The Modus Operandi and Present Impact of Solntsevskaya Bratva Organised Crime Group - Case Study Example

The modus operandi and present impact of Solntsevskaya Bratva organised crime group Name Institution Course Code Instructor Date Executive Summary The character and diversity of the crimes that have prevailed in Russia, have appeared unlimited to human trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering and stolen automobiles. Unfortunately, the spill-over effects of the crime into parts of Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe, have become a concern to the rest of the world. The Solntsevskaya Bratva is, currently, the largest in Russia. This report presents information on Solntsevskaya Bratva’s steady transformation. It further explores its national and transnational modus operandi. Lastly, it presents a critical analysis of the group’s current day impacts on Russia’s social, political, and economic development. The Solntsevskaya Bratva organisation deals in arms trading, drugs smuggling, kidnappings, and prostitution, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and money laundering. It has several divisions or semi-autonomous, brigades that function using the name Solntsevskaya. In comparison to other Russian criminal groups, the Solntsevskaya operates under a criminal culture dubbed the vory v zakone culture, which denotes professional crime syndicate that specialised in crime as trade. The group's command and control is decentralised, and operate globally through the varied small cells. To a considerable extent, the Solntsevskaya has contributed to business development. The Solntsevskaya has also led to destabilisation of economies. The group has also been recognised for providing employment. The group has also made significant interference to the Russian economy in 2013. Solntsevskaya has also had long-term implications, including significant damage to the society by facilitating the growth of corruption and promoting public mistrust in government officials Table of Contents Executive Summary 2 Table of Contents 3 1.0 Introduction 4 2.0 Background of Solntsevskaya Bratva 5 3.0 Solntsevskaya Bratva’s modus operandi 6 4.0 Impacts of Solntsevskaya 9 5.0 Conclusion 13 References 13 1.0 Introduction The world is continually becoming a target of global crime threat from organised criminal groups that continue to grow several decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Criminal activities have, consequently, filtered through the Russian borders. The character and diversity of the crimes that have prevailed in Russia, have appeared unlimited to human trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering and stolen automobiles. Unfortunately, the spill-over effects of the crime into parts of Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe, have become a concern to the rest of Europe and parts of Asia, including Israel. The volatility and interconnectedness characterizing the Russian criminal groups also characterise the business environment in Russia, hence making Western investors cautious of investing in Russia (Galeotti 2012). Of the more than 1000 different factions of the Russian criminal groups, the Solntsevskaya Bratva is the largest in Russia, with nearly 300 000 within the country and all other countries, like Israel, Indonesia, and Japan, where it operates (TSQ Magazine 2013). This report seeks to present information on Solntsevskaya Bratva’s steady transformation. It further explores its national and transnational modus operandi. Lastly, it presents a critical analysis of the group’s current day impacts on Russia’s social, political, and economic development. 2.0 Background of Solntsevskaya Bratva Considered to be among the wealthiest organised criminal gangs globally by Fortune magazine, Solntsevskaya Bratva is estimated to have revenue of $8.5 billion (AboutTheMafia 2014). Started during the mid-1980s in Solntsevo, Moscow by Sergei Mikhailov, Solntsevskaya Bratva has through the years established itself as the most authoritative criminal group in the whole of Russia, which operates arms trading, drugs smuggling, kidnappings, and prostitution. The gang’s clout is estimated to extend beyond the Russian borders to as far as Latin America and Indonesia, where it runs cocaine trafficking networks jointly with the Mexican cartels. It is structured as semi-autonomous cells and has a central leadership council that makes major decisions (GorillaConvict 2015). Figure 1: Regions where the Russian organised criminal gangs operates (Burton & Burges 2007) With close to 4,000 members, Solntsevskaya Bratva is among the largest and most impactful criminal gangs. It is well-resourced with military weaponry and has connections with many international companies, such as Hungary’s weapons manufacturer ‘Army Co-op’ (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1992). Sergei Mikhailov is recognised as the group’s founder in 1984, after finishing his jail term for insurance fraud and partnering with Victor Averin, who was also a former inmate (Varese 2011). The two later collaborated with Sergei Timofeev, who then led a Chechen gang called Orekhosvkaya group (Volkov 2002). 3.0 Solntsevskaya Bratva’s modus operandi The Solntsevskaya Bratva is touted to be a violent, ostentatious, and politically active Russian organised criminal group, as it is knowledgeable in business practices and supply of advanced technology (Bagley 2001). According to a past FBI report, the Solntsevskaya Bratva is the most dominant and well-resourced ‘Eurasian’ crime group, with significant wealth and financial control (Bugajski 2004). The group is estimated to have more than 300,000 members, although the precise figure remains unknown to current open source information. The countries it operates in include Central America, as well as the Caribbean, including Cuba, Mexico, and Latin America. Globally, it operates across the Russian federation, Balkans, Western and Eastern Europe, China, United States, Indonesia, Israel, Japan and China (Varese 2011). Different from the famous Italian traditional family-oriented organised crime groups or mafias, the Russian Mafia syndicates function differently and have different organisational structures. The Solntsevskaya Bratva, for instance, has several divisions or semi-autonomous, brigades that function using the name Solntsevskaya (Varese 2011). In comparison to other Russian criminal groups, the Solntsevskaya operates under a criminal culture dubbed the vory v zakone culture, which denotes professional crime syndicate that specialised in crime as trade (Porter 2015). Different from the Italian Mafia, the Russian Mafia tends to represent a virtual joint venture between criminals and government officials. The corrupt influence of the group is believed to extend to the highest echelons levels of the government of Russia. There have also been assertions that the group, like all other Russian Mafias, is representative of an attitude instead of just an organization. The attitude is believed to have been adopted in the years of Communist Party rule, and is anchored in the principle, that some government officials hold to date, that when ‘something does not becomes nailed down, or brought within their power, they deserve a right to treat it as personal property (Boylan 1999). The group is headed by Vor V Zakone, who is responsible for helping others due to his contacts nationally, including local and national government, as in the business industries. Below Vor V Zakone consist of deputies of varied units, including banking consultants, drug smuggling strategists and security teams, heads of racketeering, accountants and bankers, and extortionists. The group also have soldiers, who mainly work on the ground, such as pimps, smugglers, bodyguards, and hit men, all who operate separate accounts (Siegel and Van de Bunt 2012). The group's membership is based on formal and informal membership. It also has informal support networks in many areas it operates. The group's command and control is decentralised, and operate globally through the varied small cells. The Solntsevskaya Bratva’s structure is similar to the structures of organised criminal groups, as identified by the UN’s Office of Drugs and Crime, which identifies structures of organised criminal groups, as indicated below. Figure 2: A typical organisational structure for Solntsevskaya Bratva (UNODC 2002) As indicated in Figure 2, the clustered hierarchy is consistent with that of the Solntsevskaya, as the group maintains several divergent crews that function under the banner of Solntsevskaya (Varese 2011). The group also operates a supreme council made up of 12 individuals, who also oversee the individual crews. The group has substantial financial resources. The group boasts of free access to revenues it generates through legitimate businesses, as well as illegal activities. During the 1990s, it is believed that the group was in control of over 120 businesses, although they have expanded to day. Figure 3: Evolution of mafias in Russia (Economist 1999) Additionally, the Solntsevskaya maintains a strict ethical code, whose structure seeks to limit contact with other bodies, which could potentially result in identifying of the whole network (FAS 2014). The ethical code is reflected in the Russian mafia’s thieves’ code underneath: The group’s criminal activities vary from extortion money in some districts for protecting of commercial kiosks, prostitution, consumer service enterprises, public catering, money laundering, racketeering, fraud and drug trade. In its key strongholds like Moscow, it engages in retailing illicit drugs, supply, and sale of oil and gas in addition to prostitution and extortion. All the brigades are required to organise individual protection scams or rackets, while all groups are intended to be left to take responsibility for their specific businesses, although for profit generation (McCarthy 2011). 4.0 Impacts of Solntsevskaya To a considerable extent, the Solntsevskaya has contributed to business development. In some instances, Solntsevskaya entered into legal businesses, which were observed by the FBI in 1992, after Mogilevich, who is the gang leader, altered his modus operandi, and started investing internationally through a company registered in Budapest, Hungary called YBM Magnex. Despite this, the company eventually collapsed in 1998 in Canada, following reports by the media that it was engaging in illegal business, including laundering some $150 million for the gang (Liddick 2004). Additional international businesses included an investment of 90%, representing 701 million forints, in Army Co-op (FBI 1992). According to the FBI records, Mogilevich also had control over natural gas companies that were in conflict during the Ukraine and Russia conflicts of 2011. The Solntsevskaya has also led to destabilisation of economies. The criminal activities have enabled the group to accumulated sufficient capital that allows them to infiltrate and destabilize the countries in which they operate (Krane 1999). For instance, Mogilevich is highly recognised for capitalising his illegitimate profits for purposes of influencing governments where the gang operates and control their economies (Bjelopera 2010: 34). A case in point is when the Army Co-op takes the initiative of arming a company that was created in Hungary at the time the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapsing, a period that facilitated organised criminal activities merely because the countries were in the process of recovering from economic and political instability, which also provided suitable environments for growth of criminal groups (Porter 2015). In addition, the group’s leaders like Mogilevich have shown the extent of the influence they have on countries they operate in, including when Mogilevich bribed a Russian judge to discharge sentenced criminals from prisons, including his partner Yapondick Ivonchok (Finckenauer & Voronin 2001). Past estimates suggest that Solntsevskaya had laundered up to US$100 Billion by 1994, and more than US$300 Billion by 1999. These indicate just how profitable the group is and how much it has been accumulating since the 1980s (Idea House 2001). Wiki leaks revelations of 2010 further showed that Mogilevich was the real cog behind the existence of RUE, a Ukrainian-Swiss registered gas supply firm that leads in supplying gas from Central Asia. The Solntsevskaya has also been recognised for providing employment. It continues to provide work for legitimate employ workers, who operate the group’s legitimate businesses, which have been noted to be transparent and legal, such as the energy firm RUE. In 2004, the British detectives attempted to investigate certain accounts conceived to have been owned by Mogilevich and The Bank of New York’s London, but the investigations proved futile, leading to a conclusion that monitoring organised crime was difficult because the groups are assisted by legitimate entrepreneurs. In which case, criminals hid behind lawful businesses (Block et al 2004: 154). The group also made significant interference to the Russian economy in 2013. In the study undertaken by the Russian Ministry of Interior, it was established that up to 23 percent of the law enforcement agencies perceived the criminal groups as significantly interfering with the economy. Figure 4: factors for expansion of organisation crime in Russia (Acontrario 2013) Another report by the World Economic Forum indicated that the degree of harm to business that organised crime caused was greatest in Russia (Sukhareno 2013). For instance, it makes Russia less attractive to foreign investors. It also threatens political reform and economic liberalization, as it corrupts and co-opts government institutions and commercial enterprises (Milov et al 2011). Figure 5: Rise in corruption in Russia due to organised crime (Milov et al 2011). This includes creating an environment, which negatively influences business transactions, such as bribing government officials to set up business, leading to increased cost of consumer goods, housing, and social services like health care. This leads to capital flight, which the Russian Government estimates to amount to nearly $1 billion each month (FAS n.d.). Solntsevskaya has also had long-term implications, including significant damage to the society by facilitating the growth of corruption and promoting public mistrust in government officials. Additionally, it has undervalued democracy in Russia by distorting the moral perceptions regarding what should be moral or immoral (Beken 2004). The Solntsevskaya also significantly affects the Russian society, as it is a major contributor to human trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering. Consequently, several people have fallen victims to the augmented crime rate in Russia, due to loss of lives, drug addiction, and smuggling (United Nations Office on Organised Crime 2014). 5.0 Conclusion It is established that different from the famous Italian traditional family-oriented organised crime groups or mafias, the Russian mafia syndicates function differently and have different organisational structures. The Solntsevskaya Bratva has several divisions or semi-autonomous, brigades that function using the name Solntsevskaya. In comparison to other Russian criminal groups, the Solntsevskaya operates under a criminal culture dubbed the vory v zakone culture, which denotes professional crime syndicate that specialised in crime as trade. The group's command and control is decentralised, and operate globally through the varied small cells. It deals in arms trading, drugs smuggling, kidnappings, and prostitution, human trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering. To a considerable extent, the Solntsevskaya has contributed to business development. The Solntsevskaya has also led to destabilisation of economies. The group has also been recognised for providing employment. The group also made significant interference to the Russian economy in 2013. Solntsevskaya has also had long-term implications, including significant damage to the society by facilitating the growth of corruption and promoting public mistrust in government officials. 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