Covert Surveillance and Informer Handling - Coursework Example

Covert Surveillance and Informer Handling [Name] [Professor Name] [Course] [Date] Introduction Harfield (2012) describes informers as persons who supply information about other individuals to authorities in a covert manner often for some form of reward. The information supplied has the potential of leading to intelligence or enable the concerned authorities to embark on regulatory enforcement or investigation. In particular, the informer has access to the pursued information by virtue of his association with the individual subject of the information. In this case, the police and the informer engage in a covert relationship which misleads the subject individual on whom the information is passed to. Covert information on the other hand is described as a clandestine or secretive intelligence operation where an individual pursues continual observation of individuals, objects or places with the objective of obtaining information on certain activities that are then recorded in material forms (Justice 2011). In the UK, the use of covert surveillance and informer handling fall under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000. Before the Act was enacted, the processes were not subject to ample safeguards. However, since RIPA 2000 has generally been criticized for its inability to provide a complete structure for covert surveillance and informer handling, the Act is supplemented by a set of codes of practice and statutory instruments such as Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Revised Code of Practice (Pursuant to Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000) (Home Office 2010). Indeed, technology advancements have meant that legislative changes have to be made to make them more efficient (Waldeck, Seibold & Flanagin 2004). Recent changes in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 have imposed severe restrictions to local authorities that limit them from directing surveillance under the Act. The changes were given legislative forces through the amendments to RIPA through the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. In my professional practice however, the Act is still predominantly viewed as promoting intrusion of privacy. Indeed, section 28(3)(b) of RIPA Act 2000 provides that whenever there is a need to prevent or detect crime or disorder, then the local authorities can still authorize the covert surveillance. The amendment of the Regulation Investigatory Power in the Act, which stipulates the procedure for surveillance and covert intelligence, has limited the number of officers within the public authority who can authorize covert surveillance and informer handling under RIPA 2000 Section 28(3). Additionally, the authorizing officers can only approve directed surveillance when it is for the purpose of detecting a criminal offence as well as when it meets the conditions stipulated in article 7A (3) (a) of the 2010 order. The conditions comprise the offences under direct surveillance should be punishable by the law. However, under the new changes, directed surveillance with the objective of detecting antisocial behavior is no longer permissible by the law, unless the behavior can be termed as a criminal offence. This also means that directed surveillance for cases of sexual harassment still apply. Section 21 to 25 of the RIPA Act 2000 however gives authority to a wide range of people who can access the communications data, such as emails or phone logs, for the purpose of directed surveillance. The people include the police, councils, government departments and agencies. Case Scenario at Redbus Interhouse My organization has often used surveillance in investigating certain individuals for fraud or antisocial behavior. The typical methods include using CCTV to track employee activities, screening emails, internet monitoring, taking photographs of individuals using hidden cameras and email surveillance (Lasprogata, King & Pillay 2004; Monahan 2011). Within the last six months, the conducts have succeeded in having a gyrating effect on the performance of employees. A section of the employees have had to quit employment terming the process of being monitored as unfair. The most predominant activity has included email surveillance, which has been seen as violating interactional and informational privacy (Schmitz 2005). In one incidence, employees complained over the issue during a meeting with the upper-level management. The employers however claimed that they were motivated to screen the emails with the purpose of protecting the assets of the company as well as to ensure improved productivity (Cripps 2004). Further, the upper-level management claimed that this was necessary since they are responsible for the conduct of the workers. Such action has given the employers the freedom to intercept the employees’ emails at will (Miller & Weckert 2000). Another critical conduct by the employers includes monitoring the internet use by the employees. The practice has increased significantly at the organization (Lasprogata, King & Pillay 2004). This issue has extensively affected the performance of employees, particularly those involved in research activities. Most employees in the research and development department that I have come into contact with have claimed that they have been reluctant to access some critical sites thus slowing their quality of research. At the company, the organization may sometimes block some sites, monitor the internet search history, track the dialogue box and in some instances, take a snapshot of what employees view on the internet. The company has also been involved in collecting personal employee information using tracking devices such as radio frequency identification tags (RFID) or an active badge. For instance, during breaks from work, the management has often attempted to closely monitor what we do at breaks on claims that they are concerned about the productivity of the employees. In some instances, some smartcards were installed into the phones of a section of the employees’ in the sales and distribution department to know their locations. In extreme cases where some employees at my workplace have been suspected of fraud, corruption or antisocial behavior, undercover operatives have been used to gather information on such employees. More specifically, employees with some knowledge on the suspected employees’ routine life have been used. Recently at my organization, a 25-year old workmate had blabbed away about his medical coverage. After she fled a worker’s compensation claim for certain abdominal and backbone complications, some “operatives” were asked to gather information on her private life from his co-workers. Unfortunately, she had told some coworkers of a recent abortion. The company therefore insisted that the complications resulted from the abortion rather than ergonomic standards. The change in legislations on covert surveillance and informer handling in UK has indeed made significant impacts on our professional practice at workplace. An existing consensus among the employees is that the changes have failed to protect their privacy rights (Schmitz 2005). Rather, they have concentrated on specifying the roles and limiting those who can be entrusted with authorizing covert surveillance and informer handling at the institutional level (Wakefield 2013; Walsh 2010). With regard to productivity, it is evident that the legislative changes have to some considerable impact increased the productivity of the employees at the organization. For instance, even though employee monitoring through surveillance and informers has been widely criticized for infringing the privacy of the employees, it has made some positive impacts. For instance, the quarterly financial analysis report by the organization has showed increased productivity. Additionally, the supervisors have claimed that monitoring internet search has enabled them to make sure that employees do not duplicate searches when searching for information on products. Additionally, cases of fraud and pilferage have been significantly reduced (Jitendra & Crampton 1998). The practice has also imposed some level of accountability on the part of the workers. For instance, the use of CCTV and telephone calls monitoring has been effective in reducing the rate of crime at the organization. Data from my company’s human resource department has indicated a decline in the rate of sexual harassment cases (Wakefield 2013). This related to general moral theory of policing. Critics of computer monitoring have protested on the issue of privacy. From the above case scenarios it can be established that monitoring of employees at my organization is intrusive as there is a potential for abuse. For instance, technological advancements have made it possible to spy on the employees and to use the gathered information against the employees (Jitendra & Crampton 1998). However, the legislative changes in RIPA have failed to set out the regulations on how the gathered information should be used, what should be accessed and who should have access to the information. From my point of view, it is critical that the legislative reforms accommodate these areas as organizations can use the information to retaliate against or discriminate employees identified as whistleblowers. The consequence is that this may have a significant effect on an employees’ professional performance. In most cases, harassing such employees may make them to operate in fear, affect their quality of output or even lead them into quitting the organization. For instance, the creation of “electronic shops” has promoted unnecessary pressure and stress on the employees and stressful working conditions. Among the conditions include social isolation, lack of involvement or active participation in jobs, fear of losing job, heavy workload or sycophancy (Martin & Freeman 2003). Theoretical Perspectives Several theoretical models of surveillance have attempted to contend with directed surveillance at the institutional level. This has implied establishing empirical data on practices within the institution which are thereafter compared to the existing concepts to determine a correlation between them. If there is no correlation, then matter remains on how the theory should be modified to account for the difference. This can be effective in advancing knowledge although it might as well lead to limited intellectual benefits particularly if theorists are content with the modifications they make to the already established concepts (Clarke 2005; Charmaz 2006). It is however clear that the impact of covert surveillance and informer handling on professional practices at institutional level has led to emergence and reference to a range of theories. This has been due to several researches on surveillance in consistency with the rapid technological change. Some of the landmark concepts on the evolution of technology in surveillance were Wilson and Sutton (2003), McCahill (2002) and Armstrong (1999), who were criminologists who studied close-circuit television (CCTV), informer handling and security personnel installed at public places. Permitting institutional actors such as the police promoted the development of analytical frameworks that attempt to explain the legislative or politically motivated intentions for the implementation of surveillance tools such as CCTV (Fussey 2007). From this perspective, researchers observed that the impact and experiences of covert surveillance and informer handling are different based on the purpose, the setting and the population. Towards this end, it was argued that a range of surveillance systems are sorted for specific populations are based on the expected risk and value (Torpey 2007). The use of electronic surveillance at the institutional level has raised a deep-seated tension between the need by an employer to acquire the information to reduce uncertainties over an individual’s privacy (Stanton & Stam 2003). A primary concern within the underlying tension is related to the privacy boundary turbulence and privacy boundary ownership. At my organization, employees are encouraged to participate in the designing and implementing of the surveillance system. However, despite this, the employee privacy may still be eroded (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). Communication privacy management (CPM) theory suggests that since individuals or groups will naturally want some level of privacy, they will always tend to regulate the contradicting tensions. Five key suppositions define the nature of CPM theory. Supposition 1 describes the private discoveries that reveal the aspects of self that are not publicly known. Regardless of the legislations, individuals will always feel they reserve the right to control their personal information even when at work. Indeed this supposition reflects on the impact of the changes in the RIPA 2000, which made little impact on motivating the employees despite the amendments to promote individual privacies (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). Supposition 2 on the other hand suggests an integral boundary that divides individual privacy and shared information. Consequently, individuals will always decide what information to reveal or hide based on the conditions negotiated within the institutional context. Supposition 3 suggests that individuals feel susceptible and violated when some level of control of their information is taken away from them. Consequently, invasions of privacy through surveillance can injure an individual’s personal identity, image, social identity or self actualization (Stanton & Stam, 2003). Supposition 4 postulates that when individuals disclose information, the information is shared so that others become co-owners of the information. This leads to the formulation of privacy rules, which set out who should control who benefits from the disclosure (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). The above suppositions largely correspond with the situation of legislative change and its impact within the workplace context. At my organization, my fellow employees have been advocated for individual management of their personal information as well as to seek the linkages, permeability and ownership of confidential information (Petrionio 2002; Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). Indeed, CPM theory has been extensively applied to the study of workplace surveillance. In a study by Stanton and Stam (2003), the researchers classified information on employees as a vital organizational resource capable of being captured using technology. According to Petronia (2004), CPM theory is a practical model that can be applied in the workplace with the objective of solving privacy issues at work. From the employer’s point of view, it is specifically essential for exploring how the employees can react to electronic surveillance. The theory also describes the privacy-related issues from the perspective of an individual worker, in contrast to the agency theory in explaining decisions to install surveillance and informer handling at workplace (Allen, Walker, Coopman & Hart 2007). It is critical that privacy issues arising from surveillance and monitoring at workplace be dealt with using some theories that underscore ethical perspectives (Mujitaba 2004; Henry & Pierce 2000). Critical areas include whether employees have a right to privacy and whether employers can intrude on employee privacy for some justifiable course (Bassick, McNamara & Sullivan 2007). There are several other theories that can be applied to explain privacy issues in relation to the institutional surveillance. Integrative social contract theory offers a relevant ethical perspective within this context by distinguishing values that are culturally specific or those that are similar (hypernorms). Integrative social contract theories attempt to verify the ethical principles that assimilate different organizational cultures and established industrial standards. An example of integrative social contract theory is John Rawls’ distributive economic justice theory. The theory defines ethical acts as those activities that lead to equitable distribution of resources. The theory further illustrates a scenario that prevents individuals from knowing their privacy rights due to ignorance. Indeed this perspective attempts to explain the modern-day industry where technological advancements have enabled employers, such as at my workplace, to monitor and track employee activity basing on the ignorance of employees (Ahmed 2007). Basing on the argument by the upper-level management at my organization that the surveillance and monitoring is for the good of the company and that it does not harm individual employees, ethical perspectives in terms of utility to the organizations have failed to fully justify the suggestion (Bassick, McNamara & Sullivan 2007; Kenner 2008). Indeed, utilitarianism is basically a weak principle since the idea that monitoring and surveillance does not harm people, however this does not imply that it is ethical (Ahmed 2007). Action Plan Employers can apply CPM theory to maximize benefits from such information that can be viewed as private. For starters, engaging the employees in reciprocal exchange through potential sanctions or rewards can be effective. At this stage, employees are encouraged to disclose information (boundary openness) or hide information (boundary closure) on performance based on the perceived benefits or cost of sharing the information and the expected utility of the information (Mumby 2005). Moral issues at individual level have arisen from the act of covert surveillance and informing. The informing can be divided into two areas, namely handler moral behavior and informer moral behavior (Harfield 2012). Where an informer (X) provides certain information on a suspect (S) to the authorities (p), the action is morally justified at the institutional level within the context of moral theory of policing. X is at a unique position to provide information on S since they closely associate. X will have either be in possession of the information based on past association with S or the current association may provide avenues X can use to discover the desired information. For instance, X may have information on the health of S, and if he doesn’t know, their close association provides an avenue to investigate the information. It can be assumed that S will not warrant the passing of such information to the authorities (P), since P will use such information to investigate and impeach S (Harfield 2012). When S discovers that X is supplying the information to P, S may frustrate the process through deception. These assumptions are viewed as reasonable based on reported incidences by handlers, informers or undercover officers. Such a scenario justifies the use of deception to protect the integrity of X’s investigation. Failure to inform S that X is passing information to P, means that X is deceiving. The deception is morally wrong, however, it is overshadowed by the moral theory of policing (Harfield 2012). The theory justifies the use of covert surveillance and informer handling in situations where the suspect is pursued for criminal activities. Indeed, the legislative changes such as RIPA Act 2000 section 28(3)(b) provides that whenever there is a need to prevent or detect crime or disorder, then the local authorities can still authorize the covert surveillance. The handler joins forces with the informer (X) to deceive the suspect (S). Although the informer is the one who is in active deception of S, the handler has complicity in deceiving the suspect (Harfield 2012). Since the deception undercuts the trust upon which social relations are anchored in, the deception can be viewed as morally wrong. However, when employed in promoting the protection of justifiable and enforceable community and victim moral rights, then it can be morally justified. In addition, in situations where handlers have to protect themselves using false names for the purpose of the operation, then the use of false identity can be viewed as morally wrong. Any form of account is generally viewed as morally wrong. However, on a different account, the deceit by the handler can be morally justified based on the moral theory of policing. This again is reflected on the new changes in the legislation where the police are given the right to authorize cover surveillance and informer handling (Harfield 2012). The amendment of the Regulation Investigatory power, which stipulates the procedure for surveillance and covert intelligence, currently limits number of officers within the public authority who can authorize covert surveillance and informer handling under RIPA Section 28(3). However, the police are given authority to for covert surveillance and informer handling. Additionally, the authorizing officers can only approve directed surveillance when it is for the purpose of detecting a criminal offence as well as when it meets the conditions stipulated in article 7A(3)(a) of the 2010 order. The conditions comprise the offences under direct surveillance should be punishable by the law. Analysis The changes in legislations have however made little impact on the employees at my organizations as they still have some loopholes. For instance, even with the changes, the legislations have still failed to specify the limits for monitoring the communication content. For instance, claiming employee rights to privacy is generally viewed as difficult by the employees at my organizations. This is because courts have always held the view that despite workers having ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,” it is limited when communications are through the company-administered email system. With regard to website surveillance, the employers may adopt a more lenient surveillance that considers the needs of the employees. This will make the employees to feel that even if they are being monitored, the company respects their personal needs away from the workplace. This way, a sense of trust is established that motivates the employees both professionally and personally (Jitendra & Crampton 1998; Holmes 2003; Whitty 2004). From this perspective, it is critical to understand that just because something is legal does not mean it is necessarily ethical (Hindman 1999; Sewell & Barker 2006). Despite the reasonable expectation, employees have always felt that they should have the right to communicate. This argument is supported by CPM theory. Proposals for Future Studies The essay aims at establishing a foundation for new analysis of covert surveillance and informer handling in future. First, studies should be conducted to explore how surveillance-capable technologies can be implemented in organizations across UK without infringing privacy rights. Additionally, a great deal of research needs to be done in UK to establish the outcome of surveillance at workplace and how it affects employee performance and productivity. An extensive survey across various professions is also necessary to establish whether surveillance can actually contribute to decline criminal activities within the workplace is also critical. The study should be replicated with representative sample from financial institutions. Studies should be extended to find out whether attitudes towards surveillance and monitoring are dependent on particular types of surveillance methods used. For example, whether video surveillance is preferred for its capacity to provide high-security measures in situations where email and internet monitoring may indicate lack of trust on the employees. Conclusion Whether the legislative changes limit covert surveillance or informer handling at workplace, the employers who adopt such practices should adopt some guiding principles. Since the legislative changes still recognize the need to monitor the employees who are suspected of engaging in criminal activities, there is need for some restraint. This is because such surveillance activities have the potential to affect the entire workforce’s productivity and consumer handling. Employees often desire some level of privacy. Consequently, policies or legislations are needed that specify that the surveillance or monitoring system benefits both the employees and the employer. In certain jurisdictions such as the UK, the Employment Practices Data Protection Code was issues by the data protection authority to guide employers to comply with RIPA Act 2000 or the Data Protection ACT 1988 (Home Office 2010). The Code covers issues on monitoring the workplace and further recommends that all organizations conduct and outcome assessment before implementing the surveillance system. Despite the Code not being legally binding, noncompliance can be cited in an enforcement notice for noncompliance with Data Protection Act 1988. Such employers are therefore guilty of criminal offence and may be subject to a jail term or fines. In jurisdictions such as the United States, the extent of electronic monitoring undertaken by employers is provided from under Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 1986. References Ahmed, S. 2007 "Analysis of Workplace Surveillance in A Qeuest for an Ethical Stance." Journal of Business Systems, Governance and Ethics, Vol. 2 No. 4. Allen, M., Walker, K., Coopman, S. & Hart, J. 2007. "Workplace Surveillance and Managing Privacy Boundaries." Management Communication Quarterly, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp.172-200 Bassick, M. McNamara, T. & Sullivan, D. 2007. 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