Development Strategies of China after World War II - Essay Example

Development strategies of China after World War II Deng as one of the communist reformists was born on August 21, 1904, in a village called Baj, Fang, located in the far western province of Sichuan (Lin, and Cai, 11-12). His daughter Maomao describes the place as "poor and remote." The family home was simple, with wooden walls and a tile roof. Dengs family raised aggressive geese to act as house guards. Deng was better off than most in Chinas countryside. His father was a small landowner, who in his later years rented out his land and worked for the government. Deng always had enough to eat and a comfortable bed.34 Able to focus on his studies; he excelled. While living in the metropolis of Chongqing, Dengs father noticed a newspaper advertisement for a new school preparing Chinese students for study in France. The programs goal was to teach young Chinese new skills from the West to help the nation modernize. After graduating in 1920, Deng departed for France by steamer, arrived in Marseilles in a bowler hat and pointed shoes (Elvin, 14-18). He began over the next several years; Deng worked as a fireman on a locomotive, a kitchen hand, and other odd jobs. He also assembled waterproof overshoes in a rubber factory just the type of light assembly work Dengs reforms would later provide for millions of Chinese. He never earned enough, though, to return to school. One could hardly live on the wages, let alone go to school for study, Deng later recalled. Thus, all those dreams of saving the country from industrial development, learning some skills, and more came to nothing. Instead, his intellectual curiosity and patriotism drew him toward Communism. Deng began attending meetings organized by Chinese and French Communists (Gupta, 30-41). Several young Chinese living in France at that time would become senior leaders of the Chinese Communist movement. The most famous of them was Zhou Enlai, later a highly respected premier of Maos China (Anshan and April, 15-23; The Miracle, 152). Despite the creativity and support of cadres like Zhao and Hu, Dengs reform efforts were far from smooth. Deng at times pressed changes with great haste and daring while, at other moments, he slowed or even blocked change. "Sometimes he acted with a clear mind; at other times he appeared befuddled, driving both forward and backward in the huge cart of Chinas reform," wrote Ruan. Dengs apparent inconsistency was caused by the unstable nature of his reform coalition (Clark, 102). While Deng collected a wide range of support within the Communist Party for change, not everyone agreed on what form that change should take. Some feared Chinas opening to the world would allow corrupting influences to seep into society that could threaten Communist rule. Others thought Deng was ditching Communism altogether. As a Communist Deng, rejected large swaths of Maoist doctrine and turned China toward the international capitalist economy. The starting point for any explanation is Chinas pitiful condition in the late 1970s. Under Mao, Chinas planners, like those in the Soviet Union, favored the development of heavy industry but produced few benefits for the average citizen. Between 1952 and 1980, the gross output of industry and agriculture grew nine-fold but average individual income only doubled. As in the Soviet Union, consumer goods were always scarce (Weber pp. 10-21). There was a prevailing sense among Chinas leaders that the economy was in crisis, and unless something drastic was done to improve human welfare, the survival of the regime itself was at risk (The Miracle, 152). For Deng, reform was the only answer, the only sure way to preserve the existing Communist government. "We havent made improvements in time. Deng said in his Third Plenum speech. The countrys "socialist cause will be doomed if we dont make them now His thinking, in this regard, resembles Parks, Lees, and Chiangs unstable regime. Economic growth became his primary tool to fortify an unstable government. With Dengs support, the central government issued a document permitting the household system in January 1982 (The Miracle, 148). That was the watershed. Six months later, nearly three-fourths of the countrys rural production teams had implemented the household system Farm production soared. Deng and Wan Li had managed within a few years duration to dismantle Maos communes efficiently and improve the rural economy and the lives of the long-suffering peasants (Medeiros, Cliff, Crane, and Mulvenon, 180-190). The reforms in the countryside were spectacular in nature, but would only get China so far. To truly modernize his nation with any rapidity, Deng needed two crucial ingredients—money and technology. China had neither. In an odd way, therefore, Dengs China, with one billion people, faced a similar problem in Lee Kuan Yews Singapore with a mere two million. Dengs solution resembled Lees. He would turn to the global economy and tap into the knowledge and wealth of the West. In 1978 Deng said that China made contributions to the world down through the ages. At this time was time for China learned from the advanced countries. Learning from developed nations has made China tap other countries technology (The Miracle, 149). Deng advocated a greater opening to the outside world than a reclusive China had allowed in centuries. He blamed Maos xenophobia for keeping China mired in poverty. As China remained isolated, Deng believed, the country would never catch up to the industrialized countries. Deng lectured local party officials in September 1978. This conference made China development and sharing of technology at an advanced level even now the world believes China will be the largest economy in 2030 (Grivoyannis, 74-89). Global capital could finance Chua’s development and bring in new management know-how and technologies with which the country could construct more competitive, modern industries. Deng was influenced by the Tigers in regard to foreign investment. After his 1979 journey to Singapore, Deng told a party conference how foreign investment in the island nation brought high salaries to bankers and greater revenues for the government, and stimulated Singapores overall economy. This knowledge has helped Deng in the construction of China’s developmental strategies that would later be used to invite foreign investment to boost the economy of China. As from mid-1980s, Deng was starting to replicate Singapore’s strategy to invite foreigners to make investments in China to increase productivity and the GDP (Li, 7-25). To make his policy successful, Deng needed the United States, the worlds largest economy and the principal source of advanced technology. China could not thrive without access to the American market and money from U.S. firms. Following Nixons surprise Beijing-visit in 1972, and Deng normalized relations with the United States in January 1979. Later that month, Deng traveled to the United States as part of a major charm offensive to remake Chinas image with wary Americans still consumed in the Cold War (Palgrave Connect, 10-19). Deng caught Carter at the right moment. Some policymakers in Washington hoped economic ties between China and America could exacerbate a split between the Soviet Union and China and help the United States in its global struggle against Moscow. In early 1980, the United States granted China most-favored-nation status. This step was a crucial turning point. Without such preferred access to the giant U.S. consumer market, any attempt by China to attract foreign investment and develop a modern export sector would have been impossible. Dengs new friendship with the United States allowed China to adopt the export-led growth model that had worked so brilliantly for Japan and the Tigers (The Miracle, 149). As Zhao began experimenting with practices aimed at giving fearer autonomy to state enterprises in his province. In usual China Communist practice, enterprises did not have clearly defined independent accounts the revenues, and profits went to state, and the planners handed back funds for the operation. Zhao, in a series of steps, allowed enterprises to take full responsibility I over their finances. Instead of forwarding their profits to the government. The retained profits were used for investment and pay incentives, which linked the companys performance to employee compensation. The results were astounding. The enterprises allowed to enter the program saw massive increases in production and profits. The central government was simultaneously conducting its experiments with the reform of state companies. Various methods of management autonomy were being tested in thousands of state enterprises across the country. But Zhao and Deng ran into a wall — the central planners. Zhaos efforts undermined the entire idea of central planning. The reformers believed the country would be better off with less planning, which, they argued, ignored the needs of customers and the costs of manufacturing. It was also responsible for the oversupply or shortage of ice products, and therefore wasted scarce resources. Conclusion Small-scale Chinese private enterprises also began to flourish as Dengs reforms encouraged the Chinese to pursue their businesses. These private companies were far more competitive efficient than those run by the government and its central plan. Chinas state sector was getting left behind. The reformers slowly regained the upper hand until Deng rejected the Conservatives economic thinking altogether. The biggest breakthrough came in October 1984, in a document called the Decision on Reform of the Economic Structure. Enterprise managers were given unprecedented control over production, marketing and pricing of products, the use of retained profits, as well as the hiring and firing of staff. The document was a devastating blow for the central planners and a watershed for Deng. The reforms not only curtailed government interference in corporate management, but they also started unwinding the overbearing control of the plan. The Wall Street Journal said the document "is laced with enough free-market, supply-and-demand, anti-welfare, get-the-government-off-our-backs rhetoric to sound at times like an old Ronald Reagan campaign speech. Corporate China was being let free from the handcuffs of the government, to rise (or fall) on its own. It marked one of Dengs biggest steps yet toward a market economy. References Anshan Li, and April Funeka. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: The Politics of Human Resource Development. African Books Collective, 2013; pp. 15-100 Clark Woodrow. The Next Economics: Global Cases in Energy, Environment, and Climate Change. Springer Shop, 2012; pp. 102-137 Elvin Mark. The pattern of the Chinese Past. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973; pp. 14-18 Grivoyannis Elias. The New Chinese Economy: Dynamic Transitions into the Future. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; pp. 74-98. Gupta Amit. Strategic Stability in Asia. Ashgate Publishing. 2008; pp. 30-170 Li Mingjiang. Soft Power: Chinas Emerging Strategy in International Politics. Lexington Books, 2009; pp. 7-25 Lin Yifu, and Cai Li. China miracle: development strategy and economic reform. Shanghai: Sanlian and People’s Press, the Chinese edition, 1994; pp. 11-12 Medeiros Evan, Cliff Roger, Crane Keith, and Mulvenon James. A New Direction for Chinas Defense Industry. Rand Corporation, 2005; pp. 180-220 Palgrave Connect. Economic Integration in Asia: Towards the Delineation of a Sustainable Path. Palgrave Macmillan, Jun 13, 2014; 10-19. Weber Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958; pp. 10-21 Read More