How Arbitral Tribunals Deal with Challenges to Their Jurisdiction - Coursework Example

Assignment Extract In Yukos Universal Ltd v Russian Federation (Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No AA 227, 2009) the tribunal dismissed the objections to jurisdiction and admissibility based on the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty. Critically discuss how an arbitral tribunal deals with challenges to its jurisdiction (with special reference to investor-state disputes) and consider the effects of preliminary challenges to the effectiveness of arbitral processes. _______________________________________________________________ How Arbitral Tribunals Deal With Challenges to Their Jurisdiction Scope of Arbitral Tribunal Challenges There are many instances where an affected party to an arbitration hearing has challenged the validity of the Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of the clauses in the contract, or the Tribunal's jurisdiction or even its findings1. The scope of the arbitral tribunal challenges range from those questioning the competence of the arbitration tribunal to nuances on issues of contractual interpretation and procedural matters during the arbitration process4. A court is usually faced with two choices when it receives a challenge against the power of jurisdiction or the validity of an arbitration agreement from one of the parties whose case was mediated by an Arbitral Tribunal: either to suspect that the challenge is spurious and therefore start from the view-point that the matter should be reviewed; or on the other hand take it at face value that the challenge is legitimate and therefore direct that the case be re-heard. Many challenges to arbitration agreements are indeed without foundation and this has led courts to be cautious of challenges and take an initial stance that the case should be reviewed when presented with an arbitration challenge. Thanks to the provision for separability (or severability) between the contract clauses per se, and the arbitration clause within the same contract, it is possible for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide whether it has jurisdiction and for the arbitration to proceed whether or not the contract still subsists. Separability allows the arbitration clause to exist completely apart from the main contract and remain effective even when the main contract is dissolved, or was null and void from the beginning. It also sets a restriction that all challenges to the arbitral tribunal are only those that address the facts and law relevant to the question of whether the arbitration clause is appropriately applied. Important initial considerations prior to arbitration However, two of the most important initial considerations are firstly that there exists an arbitration clause and secondly that it is appropriate for the Arbitral Tribunal to proceed with arbitration2, otherwise no legitimate arbitration can be conducted. The advantage of this legitimacy requirement is that it allows the Tribunal's rulings to have the force of law and compels the parties to comply with the ruling, and these tribunal rulings are favoured more worldwide than the court rulings in the respective countries3. The 'competence-competence' principle is a provision for the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction in the event that its ruling is challenged, and complies with the relevant laws of the country and the rules of the institutions in which the tribunal operates. An arbitration process can be initiated through any of four ways. It could be initiated as a court order, or as specifically stated in a contract, or as a post contract agreement or as a written confirmation of an agreement reached by discussion between the disputants and the arbitral tribunal. In any event, there must always be a written basis upon which the arbitral tribunal proceeds with the arbitration. Once there is an arbitration agreement then The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration (MAL) can apply. Controversy still surrounds the provisions of article 16 of MAL which gives the arbitral tribunal competence to decide on its own jurisdiction. However, there is a body of evidence in Case Law5 that this “competence-competence” provision of MAL is almost universally accepted by all countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL model Law on arbitration 4. This allows the arbitral tribunal to decide on its own that all aspects of the case under consideration fall within the ambit of the tribunal’s rules and that all the clauses that stipulate the need for arbitration are in place and still valid. Objections as to the lack of jurisdiction Objections as to the lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal have to be filed as provided by MAL (under paragraph 3) before the statement of defense and any late submissions and lack of submission are normally regarded as a waiver of the right to object to the arbitration, and thus gives the arbitral tribunal to present its findings as if they were from a fully authorized arbitration agreement from both parties4. During the setting aside hearing the Highest Regional Court—Oberlandesgericht in Stuttgart (Germany), ruled that the party that did not file any objections to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal was no longer able to raise those objections6. However under similar circumstances in Singapore the right to object was given even though the party had failed to file objections prior to the defense statement7. The preliminary ruling asserting the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal should normally be dealt with as procedural orders only, but it has been found that some arbitrators issue the ruling as substantive orders4. Objections to the courts also require 30 days lead time before they are deemed as belated and hence considered inapplicable for purposes of the setting aside hearings4. How Arbitral Tribunals Deal with Preliminary Objections There is also the requirement that the Claimant and Respondent file their Memorials and counter Memorials before the Arbitral Tribunal within a stipulated period: usually 90 days for the Claimant’ memorials, counting from the date of the first session and after receipt of these 90 days is allowed for the Respondent to file their own Memorials before the Arbitral Tribunal8. Thereafter the Claimant’s Rejoinder is required for filing within 45 days and any objections by the Respondent be filed also 45 days after receiving the Claimant’s arguments. It is possible that if two or more claimants have similar or identical claims as viewed by the Tribunal, their claims can be consolidated and dealt with as one case with the agreement of the Respondent8. Illustrative of this is the joint case of Pan American Energy LLC (PAE of Delaware, USA) and BP Argentina Exploration Company and BP America Production Company (both of Delaware USA)against the Government of Argentina after the government’s attempt to align the Peso to the US dollar fell into problems and Argentina experienced problems fulfilling its contractual obligations under the oil and gas production concessions held by the Delaware claimants, principally with respect to the hydrocarbon and the electricity frameworks by which the companies were enjoying certain operational guarantees8. The claimants argued that the Argentine government’s decision to create parity between the US dollar and the Argentine Peso and the underlying rules by which this was carried out had resulted in losses to the companies, and that Argentina was in breach of contract and was infringing upon international law (for example pacta sunt servanda) and local Argentine law (especially with regard to investments, royalties, exchange rate and taxes) under the Regulatory Framework for Oil and Gas, and the Regulatory Framework for Electricity. The duty of the Arbitral Tribunal was to rule on its jurisdiction before addressing the case on its merits. To do this the arbitral tribunal needed to establish that there was written agreement from both the claimants and the respondent so the arbitration clause could take effect by mutual consent. The Tribunal took it that subscription to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or Washington) Convention by both parties constituted the requisite written consent for purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID Convention regarding the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the matter9. Secondly, the Tribunal needed to establish that reasonable effort had been expended to resolve the dispute through mutual agreement and between the parties, and that for a period of at least 6 months this effort at mutual private resolution of the dispute had been seriously and adequately pursued to no avail. This proviso having been fulfilled and supported by written communications between the Claimants and the Argentine Government officials satisfied the Tribunal that the matter was ripe for arbitration under its jurisdiction. The Tribunal had to examine the objections to its jurisdiction from the point of view of its ratione materiae competence to address all issues constituting the prima facie submissions and not the merits of the dispute, only with respect to the arbitration clause embedded within the Bilateral Investment Treaty, without requiring the Claimant, as the party that avers, to have any burden of proof of the foundation of the claim8. This restricts the deliberations of the Tribunal to address only its competence to hear the case and not to judge the claim on its merits, which is an altogether separate exercise9. On the other hand the Respondent also required that the Claimant show that they are not claiming based on general policy related government initiatives, and that their claim was based specifically on injury arising from the BIP contract alone. This, while conceding that if general policy changes and pronouncements affect the substance of the underlying contract then the respondent would be willing to entertain the claim to the extent applicable under the contract. The Claimants having shown sufficient corporate ownership and identity within the context of preliminary objections; and having established their claim for arbitration based on the requirements of the Tribunal the decision to go for arbitration is upheld in spite of the Claimant demanding more evidence. Case Law on Illinois Code Arbitral Tribunal Composition According to the 2005 Illinois Code - 710 ILCS 30/10 International Commercial Arbitration Act- Composition of Arbitral Tribunal, the disputants have the freedom to select any number of members to the Arbitral Tribunal but failure to agree on this will result in one arbitrator being appointed under the provisions of subsection (d) of Section 10_10 of the Act. If there is dispute as to the selection of a third arbitrator to a three member tribunal, the disputants can each select one and then these two in turn can agree on a third arbitrator to join them, failure which after 30 days of disagreement a court will appoint the third arbitrator in accordance with the Act’s section1-30; and under the provisions of the same section a party to the dispute can ask the court to fulfill any action which another party has failed to fulfill for whatever reason pursuant to the appointment of arbitrators, and such court decision can not be appealed against11. Challenges to Membership on the Arbitral Tribunal In terms of the provisions of the 2005 Illinois Code, International Commercial Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 30/10-15) Section 10 -15, if any disputant in an arbitration hearing feels that the impartiality or independence or qualifications of any member appointed to the tribunal are grounds for objecting to that member being part of the tribunal, then the disputant can file such objection with the arbitral tribunal. There is also a requirement for full disclosure by any member approached to sit on the tribunal if there are any issues that may compromise the member’s impartiality, independence or otherwise the member’s eligibility or qualifications for the purposes of serving on the tribunal. The provision is also stipulated that any challenge to a member’s appointment by a disputant who took part in the appointment process of that member to the tribunal can only be accepted if the reasons stated are such that the disputant only came to the knowledge of the issues too late for the disputant to prevent the appointment of that member to the tribunal. Within 15 days of the arbitral tribunal being constituted any disputant can file an objection against membership of any of the appointed arbitrators. If the concerned arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw candidacy then the tribunal would have to give a ruling based on the challenge according to section 710 ILCS 30/ 10-15 (b) of the Act. Similarly an arbitrator can withdraw from office or otherwise be terminated by the parties to the dispute if for any reason, de jure or de facto, he can no longer fulfill his obligations on the Tribunal. If however, due to disagreement on the status of a member to the tribunal a court decision is required to intervene and rule on the termination of a member, such court decision is not subject to appeal. A substitute arbitrator can then be appointed to replace the terminated member according 710 ILCS 30/10/30 and to this the rules of procedure that apply to the initial appointment of that member to the arbitral tribunal should be followed. Case Law on Swiss arbitration system According to the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law (PILA) , Article 190 section 2(a), a tribunal that is not properly constituted may be grounds to set aside an award granted by that tribunal, and section 2(e) goes further to provide for annulment of award if public policy is contravened. On 10 June 2010 the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected objections to the appointment of two arbitrators to the three member tribunal12. In the first case it ruled against an objection as to the possible lack of partiality or independence of one arbitrator citing lack of evidence to substantiate the challenge; and in the second case ruled that as long as the legal questions are different the same arbitrator who has previously granted an award in a dispute between the same disputants in the same dispute can also give the final award. The UNCITRAL Model Law allows the arbitrator who is being challenged to sit with his colleagues on the tribunal and deliberate as to whether he is unfit to sit on the tribunal10, and furthermore, the arbitral tribunal’s decision is not subject to appeal once the challenge is accepted by the tribunal. Case Law on Hungarian arbitration system The juridical system in Hungary changed dramatically since 1988 with the dissolution of socialism, and the country’s Civil Procedure Code started putting proper emphasis on the need to accept arbitration as a separate and functional institution in Hungary, starting with the Corporate Act (number VI of 1988), significantly Article 18; and then the Foreign Investments Act (number XXIV of 1988), significantly Article 44; and then the Arbitration Act (number LXXI of 1994) establishing a proper basis for arbitration in Hungary13. This Act restricts arbitration to cases dealing with economic disputes only and providing that there is an arbitration agreement in place, either as separate clause in their contract or as detailed in a written communication between the parties. The arbitrators are also sworn to secrecy regarding information that becomes privy to them as part of their duties in the arbitral tribunal, and they are held to secrecy even after the case is concluded. Arbitrators in Hungary must also disclose to all the disputants in writing all material issues that may reasonably raise doubts as to their competence to sit on the arbitral tribunal. Section 51 provides that a challenger who has been notified that his objection to the appointment of a particular arbitrator was rejected, can ask a court to intervene but must do this within 30 days of being informed of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling on his challenge. The Hungarian Arbitration Act also upholds the “kompetenz-kompetenz” provision allowing the Arbitral Tribunal power to rule on its own decisions, and further allows the tribunal to proceed and award on the case even while a court challenge is still being pursued by the losing disputant in the arbitration matter. There is further provision for the arbitral tribunal to order a preliminary injunction that will hold till the case is concluded, or otherwise will only be rescinded by a new decision of the tribunal. During the deliberations between the parties to the dispute, if they do not agree on the appropriate procedure to be followed the tribunal reserves the right to rule on these procedural issues, including matters of language and place of hearing13. In the event that a party does not appear before the tribunal, or does not present its defense, the tribunal shall continue with arbitration up to granting an award based on the evidence the tribunal already received from the other disputant. In making the award the majority vote shall take precedence, and in the event of a tie the presiding chair has the right to make a casting vote to decide the matter. An out of court settlement between the disputants shall be accepted by the tribunal as reason to stop arbitration and awarded as would have been the award of the tribunal13. Setting Aside Requests Whereas the ruling of the arbitral tribunal can not be appealed, the losing disputant can within 60 days of receiving the tribunal’s ruling can ask a court to set aside the award ruling if the grounds include, inter alia: that he was not given a chance to adequately present his defense; or did not get sufficient notice that a particular arbitrator was being appointed; or that the laws under which the arbitration proceeded were inappropriate; and also on issues of composition of the tribunal, scope of the issues under arbitration, or procedural matters13. The competence of Hungarian laws to deal with the matter may also be put to a challenge, as well as if the disputant claims that the award would cause a disturbance of public order. Case Law on El Salvador arbitration system In the dispute between the Government of El Salvador as Respondent sued by the Commerce Group Corporation and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc., as Claimants, the government was objecting to the arbitration citing lack of consent as provided under the CAFTA article 10,18,2(b) requiring that claimants waiver any court actions in El Salvador against the respondent, which the claimant was breaching by continuing a motion in the Supreme Court of El Salvador while at the same time pursuing an arbitration settlement14. The claimants were suing for damages of more than $111 million in the domestic judicial proceedings before the Supreme Court of El Salvador, which only involved the exploitation concession and the processing plant. Without the waiver of domestic litigation being fully respected the Respondent complained that a basic condition of consent to the arbitration had been breached when they took the Respondent to court because of the revocations of their environmental permits, the same measures as would be the subject of arbitration proceedings. In this case it was clear that the Claimants had deliberately ignored the requirement to waiver any litigation if they opted for arbitration. Although CAFTA Article 10.18.3 provides for some exceptions to the requirement for waivers of domestic litigation, the particular case under arbitration was not included in the exceptions under CAFTA. Therefore under CAFTA rules and even under the provisions of the International Convention ICSID the government of El Salvador was able to successfully to challenge the Arbitral Tribunal on the grounds of no consent. The fact that there were demonstrable grounds by which the Claimants had breached the requirement for waiver of litigation meant that the arbitral tribunal was no longer competent to proceed with arbitration, and also the International Convention was also powerless to act on the matter having been deprived of jurisdiction by the actions of the claimants14. The Claimants in this case were their own worst enemy as they missed the opportunity to successfully hold on to their claim for damages against El Salvador because of the insistence on domestic judicial litigation. The Claimants' attention was drawn to Article 10.18.4 by ICSID during the registration process on 29 July 2009 when the ICSID Secretariat wrote to Claimants requesting: "…explanation as to whether Commerce and Sanseb are in compliance with CAFTA Article 10.18.4, with respect to any previous submissions addressing the same alleged breaches to: i) an administrative tribunal of El Salvador; and to ii) a court of El Salvador for adjudication or resolution, particularly in view of paragraphs 22 and 24 of the request for arbitration." Furthermore, in a letter dated 14 August 2009 the Attorney General of El Salvador clearly drew the attention of the ICSID Secretariat and Claimants to the provision in CAFTA_DR, Article 10.18.2, and explaining that: "…the measures subject of the proceedings filed by claimants in El Salvador are the same measures upon which claimants base their entire claim submitted to arbitration under the ICSID Convention." The Respondent even gave the Claimants written agreement to discontinue with the proceedings if they waived their litigation before the tribunal was fully constituted, but the Claimants still did not grab at this opportunity to correct their position. The Claimants should have taken advantage of these overtures to revise their position and desist from domestic litigation to allow the arbitration to continue without challenge from the El Salvador government. If the claimants were only seeking injunctive relief from the domestic Supreme Court in order to keep their rights to claim from the Respondent that would have been accepted by CAFTA under its rules, but they were actually seeking that the Supreme Court reverse all the measures that the Respondent had challenged through ICSID. The rules of arbitration clearly provide that if there is no consent the matter must be dismissed by the tribunal regardless whether the Claimants resubmit their cases14. Some State Parties to international conventions have been known to exercise their discretion and allow arbitration proceedings to continue in spite of there being violations by claimant enterprise of the need to waiver domestic litigation, mainly to preserve the effective operation of the ICSID and the arbitral Tribunals. There is no obligation for the State Party to concede to these violations and each case is dealt with individually depending on the circumstances, gravity of violations and the merits of the case14. Worse still for the Claimants in the case against El Salvador, they did not only reject any offers from the Respondent for attending to the ICSID and CAFTA rules, but they also missed a chance to initiate a new claim within the stipulated three year statute of limitation imposed under CAFTA Article 10.18.1 which provides that within three years of being made aware of the violations stipulated in CAFTA Article 10.16.1 that they had incurred damages through loss of their environmental permits, the Claimants should submit their claims to arbitration. Even worse for the Claimants, the Supreme Court of El Salvador ruled in favour of the Salvadorian government adjudging that the Ministry of the Environment was correct in revoking the Claimants environmental permits15. The Claimants additionally faced the costs of filing and pursuing frivolous claims and making incorrect factual allegations regarding the contractual obligations of the Respondent, and under CAFTA rules the Claimant have to pay the legal costs of representation incurred by El Salvador, and all expenses and costs of the preliminary objection. The government of El Salvador also reserved the right to request security for costs in the event that the matter went beyond the preliminary objections phase of arbitration to ensure Claimants will be able to pay in the event that the Respondent wins the award. El Salvador also reserved the right to file counter-claims for cleaning up the chemical contamination of the San Sebastian River caused by the Claimants. Limitations on the Terms of Reference of Arbitral Tribunals Despite all the power and authority wielded by an arbitral tribunal there is almost universal agreement that they should never go beyond their jurisdiction to exceed the terms of reference set out in the arbitration clause, and must not arbitrate on matters not specifically mandated for their action. The arbitration statutes in France stipulate that tribunals can have their awards challenged on the grounds that they made a decision that was not in keeping with the scope of the terms of reference16. As commonly occurs, a disputant may challenge only part of the tribunal's jurisdiction, be it a member they feel can not be impartial, or a particular issue they feel should not be included in the deliberations, or indeed part of the interpretation of the contract by the other party. This partial challenge is common-place and is usually dealt with expeditiously under the 'competence-competence ' powers of the tribunal. A total challenge as to the whole foundation of the tribunal is more problematic because the challenge concerns whether or not the tribunal should be concerned at all with the matter at hand in view of the terms of the arbitration clause. Many reasons can be cited by a disputant to challenge the tribunal's authority under the clause. If the party denies that they consented to the insertion of the arbitration clause by their claimant, and claims therefore that they are not bound by it; or if a party says they are not the signatory to the clause; or that the agreement to go to arbitration was not set down in writing; or even that the matter goes beyond the scope of the tribunal therefore challenging the juridical authority of the tribunal over the matter. Another matter that concerns the jurisdiction of the tribunal is that of whether the underlying contract in which the arbitration clause is contained is valid. It has been argued that an illegal contract can not be brought before an arbitration tribunal, or that a contract that has ceased to perform is no longer binding. The arbitration tribunal possesses the power to deal with this complexity by virtue of the separability rule between the parent contract and the arbitration clause. Separability allows the arbitration clause to exist separately and survive the nullification of the main contract. In other words this provision allows the tribunal to proceed with the matter up to awarding damages in spite of the fact that the underlying contract is no longer performing, has been deemed null and void, or was illegal in its constitution17 - 21. Increasingly the move towards globalization and international business contracts between corporations and state enterprises has also placed a new focus on international law. It is clear that international law is the contract of choice. Summary and Conclusions Many challenges to arbitration agreements are indeed without foundation and this has led courts to be cautious of challenges and take an initial stance that the case should be reviewed when presented with an arbitration challenge, rather to rule that the case be re-heard afresh. It has been recorded that most countries now subscribe to the international rules on arbitration but the practices in each country vary according to differences in local legislation. It is imperative that a party to a dispute that is going for arbitration must file their challenges in time to make it possible to pursue their rights later on in the process especially when it comes to setting aside rulings. The arbitral tribunal enjoys the power to rule on its own decisions under the ‘competence-competence’ provision and this has raised much controversy among disputants in the arbitration process. The rule that the arbitration clause exists separately from the underlying commercial contract also means that arbitration can continue whether or not the underlying contract is later proved to be null and void. This gives the arbitrator power to proceed with the hearings regardless of the subsistence of the contract itself. Any disputant who feels he was not given a chance to adequately present his defense; or did not get sufficient notice that a particular arbitrator was being appointed; or that the laws under which the arbitration proceeded were inappropriate, can file an objection with the arbitral tribunal on those grounds. Challenges can also be filed on issues of composition of the tribunal, scope of the issues under arbitration, or procedural matters. The Claimant does not always get the award, and sometimes the respondent gets an award if the Claimant’s case is proven to be frivolous and without foundation. The Yukos claim by the three claimants from Isle of Man and Cyprus against the Russian Federation represents perhaps the biggest award against any Respondent in arbitration history, and confirms Russia’s seriousness to participate in international arbitration proceedings without prejudice to the other signatories of the convention, covering all of the EU countries and some oil rich Middle Eastern countries. The preliminary objection by Russia that the claimants were precluded from filing a claim by article 17 of the treaty was dismissed by the tribunal as frivolous. The significance of the award is in the affirmation that international law and treaties between international participants can hold sway in this increasingly globalized economic and commercial environment. References 1 Park, W. (2008) “The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction” in ICCA Congress Series No. 13, International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics? pp.96-111. 2 Redfern, A., and Hunter, M. (2004) Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, p295 3 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, (10 June 1958) 330 UNTS 38 4 Uzelac, A. (2005). Jurisdiction of The Arbitral Tribunal: Current Jurisprudence and Problem areas Under the UNCITRAL Model Law: Arbitral tribunals; International commercial arbitration; International law; Jurisdiction; Model laws 5 Case law on UNCITRAL texts (CLOUT): UNCITRAL website, www.uncitral.org. 6 Highest Regional Court—Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (Germany), 1 Sch 16/01, December 20, 2001. 7 High Court (Singapore), November 30, 2000, Tan Poh Leng Stanely v Tang Boon Jek Jeffrey. 8 International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Washington DC: Decision on Preliminary Objections. 2002. (ICSD Case Numbers ARB/03/13and ICSD 04/8; BP America and Pan American Claimants v Argentine Republic Respondent. 9 ICSID Case Number ARB /01/8, ULM, Vol. 42, 2003, p788. 10 Poudret, J F., and Besson, S. (2007). Comparative law of international arbitration http://law.justia.com/illinois/codes/2005/chapter51/29405.html. 11 2005 Illinois Code - 710 ILCS 30/10 International Commercial Arbitration Act. Composition of Arbitral Tribunal (P.A. 90 - 631, eff. 7/ 24 / 98). 12 Voser, N. (2002).Swiss Federal Tribunal rejects arbitrator: http://us.practicallaw.com/1-502-6933?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= 13 Kárpáti, L. Jr. ( ) Arbitration in Hungary. 14 http://law.wustl.edu/Library/cdroms/IBL/Conarb/W23Kar.htm 15 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17 Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. Claimants, v. Republic of El Salvador, Respondent. The Republic Of El Salvador's Preliminary Objection Under Article 10.20.5 Of The Dominican Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 16 The New Code of Civil Procedure, 1981, Article 1502.3. 17 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 21 18 ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 6.4 19 AAA Arbitration Rules, Article 15.2 20 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 16.1 21 English Arbitration Act 1996, section 7 15 Regulations of the Mining Law of El Salvador and its Amendments, Art. 11, Legislative Decree No. 47, June 20, 2003, published in the Official Gazette No. 125, Book 359 of July 8, 2003 Read More