Caplan argues that while religious fundamentalism is possible--even expected and accepted--market fundamentalism is not: no one, he argues, is a true market fundamentalist. Yet, Caplan's preference--and that of all students of Public Choice--is mark - Article Example

Reflection Paper: Market over Government Caplan supports his argument, ‘while religious fundamentalism is possible, even expected and accepted, market fundamentalism is not: no one, he argues, is a true market fundamentalist’, with several premises which will be highlighted in this paper. These premises are particularly important because they will logically lead the reader to the conclusion on preferences of market over government, as is Caplan’s inclination.
He observes that there is no one true fundamentalist mainly because of the human nature of being egocentric. People, such as the politicians who are delegated in a democratic system, are motivated mainly by self-interest. Therefore the notion that the politicians can allow for a free style system of decision making should be perceived as just an illusion. Illusions endure because illusion is a need for almost all men, a need they feel no less strongly than their material needs (Caplan, 116). Once in policy, the politician will want to gain control over everything, to even suppress the subjects, as opposed to the expectations of a democratic system. However, could people liberate from voting for politicians who are not visionary, then could they have leaders who have their interests at heart.
When people vote under the influence of false beliefs that feel good, democracy persistently delivers bad policies (Caplan 2). The voters are not critical thinker and therefore rely on the opinions of the politicians. Voters are deeply ignorant about politics (Caplan 2). Religious fundamentalism is possible as it is the strategy use by politicians to manipulate voters. Politicians have a strong incentive to do what is popular, but little to competently deliver results (19). The voters go to the ballot blinded by the politician’s beliefs instead of their preferences. Consequently, they give the politicians the mandate to make policies which are otherwise not of significant influence towards development but motivated to pursue personal agenda. Caplan quotes Ronald Coase, “The employee of a corporation who buys something for $10 and sells it for $8 is not likely to do so for long. Someone who, in a family setting, does much the same thing may make his wife and children miserable throughout his life (1).” The masses have never thirsted after truth. They turn aside from evidence that is not to their taste, preferring to deify error, if error seduces them. Whoever can supply them with illusions is easily their master; whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim (Caplan, 19). This is where the so called politicians take the ultimate advantage over the voters. Breaking away from decision making based on dependent rids the one’s limits to rationality and therefore one is no longer easily misguided.
In conclusion, the two thought can be reconciled through acceptance of people’s own liberation in in the best way through critical thinking as it has been discussed in the paper. I see neither well-functioning democracies nor democracies high jacked by special interests. Instead, I see democracies that fall short because voters get the foolish policies they ask for. Adding one new ingredient to the rational choice stew gives it a starkly different flavor (Caplan, 22). By this new ingredient, he refers basically to critical thinking. He does a very good job in supporting his insights. It is an ideal proponent of any inclination and makes his believable.
Works Cited
Caplan, Bryan D. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Print. Read More