each of the following tasks: response, logistics, and recovery; director for the Office of Readiness and Assessment, and the director for the Office of Federal Disaster Coordination (FEMA, 2012d). An associate administrator for the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration would also be under the administration of FEMA. Other offices under the FEMA administration include that of the chief financial officer, Office of Equal Rights, Office of Internal Affairs, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor to the Administrator, Associate Administrator for Policy, Program Analysis, and International Affairs, Office of Regional Operations, Center for Faith-Based & Neighborhood Partnerships, and the Office of Disability Integration & Coordination. Within the specific regions (10 regions), the regional administrators are considered the primary officers for the FEMA (FEMA, 2012d). Specific issues related to the FEMA include: slow disaster response time and poor coordination of services among related agencies. Slow response time has been seen in terms of the delays in the deployment of personnel and of the resources and tools needed in order to efficiently manage the disaster (Burns, 2007). Such slow response time seems to have been considered contributory to the negative impact of the disasters on people and property. The poor coordination with the different agencies in disaster response is also poor, hence causing the delayed and the poor delivery of resources even when these agencies are equipped with the right tools to assist and are very much willing to lend assistance (Burns, 2007) Part 2 1. Slow response time The primary issue or problem in the performance of the FEMA is its slow response time. Since its establishment, the slow response time of the FEMA has been a primary issue in its management of disasters (Burns, 2007). During the 1992 Hurricane Andrew which affected Florida and Louisiana, the agency was significantly criticized for its slow response time. They were slow in housing and feeding the thousands of people who were affected by the hurricane. This same slow response was also identified as a major problem with the FEMA in previous disasters, specifically that of Hurricane Hugo in 1989 (Burns, 2007). The slow response of the FEMA was especially identified during Hurricane Katrina in August of 2005. Although the FEMA was pre-positioned in the Gulf Coast, most of its personnel were still unable to provide direct assistance; at most, their response was only to report on the situation along the Gulf Coast (McEntire, 2007). Only after three days were a large number of troops from the National Guard were dispatched to the affected region. By then, the impact of the disaster was already extensive and very much significant. Adding to the slow response time of the FEMA was the fact that the sheer number of evacuees and affected citizens was just too much for the available FEMA personnel to handle and manage (McEntire, 2007). Their situation was not made any easier by the flood waters which interfered with the transport of people and resources in and out of the affected areas. Such slow response time was also attributed to the poor communication and coordination of the different agencies involved in the disaster management which included the federal, state, and local personnel (McEntire, 2007). Their initial response was slow and they could not effectively manage and care for those who were trying to flee the affected areas. As a result, even more casualties were added in the aftermath of the actual hurricane. New Orleans, the city which was most affected by the disaster has long been considered one of the poor metropolitan areas in the US, registering one of the lowest median income in America (Burns and Thomas, 2007). A good number of these residents also do not have private transportation. No emergency evacuation was also set in place for the homeless, low-income, the elderly, and the disabled citizens (Burns and Thomas, 2007). Majority of these citizens were abandoned in the city. Buses were deployed to fetch stranded residents hours before the hurricane struck, however, many residents were still abandoned in their homes due to inadequate government resources (Burns and Thomas, 2007). Although food was prepositioned before the disaster, the resources were still not adequate to meet the needs of the people and after only 1 or 2 days, their food supply was severely depleted. When the disaster struck, any additional supplies were difficult to bring in to the relocation areas. The president was able to release 10 billion dollars for the relief of those affected by the hurricane; about 7000 troops were also deployed to assist in the relief of affected individuals (Reynolds, 2011). Police troops, firemen, and EMS organizations outside the affected areas were also prevented from rendering assistance because they were not allowed to enter affected areas (Reynolds, 2011). The FEMA also sent hundreds of firefighters who volunteered to help to a two-day training class on sexual harassment and on the history of the FEMA. Any assistance which was offered by outside agencies also had to undergo various procedures before they could enter the area (Reynolds, 2011). Majority of the local rescuers were severely burdened by the impact of the disaster and a good number of their EMS abandoned the city when turf wars between gangs broke out. The inflexibility of the FEMA in handling the other agencies and nationalities wanting to assist further delayed the help from getting through to the people (Reynolds, 2011). And yet, they were unable to actually respond to the needs of the people on the ground. The slow response to the Katrina disaster cannot be satisfactorily excused because it was hardly a surprise disaster. The hurricane was expected to hit the US days before the actual disaster, so the disaster teams should have had sufficient time to prepare what resources they would need and to deploy the necessary personnel to the critical at-risk areas (Walker, 2006). The local authorities were also disappointed with the slow response of the FEMA considering the fact that their agencies were also ready to respond if the FEMA had coordinated with them. FEMA was accused of slowing down the disaster relief and response. The head of the FEMA at that time, Michael Brown instructed the fire and emergency services not to respond to the counties and areas affected by the disaster without a formal request being deployed under the mutual aid agreements (Walker, 2006). Failure of coordination and the persistent application of bureaucratic practices slowed down the response time for the agency. FEMA also blocked the Astor Hotel’s plans to secure 10 buses in order to carry about 500 of their guests to higher ground (Griffin, 2007). The FEMA instead controlled the buses and instructed the guests to join the evacuees at the Ernest Morial Convention Center. In so many instances, the FEMA’s imposing orders made things worse for the victims and the rescuers. They turned away three Wal-Mart trailers loaded with water and even prevented the Coast Guard from delivering diesel fuel (Griffin, 2007). They also cut the Jefferson Parish emergency communication systems and this prompted the sheriff to restore it; the sheriff also posted armed guards to protect the lines from FEMA. The Wal-Mart truck was prevented from entering the possible high risk area before the hurricane hit and a caravan of trailers loaded with supplies was also deployed by Wal-Mart by September 1 (Griffin, 2007). About 50 civilian planes who were responding to pleas by hospitals and agencies were ready to enter the area after the hurricane hit, but the FEMA also prevented them from entering the affected regions. The FEMA indicated that these rescuers and aircraft operators were not authorized to enter the area (Griffin, 2007). As a result, as people were trapped in their homes, roofs, and in evacuation centers waiting for rescue and assistance, numerous planes and helicopters were sat idle. Instead of coordinating the relief and recovery, the FEMA wanted to control the relief efforts coming into the affected areas. The other agencies like the US Forest Service was standing by to put out fires in the riverfront, however, FEMA did not want to accept their assistance (Burns and Thomas, 2007). Amtrak was also read to offer their trains to move victims; their transport systems was actually more efficient than the buses, however FEMA was slow in its response and in the end refused their assistance. Offers of aid, equipment, medicine, and communication assistance was also offered from other agencies, both public and private, but these were continuously ignored by the agency (Burns and Thomas, 2007). The New York Times also indicated that there was about 91,000 tons of ice which were ordered by the FEMA to assist the hospitals and to assist in food storage. These tons of ice never made it to the affected areas. A private Methodist Hospital also sent emergency relief supplies to the flooded areas, but these supplies were confiscated by the FEMA (Burns and Thomas, 2007). Doctors who were also eager and very much willing to assist the sick and injured evacuees were not allowed to help the victims because the FEMA was concerned about legal issues (Burns and Thomas, 2007). These doctors were instead given mops to help in the cleaning while many patients around them were suffering. The slow response of the FEMA was very much apparent when the new agencies covering the disaster were able to retrieve information about the disaster which the FEMA was not. In fact, the FEMA was informed of the low food supply at the Astrodome through the news agencies. They were criticized for not securing food drops to the Astrodome even as it was one of the more applicable options for the FEMA at that point (Burns and Thomas, 2007). 2. Poor coordination Apparent in the discussion on slow response time is the fact that the FEMA does not communicate and coordinate well with other agencies, both in the private and public sector (Fagel, 2011). The coordination of agencies is a significant aspect of the disaster response process, and the FEMA has repeatedly failed in this aspect. During Hurricane Katrina, the FEMA did not secure personnel and resources within their regional offices. The ten regional offices function to secure assistance for various states in the planning of disasters, establishing of mitigation programs and securing the needs of the people during major disasters (Fagel, 2011). During Katrina, eight of the ten regional directors were in an acting capacity and four of the directors in the operational divisions were occupying acting capacity roles. This caused significant burdens on the staff which were already feeling the burdens of limited personnel (Fagel, 2011). The FEMA failed to coordinate with the private and other agencies in securing the efficient and speedy delivery of assistance. The bureaucratic processes which they were insistent on applying also prevented the delivery of assistance which was already available to the victims. Approaches 1. Increased and improved coordination with local and private agencies (FEMA, 2012a). These measures would include the reassessment of the policies of the FEMA on the assistance offered by local and other agencies. The bureaucratic processes which may hinder the delivery of assistance must be eliminated (FEMA, 2012a). Weaknesses of this approach would include the fact that policy amendments are difficult to implement; they would also require systemic and legislative changes to the FEMA and the DHS. 2. Increased participation of private agencies. Private agencies must be allowed to participate in the relief and recovery measures of the FEMA (Burns, 2007). Specifically for private institutions or businesses which are already within the affected areas, the FEMA needs to allow these institutions to coordinate with them and assist in the delivery of resources and needs (Burns, 2007). Weaknesses of this approach would mostly relate to the fact that the overlapping of services, as well as confusion in the delivery of services may be seen. Implementation Plan 1. Lobbying by local emergency disaster response teams for the federal government to implement changes in policies. Fayol emphasizes the relevance of unity of command and unity of direction in order to secure positive and favorable response from the entire agency or organization (Daft, 1983). Securing changes in policy would help realign the goals, resources, and activities of the FEMA unifying its command and direction towards common ends. 2. Meeting with the different private agencies in order to discuss the appropriate plans on the merging of services during disasters. The planning process is supported by Fayol and Taylor’s theories in relation to effective management with Fayol declaring the importance of management planning and coordination and Taylor also emphasizing best practices in order to ensure effective management (Head, 2005). 3. Increased training of personnel mostly on activities related to the coordination of services with other agencies and institutions. Such training is also supported by Fayol’s principle of management – discipline which highlights the importance of supporting the rules and securing the effective processes for work in order to manage organization activities (Daft, 1983). By ensuring discipline among the members of the organization, the goals of the activities would be met and the application of resources would be based on what is sufficiently applicable to the needs of the organization and its members. References Bullock, J. (2009). Introduction to homeland security: principles of all-hazards risk management. New York: Butterworth-Heinemann. Burns, L. (2007). Fema (Federal Emergency Management Agency): An organization in the crosshairs. California: Nova Publishers. Burns, P. & Thomas, M. The Failure of the Nonregime: How Katrina exposed New Orleans as a Regimeless City. Urban Affairs Review, vol. 41 (4): 517-527. Daft, R. (1983). Organization theory and design: The West series in management. New York: West Pub. Co. Fagel, M. (2011). Principles of emergency management: hazard specific issues and mitigation strategies. California: CRC Press. FEMA (2012a). The State of FEMA. Leaning forward: go big, go early, go fast, be smart. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/2012-state-fema FEMA. (2012b). About the agency. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/about Federal Emergency Management Agency (2012c). Agency reinvention activities. Retrieved from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/reports/Agency_Acts_FEMA.html FEMA (2012d). Organization structure. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/organization-structure Griffin, R. (2007). Fundamentals of management. California: Cengage Learning. Head, S. (2005). The new ruthless economy. Work and power in the digital age. Oxford: Oxford University Press Malcolm, C. (2012). Objectives of FEMA. Retrieved from http://www.ehow.com/info_8607864_objectives-fema.html McEntire, D. (2007). Disciplines, disasters, and emergency management: the convergence and divergence of concepts, issues and trends from the research literature. New York: Charles C Thomas Publisher. Reynolds, C. (2011). Hurricane Katrina then and now including preparations, effects, FEMA, reconstruction, media coverage, and more. New York: BiblioBazaar. Walker, D. (2006). Hurricane Katrina: Gao's preliminary observations regarding preparedness, response, and recovery. California: DIANE Publishing. Read More