RVM as a Provider of Data Forensic and Litigation Support Services - Assignment Example

Case Analysis Name: Professor: Institution: Course: Date: Introduction RVM is a well known provider of data forensic and litigation support services, and also a provider for legal technology consulting services. Considering the cases of R V M and another [2009] EWCA Crim 2615, [2010] 4 All ER 51, it is found out that they were appeals that had been posted in the court. [2009] EWCA Crim 2615, [2010] 4 All ER 51 is an appeal that was made by the Crown in opposition to the trial judge's ruling, and in this case the submission of saying that the offence was committed by bringing a prohibited article into prison was rejected. This was quoted under section 40C(1)(a) of the Prison Act 1952, which by that time had been revised making the incidence to be an offence of absolute or just a strict liability. In this case, it does not necessitate a trial for the purpose of proving any element of guilty (Chitty 2006, p. 304). The ruling of the case was carried out on 25 February 2009 by HHJ Goldstaub QC at a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 29(1). This section is of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. After the hearing had been carried out, the judge then, on 11 May 2009, approved the Crown leave to have an appeal pursuant to section 35(1) of that Act. This was on the principal ground of believing that the statutory provisions that are within question had only been put into effect recently and at that time, the solid decision on the issue was not applicable (Chitty 2006, pp. 305-309). Analysis of the Case On behalf of the Crown, Mr Arlidge QC, however put in the front position of his brief submissions on the fact that section 40C(1)(a) contained less elements of guilty, and this is disparate to other sub-sections that are enclosed within the amendments that are introduced by the 2007 Act. With this in mind, Mr Arlidge QC referred the court to sub-sections 40C(1)(c) and (d), and he also included their express to guilty, and also to section 40C(2) for the same principle, to offer support to the submission that could not have anticipated sub-section 40C(1)(a) by the Parliament. It contained no state of guilty element, and another purpose was to grant more other than just an offence of strict liability. Under the selected sub-section, all that the prosecution was supposed to prove in the case was the defendant, and in this case a list B article was supposed to be brought in or out of prison. At that time, Mr Arlidge gave a description of the legal scheme as one where most of the actus reus and mens rea elements had been worked out in a better manner. Mr Arlidge sustained that fundamental submission on the existing language of the statute by these supplementary deliberations, and in this case particular by the indication to the statement made by Lord Scarman. This was found to be of appropriate standards in Gammon. Therefore, Mr Arlidge was unable to grant that the section 40C(1) offences were considered as "truly criminal," and this took place when he was accepting the general presupposition. Section 40C(1) offences were elements of a code for the regulation of security within prison, and also part of an Act that is mainly concerned with the management of different offenders. Although the greatest sentence approved was two years, which could be evaluated with the offence caused in Gammon for which a limit of three years was passed. This means that severe punishments could be obligatory for something that can be less than true crime that was assumed to have been caused. The regulation of security within a prison was considered to be just a matter of social alarm, and by that time strict liability had been selected for the logical reasons that the beginning of articles including mobile phones caused serious complications. On the other hand, the one without strict liability made it easier for any given defendant to decline knowledge of what had caused him or her to be brought into prison. Furthermore, strict liability is considered to be effective in encouraging prison visitors to be all more observant by ensuring that nothing prohibited is brought into the prison and let it go past the reception desk. Some words were deliberately omitted in section 40C(1)(a), and the Parliament, by means of strict liability, had established that a significant trouble was to be dealt with. This was to be applied in any fitting case and if necessary it is needed. Therefore, in other cases, there was discretion of not prosecuting. On behalf of the respondents, Mr Harding and Ms Lynch QC gave support to the judge's final ruling, of which the initial reasons were behind their decision to support the judge. There was no need for setting the natural presumption aside and not allowing them to play a significant role many issues to be addressed. Some kind of precise intent, such as “intending it to come into the possession of a prisoner” has been identified in other sub-sections. The problem is that there was no good rationale to supersede the natural and also the general presumption. Such presumption was supposed to be shown that a defendant one way or another had acted intentionally. The lack of any express mens rea language simply revealed the expectations of the Parliament that the general presumption would only be applied by the courts. The perspective had criminal intention in nature, as the strict punishment established, and in this reverence it had to be considered that section 40B(1)(a), with the implemented penalty of ten year in the case of a List A article, had the same language as section 40C(1)(a). Such strict punishments could only be vindicated on the foundation of criminal intention. The social trouble alarmed went further than the simple management of prisons and its prisoners. Therefore, the sections apprehensive were not a cautiously worked out policy, but a reformulation of the earlier existing sections within the original Prison Act 1952. Discussion of the Analysis In my judgment, I believe that the overall ruling about the case was right and there has been no denial of the superseding presupposition in good turn of mens rea as a significant part of the offence in that is in question. The normal stand indicates that despite the nonexistence of any express language, there is a deduction, which is based in the constitutional principle, indicating that mens rea is a necessary element of the offence. Only a persuasive case for involving the elimination of such an element as a matter of stipulation will be sufficient. This indicates that with the absence of express language, and this can be even in the existence of express language somewhere else within the ruling, is not sufficient to refute the presumption except the situation as a whole oblige such a final conclusion. Looking at the language of the statute itself, section 40C(1)(a) is in terms indistinguishable to section 40B(1)(a), production with List A articles and its ten year maximum penalty. It is counter-intuitive to think that such an offence is one of absolute liability. As for the actus reus of the section 40C(1)(a) (or section 40B(1)(a)) offence, that is clear in terms of the term "brings, throws or otherwise conveys" (Chitty 2006, pp. 322-329). It is rigid to believe that the word "throws" has no chances of indicating an intentional act of some sort. It is has proved to be hard in conceiving by an individual being in a position to placing some List B (or A) article into or out of prison. Such an intention could be as without the knowledge of the person about the happening. The word "brings" is conceivably more neutral, but it obtains its color from the term "throws". Therefore, an expression "otherwise conveys", being of a catch-all nature, must evidently take its color from the previous version. Hence they are considered to be discouraging words that are designed to be in a position of finding an offence of absolute liability. Furthermore, section 40C(1)(a) (and section 40B(1)(a)) have to be deduced as only one among different offences that are within the section 40C(1) (or section 40B(1)). This means that the other offences within the sub-sections (b), (c) and (d) are articulated in terms that are indistinguishable for both List A articles (section 40B)) and List B articles (section 40C)). The sub-section (b) offence is strongly formed on the sub-section (a) offence, in that the “bringing,” “throwing” or even “conveying” is literally done by a different individual at the occurrence of a defendant. This is a person "who causes" the idea of “bringing’, “throwing” or otherwise “conveying” (Chitty 2006, p. 305). Even though there is again a nonexistence of express mens rea language, the apparent deduction is that the source of those trials is an intentional act. Therefore, sub-section (c) is focused mainly with the idea of leaving a listed article in any place with the express mens rea element of "intending it to come into the possession of a prisoner". This could either be inside or outside a prison. That is a more precise intent than any other fundamental mens rea element of understanding that is supposed to be incidental as part of the sub-section (a) offence. Nevertheless, such precise intent is not in any way incompatible with a mens rea element in sub-section (a): on the dissimilar, an individual who stays within prison a forbidden article be determined to come into the ownership of any prisoner, definitely will almost indeed by now have either committed an offence within sub-sections (a) or (b) or even be complicit with another individual who has caused the offense. The main idea behind the whole process is that it allows for the likelihood that it is made of somebody who has unknowingly brought a banned article into prison (Chitty 2006, pp. 315-319). The important issue about sub-section (c) is that it also transacts with the case that is not presented for within the sub-sections (a) and (b), where the article in question is left outside the prison. In such a case as explained above the supplementary precise intent required is essential in bringing the occurred offence back to the issue concerning the regulation of prison security. In conclusion, the sub-section (d) also is enclosed with an express and definite mens rea element, "knowing a person to be a prisoner". Such element is apparently required for the purpose of dealing with cases involving the act of issuing outlawed articles to prisoners, who are outside prison on short notice. Therefore, the appraisal of all the acts considered under section 40C(1) (or section 40B(1)) suggests that none of them are anticipated to be offences of absolute liability. Bibliography Chitty Joseph, A treatise on the law of contracts, New York: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, pp. 304-376. England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions, retrieved on 10th January 2011 from: http://bit.ly/gm9vIw. Blackstone’s Criminal Practice Bulletin: Criminal Letter, issued 4th, July 2010, retrieved on 10th, January 2011 from: http://bit.ly/fCjPBO. Read More