Efforts by the Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe to Revise Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution - Coursework Example

Efforts by the Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe to revise Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution Among the most powerful countries in contemporaryinternational relations, the internal situation and external positioning of Japan is unique. By being one of the most influential actors in terms of economic development, this state on the highest level rejected to enter into the war and maintain its own army. In this context, it is common to believe that the main strength of Japan is based on its economic innovation power and cultural expansion of anime, sushi, and other products, exotic for European and American customers. Nevertheless, in the recent years the rise of China significantly challenges the might of Japan. In these circumstances, the Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe proclaimed his course on transformation within this country. In addition to economic policy (titled by his name Abenomics), this ruler has certain incentives towards the change of Japan’s military status. All these efforts have an aim to enable Japan’s internal stability, protect its sovereignty, and maintain the important role in international relations. In this context, the given essay investigates three levels of implication in context of Article 9 revision. Thus, domestically, regionally, and internationally it is evident that such a reformation challenges current balance of powers and has a potential to complicate already existing crisis in Asian region in general and in Japan in particular. To start with, the pacifist spirit of Article 9 is important for the internal political stability of Japan. Precisely, from two parts of Article 9 (namely, denouncing war and agreement not to maintain of military forces) Abe’s purpose is to change only the latter section. In this context, it is important to mention that the internal situation with army in Japan has never been as straightforward as it is on the constitutional paper. In fact, Japan has always owned its Self Defense Forces (JSDF) that protect country’s sovereignty but does not enable its involvement in any collaborations on protection collective security. In the opinion of David McArthur, the very existence of these forces is highly controversial to the spirit of Article 9, mainly as it is “funded by the fifth largest military budget in the world” (197). Nevertheless, their existence is a fact that defines Japan’s reality for years. Thus, current discussion on remilitarization is crucial but “is less radical than some might assume” (Siddiqui 3). In other words, proclamation of any kind of militarization does not change the internal situation to the core. Nevertheless, its potential impact should not be underestimated. In this context, the very situation of governmental proposals to constitutional reforms disregards judicial power of Supreme Court; hence, it endangers the very political balance between independent branches in the Japan (McArthur 202-203). Moreover, there exists an opposition from Japanese Left in the parliamentary environment and there are evident several nation-wide protest against Abe’s decision (Siddiqui 7). Concerning public opinion, the fact that it is shifting on defense issues (Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin 6) proves that the constitutional change is rather a political manipulation than a necessity for Japanese society. Therefore, it is reasonable to state that governmental proposal to remilitarize Japan is dangerous for this country itself; in particular, it does not change the situation with self-defense but simply provides imbalance in all the levels of Japan’s political system. Furthermore, regional situation in Asia currently demonstrates its unpredictability; thus, rapid change of military status of one country has a potential to cause instability for the whole region. In this context, Japan for years was the only actor that on the highest level possessed its non-involvement in internal Asian conflicts and gained respect for that. Historically, the appearance of Article 9 served as “an absolute safeguard to prevent Japan from ever again succumbing neighbors as it had prior to and during World War II (McArthur 199). Hence, such an untypical for Western culture legislative act above all demonstrated Japan’s non-conflict position in foreign policy; consequently, the level of trust became higher and the regional cooperation after cruel war became possible. However, current situation in the region demonstrates “absence in trust and competing interests” (Siddiqui 3). In this context, from the very first days in office, Abe postulated his strict position in relations with North Korea by closing ports, sanctions, and closing borders for visits from this country (Hughes and Krauss 166). In addition, Abe systematically destroys the very ability of cooperation with rising China. In fact, Abe’s foreign policy is as controversial and nationalist as Koizumi’s one, who had worsen Japan-China relations after visiting Yasukuni (Hughes and Krauss). In his turn, Abe “is clearly to use these universal values [freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law] as a means to demonstrate to China that Japan can construct a regional counter-coalition to it, including India” (Hughes and Krauss 170). In the given uncertainty and rising antagonism, there appear debates even on changing Japan’s international status to nuclear state one (Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin). In addition to the above-mentioned list of challenged attitudes in Asian region, McArthur mentions unclear relations with South Korea. Precisely, he believes that “peoples and political leaders of those countries have not forgotten Japan’s actions of brutal imperialism during World War II, and they remain suspicious and antipathetic towards Japan to this day” (McArthur204-205). In general, it is evident that the whole situation around the modification of Article 9 can have severe consequences for the regional positioning of Japan. In the given circumstances of unresolved historical disputes and changing relations within the region, any clarification of confrontation can harm the whole region’s security. Thus, Abe’s policy can be compared to the delayed-time bomb for Asian region, Finally, in the dimension of international relations close ties between Japan and USA give rise to numerous concerns that its militarization will lead to strengthening of American influence in the region. In characterization of Japan’s traditional position over the years, Hughes and Krauss use such epithets as “reactive state, passive in security policy, ‘free-riding’ on US power” (159). In this context, such a resonance around this constitutional change inevitably brings to the forefront the question of American benefit of Japanese militarization. In a retrospective, from the very establishment of JSDF Supreme Court left all its trials unresolved because of inability to discuss with the U.S. government in an open and strict manner (McArthur 201). In these circumstances, Japan’s pacifism demonstrates that it at least will not try to support USA by its own troops (Hughes and Krauss 167). In other words, Article 9 provides some guarantees and predictability of Japanese non-involvement in American military campaigns. And so, abandoning of this neutral position is challenging for the whole world. In context of Abe’s foreign policy, his strict position was fruitful for the US; namely, “Japan revealed itself to be an increasingly ‘normal’ ally for the US, expressing greater solidarity with the US, and willing to provide not just bases but also military assets at the disposal of US-led ‘coalitions of the willing’” (Hughes and Krauss 167). Therefore, traditionally close relations lead to the suspicion of solely American interest in Japan’s militarization. Precisely, McArthur defends an opinion that “under pressure from the United States government to support its military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the politically dominant Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has pushed in recent years to amend Article 9” (202). However, the further perspective of gaining nuclear status by Japan is challenging even for USA due to its uncontrollable technological development (Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin 6). In general, there is no wide support of Japan’s constitutional change in international scientific environment. Moreover, Japanese people are known to feel their unusualness; consequently, the ambition to turn into “‘normal’ state” (Hughes and Krauss 158) has rather an emotional than rational purpose. Hence, the outcome of change in Article 9 can unpredictable even for Abe himself, as his purpose to increase Japan’s weight and prestige in international relations can turn to manifestation of its further dependence on USA. In order to sum up, Abe’s decision to revise Article 9 of Japan’s constitution has a wide context of implications and leads to numerous negative reactions on different levels. First, within the country militarization leads to the challenging of democracy, as it causes disbalance between main branches of power and provokes national protests. Secondly, within the Asian region Japanese army can provoke an open conflict in the situation when the relations with neighbors are already blundered by historical disputes and economic competition. Finally, on the global scale the previously established dependence on USA creates a suspicion that Abe’s willingness to take part in collective military campaign was dictated by the external factors. Thus, the ambitious plan to turn Japan into ‘normal state’ by transforming JSDF into the real army can turn into the dangerous act. Potentially, it can destroy already fragile balance both in internal and external dimensions of Japan’s existence. Works Cited: Chanlett-Avery, E. and Nikitin, M. “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests.” Congressional Research Service, 19 Feb. 2009. Web. 15 Jan. 2015. Hughes, C. and Krauss, E. “Japan’s New Security Agenda (US-Japan Alliance Futures: Security Policies, US Challenges).” Survival 49.2 (2007): 157-176. Print. McArthur, D. “Constitutional Transformation and Its Implications for Japanese Pacifist Democracy.” Santa Clara Journal of International Law 7.1 (2009): 197-206. Print. Siddiqui, S. “Japan Collective Self Defence.” Aljazeera Center for Studies, 21 Aug. 2013. Web. 15 Jan. 2015. Read More