What Would a Clone Say by Gary Rosen - Term Paper Example

Critical Analysis of Gary Rosen's essay "What Would a Clone Say" The mixed technique of argument evaluation, in its present widely used form, familiar in the current informal logic texts - appears to have been originated by Monroe Beardsley in his textbook, Practical Logic. In this analysis, we use a "skeletal pattern" as well as a general technique that helps us to display the interconnected parts of an argument that lead up to its final conclusion. According to Beardsley (cited in Sarnoff 137), in some cases it is not too easy to see what the structure of an argument is, because the logical indicators are left out, for example, in the "semi-random ravings of white-hot orators, overwrought poets, and worried neurotics." However most arguments, Beardsley suggested, "fall somewhere between perfect order and chaos," and therefore can be helpfully organized by the techniques used (cited in Sarnoff 139). Essentially, the basic techniques in use today follow Beardsley's basic categories, notations, and methods fairly closely. However, there is one major exception. The current textbooks virtually all make a basic distinction between convergent and so-called linked arguments. In a linked argument, both (or all) premises are linked so that each is required in order to support the conclusion (Sarnoff 139). In a convergent argument, each line of evidence is separate from that of the other premises, so that neither (or no) premise is required to support the other (or another) premise in order for the conclusion to be derived. The convergent argument represents the concept of a new and independent line of reasoning, or "new knowledge," which is found to support a conclusion previously based on a different line of argument (Sarnoff 140). In the analyzed Gary Rosen's essay "What Would a Clone Say" the author skillfully used convergent type of arguing though we're able to find some fallacies there. The fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, also sometimes known as circular reasoning or arguing in a circle, is one of the standard, informal fallacies that have traditionally been included for treatment in the logic curriculum. This particular fallacy has a long history, going back to Aristotle's discussion of it as a "sophistical refutation," or deceptive tactic of contentious disputation used when two parties "reason together" (Walton 114). Due to the neglect of the study of the fallacies in favor of the study of formal logic in the modern period, however, no improvement on Aristotle's analysis of this important fallacy has been made, even in the twentieth century. In fact, in some ways we are worse off, because the Aristotelian context of the fallacy has survived into the modern texts in a garbled and incoherent form that makes the fallacy less comprehensible than it may have appeared to the Greeks" (Walton 111). According to the standard treatment, the basic fallacy is "assuming what is to be proved," but most texts recognize a subcategory of this same error called the fallacy of question-begging epithet (Walton 94). The standard treatment of the fallacy of begging the question can be found in its barest, quintessential form in the one page of text Copi (cited in Walton 93) devotes to this informal fallacy. Copi called the fallacy that of circular reasoning, or begging the question, and wrote that it occurs "[i]f one assumes as a premise for an argument the very conclusion it is intended to prove" (cited in Walton 94). As for Gary Rosen's essay "What Would a Clone Say" we're analyzing there are two types of examples of the fallacy given by this text. The first one is the author's attempt to characterize Ishiguro's protagonist in "Never Let Me Go": Case 1: Despite the novel's fantastic premise and Kathy's gruesome lot, she is unmistakably a person (paragraph 2). What may most surprise us about that first child is its ordinariness(paragraph 10). In this case, the idea that a clone is a common person appears in the begging and in the conclusion of the text. Thus, "one and the same proposition occurs both as premise and conclusion," although the two propositions are formulated in a different enough manner to try to obscure their identity (Sarnoff 88). This concept of the fallacy of begging the question (represented by case 1) is called the equivalence conception and said to obtain when the conclusion of an argument is tacitly or explicitly assumed as one of the premises - that is, where the conclusion is equivalent, or even identical to a premise (Sarnoff 115). The second case is an instance of what is called the dependency conception of circular argument, where some premise depends on the conclusion, in the sense that one needs to accept the conception as a prior requirement of accepting the premise (Sarnoff 47). As Copi notes this type of case characteristically involves a chain of arguments (cited in Walton 95). Such a circular argument clearly begs the question and is without value as proof: Case 2: What's upsetting about Kathy isn't her existence as a clone but rather the fate that has been assigned to her: to die young, used up for the medical benefit of others (paragraph 2). If she really existed, she might even be in Washington just now, raising her voice against the evils of therapeutic cloning (paragraph 10). We have the perfectly justifiable right to object that this argument tells us "nothing new"-it gives us, no real reason to accept the proposition that Kathy would rather raise her voice against the evils of therapeutic cloning to reproductive cloning. But isn't it possible for her to be against any kind of cloning for people in future will never suffer the way she was. The reason would seem to be that the point of such an offering the argument is to convince us or give us some evidence that could lead us to accept, or come to have grounds for accepting the proposition that Kathy would rather raise her voice against the evils of therapeutic cloning to reproductive cloning. But the whole point of the offering this kind of argument is that we must have taken up some stance to indicate that there is some possibility for us to doubt this proposition, or at least to seek out evidence or grounds that could be useful in removing such doubts. But the circular argument above is not useful for these doubt-removing purposes. There is some sense of proof in which it is useless or futile as a proof (Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning 77). A special type of question-begging argument, often described as a subcategory of the fallacy of begging the question in logic textbooks, has to do with the meaning of a key term or phrase (epithet) that occurs in the argument: Case 3: You know from the start that there's something creepy about Kathy H (paragraph 1). The alleged problem with this type of argument is that the premise, in defining or describing the heroine in question by using the negative term "creepy," begs the question by assuming that the protagonist (so described) is one that should give rise to sympathy, fear and anxiety. It is a typical case of begging the question, but the distinctive feature is that the question-begging is due to the meaning, definition, or use of a term or phrase. Hence the fallacy is really a kind of linguistic fallacy, turning on the use of "loaded" terms in argumentation (Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning 79). A brief sampling of some current textbooks will convey the conventional wisdom on question-begging epithets as a species of fallacy. According to Engel (cited in Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning 80) the fallacy of question-begging epithets is the error of using slanted language (epithets) "that reaffirms what we wish to prove but have not yet proved." Since, according to Engel, "to beg the question is to assume the point in dispute," the fallacy of question-begging epithets is to use a word or phrase to beg a question - that is, to suggest that "a point at issue has already been settled when in fact it is still in question." According to Damer (cited in Sarnoff 34), the fallacy of question-begging expression "consists in discussing an issue by means of terms that imply a position on the very question at issue." The fault, according to Damer (28), is that the listener is "begged" to infer a particular conclusion instead of being offered evidence to accept that conclusion. This account of the fallacy seems to equate question-begging expression or epithet with lack of adequate evidence being offered for a proposition. For what is wrong, according to Damer, is that the use of a particular term implies a particular position on an issue without giving any good evidence to support that position. The failure is the lack of good evidence offered by the arguer to support his position (Sarnoff 30). One of the strongest influences in determining the nature of present-day treatments of the fallacy of question-begging epithets appears to have been Jeremy Bentham's section on question-begging appellatives in his Book of Fallacies (Part IV, chapter one). Bentham advocated a very broad definition of the fallacy of begging the question, applying it to the use of emotionally loaded terms that can be used to support one's own side of argument or to undermine one's opponent's side (Walton 22). He called such terms question-begging appellatives, in a way that is very similar to the usage of recent logic textbooks as outlined above. According to Bentham (cited in Walton 27), the fallacy of petitio principii (begging the question) occurs when "[i]n answer to a given question, the party who employs the fallacy contents himself by simply affirming the point in debate" (cited in Walton 29). This seems an appropriate definition to the extent that it ties the fallacy to the point to be made (conclusion to be established) in a disputation. Case 4: Embryonic stem cells can develop into almost any of the body's specialized cells, a capacity that gives them enormous therapeutic potential (as yet unrealized) for the treatment of diseases like Alzheimer's and diabetes. They might also make it possible to cultivate new tissue for failing organs. Researchers fear, however, that the immune systems of would-be patients will reject stem cells whose DNA is foreign to them. How to solve the problem By drawing stem cells from embryonic clones of the patients themselves (paragraph 5). The fallacy in this case is the assumption that to solve the problem the only way would be to draw stem cells from embryonic clones of the patients themselves. Is there really no other possibilities Here is one more case: Case 5: A bill now before Congress would allow federally financed stem-cell research on embryos that would otherwise be thrown out by fertility clinics. Abortion foes hope to head off the legislation with their own proposals encouraging alternate sources of stem cells. But all of this is just a warm-up. The issue hovering in the background is cloning, what scientists call somatic cell nuclear transfer (S.C.N.T.) (paragraph 4). It's incomprehensible first of all what are the reasons to claim the last fact. Moreover using the phrase "But all of this is just a warm-up" puts to our minds an idea that it will in any case bring to the results the author describes. Speaking about the first opening paragraph of the essay we should say that it's simply a short exposition of the Kazuo Ishiguro's "Never Let Me Go," while the second paragraph represents the premises that are using other words stated again in the conclusion. Analyzing the essay there is an impression that Gary Rosen tries to express his opinion against cloning for research or therapeutic cloning but he doesn't mention it in his conclusion while stating it in the premises. While each new paragraph gives new arguments against therapeutic cloning: Case 6: What's upsetting about Kathy isn't her existence as a clone but rather the fate that has been assigned to her: to die young, used up for the medical benefit of others (paragraph 3). But all of this is just a warm-up. For researchers in the field, as well as for the various interests that lobby on their behalf - universities, patient groups, the biotech industry - the real prize is public support for work not just on "spare" embryos but also on cloned ones (paragraph 4). How to solve the problem By drawing stem cells from embryonic clones of the patients themselves (paragraph 5). The language of the scientists and their supporters is clinical, meliorative and humane, but it gives off an unmistakable whiff of cannibalism (paragraph 7). There is, by contrast, nothing accidental or contingent about creating nascent human life with the declared aim of destroying it. It is the deliberate use of one (developing) person as the instrument of another (paragraph 8). There is no conclusion based on this premises, thus, perfect arguments of the author are not supported with a corresponding conclusion. Works Cited Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996. Sarnoff, Tamar. "Argumentation in Psychology." Argumentation and Advocacy 40.2 (2003): 136. Walton, Douglas N. Begging the Question: Circular Reasoning as a Tactic of Argumentation. 1st ed. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. Read More