Effects of Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Requirements on Relationships in Atlantic Jurisdictions - Research Paper Example

O1 Table of Contents TITLE OF RESEARCH 2 INTRODUCTION 3 LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING……………………...5 UK’S LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 6 OVERVIEW OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS 2007 7 USA’S LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 9 THE EFFECTS OF ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS ………………………………………………………12 CASE STUDIES ON THE IMPACT ON PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS…………15 P V. P 15 BOWMAN V. FELS 17 COMPARISON WITH BELGIAN CASE…………………………………………………21 CONCLUSIONS …………………………………………………………………………….23 BIBLIOGRAPHY 24 ANALYSING LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES AND THE EFFECTS OF ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN ACROSS ATLANTIC JURISDICTIONS I.E., PRIMARILY UK AND USA. INTRODUCTION In recent years, money laundering has emerged as a major threat to financial security on a global front and this threat is sometimes tied in with the even more menacing threat of financial terrorism. To be able to understand this threat of money laundering, a proper definition is necessary. Money laundering refers to the process whereby criminals attempt to hide the true ownership and origin of the proceeds of their criminal activities so as to legitimize it.1 When money laundering is successful, the money effectively loses its criminality and seems legitimate. A vast majority of the crimes that fuel money laundering include drugs, illegal arms, prostitution, insider trading, computer fraud, embezzlement and bribery among others.2 These criminal activities generate great sums of money and thus the incentive to engage in money laundering is considerable. If a certain criminal activity creates significant profits, the group or individual involved is forced to use a method to control the funds without drawing attention to the activity and this is accomplished through moving the funds to a less suspicious area, disguising the sources or changing the form. All in all, the main objectives of the money launderer is to: put his finances within the financial system while not arousing suspicion; move his money around in a chain of intricate transactions to make it difficult to find out the original source; and finally to return the money into the financial business system to make it appear to be legitimate assets or funds.3 Evidently, the complexity inherent in the process in addition to the sheer determination of money launderers with plenty at stake means that identifying and curtailing money laundering is oftentimes a very difficult task. The international scope of money laundering only makes its control more difficult. As such, anti- money laundering legislation has been drafted in various countries across the globe to put a stop to this vice. An in-depth analysis into the various legislative approaches that have been used by these countries (particularly in the US and UK) is necessary to get an understanding on how money laundering is controlled is necessary and therefore the following discussion will focus on these approaches, In addition, the discussion will focus on the effects of anti money laundering reporting requirements on professional relationships in and across Atlantic jurisdictions and recommendations for improving them. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING To effectively combat anti- money laundering, an international effort is required due to the global nature of this crime. Central to the international effort against anti- money are three main bodies- the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Commonwealth Secretariat and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The three bodies came together in 2003 and came up with model provisions against money laundering, proceeds of crime, the financing of terrorism and civil forfeiture and these model provisions serve as a basis for government authorities as they decide upon the legislation to be drafted into their own domestic law. The UNODC released the Model Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing Bill as part of its bid to help individual jurisdictions set up or improve their own legislation in line with internationally accepted standards. These model provisions were updated in 2009 and together with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations and best practices replace the UNODC Model of 2003. 4 These model provisions are crucial as a standard resource for individual countries/ jurisdictions in coming up with effective legislation that deal with money laundering and the increasingly commonplace menace of terrorism financing. Used together, the provisions strengthen existing standards and also integrate a legislative foundation for the several requirements contained in the FATF 40+9 Recommendations the various international instruments.5 It is against this common international backdrop that individual jurisdictions are able to improve upon their local legislation while at the same time having the surety that their anti money laundering efforts have the support of the international community. UK’s LEGISLATIVE APPROACH: The United Kingdom is one country that has been at the forefront of anti money laundering efforts for a long time due to its prominent role in the international community as well as its vulnerability to terrorism and money laundering. As such, it has continually drafted pieces of legislation to counter money laundering of the years such as the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The UK constantly contends with grave and ever changing threats from crime and terrorism with money being the main engine of both vices. To stay ahead of the criminals, the UK government has to identify, disrupt and put off crime and terrorism through a variety of methods such as restricting access to the financial system by criminals. As crimes of this nature become increasingly sophisticated and complex, it becomes imperative on individual governments to constantly upgrade their legislation in line with the increasing threats. The UK government is alive to this fact and resultantly, drafted a new anti money laundering legislation- the Money Laundering Regulation 2007.6 This latest piece of legislations adopts a more risk- based approach to anti money laundering efforts. This is especially with regards to the manner in which a regulated entity implements customer due diligence, enhanced due diligence and on-going monitoring.7 OVERVIEW OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS 2007 The following is a summary of the key provisions in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007: The Businesses Covered: One of the main changes is in relation to the scope of businesses covered which saw a major increase to cover registered businesses, several non-authorized, businesses as well as non- regulated businesses. This is covered as part of Regulation 1.8 Customer due diligence measures: Under Regulation 5, businesses have to enforce thorough checks on clients prior to opening any facilities. In addition, greater due diligence is required for high-risk clients particularly the ones with businesses that involve large sums of money or those involved in cross-border sales. Further to that, ongoing due diligence structures are required to be kept in place and this involves more detailed and regular client audits. Under Regulation 5(2), there are regulations in which there are obligations to identify the beneficial owner of client partnerships, trusts and companies. Lastly, customer due diligence under this regulation encompasses getting information concerning the purpose and planned business relationship nature.9 Simplified due diligence: Simplified due diligence refers to the fact that only the relevant people are required to get information concerning whether or not evidence a client falls under one of the particular categories that applies to simplified customer due diligence. The simplified due diligence under Regulation 13 applies to businesses that have securities which are listed on a regulated market; financial or credit institutions; some independent legal professionals; transactions in which child trust funds are involved; public authorities inside the UK; among others. 10After there have been reasonable grounds for believing that a transaction, product, business or customer belongs to one of these categories, then simplified due diligence ca be carried out when developing a business relationship.11 Risk- based approach: The regulations employ a risk-based approach to supervision where various tools are allowed when evaluating the anti-money laundering controls used by registered businesses such as thematic work, questionnaires and mystery shoppers. Offences: Violators of these regulations may be criminally liable to fines and if convicted, they are even liable to imprisonment for two years at the most, or both a fine and imprisonment. Under Regulation 45(2) a court is obligated take into account advice provided by a supervisory authority, permitted by Treasury and published in a way that is accepted by the Treasury. 12 USA’S LEGISLATIVE APPROACH The US legislative policy enacted to prevent money laundering and terrorist finance is considerably based on the reporting requirements placed on financial and credit institutions. The main pieces of legislation are the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and the USA PATRIOT Act 2001. In 1970, the US Congress approved the Bank Secrecy Act and with that it became the first set of laws to combat money laundering in the country. Under the Act, businesses are required to keep records as well as file reports which are expected to be very useful in relation to tax, criminal and regulatory issues. Law enforcement agencies, both on the domestic front and international ones, heavily use the documents which are filed by these businesses as part of the BSA regulations in identifying, detecting and deterring money laundering regardless of if it is being used for the maintenance of criminal activities in general, tax evasion, terrorism, and the like.13 Within the Bank Secrecy Act (1970), there are several reporting requirements: Currency Transaction Reports: Businesses that get amounts in excess of $10,000 in cash during one single transaction have to file IRS Form 8300 15 days after the receipt of the cash or earlier.14 Suspicious Activities Reports: Under the Act, if the business obtains money from a customer when the business suspects or knows that the money has been obtained illegally they have to file a Suspicious Activity Report no later than 30 days after the transaction.15 Anti-Money Laundering Compliance: Businesses are obligated to write anti-money laundering compliance policies and give independent audit of their anti-money laundering policies to ensure conformity to the Bank Secrecy Act. 16 The USA Patriot Act is the other anti- money laundering legislation and it not only complements the reporting obligations but also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose additional money-laundering requirements and controls on financial and credit institutions. The Act setup a chain of regulations which detects terrorist finance before its amalgamation into the financial system.17 Under the Act, financial institutions are required to file a suspicious activity report (SAR) to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN). A SAR has been defined as a “piece of information, which alerts law enforcement agencies that certain customer activity is in some way suspicious and might indicate money laundering or terrorist financing.” The new reporting requirements impose significant administrative burdens on financial institutions that already had to comply with reporting requirements under the Banking Secrecy Act 1970. The USA PATRIOT Act 2001 has already led to an increased level of record-keeping, report filing, and internal policing requirements. In 2006, FINCEN reported that US financial institutions filed 919,230 SARs, an increase of 37 per cent when compared to the number of reports filed in 2004.18 The imposition of more mandatory reporting requirements was inevitable following the attacks of 9/11 because one of the terrorists had been the subject of a SAR. In relation to provisions regarding reports of transactions above a specified amount, US law has clear guidelines. Before suspicious transaction reports became the international standard, countries with money laundering prevention systems relied on the analysis of large transactions to detect criminal activity. In the USA financial institutions must report all cash transactions above $10,000 to central location supervised by FinCEN (unless exempted). In addition to the two pieces of legislation, the anti- money laundering scope is much wider. In 2007, the U.S. National Money Laundering Strategy was initiated. The 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy was an initiative of the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury and Justice who collaborated on coming up with the strategy that outlines the various measures the US government uses to fight money laundering and terrorist financing. Within the 2007 Strategy, the main vulnerabilities and threats pointed out by the 2006 Money Laundering Threat Assessment which had been tasked with the duty of investigating the latest techniques that criminals and terrorists employ to make money illegally, move this money and later launder it. It was the first assessment of its kind and helped strengthen the anti money laundering cause immensely.19 The 2007 Strategy built upon the programs initiated by earlier National Money Laundering Strategies. In addition to fighting money laundering locally, one of the main objectives of the 2007 Strategy was to level the playing ground on the international stage to ensure that U.S. financial institutions were not at a disadvantaged point in relation to the enforcement of standards and controls to fight money laundering. To prevent this, the U S government is in constant collaboration with international bodies to ensure that their legislative efforts are in tandem with the rest of the world. THE EFFECTS OF ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN AND ACROSS ATLANTIC JURISDICTIONS (PRIMARILY THE UK AND USA) The benefits of AML legislation cannot be gainsaid and indeed, they serve as major repellents to anyone intending on committing money laundering and related crimes. Nevertheless, the more stringent these laws become, the greater the negative impact they have on professional relationships. One of the negative effects of existing AML legislation is in relation to the fate of legal professional privilege. This is especially evident in the UK. For instance, under s333 (3) of the previous POCA (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) a solicitor was permitted to reveal to his client whether a relevant report was made to the financial intelligence unit. Under the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, however, two categories of professional legal advisers have been developed whereby for solicitors involved in unregulated activities, the previous tipping off offence and exceptions remain applicable. Yet, for solicitors involved in the regulated sector, new exceptions are applicable in instances when disclosures are made so as to dissuade the client from involving themselves in behaviours that can be termed as an offence under the regulations.20 This creates major problems since solicitors usually engage in both regulated and unregulated activities. The changes to the tipping off amendments are very harmful to professional relationships. In truth, the UK Money Laundering Regulations 2007 aim to restrict the use of professional services for money laundering by insisting that professionals know who their clients are while at the same time monitoring the use of their services. Further to that, the ability to use discretion when discussing issues related to the case of their client is removed when the solicitor is undertaking regulated activities.21 In relation to the regulations on customer due diligence current legislation has taken two steps backward. Previously, the law stipulated that solicitors were not required to carry out client identification if a business relationship had been established prior to 1 March 2004 unless was a credible suspicion that money laundering had taken place.22 This exemption was excluded from Money Laundering Regulations 2007 whereby under Regulation 5(2), regulated persons are required to use measures of customer due diligence at correct times to current customers through a risk-sensitive approach. For most businesses a majority of their customer base that existed before 1 March 2004 are yet to undergo CDD procedures due to the long standing relationship based on trust that had been established with the clients. The professional relationship that exists between a client and his solicitor is one that is based on trust and if this trust has already been created, solicitors maintain their relationship with the clients for a long time. To require these same solicitors turn around and ask their existing clients to verify whether they are who they have been saying they are compromises that relationship based on trust and does noting for the fight against money laundering. In fact, it is such an expensive process that the money used in its implementation should otherwise be used in other areas of greater risk. In addition, of greater worry is that this risk assessment of the clients carries on for the entirety of the relationship which proves to be quite cumbersome. And, if this is not enough the regulations require the business to undertake strict investigations about who the real client is thus in the cases of limited companies they are forced to establish who the majority holder of the shares is in the company. Also when involved in Trusts the business has to find out who is the main beneficiary of the Trust. The effect of all these regulations is that developing new relationships between clients and solicitors has been made a lot more cumbersome and expensive than it was before. 23 In the US, the scenario is similar whereby the effect of reporting requirements has largely been negative especially as pertaining to the balance that has to be struck with privacy laws. The reporting of information or the disclosure of records to authorities involves information that is treated confidentially under the Bank Secrecy Act 1970. 24Yet, the regulations require disclosure when necessary. This lack of confidentiality makes it difficult to establish a trust based relationship with the clients and the solicitors thereby putting a strain on the professional relationship. CASE STUDIES ON THE IMPACT ON PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: P v. P BREIF FACTS OF THE CASE: The implications of the Proceeds of Crime Act for the practice of lawyers were first tested five years ago in P v P. 25 On the face of it, P v P was a routine ancillary relief case in family proceedings. It was jerked into prominence, however, when the wife's solicitors suspected that part of the husband's assets was derived from untaxed income and was therefore criminal property.26 The lawyers became anxious that they might be “concerned in an arrangement” under s.328, and, being prudent, availed themselves of the defence under s.328 and disclosed their suspicions to NCIS (the National Criminal Intelligence Service). However, the solicitors, after informing NCIS, did not hear from them, and, receiving no consent and no doubt becoming increasingly desperate as the date for the financial dispute resolution approached, repeatedly tried to contact them. On the one occasion they managed to obtain any advice, by telephone, it was misleading. Finally, they sought urgent guidance from the court. POINT OF LAW IN THE CASE – A BIG CONCERN FOR LAWYERS: The question for the lawyers (and lawyers in general) was therefore whether the conduct of legal proceedings which relate to money which might be criminal property constitutes “being concerned in an arrangement” under s.328. There was a further acute problem: family lawyers in ancillary proceedings are under a duty of full and frank disclosure and all information about the circumstances of the parties must be disclosed to the court and to the other party. But if the information that facts about the husband's affairs had been reported to NCIS were disclosed, the husband would be “tipped off”, and the lawyers would potentially be liable for another offence, although in the case of the tipping-off offence the defence of legal professional privilege is available, unless the work is done “with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose”. It was a question, therefore, whether the defence would be available in these circumstances. That question would depend on whose purpose it is, the client's (or here, third party's) or the lawyer's. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, the President of the Family Division, commenting on the “immense confusion and disruption” caused by POCA to family proceedings, concluded that lawyers might indeed be concerned in an arrangement, in fact, that there was a range of ways in which this might happen, including when lawyers were negotiating in family proceedings. Since no defence of legal professional privilege is provided under the section, a lawyer who knows of or suspects money laundering should indeed disclose his suspicions to NCIS and seek consent for the arrangement. However, the court went on to hold that since the defence of privilege was available under the tipping-off offence, the wife's legal advisers would be free to inform their client and their opponents that a disclosure had been made to NCIS. The decision-that lawyers would be committing the arrangement offence (and potentially liable for imprisonment) unless they disclosed their suspicions about their clients or other parties in legal proceedings caused consternation among English lawyers. It caused “very great difficulties in solicitors' offices and barristers' chambers and in the orderly conduct of contested litigation through the country” and resulted in a huge number of suspicious activity reports to NCIS from lawyers. BOWMAN V. FELS Lawyers predictably reacted strongly against the decision and their professional groups launched a challenge which came before the Court of Appeal in the case of Bowman v Fels.27 Because of the importance of the issues for the legal profession, the Law Society and the Bar (and NCIS also) were represented at the hearing, as indeed, they had been, though hastily, in P v P. BRIEF FACTS: Bowman v Fels was again a property dispute between a couples, with similar facts to P v P, save that the couple were not married. Again, the lawyers suspected the defendant of obtaining criminal property by his financial dealings and notified NCIS of their suspicions. In fact, by the time that the case came before the Court of Appeal, the litigation had already been settled, but the court decided that the issue was of such great public importance, involving an important and difficult point of law arising from the interpretation of a recent statute and concerning a large number of similar cases, that it could be entertained by the court. POINTS OF LAW INVOLVED / QUESTIONS OF APPLICABILITY TO LAWYERS The important and difficult point of law was again the question of the applicability to lawyers of s.328, the “arrangement” offence. Does the section apply to the ordinary conduct of legal proceedings or any aspect of such conduct? And again, the question of legal professional privilege, though not available under the section, needed to be considered. Could Parliament have intended to override the important principles underlying legal professional privilege without using clear words to that effect? The Court of Appeal considered the issues in great depth. The single judgment, to which all the judges had substantially contributed, was given by Brooke L.J. The judgment, naturally, related the English legislation to the European Directives, the English Act had to be interpreted “as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter”, and analysed the relevant provisions of both rigorously. The main discussion centred on s.328 and the word that very vague word “arrangement”, which is not taken from the Directive itself. The relevant mandatory parts of the Directive are Arts 6 and 7. Article 6, as we have seen, requires institutions and persons subject to the relevant Directive, that is, those “ legal or natural persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities” specified in Art.2a to be obliged to report to the authorities “any fact which might be an indication of money laundering” . Article 6(3) sets out the exemption for lawyers: “in the course of ascertaining the legal position for their client or performing their task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning judicial proceedings, including advice on instituting or avoiding proceedings, whether such information is received or obtained before, during or after such proceedings” . This is the article which is applied to the regulated sector in England by s.330. Article 7 of the Directive requires that “institutions and persons subject to this Directive refrain from carrying out transactions which they know or suspect to be related to money laundering until they have apprised the authorities …” who may give instructions not to execute the operation. Unlike Art.6, and perhaps oddly, no exemption or legal privilege is set out in this article. The persons to whom both Arts 6 and 7 apply (lawyers carrying out property or financial transactions, for example, accountants and tax advisers) are in the “regulated sector” in England. COURT OBSERVATIONS The court found that s.328 (and its companion offences) is close in subject-matter and spirit to Art.7, apart from the fact that Art.7 is restricted to persons subject to the Directive, whereas the section applies generally. The word “arrangement” in the Act therefore relates to the word “transactions” in Art.7. The court considered whether Art.7 could have been intended to apply to transactions in general, or merely to those in activities subject to the Directive of dealing with financial or corporate transactions. Similarly, the fact that there was no defence of privilege included in s.328 was a strong argument that the concept of “being concerned in an arrangement” should also be interpreted restrictively. The court concluded that “… Parliament cannot have intended that proceedings or steps taken by lawyers in order to determine or secure legal rights and remedies for their clients should involve them in ‘ becoming concerned in an arrangement … which facilitates the acquisition, retention, use of control of criminal property’ , even if they suspected that the outcome of such proceedings might have such an effect.” 28 In summarizing the US case study, it is evident that although the 2002 Act does not produce major change from its predecessor (notably the reliance upon suspicion-based reporting and the interesting defence of having a reasonable excuse for failing to make the required disclosure), PoCA 2002 nevertheless identifies some important and difficult issues. It is interesting that if any one (persons or institutions) who negligently fails to report their knowledge or suspicion of money laundering will be punished heavily by the courts. It is particularly disappointing that there are variable standards of reporting practice amongst members of the regulated sector as a whole. It is the unavoidable truth that the number of disclosures and reports made to the OCA will increase sharply. The point of concern is that whether the SOCA or FinCEN in case of USA has the resources to deal effectively with the likely increase, and moreover whether the “leave no stone unturned” approach to the reporting system will, in reality, lead to an improvement of the quality of the disclosures made. Undoubtedly, the answers to these problems will not be as easy as one would wish, and if one is hoping to see the threat to financial system posed by money laundering is avoided, one must hope that the Government's new legislative framework is successful in persuading those disbelievers within the regulated sector that the suspicions-based reporting regime is effective. In any event, it is clear that challenging times lie ahead for those professionals, whether they are bankers, accountants or lawyers, affected by the provisions of the PCA 2002. It is also encouraging to have this firm reassertion of the importance of legal professional privilege in the law. At the same time, it is worth noting that the privilege is protected under s.330, it by no means exactly corresponds to the exemption provided for lawyers conducting legal proceedings under Art.6.29 It is in fact considerably narrower than the European exemption, if only because of the limitation on its application which is set out in the statute, which states that privilege applies unless “the information … is given with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose”. 30 COMPARISON WITH BELGIAN CASE- EXCEPTION PROVIDED TO LEGAL COUNSELLOR UNTIL AND UNLESS PARTICIPATED WITH CRIMINAL PURPOSE This probably means a criminal purpose, not just of the lawyer, but also of the client, or even a third party, which purpose may well be quite unknown to the lawyer. The European version, expressed in the Belgian case and in the Directive, is that the exemption applies: “ … unless the legal counsellor is taking part in money laundering activities, the legal advice is provided for money laundering purposes, or the lawyer knows that the client is seeking legal advice for money laundering purposes”.31 The greater protection for the advocate and professional relationships are secured here. RELIEF FELT AFTER THE JUDGEMENTS OF BOWMAN V. FELS The result of Bowman v Fels is that lawyers, while still subject to the disclosing requirements of s.330, and with the protection of legal professional privilege, where appropriate, are not subject to the draconian effect of s.328 in the normal conduct of legal proceedings. The relief felt by the legal profession is well indicated by the fact that, as a result (probably) of Bowman v Fels, the number of SARs (suspicious activity reports) filed with the police by solicitors reduced from 18,731 in 2004 to 9,608 in 2005.32 For English professionals, it is the question of reporting mere suspicions imposed on the regulated sector which makes the situation critically difficult. The requirements of s.330 POCA go considerably further than the requirements of the European legislation in Art.6 of the Directive. It provides that a person in the regulated sector commits an offence “if he knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting” that another person is engaged in money laundering. The offence of “failing to disclose”, making a failure a positive offence, punishable with up to five years' imprisonment, is novel in English law. Another novelty, even more significant, is the mens rea, which is cast in such very wide terms. Previous legislation, which had specified “knows or suspects” as the mens rea, had attracted academic criticism, partly because it seemed as if it might involve a reversal of the burden of proof. The phrase “reasonable cause to suspect”, now added to the requirements, simply covers every possible contingency--it is breathtakingly wide. CONCLUSION In conclusion, it is clear that there have been many strides made on the global front with regards to anti- money laundering legislation. This can be attributed to the ever increasing threats of money laundering and financial terrorism that have escalated during this millennium. As such, legislations such as The Patriotism Act 2001 for the U S and the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 for the U K have been enacted. Despite the necessity of such legislation, there have been certain challenges experienced. The reporting requirements, for one, have largely been negative, being both cumbersome and expensive and serving to put a strain on the professional relationships that exist between solicitors and their clients. To correct this, revisions need to be made to existing legislation, particularly to the UK regulations; to loosen up the stringent reporting requirements and this can only be accomplished if all the stakeholders are involved in the legislative process. This will ensure that money laundering efforts are improved while at the same time maintaining healthy professional relationships that are crucial in ensuring the financial prosperity of the financial system as a whole. BIBLIOGRAPHY ACCA. 2009. Review of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. Retrieved January 11, 2010 from http://www.accaglobal.com/general/activities/policy_papers/archive/business/cdr909 Bazley, J., & Winch, D. (2004). Money Laundering for Lawyers. East Kilbride: LexisNexis UK. Bennet, T. (2007). 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