Covert Surveillance and Informer Handling in the United Kingdom - Coursework Example

Covert Surveillance and Informer Handling [Name] [Professor Name] [Course] [Date] Introduction In the United Kingdom, covert surveillance and informer handling activities are authorized under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000. The act has undergone several changes since it was first enacted in 2000. Within the constitutional context, these changes have had various implications to the employees and the employers. This paper evidences the relating of legislative change to a relevant range and depth of professional practice within an institutional context. The major problems are identified in the area of work. A survey of literature is further done to find solutions to the problems identified. Basically, surveillance refers to all acts of observing, tracking, monitoring or listening to an individual's conversations, movements or any other activity or communication and recording them in any material form (Liberty 2010; Baker & Gunter 2005). In the UK, it is an offence to undertake covert surveillance and informer handling unless authorized under section 1 of the RIPA 2000 (Liberty 2010). In most situations, authorities use covert surveillance technologies such as CCTV or through the deployment of informers. Informers are individuals who provide information in a covert manner to authorities about certain individuals of interest for some kind of incentive. The authorities use the information to investigate the depicted individuals over involvement in certain alleged criminal activities. During this process, the investigators assume that the individual can access the information that is of interest based on his relationship with the individual who is the subject of that information. The process by which the authority trains, interact and control the informers and the information they supply is called informer handling. Some observers have illustrated that informer handling goes hand in hand with covert surveillance. Covert surveillance techniques refer to a set of processes that can be applied to ensure a close observation of an individual or a group of individuals secretively. In both cases where the technologies or informers are used, of particular interest is the covert information or intelligence. Covert information is the secretive nuggets of information pursued over an individual of interest by the informer through persistent surveillance of the subject individual, places or objects (Justice 2011). This paper discusses the various implications of covert surveillance and informer handling practices at Keep Britain Tidy (formerly ENCAMS) from a reflective perspective. Legislative changes Regulation and Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) was enacted in the year 2000 with the primary objective of making provisions for the interception of information, information acquisition and disclosure. Other reasons included undertaking surveillance, informer handling and application of intelligence sources. The Act also aims to provide a tribunal in relation to these issues. The decision to ratify the legislation came after The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that UK's surveillance laws were imprecise on prevention of abuses by organizations with regard to interception of electronic communication, specifically of employees (Abbas 2011). Generally, RIPA 2000 governs the use of covert techniques both by organizations and the government. It also provides that when authorities (such as the government departments, organizations or the police) need to use covert surveillance and informer handling to acquire information about an individual, then they have to conduct in a manner that is proportionate, necessary and attuned to human rights (The Guardian 19 Jan 2009). RIPA 2000 codes apply to such action as intercepting communication content of emails, letters or phone calls, conducting covert surveillance in private or public places and use of informers. However, RIPA 2000 has from the outset been constantly criticized for lacking a complete structure for covert surveillance and informer handling at workplace (The Guardian 2009). To cover for these shortcomings, the Act is substantiated by statutory instruments including Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Revised Code of Practice, which is pursuant to Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000) (Home Office 2010). Given the effects of globalization due to technological advancements in the past once decade, legislative changes have been made to make the Act more effective (Waldeck, Seibold & Flanagin 2004). Among the changes to the RIPA 2000 include providing more restrictions to the local authorities limiting them from conducting covert surveillance and informer handling. The changes became effective on 1 November 2012 requiring local authorities or organizations to seek judicial approval before deploying covert techniques (The Guardian 2009). Additional changes included limiting authorization of surveillance by local authorities under RIPA 2000. In essence, authorization would only be given on condition that an order is granted by a justice of peace in England and Wales, a district judge in Northern Ireland and sheriff Scotland. Further, local authorities or organizations using directed surveillance under RIPA 2000 would only be required to do so for investigations of crimes that can attract up to 6 months custodial sentence except for offence that relate to sale of tobacco and alcohol to minors. Criticism of RIPA 2000 legislative reform from institutional context The RIPA 2000 is viewed generally as less motivated to prevent intrusion of privacy by authorities. According to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 section 28(3)(b), in case of a need to prevent or detect a form of crime or disorder, then the local authorities are obligated to authorize covert surveillance (and only when it meets the conditions specified in article 7A (3) (a) of the 2010 order. The conditions include the necessity that direct surveillance should be punishable by law. Additionally, under the new changes, directed surveillance aimed at detecting antisocial behavior is no permitted by the law. This is unless the antisocial behavior can be said to be a criminal offence. However, Section 21 to 25 of the RIPA Act 2000 still authorizes a variety of people such as the police, government department and other government agencies to access communication date such as emails, phone calls.’ Stanton and Stam (2003), the researchers described information on employees as a vital organizational resource capable of being captured using technology. Wollinger and Ullrich (2011) noted that the legislative changes on covert surveillance have only served to violate the principles of privacy while strengthening the authority of institutional actors such as the police. For instance the legislative changes on RIPA that became effective on 1 November 2012 have still failed to set out the regulations on the manner in which the information content gathered from covert surveillance operations should be used, what should be accessed and individuals who should solely have access to the information gathered. From my reflective perspective, the legislative reforms should consider inclusion of restrictions on these areas. This is because organizations can abuse the practices and use the information gathered for the purpose of discriminating against employees who may have been identified as whistleblowers. An indirect implication is that the abuse will have significant effect on the workers’ professional practice. Indeed, retaliation or discriminating against employees isolated through covert surveillance and informer handling may make the employees to operate in fear. The employees may also see the company as antagonizing against them. The effect is that it will affect their productivity or promote sudden employee turnovers. The case scenario below illustrates the implication of legislative changes to the institutional context of Keep Britain Tidy (formerly ENCAMS). Case Analysis of professional practice at Keep Britain Tidy On critical analysis of my professional experience at Keep Britain Tidy, the legislative changes have been a cause for alarm as they have contributed to some major problems facing its operation. The company has instrumentally deployed covert surveillance and informer handling to investigate employees suspected of engaging in fraud, pilferage and sexual harassment. Among the methods in use include deploying informers to spy on suspected employees, screening of emails, using CCTV to monitor the suspected employees and internet monitoring (Lasprogata, King & Pillay 2004; Monahan 2011). From a reflective perspective, I have observed situations where covert surveillance and informer handling affected the professional performance of the employees in one way or the other. A general consensus is that the employees have expressed mistrust towards the company (Abbas 2011). The question of mistrust has made some employees to view the company as an adversary rather than a partner. For instance, screening of emails, SMS and phone calls has led to breakdown of communication between employees or departments. Several employees have expressed disappointment at the decision and complained that they have been reluctant to send messages viewed to be sensitive in nature via the platforms. This has delayed communication as well as crippled informed decision making processes. Indeed, several researchers such as Schmitz (2005) have argued that email surveillance violates informational and interactional privacy. From the perspective of the company’s senior management, the email surveillance practice is encouraged by the need to protect the assets of the company from pilferage, the image of the company from corrupt tendencies and the need to monitor workers at their situation of work to increase productivity (Cripps 2004). Miller and Weckert (2000) argue that employers have generally stuck to the practices of intercepting employee communications as they view themselves as being responsible for the conduct of employees at the place of work. Covert surveillance practices that are increasingly in use at the company include monitoring the internet using technologies such as deep packet inspection (DPI) to track internet activities of the employees. The technology enables the organization to spy on individual employee internet activities (Fuchs 2012). Although this technology has contributed to promoting productivity of the workforce by ensuring that employees visit only sites that can contribute to their output, it has had major shortcoming on employee morale (Lasprogata, King & Pillay 2004). Part of the workers involved in creative sections and who spend a large part of the day researching on the internet have expressed disgust at the practice. An issue of concern is that their research capacities have been reduced as they can only visit limited sites. In addition, they have also complained of reduction in innovativeness. Most importantly, they have expressed that they have been de-motivated by the employer as their freedoms have been infringed on. The overall impact is that the quality of research has incrementally become low even as the company has not been able to keep up with the innovativeness of the industry. At a recent trade fair, customers complained that the company had failed to meet their customer expectations as it was less innovative. Another covert surveillance technique used comprises use of undercover operatives. In some cases where employees have been strongly suspected of engaging in theft, fraud or sexual harassment, undercover operatives have been deployed to pursue information from suspect individuals. In most cases, employees who have close associations with the suspect have been used with the hope for promotions or other monetary incentives. Although this has worked in some instances, a recent case saw one employee who was suspected of being an informer being treated as a traitor she had been alleged to have betrayed a fellow worker who had been suspended for using company vehicle for personal gains (Schmitz 2005). Impacts of legislative changes on covert surveillance at workplace The legislative changes on covert surveillance and informer handling (as specified by RIPA 2000) have tremendously affected professional practice at the organization (Wakefield 2013). A major concern among the workforce is that the changes have failed to protect them from employers who infringe on their privacy rights. Instead, the changes have focused on edifying the employees and the general public about the roles of those who should authorize any form of covert surveillance and informer handling. Even though the organization’s management has actively been involved in defending the surveillance practices arguing that it has the potential to increase productivity, this has not been in the case in practical world (Walsh 2010). For instance, employees have become increasingly de-motivated. In addition, fluctuating outputs and revenue collection have been observed in the company’s annual financial report. The company’s annual financial report has showed. However, positive implications have also been noted on the part of the company as the company has reported reduced cases of pilferage, sexual harassment and fraud (Jitendra & Crampton 1998). The senior management has also reiterated that the employees have become more accountable, morally upright and responsible at workplace. Indeed, this is consistent with the suggestions of the general moral theory of policing (Wakefield 2013). In conclusion, the case analysis shows that covert surveillance and informer handling can indeed be intrusive as there is potential for abuse by the organization (Jitendra & Crampton 1998). Martin and Freeman (2003) opined that covert surveillance practices by the employees can cause unnecessary pressures and stress on the employees. This has a direct effect on their morale. Among the possible scenarios include fear of losing employment, social isolation at workplace, general feeling of mistrust among employees, sycophancy, lack of active involvement at workplace and heavy workload to please authorities (Keep Britain Tidy 2003). Related Theories Mujitaba (2004) pointed out that it is important that privacy problems arising from covert surveillance and informer handling with institutional context be examined using a range of theories. Basically, these theories emphasize the need for the employers to investigate the impact of surveillance and informer handling on the employees, and therefore emphasize on looking at ethical perspectives (Henry & Pierce 2000). Important areas of study include whether workers really have a right to privacy and whether companies can actually intrude on privacy of its workforce for a justifiable reasons (Bassick, McNamara & Sullivan 2007). Survey of literature suggests a number of theoretical perspectives that conceptualize how change has affected professional practice at workplace and how the practices are consistent with the practice. Indeed, the effect of covert surveillance and informer handling on professional practices within the context of an institution is related to various theoretical perspectives. Among the dominant perspectives include those of Allen et al 2007, Armstrong (1999), McCahill (2002) and Wilson and Sutton (2003). In their studies of informer handler, security personnel and close-circuit television (CCTV), it was noted that indeed covert surveillance techniques have a significant effect on professional practices at workplace. One of the related theories is the Communication privacy theory. According to the Communication privacy (CPM) theory hypothesizes that individuals will often tend to regulate the contradictory tensions within their environments since they naturally want to have some degree of privacy (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). Five suppositions are applied to describe the nature of CPM theory. The first supposition presupposes the private discoveries that show aspects on individuals that are an unknown publicly. According to this theory, despite any legislative changes made, individuals will always desire some level of privacy. This is consistent with the effects of legislative changes on RIPA 2000 to the professional practice at my workplace (Keep Britain Tidy 2003). Even though major changes were made, which the UK government hoped would promote privacy; this was not the case at the institutional (Gov.uk 2013). The second supposition suggests a critical boundary dividing individual privacy on shared information. According to the theory, individuals will often decide on the amount of information to reveal or hide depending on the conditions they face at the institutional level (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007).. The third supposition suggests that individuals will often feel vulnerable and violated against when their capacity to control of their information is taken away. According to this theory, invading employee privacy through surveillance can damage an individual employee’s personal identity, social identity, image, esteem or self-actualization (Stanton & Stam, 2003). The fourth supposition hypothesizes that when individuals divulge information to the authorities, the information is shared to enable others to become the co-owners of the information. The triggers the creation of privacy rules that specify individuals who should control who benefits from the divulged information (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). On the whole, the four suppositions discussed are largely consistent with the impacts of legislative changes on RIPA 2000 within the institutional context. It can be argued that CPM theory undergoes an extensive application at the workplace. Petronia (2004) suggest that CPM theory is a practical model applicable in the workplace scenario with the view of solving privacy issues. However, from the perspective of the employers, it is particularly important for examining the manner in which employees can react to various covert surveillance techniques such as CCTV and email screening (Keep Britain Tidy 2003). Allen et al (2007) demonstrates that privacy related issues from an individual employee’s perspective contrasts the agency theory as it explains whether decisions should be made to install and covert surveillance and informer handling techniques at workplace. Also the Integrative social contract theories are other relevant theories. Integrative social contract theories attempt to verify the ethical principles that integrate different industry established standards and organizational cultures (Ahmed 2007). Like the CPM theory, this theory also relevant ethical perspectives within the institutional context. It ensures this by categorizing values that are culturally specific or those that are similar. Examples of relevant forms of Integrative social contract theory include John Rawls’ distributive economic justice theory (Ahmed 2007). According to John Rawls’ distributive economic justice theory, ethical acts are such acts that have the potential to lead to equitable distribution of resources, including information. The theory hypothesizes that employers have often infringed on employee privacy information due to the ignorance of the employees. This perspective is applicable in the highly globalised world where advances in technologies have allowed companies to conduct covert surveillance as well as track the activities of the employees due to the employees’ ignorance (Ahmed 2007). This theory negates arguments for justification of covert surveillance by my company that such practices do not harm people, rather, are meant to protect the assets and image of the company (Ahmed 2007). Indeed, ethical perspectives of moral theory have also negated such arguments. Towards this end, it can further be argued that just the idea that covert surveillance does not harm people does not imply that it is not unethical (Keep Britain Tidy 2003). Proposes Action Plan There is a need to reduce the underlying tensions existing when there is a need by institutional actors (such as the police or the organizational management) to obtain private information and the potential risk of invading risks. First, organizations should do an explorative search of theoretical models resulting from empirical studies to understand the overall impacts of the covert surveillance and informer handling techniques to be used. A predominant theory widely conceptualized to be effective is the CPM theory. Indeed, such actions as engaging employees in a reciprocal exchange can be used. This process allows a situation Mumby (2005) refer as “boundary openness” and boundary closure.” Under this situation, employees can either hide (boundary closure) or disclose (boundary openness) information. This depends on the anticipated utility of such information shared and benefits or drawbacks of sharing information (Mumby 2005). When it comes to covert surveillance techniques such as website surveillance, institutions can adopt a more moderate surveillance that considers the needs of the institution as well as that of the employees (Jitendra & Crampton 1998). The result is that employees will feel that the company respects their privacy and personnel needs even if some level of monitoring remains a policy of the organization. Holmes (2003) observes that such criterion can establish a level degree of trust that may not hamper with the professional practice of the employees. The organization can as well encourage an environment where employees are encouraged to take part in the design and implementation of the surveillance system (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). This is especially so to reduce tensions that come up where an organization must obtain certain information on an individual to mitigate certain risks yet there is a possibility of invading an individual’s privacy rights (Stanton & Stam 2003). Analysis Authorization of institutional actors like the police and the court of justice have promoted development of analytical structures that attempt to elucidate the political- or legislative-motivated objectives for deploying covert surveillance and informer handling techniques at the institutional level (Fussey 2007). It should therefore be observed that the impacts of these practices are varied. More so, they depend on the purpose to which there are used, the setting where they are implement and the population whom they are subjected too. According to Topey (2007), the type of covert surveillance and informer handling technique used on a particular population depends on the expected risk and value. For instance, the decision to use covert surveillance techniques such as email screening or hidden cameras at the institutional context has triggered innate tensions at the workplace. Such tensions include the need by the organization to obtain certain information on an individual to mitigate certain risks and that of invading an individual’s privacy rights (Stanton & Stam 2003). Further, it is conceivable that legislative reforms on RIPA 2000 have not had a substantial effect at the institutional level on the part of the employees. Even though the changes have been meant to instill some level of privacy on the part of the subject individual, some ambiguities and loopholes have made it impossible to do so. Despite the changes that took effect in November 2012, studies indicate that legislations in UK still fail to specify the limits under which intercepted communication content can be used. Other failures include the limits for monitoring the communication content. From a reflective perspective, employees have faced a problem claiming their privacy rights at my workplace. For instance, this is since the courts have often seemed to endorse the view that employees should expect employees’ “reasonable expectation of privacy” is limited in scenarios where they used company-administered emails. This is because most organizations have indicated that in addition to such email systems remaining an institutional property, they should be used for the benefit of the company (Whitty 2004). Towards this end, it is conceivable that just because a practice is legal does not automatically imply that it is ethical (Sewell & Barker 2006). Counting on the “reasonable expectation of privacy”, institutional actors such as the employees have often felt that they reserve some level of privacy. This is because there is always a need to communicate. This view is supported by “supposition one” of the CPM theory (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). Indeed, from the above discussion, it is clear that theoretical models have sought to argue against any need for directed surveillance within the context of an organization (Clarke 2005). This has further implied need for further empirical studies on practices within an organization or institution which are afterwards compared to the subsisting concepts in order to establish their correlation. In case a relationship cannot be established, then the issue has often revolved around modifying the studies to account for the variation. Charmaz (2006) suggests that this can indeed serve to advance knowledge. In some cases however, it might limit advancement of intellectual benefits especially if criminologists or theorist show content with the modifications they make to the existing models (Charmaz 2006). Overall, there is a need for future researches on the subject of covert surveillance and informer handling. Proposals for Future Studies There is a need for future studies to be conducted with regard to the impact of legislative changes on covert surveillance and informer handling to an institution’s policies. Studies should also be conducted to establish how legislative changes on covert surveillance and informer handling conform to rapid technological advancements. Empirical studies whether covert surveillance technologies such as email surveillance and CCTV reduce criminal activities at the institutional level should be conducted. Conclusion Legislative changes to RIPA 2000 limiting the authorization of covert surveillance and informer handling that took effect on November 1, 2012 have had various implications on professional practice in specific institutional contexts. This is since even with the legislative reforms, the changes have failed to specify the limitations under which the authorities should monitor the communication content of electronic forms of communication such as emails and SMS text messages. Currently, emails and SMS are among the most used communication platforms at the institutional level. Existence of such loopholes has therefore indicated that the legislative changes have failed to keep up with the rapid technological advancements. Indeed, covert surveillance and informer handling techniques within the context of an institution can cause preventable pressures and stress on the employees. This has a direct effect on their morale. Among the possible scenarios include fear of losing employment, social isolation at workplace, general feeling of mistrust among employees, sycophancy, lack of active involvement at workplace and heavy workload to please authorities. Among the covert surveillance and informer handling techniques used at the institutional level include deploying informers to spy on suspected employees, screening of emails, using CCTV to monitor the suspected employees and internet monitoring. Most importantly, even though covert surveillance and informer handling could be argued to have been effective in managing institutional crimes, they have been seen to infringe on individual employee privacy rights. This has had negative impact on the loyalty of the workers. For instance, it has encouraged some level of mistrust between the institution and the employees. The question of mistrust has made some employees to view the company as an adversary rather than a partner. It should further be observed that privacy problems that arise from covert surveillance and informer handling with institutional context need to be examined using a range of theories. Among the theories that relate to this context include integrative social contract theories, CPM theory and moral theory. Basically, these theories emphasize the need for the employers to investigate the impact of surveillance and informer handling on the employees. Emphasis on looking at the ethical implications is also suggested. With this regard, whether the legislative reforms on RIPA 2000 limit covert surveillance at workplace or not, institutions that adopt such techniques should consider using some codes of practice. In the UK, the Employment Practices Data Protection Code is intended to guide employers on how to comply with RIPA Act 2000 (Home Office 2010). References Abbas, R, Katina, M, Michaela M & Aloudat, A 2011, ‘Emerging forms of covert surveillance using GPSenabled devices,’ Journal of Cases on Information Technology, Vol. 13 No. 2, 19-33 Adele, C 2005, Situational Analysis: Grounded Theory after the Postmodern Turn. 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