Assessment of Police and Community Safety - Essay Example

Assessment of Police and Community Safety i. Introduction APACS aims to make performance management simpler and more cohesive by reforming and aligning the manner by which performance is determined and measured across policing, crime, and drugs. APACS reflects the National Crime Strategy and Public Service Agreements and provides indicators for Home Office use. However, stimulating and synchronising the works of so many members of a partnership presents a momentous challenge to APACS. Local authorities see it as a crime control discounting other local objectives and targets, and leaning excessively towards police performance in isolation. The extent to which Home Office’s APACS is seen as a method of strengthening local partnership is the focus of this paper. It will discuss various crime reduction strategies and evaluate the roles of police and local authority as responsible partners. ii. Partnerships and the Emergence of APACS Partnership is a device for collaboration between various agencies and services that develop out of initiatives to promote multi-agency cooperation. It is usually acknowledged that where partnership transpire those taking part maintain their own professional boundaries, autonomy and responsibilities but seek to improve outcomes by sharing wisdom, information, and assets as appropriate. At the local level, the Home Office significantly rely on local authorities for their own crime prevention and reduction initiatives because the heart of the central government’s function is to ensure public safety and protection (Gibson and Faulkner 2007, p.26). Since April 2008, Assessments of Policing and Community Safety or APACS succeed the PPAF (Policing Performance Assessment Framework) and other assessments for Crime and Disorder Reduction Parnerships (CDRPs). This is to simplify the country’s performance measurement and bring performance frameworks of community safety partners closer together. The difference of APACS difference from preceding frameworks is its ability to deal with policing and community safety issues such as terrorism, violence, and protective services. Generally, it encourages partnerships between agencies and other performance frameworks for other public services because it reflects the National Crime Strategy and Public Service Agreements. The Home Office use APACS as a gauge to observe and measure performance in local areas. The initial assessment that will be published in 2009, includes appropriate performance indicators for “confidence and satisfaction, confronting crime, serious crime and protection, organization management” Newburn (2008, p.741). APACS is part of a wider and progressively more complex national performance landscape that include Local Government Performance Framework, National Community Safety Plan 2008-11, Crime Strategy, and Public Service Agreements (Newburn 2008, p.741). iii. Difference of APACS in Performance Measurement PPAF performance measures were introduced in 2004. It separated policing responsibilities into six outcome areas that involve “citizen focus, promoting safety and security, resource usage, investigating crime, reducing crime and helping the public” Joyce (2006, p.205). A seventh area to determine force performance alongside local priorities was also incorporated in the PPAF. To attain such goals, measurements will be done through various key performance indicators such as BVPI or ‘Best Value Performance Indicators’. Evaluation between police forces was prepared based on most related force comparison groups. It was useful in determining yearly performances of individual forces. However, the problem with this kind of approach according to Joyce (2006, p.205) is that it did not consider the resource available to a force thus assessments between these force became more complex. APACS on the other hand was envisioned to bring greater consistency to the performance assessment of policing and community safety, which will accentuate the outcomes realized by partnerships “as a whole, and not just the separate agencies in isolation” (Stationery Office 2006, p.10). APACS strategic endeavour is to make it straightforward for the existing frameworks in used by the Home Office to align clearly with “criminal justice, local authorities, LLAs, and Health and Transport frameworks” ( Home Office 2008c, p.1). The benefits according to the Home Office are lesser formalities, effective delivery through shared priorities, measures, and goals. APACS enables uncomplicated, comprehensible, and consistent messages regarding performance. Since it unites assessment with policy, delivery and support functions boost performance and reduce performance digression between peers. More importantly, it also develops the ability to recognize what is efficient or not. Similarly, it is easy to recognize individual roles and responsibilities since APACS is endorsing a balanced regime of accountability. APACS covers crime, drugs, and policing concerns methodically thus decreasing formalities and prevents imbalances in coverage. Moreover, it takes advantage of accessible data and professional views to generate analysis and assessments that can take full advantage of the significance of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. In addition, to augment local transparency and accountability, enhance data analysis, and sort out problems, APACS guarantee that data and assessments are communicated in a judicious way (Home Office 2008c, p.1). The Home Office is working in partnership with ACPO or the Association of Chief Police Officers, APA or Association of Police Authorities, and other police organisations. There were documents released in 2006 and 2008 to guide forces and authorities. These are practical guide to police performance management and practical guidance for police authorities. The 2008 guidance that includes resource documents and case studies, intends to help augment the knowledge and practice of performance management in policing. The case studies are illustrations and application examples on how forces have implemented the principles of effective performance management (Home Office 2008b, p.1). The guide explains that ‘performance’ is simply finding out ‘how well something is done’. However, according to the guide, the problem is the word ‘how well’ can mean anything as it can be interpreted as good performance in terms of numbers. Good performance in police work normally is deduced as the quantities of criminals brought to justice, lesser fatalities of crime, and so forth rather than performance determined by doing the appropriate things or priorities, the worth of doing them, and doing it in the right amount. Therefore, better perception of the real meaning of ‘performance’ is essential to ensure that the right actions are taken to improve that performance (Home Office 2008b, p.3). “Performance management is about people” (Home Office 2008b, p.8). These people are those who know the business and are willing to improve and change it. Performance management allow managers and team leaders to appreciate and communicate force, department and team’s main concern. It is useful in addressing the deficit in areas where priorities are not satisfactorily achieved. Managers can learn from their mistakes through honest assessment thus similar mistakes would not happen again. More importantly, they will learn to work with local agencies regardless of the dissimilarity between organisations (Home Office 2008b, p.8). iv. Criticism on APACS Growth in community safety organisation and regulation constantly refer to partnership functioning as the way ahead, and amalgamation of locality’s policing initiatives with other local agencies as the road along which development will be made. However, the emergence of APACS as a method of optimising CDRP or Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership performance, was perceived by some experts as “a crime control that are not aligned with other local objectives and targets” (Newburn 2008, p.353). The LGA response to Home Office Consultation about APACS in July 2006 stated that they welcome the ‘burden-reducing objectives’ of APACS by simplifying the assessment of crime, drugs, and policing into a single performance network. However, according to LGA, the proposals summarized in the consultation was leaning too much towards police performance in isolation, lacking adequate consideration to local partnership, with police as a significant factor in providing better outcomes for local people. Moreover, LGA was seeking some explanation on how APACS could function in conjunction with other developments such as the Local Government White Paper, CDA Review and DCLG Neighbourhood Agenda. LGA and others view that a new performance framework is essential but it should “focus more on local priorities, citizens and service users’ interest with local public services owning and managing their performance” (LGA 2006, p.1). Similarly, ACPO in 2008 also responded to the consultation criticising APACS inability to provide terms for observations about the comparative performance and commitment of various agencies. ACPO added that APACS has the inclination to be incompatible since it is possible that within a force area, various CDRPs will have dissimilar local priorities consequential to further disagreement for putting the assessment in context. Moreover, various parts of activity are not subject to measurement such as life-threatening crimes and protection domain. The necessity to improve the balance between local and national priorities lingers thus central government must give up its control on local priorities and allow them to handle their priority management and measurement flexibly. Local priorities are adaptable and self-motivated, particularly given that local policing and neighbourhood management policy methodologies implemented by police forces aligned with national strategy. ACPO argued that shared accountability for delivery of service locally is improbable because lines of accountability to central government for partners and agencies concerned are useless. This is because partner agencies are answerable to various departments of central government. In the same way, it is unclear what the outcome will be, when a CDRP partner decide not to engage or has limited engagement with the APACS agenda (Winstone and Pakes 2005, p.73). v. Challenges in Partnerships Inspiring and directing the works of various members of a partnership according to Winstone and Pakes (2005, p.73), put forward significant challenges. Local authority chief executive and police commander is the key to successful leadership. When this official exhibit greater dedication, the possibility of effective crime reduction programme is high since community safety officers or local authority employees will have the complete support of partner agencies. Where this leadership is deficient, the successful delivery of service becomes more difficult. Additional difficulty that can confront successful partnership work at the local level is at times when member agencies do not share ‘coterminous’ boundaries. This difficulty will be compounded by the two-tier arrangement of local government in England and Wales, where all area along with all local district authorities are provided with CDRP responsibilities. This is actually demanding since every tier is accountable for various services. However, this condition does not extend to the unitary local authorities stationed on mainly urban areas, made accountable for the distribution of all local services in their towns and cities but difficulties with the synchronization of strategic tasks such as health, fire and police services may nevertheless occur. A potential lasting solution to the pervasiveness lack of ‘coterminosity’ that challenged CDRPs is the creation of unitary authorities across England and Wales. According to Muncie and Wilson (2004, p.175), CDA 1998 gave both the local authority and the police duties and powers to develop strategic partnerships to help prevent and reduce crime and disorder in their locality. However, local case studies suggest that pressure and conflicts, and political struggles between partners linger alongside the demands to be seen in public as contented and cohesive partners working in the neighbourhood. Moreover, Muncie and Wilson (2004) added that most partnerships took up a focused crime reduction agenda instead of encouraging a wider community safety approach in the first few years of local implementation. Moreover, a centrally determined performance management programme in which gainful processes for the fulfilment of particular outcomes and reduction targets often establishes local policies. Strongly associated to the ‘audit culture’ and the ‘cult performance management’ is the government’s devotion to financially support evidence-based undertakings and agenda. “The routine operation of local crime and disorder reduction partnerships in the 2000s remains massively affected by this ‘technicist’ paradigm of success in policy and practice” (Muncie and Wilson 2004, p.175). The Home Office performance agenda, Tilley (2005, p.747) explains generally assume the CDRPs are there to meet police ends. However, to many, this does not appear to be a strong foundation upon which to erect partnerships of equals, although we should not deduce, regardless of the rhetoric, that CRDPs are there for purposes of equal presentation. The outline of CDRPs is not just placed by the Home Office since one can visualize points of tension with other interests, though the possibility of becoming apparent depends partly upon the potency of the ideology of unity that support the partnership approach. Tilley (2005) explains that the same ideology can result to ‘policies of conflict prevention’ where power discrepancies between agencies and their various crime prevention strategies remain uncontested. Conflict avoidance may be motivated by the need to preserve the impression of unity, but also by the felt need to preserve good relations at an interpersonal level. This ideology makes it important that individuals and organizations are seen to unite (p.747). Interference from central government in the determination of local service provision is another difficulty that has challenged CDRPs in the local delivery of crime reduction strategies. The dedication of central government in performance management and performance culture has produced an overabundance of service targets and performance indicators that are mainly invented from Whitehall or the Cabinet Office. The effect of central government’s interference expounded a major challenge to the development of local crime reduction strategies that progressively mirrored the main concerns of central government. The intensity of interference has made it complicated for some services to commit completely to local strategic priorities unless there clearly overlap with those identified by the central government. “The problem of micro-management by the government has proved to be particularly problematic for the police service” (Winstone and Pakes 2005, p.74). Central government funding is not the only problem confronting the police partnership role within the CDRP. As was acknowledged in the initial Home Office progress report on CDRPs, when various agencies operate within dissimilar geographical boundaries complications of various types occur for partnerships. The absence of coterminosity has meant that it is complicated to disaggregate data or make significant assessments between services in the same CDRP area. Isolated from unitary authorities, the absence of coterminosity between local BCU commands and local authority boundaries can be exceptionally difficult. In the counties, a police commander can be made responsible for a number of CDRPs operating within the BCU or Basic Command Unit area. The difficulties are compounded by the diminutive size of some district authorities that are unable to align or sustain a BCU. Yet HMIC or Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary does not require the collection of data concerning the presence or absence of coterminous boundaries, despite the recognized value of this in improving police effectiveness (Winstone and Pakes 2005, p.84). As HMIC is involved in enhancing competence and efficiency, and is in charge for the compilation of data on police performance, the apparent failure to recognize ‘coterminosity’ as an issue interfering on performance is erratic. The lack of direction from HMIC enables police forces to change BCU boundaries independently and this often resulted to more problems. Restructured BCUs within which local commanders are able to use less managerial discretion are rationalize by police headquarters with reference to improving BCU efficiency. “A consequence of the redrawing of BCU boundaries is the greater difficulty in sustaining the local CDRP partnership” (Winstone and Pakes 2005, p.85). There may be agencies such as Local Criminal Justice Boards and the Crown Prosecution Service, whose boundaries are never expected to be coterminous with those of the local authority or BCU. For the probation service, the organizational modifications instigated by NOMS or National Offender Management Service may present added challenges. Nonetheless, several key agencies accountable for the delivery of local services has direct influence on the delivery of CDRP’s crime reduction strategies, where shared boundaries could be established. These include all local authority departments, primary care trusts, probation, Drug Action Teams or DAT and the Youth Justice Board. Some agencies, are already sharing common boundaries, for instance, the DATs that in 2004 been combined with the local CDRP. The difficulties of non-coterminous boundaries between local authorities and BCUs clearly need to be addressed. Within the counties, the situation is made worse by the two-tier system where strategic services are the task of the county whereas local services are the responsibility of the districts. Because of the small size of many districts, one BCU will often be required to work with a number of district councils, thus creating problems. A good example of the problem associated with two-tier local government according to Winstone and Pakes (2005, p.86) can be seen in Warwickshire, where a small county police force of one thousand officers work within two BCUs and are responsible for five district councils. In the absence of unitary structure, it is hard to develop efficient partnership arrangements successfully. At county council level, strategic services will need to be represented on each local district CDRP besides participating at a county level. This implies that future local government restructuring may require considering the opportunities arising from an extended unitary authority arrangement that would conclude the existing two-tier divide. vi. The Impact of National Performance Measurement on Local Targets The government has set CDRPs clear targets in relation the crime reduction where the Home Secretary has recognized the reduction of ‘volume crime’ as a primary target for both the CDRP and the police forces. Volume crime concerns acquisitive or property crime and covers burglary and theft of vehicles. Even though the targets placed by government have often been met, what specific impact such target setting has had on consecutive reductions in acquisitive crime remains uncertain. The consequential ‘gaming’ of public services has been recognized in an exceedingly decisive report by the Audit Commission in 2003 where they found that countless public services administer performance measures to attain the targets set for them rather than enhancing service delivery. This has already affected most public services making up the partnership. A further impact of performance management has been that individual public service targets set by the central government are seen as supreme by those services, rather than the targets or objective placed for them by the CDRP. Centrally set performance targets can always be anticipated to have high significance for public services. This has been most clearly evidenced in health and education services over the operational existence of the CDRP. The government’s dedication to performance management and measurable targets presents a recurring challenge to the CDRP predominantly in terms of the execution of continuing crime reduction strategies. Within these measurable results are of course unlikely to be immediately available. According to Winstone and Pakes (2005, p.90), evidence suggests that the “long-term success of crime reduction partnership may ultimately depend on the extent to which government releases public services from central performance measures.” vii. Conclusion The pronouncement by government to institute local partnerships may be seen as both sensible and appropriate. However, conflict may gradually surround these partnerships. One reason is associated to the actuality that in general, community safety strategies include lasting objectives, where immediate victories are not achievable predominantly when they are about collective crime prevention goals. This can collide with a party’s political process that inevitably highlights momentary benefits. In addition, government dedication to what it perceives as effective solutions to instantaneous problems of unsociable behaviour may not be shared or acknowledged within partnerships. Further hostility has come up from the comprehensive application across the public sector of a performance management approach where enormous weight is placed on quantifiable short-term goals and objectives. These are often set within a highly political context and may be designed for immediate public consumption rather than to improve the effectiveness of public service. 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