Leninism, Keynesianism and Neo-Liberalism - Coursework Example

Leninism, Keynesianism and Neo-Liberalism Leninism, Keynesianism and Neo-Liberalism are economic determinist theories which help to explain the nature of economic relations and political practices typical for modern states. These theories underline that the reduction of the states role and its replacement with regulation by the market occupy the principal position on the economic agenda. Deterministic doctrines stem from events that have been perceived or conceived by competent persons and that can be projected into the past or the future. Ordinarily but with exceptions, the events of empirical doctrines are not or cannot be manipulated or controlled by human beings, those of experimental doctrines are or can be controlled or manipulated. Either type of doctrine is deterministic and either becomes a science when its retrojection or projection is so abstract that it is applicable to a wide range of perceived and conceived events. Leninism was the dominant ideology in the USSR. This theory was developed by Lenin and discussed in his work “What is to be Done” (1902). This theory is based on the Marxism perspectives and was embodied in the Soviet world view (Carew 1963). The determinist element of this theory is that Leninism as social and political theory seeks to explain the course of human history and the structure of past, present and future societies: it postulates a model of society and an explanation of the nature of social change. There are many interpretations of Leninism as a doctrine or theory of society. Lenin devised tactics for the Russian working class to achieve and maintain political power (Harding, 1977). Leninism, after Marxism, provides a second major ingredient of Soviet political ideology. It has three main elements: the theory of the party, the theory of revolution and the theory of imperialism (Carew 1963). According to Lenin, under Russian conditions in the early twentieth century, the Russian working class would not spontaneously develop into a revolutionary body. Many workers, not seeing their long-term interests, would concentrate on short-term trade-union economistic activity confined to marginal improvements in wages and conditions (Harding, 1977). Those convinced of the need for revolutionary action should be organised in a revolutionary party, with disciplined and dedicated leaders and members, to lead the working class. Originally, the main reasons for firm leadership and strict discipline and a limited party membership were the conditions in which the social-democrats had to operate in pre-revolutionary Russia. As political parties and tradeunions were illegal, open forms of workers organisation, as found in Western Europe, led to their penetration by the police and to subsequent downfall (Harding, 1977). Lenins form of party organisation, therefore, was specifically devised to promote the interests of the working class under autocratic conditions. Though central, control of day-to-day policy and strict discipline were important, democratic participation was also an ingredient in the partys organisational form (Lukačs 1972). All party members in theory were to have an equal voice over the general policy and the party leadership was to be elected and answerable to the party congress. Lenins justification for the hegemony of one party over the working class was based on Marxs sociological theory of class, or rather his own interpretation of it. The working class, being unified socially and having a homogeneous political interest in the abolition of the capitalists, needed a single united party devoted to the promotion of the revolution (Lukačs 1972). A politically fragmented working class organised in separate trade-unions and numerous socialist parties (often based on nationalist sentiment) could only weaken and might even thwart its revolutionary potential. Therefore, one party composed of workers from all trades and nationalities was essential, though membership, of course, had to be restricted to ardent Marxist revolutionaries. Lenin distinguished between the social composition of a party and its political goals. The fact that a party is composed of, and led by, workers does not ensure its Marxist nature. On the contrary: “The history of all countries shows that the working class, solely by its own forces, is able to work out merely trade-union consciousness i.e. the conviction of the need for combining in unions, for fighting against the employers and for trying to prevail upon the government to pass laws necessary for the workers and so on” (Lukačs 1972, p. 23). The theory of Leninism and revolutionary tactics developed by some of the revolutionary intelligentsia had to be transmitted to the workers. It was necessary that the awareness of the irreconcilable contradiction of their interests with the whole modern political and social system...be brought to them from the outside. This was the task of the revolutionary intelligentsia and, of course, revolutionary working men organised in a revolutionary party. Here Lenin was opposing the more orthodox social-democratic parties of western Europe, based on wide trade-union organisations. Lenin argued that such Balkanised movements would weaken the proletariat as a class; it would define its social interest in specific trade-union terms, be more concerned with short-term gains, which would be ephemeral, at the expense of workers power (Lukačs 1972). One group of workers (say the skilled) would be turned against another (the unskilled) and the capitalists having a divided enemy, would remain supreme. Lenin considered Marxism to be a doctrine which emphasised the historic role of the proletariat to build a socialist society; his own contribution was to devise, as it were, the organisational weapon (Meyer 1977). These deterministic doctrines are considered to be neutral in affect because their retrojections and projections as such are not inevitably approved or disapproved. Leninism stresses the revolutionary role of the proletariat and the revolutionary nature of social and political change. Lenin emphasizes the role of the intelligentsia bringing ideas to the proletariat and helping to create a revolutionary consciousness. This has led to the charge that the intelligentsia takes on a directing role over the proletariat. Whether Lenins theory of the party contradicts Marxs theory of class very much depends on the way one interprets the role of basis and superstructure in social change (Meyer 1977). Classical Marxists tend to stress the determinism of the former, whereas Lenin, by emphasising the role of ideas and organisation regarded Marxism as a more voluntaristic doctrine. When Lenin spoke of the unity of the working class, he referred to what the working class would be if it were imbued with Marxist philosophy and aware of its objective class position. He assumed that there was such a thing as an objective class consciousness, which only the party could properly articulate (Theen, 1974). Lenin fully realised that, in fact, the subjective feelings of the workers did not coincide with their objective class position and, as we have seen, led to non-Marxist political leanings which his form of organisation sought to combat (Mills, 1962). Lenin, probably sincerely, believed that the working class as a whole would, with time and education, readily accept party leadership. Lenin, however, left himself open to the criticism of self-interest. The centralisation of decision-making in the party and the absence of adequate democratic controls over the leadership, left effective power with the Central Committee of the party and particularly with the leader. In practice, the democratic elements of democratic-centralism were outweighed by the centralism: the Party Congress met only infrequently, and initiative, information and day-to-day activity were in the hands of the centre. Lenin, it is argued by his adversaries, was concerned with maximising his own personal power, therefore, he was ruthlessly revolutionary and centralist to suit his own desires (Meyer 1977). The determinist elements are those that subscribe to a doctrine that ascribes their own actions to perceived or conceived events over which they believe they have little or no control. The events themselves can be explained either in deterministic or in subjectivistic terms (Mills `1962). Another economic determinist theory under analysis is Keynesianism. Keynesianism involves the idea that government should intervene through manipulation of aggregate demand in order to reach "full employment" Keynesianism was never just an economic theory, it was also a form of social practice. The post-war state intervention in the economy did not come about because of Keynes book The General Theory. Rather, Keynes book became relevant for informing those practices of economic and social management required for sustaining capital accumulation in a world that had manifestly become socially unmanageable under the classical liberal doctrine (De Angelis 1997). To the extent that a Keynesian revolution occurred and became institutionalized practice in the worlds universities and think-tanks in the post-war era, it had to define a new problem around which a new economics could unfold - unemployment. It also had to define a means for the solution of the problem - growth - and a set of instruments through which growth could be managed and achieved monetary and, especially, fiscal policies (De Angelis 1997). It may also be true that, for the sake of the correct analytical classification of doctrines, we should add the adjective "bastard" in front of the noun "Keynesian" to characterize post war economic orthodoxy (Aglietta, 1979). The determinist elements are that this doctrine finds the causes of action outside principals. In contrast, perceived events are much less important, hence they tend to subscribe to a different doctrine that stresses intervention and that leads them to be convinced that they exercise control over their own actions and their response to events (Collier & Collier, 1991). The shift in the central problem of economic theory and policy and the active engagement of the government and the state apparatus in the managing of the economy legitimately entitle the new economic strategies to a revolutionary status. The ability of a social system to offer a stable relation between productivity and wages, a stable relation between work as human activity measured by productivity, and the income stream that goes to the performers of this activity, defines a priori the central pivot around which, in principle, anything is possible, even full employment policies. he recognition of unemployment as a problem by economic theory originated out of the failure of the downward movements of the business cycle to provide the traditional economic disciplinary device for both the employed and unemployed labor force (Collier & Collier, 1991). The reason for this resides of course in a variety of historical factors (Evans, 1995). The central one, however, seems to be the organizational and confrontational maturity of what was, following the Soviet revolution, Fordism and the Great Depression, a new kind of working class. Second, the social microfoundations of Keynesianism, that is, the basic institutional arrangement to keep control of the spread between productivity and wages, and thus maintain "discipline in the factory" originated out of a process of the institutionalization, especially during the Second World War, of workers organizations: the trade unions (Aglietta, 1979). There is evidence of Keynes concern about the growing militancy of the working class and the change in the condition of capitalist accumulation and regulation of the class relation, as well as the influence of this concern in shaping the evolution of his thinking up to the formulation of his most famous book The General Theory (1936) (Arestis, 1992). In terms of determinism, the state is in control, but the society has controlled its own behavior. Every instrument can only suggest that an externally oriented principal generally has a statistical tendency to accept some kind of inevitability doctrine originating outside himself, but that he also believes, as indicated by his other responses, that the doctrine does not always hold for him and hence on occasion he may also be internally oriented. For instance, on the occasion of the Treaty of Versailles Keynes stressed the need to consolidate central Europe as a strategic pole for the containment of the circulation of struggles emanating from the Soviet Revolution and against the shortsighted policy of revenge of the victorious nations (Evans, 1995). The imposition of heavy war reparations on the defeated Germany would have the "disastrous" effect of setting the historical course toward civil war: The inflationary process and its undermining of the capitalist system by an arbitrary redistribution of wealth - that is, in Marxian terms, an arbitrary and out of control change in the balance between surplus and necessary labor - was at the center of Keynes argument (Arestis, 1992). The acknowledgment of the stickiness of money wages in relation to prices was not new, what was certainly novel were the practical implications drawn from this observation. By acknowledging the new conditions of working-class power, Keynes reacted against the strategy attempting to cut money wages as "hopeless" and laid down new political hypotheses for dealing with the new level of working class power through the adjustment of the price level and exchange rate to the going wage rate, instead of the other way round. Keynes studied the possible effect of a reduction in money-wages on the level of employment. Keynes argument was based on the priority of the social, and his critique was informed by strategic considerations (Buchanan, 1991). Post-war Keynesianism as an economic strategy presupposed a "social deal" which allowed capital to regulate the class relation or, in other terms, the balance between surplus and necessary labour (Arestis, 1992). As requirements, these social microfoundations attempted to provide a framework within which the dynamics of class struggles and of social movements could be contained. However, this institutional framework was full of cracks which soon will lead to the failure of the strategy. In other words, since class conflict does not occur only within these institutional forms, but also against and beyond. Social conflict provokes a theoretical reaction in economics and a strategic reaction in policy. However, the forms, the objectives, the dynamics of social conflict are linked in turn to the ways people relate to each other in the places of production and of living in a certain historical context. This because the new class composition based on the "mass worker" allowed forms of struggles and patterns of insubordination of a new kind which then were dealt with within the institutional forms of the social foundation of Keynesianism until the struggles of the mid-1960s and 1970s made the co-optation of conflict within this institutional framework impossible. For instance, during the Great Depression, The process of union bureaucratization was complex and it involved a strategy of co-optation of workers grassroots organizations and recuperation of their demands. This is not the place to write such an history. However, for the present argument it is important to underline how the war allowed the process of bureaucratization to gain momentum (Evans, 1995). Thus, US diplomatic activity during the last years of the Second World War was informed by the need to promote international trade in accordance with the politics of growth and productivity. In a detailed and well documented study of American policy during the last two years of the war, historian Gabriel Kolko showed how the problems of the pre-war economy constituted the basis for American diplomatic policy abroad and defined its military and strategic objectives: The impact of the prewar world depression and the experience of the 1930s profoundly colored United States planning of its postwar peace aims ... [T]he United States did not simply wish to repair the prewar economy, but to reconstruct it anew” (Kolko 1968, p. 245-6). Keynesianism required an institutional arrangement able to guarantee a relationship between classes that was stable, predictable, and under control. So far as the analytical apparatus of post-war Keynesianism was concerned, this stability was a given, an assumption that reflected the post-war institutionalization of trade unions and the recuperation of social conflict into a mechanism of accumulation. The analytical apparatus of post-war Keynesianism interpreted this stability in terms of such concepts as time, equilibrium, expectations, and the fiscal multiplier. The analytical recognition of cracks in this assumption, which reflected cracks in the actual stability of class relations, came with the Phillips curve. Thus, the Keynesian economic orthodoxy revealed its dependence, as a theoretical/strategic option, on the flesh-and-blood conditions of social relations. The collapse of Keynesianism thus corresponded to the massive social turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s that shook every aspect of life and disrupted the stability and predictability of class relations. Sometimes, moreover, an inconsistent relation appears when a causal one of some kind might be intuitively anticipated (Evans, 1995). Neo-Liberalism is a political movements aimed to promote economic development and growth. The determinist elements of this theory are that when employing an empirical doctrine, uncertain concerning the reasons for conceived events in the past or concerning future outcomes, may possibly seek additional information, especially when one alternative appears to have been or to be more attractive. The imperatives of capitalist accumulation in the twentieth century were forcing core and peripheral countries alike to turn to corporatist modes of interest representation in order to deal with various social tensions generated by modern capitalist development. The main policies are free trade and privatization, deregulation and competitive exchange rates (Evans, 1995). Many of these economic changes have clearly been for the better, given the magnitude and pervasiveness of the fiscal crisis, demonstrating the fragility of the state and its incapacity to respond to social demands. The reduction of the role of the state does not relate only to a decrease in its direct participation in productive activities but also to a lack of state participation in the organization of the market. The importance of this is that there are few structures that mediate the power of economic resources in this kind of market, which threatens to undermine the very economic model whose implementation is being sought (Bartell & Payne 1995). The vivid examples of neo-liberalism include the Chilean regime under A. Pinochet, the US policies during R. Reagan presidency and the British policies provided by M. Thatcher. Paradoxically, the neoliberal model requires a state that is smaller and less interventionist at the same time that it needs a state capable of organizing markets in such a way as to combine what is lucrative from the point of view of the private sector with what is desirable from the point of view of society as a whole. A new type of state intervention could therefore help achieve a better distribution of costs and benefits from privatization policies. Moreover, the reorganization of markets and of the relations between the state and society presupposes an institutional transformation that can only be attempted by a strong (even if small) state. Yet this is what is most notably lacking in the kind of markets that are emerging in Latin America today. Hundreds of bits of data are needed to make a reasonably accurate economic forecast, and those bits are coherently assembled and evaluated by means of an empirical theory that weights and combines them (Bartell & Payne 1995). Leninism, Keynesianism and Neo-Liberalism are economic determinist theories which make similar empirical assumptions concerning events. Many projections are made from past trends into the future; for example, economists base their forecasts on trends but qualify them by specifying as exactly as possible the conditions they presume will continue to prevail. Scientists then subscribe to deterministic doctrines when they refer empirical facts to theories that assume conceived events. Within their disciplines they would reduce uncertainty by formulating probabilities in a mathematical sense that vary from almost complete certainty to much less certainty. Any scientific doctrine, consequently, is thought to be valid, hence to point to an inevitable consequence, only when specific circumstances are fulfilled. A physician appraises the effects of a drug: it is likely to produce certain effects, but it may not do so; it can be prescribed only to persons with specified characteristics. Bibliography 1. Aglietta, M. 1979, Theory of Capitalist Regulation, London: New Left Books. 2. Arestis, Ph. 1992, The Post-Keynesian Approach to Economics: An Alternative Analysis of Economic Theory and Policy, Aldershot: Edward Elgowe. 3. De Angelis, M. 1997, Class Struggle and Economics: The Case of Keynesianism, Research in Political Economy, 16: 3-53. 4. Bartell E., and L. Payne, eds. 1995, Business and Democracy in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 5. Buchanan P. G., 1991, State, Labor, Capital. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 6. Carew R. N. 1963, The Theory and Practice of Communism. London: Penguin. 7. Collier R. B., and D. Collier, 1991, Shaping the Political Arena. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 8. Evans P., 1995, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 9. Harding, N. 1977, Lenins Political Thought. Vol. 1. London: Macmillan. 10. Kolko, G. 1968, The Politics of War. The World and United States Foreign Policy, New York: Pantheon Books. 11. Lenin, V. I. 1961, What is to be Done?, in Collected Works, Vol. 5. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 12. Lukačs, G. 1972, Lenin. London: New Left Books. 13. Meyer, A. G. 1957, Leninism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 14. Mills, C. W. 1962, The Marxists. New York: Dell Publishing Co. 15. Theen, R. H. 1974, W. V. I. Lenin. London: Quartet Books. Read More