The Imperative for Inter and Intra Agency Cooperation in Military and Civilian Organizations - Essay Example

The Imperative for Inter and Intra Agency Cooperation in Military and Civilian Organizations Introduction The impact of the problem with respect to inter and intra agency cooperation is best demonstrated in the tragedy that happened in the United States in September 11, 2001. The failure on the part of various governmental agencies to cooperate effectively, particularly with respect to sharing information has contributed immensely to the successful terrorist attack against American targets.1 Thereafter, the 9/11 terrorist attack has effectively launched a massive reform in the American bureaucracy with the aim of integrating its agencies further, providing incentives for cooperation. This narrative underscores the importance of cooperation for governments as it operate not just in the area of national security but also in the realization of its objectives and projects. This paper will investigate the concept of inter and intra agency cooperation and why it matters for states such as New Zealand. For this purpose, the paper is divided into two key areas: background, historical and conceptual discussion on the subject; and, the ideal framework of cooperation for organizations. These areas are further divided into several subsections, namely: organizational culture and cooperation; its development in the civilian and military organizations through the years; conceptual and theoretical underpinnings; and, the ideal cooperative framework. Background Governmental and organization systems must continually grapple with issues regarding cooperation because these contain massive bureaucracies that are composed of different agencies. According to Cerami and Engel (2010), the problems inevitably arise as these agencies pursue its own goals and objectives with its own allotment of resources.2 The authors, for instance, argued that, in general, autonomous agencies resist a whole organization approach to missions, explaining the outcomes in these terms: Individual agencies typically lack the ability to compel action, while interdepartmental authorities are often ambiguous. Institution-specific values prevail since a sense of interagency culture remains limited. Information sharing is not the norm. Communications predominantly follow vertical channels. Disorganized, nonexistent, or otherwise flawed strategies result from this conditions. 3 The above cited outcome essentially points to the efficiency variable, which has economic and administrative implications. It is part of the wider discourse on organizations and related themes such as organizational culture and organizational change. Cooperation in the Theory of Organization The agency theory covers the cooperative aspect in organizations. Here, the organization is viewed as a nexus of contracts between agents (the employees) and the principal (the firm).4 What this means is that the actors engage in activities dictated by contracts, which for their part determine the responsibilities, goals, roles and power of individuals and departments within the organization. For instance, there is the contract for a specific group of agents to perform human resources management or to oversee the information and communication activities of the firm. The idea is for all the contracts to lead to a specific goal or an ideal condition that lead to profit maximization in the case of commercial organizations. The problem arises, which Wickramasinghe and Alawattage (2007) called as “agency problem”, once the agents’ interests and behaviours are no longer consistent with the organization’s interests.5 These authors echo the work of Baiman (1990), which articulates how these come about. The argument is that acting cooperatively is supposed to be given and required in organizations but is often undermined by the inevitability of individuals wanting to make themselves or their departments better off, leading to deviations from cooperative behavior. He states that “the end result is that when cooperative behavior in not consistent with self-interested behavior… the group [or organization] suffers from a loss of efficiency and all individuals are potentially made worse off.”6 According to Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, the self-interest variable underpins the agency problem and this position assumes that the agents are primarily driven by self- interest and, therefore, cooperative behavior is usually opposed.7In order to address the challenge, hence, it is important to identify strategies that will control the agency problem. This will be discussed more later on. In order to put things in context to supplement the conceptual perspective, one could turn to the cases of inter and intra agency cooperation in military and civilian organizations. Civilian The imperative for cooperation in civilian organizations is supported by the principal-agent theory as interpreted by Halachmi and Boorsma (1998). Their model maintains that perfect market conditions are not possible, particularly with the sheer amount of externalities that modern organizations must face, leading to the position that the environment in which these organizations operate is imperfect.8 The model then posits that these organizations navigate this uncertainty and imperfection through institutional arrangements, leading to the so-called economics of cooperation.9 Institutional cooperation, hence, is seen as a vital variable in the organizational survival, or at least in the achievement of its objectives. According to Halachmi and Boorsma, organizations employ two critical strategies to achieve this: control or regulation as exercised by the bureaucratic administration; and, motivation, the incentives to influence and encourage cooperative behavior.10 This is best exemplified in the experiences of civilian governmental agencies. Take the case of the food safety initiatives of the US government as mandated by its food safety laws. The overall objective is to protect the public from health risk and it requires several governmental agencies to pursue, namely, the Food and Drug Administration, the Food Safety and Inspection Service and the Agricultural Marketing Service. The presence of these three agencies is problematic since they maintain different regulatory approaches as well as departmental missions and strategies. Without interagency cooperation, problems are bound to arise such as overlapping tasks and functions, conflicting regulations or standards and redundant measures and activities, among others. This is the same across all agencies in the bureaucracy. In New Zealand, this can also be demonstrated in the joint collaboration and coordination of government agencies on local and international levels to address crises such as calamities, national security and the government’s international commitments. An excellent case that could provide context to the New Zealand experience includes the Christchurch earthquake in 2011. The consensus is that, the post-earthquake response was sufficient and successful. This was indicated in an evaluation of the emergency and rebuilding measures by the Ministry of Civil Defense Emergency Management during its aftermath.11 It was found that agencies and organizations that performed well include those that were able to work seamlessly with others. The identified problems fell in this area as well, with the evaluation citing the problems with the flow of information, the tasking, provision and distribution of resources as well as the coordination between public and private sector efforts.12 The incident underscored that capable and well-trained staff is not the only critical variable to effectively deal with disasters and calamities. Rather, there is also an imperative for a systematic and focused response, which could only be achieved through interagency cooperation. Intraagency cooperation requires clear and specific disaster functional roles for staff and personnel in addition to a strong chain of command and authority whereas inter agency coordination calls for strong and preexisting partnerships that do away with overlapping functions, disorganization and bureaucratic constraints.13 The public-private sector partnership also highlights the argument for cooperative behavior. During the Christchurch earthquake, for instance, governmental agencies such as the police, the fire department and the civil defense found themselves working with the community and nonprofit organizations such as St. John’s Ambulance. Earlier, this paper cited the concept of “preexisting partnership” and this proved critical in this respect. Without it, there is the risk of muddling the operation with redundant responsibilities and functions in addition to differing organization culture and operational system on the part of public and private organizations. Indeed, the Civil Defense review found this type of problem when it cited the duplication of control between various governmental groups such as the agencies under Christchurch city and those under regional CDEM group.14 The waste in resources is a natural consequence of the absence of meaningful inter and intra agency cooperation. This does not only entail loss in revenue that could have been allotted for other governmental initiatives. Rather, it could also lead to policy failures. Furthermore, there is the unnecessary loss of life and property in instances of major disasters. Fortunately, these problems could be addressed by a culture of cooperation across agencies both in the public and private spheres. Military Modern military organizations identify cooperation as a salient component in achieving security, defense and military objectives in contemporary time. The developments and patterns of conflict and alliances has become more complex as states have to deal with transnational players such as terrorist groups and as well as rogue states. Warfare is also being waged across different fronts with the emergence of the so-called asymmetrical warfare, which involves combating several different conflicts at once such as those driven by ideology, philosophy, culture and survival as well as those involving guerilla warfare, terrorist combatants, insurgents and paramilitary elements.15 There are so many variables involved that policymaking and military actions require cooperative behaviors in order to be effective and successful. The experiences of the United States are again the best example to demonstrate this. Prior to 9/11, interagency cooperation in the US military is not its strongest suit. The agencies involved were mired in a culture that discouraged such behavior. Howard and Corum (2007) explained that, for years, military agencies were busy building their respective empires driven by managers and leaders more concerned of getting ahead themselves and advancing self- and special interests.16 There had been several episodes in the past that show the failures of this system. It was only the dramatic attack on the US that provided the critical leverage for the system to be reformed. The prevailing doctrine in the US today is one that is anchored on interagency cooperation. Particularly, there is emphasis on forging vital links between military instrument of power and the economic, political, diplomatic and informational entities of the government as well as non-governmental agencies.17 This is critical in the manner by which America projects itself militarily to the world. There is the recognition of combining all means and approaches as well as all types of power to coerce enemies or leverage rivals and adversaries. The US is also increasingly relying on coalition partners to advance its interests.18 These are the main drivers for the immediate pivot towards an inter/intra agency structure and culture of cooperation. The problem in pursuing this change intervention lies in changing the organizational culture. Egnell (2009) notes that the US institutional set-up and political culture promotes competition and distrust as well as an stovepipe administrative culture that breeds parochialism.19 As a result, the bureaucracy is incessantly plagued by interagency conflicts especially in the national security apparatus. The theories cited previously explain these phenomena effectively because the root of the problem is identified as extreme focus on bureaucratic self-interest and resource allocation rather than working together to hammer effective strategies.20 The challenge now is how to address these dilemmas. The US experience is the same elsewhere, especially in the cases with the same political and bureaucratic systems. For example, the doctrine being followed in New Zealand resembles its American counterpart in putting emphasis to the benefits of interagency cooperation. A white paper, for instance, stated that: Above all, goodwill and the desire to cooperate are essential at all levels. The increased interdependence of the Individual Services and their increasing mutual dependence on the military forces of allies and potential coalition partners has made cooperation between them of vital importance. 21 The New Zealand military doctrine also underlined the increase in the degree of possibility that its armed forces are called for and deployed as part of a multinational coalition force, underpinning the need for a culture of interagency cooperation. This is an important aspect to the New Zealand defense strategy. Failing to coordinate and collaborate in a international military campaign could jeopardize operations and put lives to risk. For example, New Zealand is part of the coalition force in Iraq. Its participation is both military and political in nature, necessitating a capacity for working within a multinational civilian and military structure under the leadership of another country. All in all, military organizations are focusing on inter/intra agency cooperation as a strategic component because of the changing landscape of modern warfare. The increase in players to conflicts as well as the imperative for coalition and partnership is additional dimension to the traditional benefit of efficiency. The Ideal Cooperative Framework When it comes to the issue of what framework works, one needs to go back to the basic aim of this strategy. That is to pool resources and capabilities in such a way that the individuals or agents as well as the agencies and institutions involved all work to achieve a purpose or the wider organizational objective(s). This could concern national security, defense and disaster response. Bonn and Baker (2000) painted what appears to be a desirable model when they stated: Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and capabilities to interagency operations. This diversity is a strength of the interagency process, providing a cross section of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, leaders must integrate many views, capabilities and options into a coherent course of action for success.22 The outcome of the above cooperative organization is expected to be positive, realizing goals and objectives of government systems, bureaucracies and organizations across all levels. On the other hand, there are risks and deviations that naturally occur amidst the differences in individual leaders and organizational cultures. It has been stated previously, that in many bureaucracies, self-interest often emerge to undermine cooperation in efforts to advance personal or organizational agenda or primacy. This is further aggravated by organizational cultures that encourage competition such as the case of the American bureaucratic culture. These problems could be addressed by change interventions designed to introduce new organizational culture because the problem is deeply rooted and cannot be eliminated by minor measures of control and administrative coercion. There is a need to reform how agents view cooperation and how agents view other agents as members of the same team. There are several strategies in the body of literature that show successful cooperative frameworks or approaches to achieving one. Bonn and Baker argues for a form of consistent and systematic cohesion, which is said to be achieved through its adoption as a standard and core value.23 This framework emphasizes the need for all stakeholders to recognize and understand the meaning and importance of collaboration and coordination, which is expected to achieve an atmosphere of cooperation. It also entails consistent and constant reinforcement to cooperation from the top to the bottom level of the organization. This model is comprehensive enough to address the challenge of changing the entire bureaucratic culture. Egnell’s model is aligned with this framework as he advocated for the establishment of a set of procedures, particularly for civilian agencies that will guide cooperative behavior between agents or agencies. More specific approaches to cooperation that fall within Bonn and Baker’s framework (particularly with respect to organizational change intervention) include Carafano and Weitz (2008) proposal for education and training. They maintain that educating military and civilian leaders on the importance of interagency cooperation and how to function in an interagency setting can provide opportunities to practice and perfect inter/intra agency cooperation because it is undertaken in a controlled environment.24 One can already see this in concrete initiatives adopted by agencies such as the US Department of Defense and State in the “whole of government approach” strategy wherein interagency coordination is either a component or a standalone subject in their respective internal training and education programs.25 There are also authors who advise against creating a new agency to oversee cooperative behavior between agencies because it is expected to add further layers to the bureaucracy (Howard and Corump. 239).26 As Wickramasinghe and Alawattage stressed, the most important thing in approaching the problem is to address non-cooperative behaviors among agencies and those agents that compose them by devising a contract or mechanisms that would effectively control the deviations to cooperative behaviour. Policymakers need an understanding of organizational culture and change to achieve this. Conclusion Inter and intra agency cooperation is not just a temporary phenomenon adopted to address a momentary problem or challenge. It is an inevitable component to running bureaucracies and organizations today if these are to become effective. This is highlighted in military and civilian organizations. Without it, agencies are prone to bickering and competition, which result in failures, flawed strategies and disorganization. In addition, it prevents them from taking advantage of opportunities that could only be obtained by working together. Today, intra and interagency cooperation is a prominent feature of the US defense and national security strategy. New Zealand could learn from the evolutionary narrative of this policy shift. There are useful models that the country could emulate particularly in the area of civil defense and disaster management. Finally, f many bureaucracies, the answer to the problem of cooperation is cultural change. Many organizations have deeply embedded culture and values that are resistant to this initiative that minor or superficial interventions will never work. Education, practice, reinforcements and incentives are just some of the components of effective models that could establish an atmosphere and culture of interagency cooperation or enhance an existing culture of cooperation. The body of literature has provided comprehensive theoretical and empirical evidences that show the benefits of interagency cooperation. The problem appears to persist because of the inevitability of self-interest in the administrative ranks. This is the reason why this paper argues for a framework that begins from top to bottom with respect to introducing cooperation/coordination as a new organizational value or a prominent characteristic that typify military and civilian organizational culture. Bibliography 1. Baiman, Stanley. "Agency research in managerial accounting: A Second Look." Journal of Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15(1990), 341-72. 2. Bonn, Keith and Baker, Anthony. Guide to Military Operations Other Than War: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Stability and Support Operations: Domestic and International. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. 3. Carafano, James and Weitz, Richard. Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008. 4. Cerami, Joseph and Engel, Jeffrey. Rethinking Leadership and "whole of Government" National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, and Prospects. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010. 5. Egnell, Robert. Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the Peace. London: Routledge, 2009. 6. Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C. "Separation of ownership and control." Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (1983), 301-25. 7. Gorman, M.J. and Krongard, A. "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the US Government: Institutionalizing the interagency process". Joint Forces Quarterly, 39 (2005), 51-58. 8. Halachmi, Ariel and Boorsma, Peter. Inter and Intra Government Arrangements for Productivity: An Agency Approach. Berlin: Springer, 1998. 9. Howard, Michael and Corum, James. Fighting the war on terror. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Imprint, 2007. 10. Kraft, Michael and Marks, Edward. U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What. Boca Raton, FLA: CRC Press, 2012. 11. McLean, Ian, Oughton, David, Ellis, Stuart, Wakelin, Basil and Rubin, Claire. Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake. New Zeland Civil Defense, 2012. 12. National Commission on Terrorist attacks. . The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton, 2004. 13. New Zealand Defense Force. Foundations of New Zealand military doctrine. Wellington: New Zealand Defense Force, 2008. 14. Uda, Robert. Principles of Asymmetrical Warfare: How to Beat Islamo-fascists at Their Own Game. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2007. 15. Veneema, Tener. Disaster Nursing and Emergency Preparedness: For Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Terrorism and Other Hazards. Berlin: Springer, 2007. 16. Wickramasinghe, Danture and Chandana, Alawattage. Management Accounting Change: Approaches and Perspectives. London: Routledge, 2007. Read More