Relationship Between Actus Reus and Mens Rea - Report Example

Relationship between Actus Reus and Mens Rea Introduction Criminal culpability, per se, necessitates deliberate action, general capa for behavingrationally, and the implicit or explicit presence of mens rea. This is due to the fact that bodily movement is provided with a meaning by these mental states. In the first instance, the mental states associated with deliberate bodily movements indicate whether the agent had actually violated an expectation by purposefully moving his body, thereby demonstrating his outlook towards the welfare and rights of others. It is necessary to realise the significance of mental states, as they are crucial for comprehending an action and its moral significance.1 Some of the features associated with criminal culpability are the presence of intentional bodily movement that produces harm, and general rational capacity. The latter is assumed to be integral to criminal culpability. However, it can be contested by claiming the presence of legal insanity and other such affirmative defences. An important consideration, in this context, is that regarding harm that is purely accidental and non-negligent. Such harm could be the outcome of intentional movements carried out by a totally rational individual.2 The criminal law does not punish such harm, as the person causing the harm has not committed any wrong. Mens rea denotes the guilty mind, and in technical parlance it connotes the prerequisite of criminal liability associated with the mental state of the accused when he carried out the actus reus of the offence. Consequently, the mens rea deemed adequate for murder is general intent, which is usually stated as a prohibition on the deliberate killing of another person.3 The mental state of the accused, which is necessary for being held guilty of this variety of murder, is described by the term intentional. The phrase ‘killing another person’ describes the following. First, the action to be performed by an individual to render him guilty of murder, this constitutes the actus reus requirement. Second, the form assumed by the accused’s belief or intention to be deemed guilty of murder, which is the mens rea requirement. Therefore, the accused should have killed another person with the intention or belief that his act would result in death.4 In addition, the principle of correspondence requires each element of the actus reus to have a corresponding mens rea. Thus, when the actus reus of the offence is the causing of injury, the associated mens rea has to be recklessness or intention regarding the causing of injury.5 As such, an individual is culpable with regard to the harm that he decides to risk or cause. As such, the relationship between actus reus and mens rea is addressed by the correspondence principle. When an offence is described with regard to certain outcomes and circumstances, then the mental element has to correspond to the offence, with reference to those circumstances or consequences. Despite the absence of moral fault, liability for a mens rea offence is frequently incurred. In R v Kingston,6 the defendant was offered a drugged drink, which had a disinhibiting effect upon him. Thereafter, he was led into a room with a drugged juvenile in it. Although, the defendant had no previous record of deviant conduct, he performed certain lewd acts upon the unconscious juvenile.7 The defendant was charged with indecent assault, and he stated that he was drugged unawares, in his defence. The trial court convicted him for indecent assault. However, the Court of Appeal ruled that Kingston’s intent had not been criminal, which directly correlated the finding of mens rea to considerations of fault. At the House of Lords, the conviction of Kingston was restored. Their Lordships ruled that the absence of blame did not involve the absence of mens rea. Mustill LJ, held that mens rea merely required the mental element stipulated in the definition of the crime to be present.8 As no recognised defence could be presented by Kingston, his conviction had to be restored. Thus, mens rea is insufficient for establishing fault. All the same, an element of mens rea is essential for treating a defendant as being liable for the outcomes of his actions. In Williamson v Norris, Russell LJ declared that as per English law, a crime could not be committed without mens rea.9 However, it would be incorrect to conclude that every actus reus element necessitates a corresponding requirement of mens rea. Under certain circumstances, it may be justified to determine the presence of constructive liability. Thus, in the offence of dangerous driving having the outcome of death, it is not necessary to demonstrate mens rea regarding the occurrence of death. As such, culpability with respect to death has to be determined with regard to the entire offence. 10 A person who kills another due to his dangerous driving is in the usual course, culpable with respect to that death, due to the fact that it is precisely such danger that renders it wrong to engage in dangerous driving.11 Constructive Liability In several instances, English law has not adopted the principle of correspondence. Thus, in several cases, individuals have been held liable for offences, despite not having full mens rea with respect to the actus reus. Such instances have been termed as crimes that consist of constructive liability. For example, a component of Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, consists of causing grievous bodily harm. The principle of correspondence, in this context, would require the mens rea of this offence to be the deliberate of reckless infliction of grievous bodily harm.12 However, the crime involved is one of constructive liability, since the sole mens rea necessary is the presence of intention or recklessness regarding the causing of bodily harm. Moreover, those who support the principle of correspondence criticise constructive liability on the grounds that it transforms criminal law into a system, wherein the degree of liability is determined by chance. However, those who oppose strict adherence to the principle of correspondence tend to support constructive crime. From this perspective, the individual who undertakes criminal activity engages in an immoral course of action. The outcomes of such criminal activity cannot be attributed to mere chance.13 When a criminal selects to attack the victim, he creates his own fortune and is therefore liable for any consequent mishap. As such, there are several crimes that do not necessitate mens rea. Some instances are the crimes of strict liability. Moreover, actus reus and mens rea depict tremendous variation, in the exact form assumed by them, from crime to crime. For example, with respect to the crime of attempt, it is necessary to establish that the action of the defendant had the intent of committing the full offence.14 On the other hand, with regard to criminal damage, it is sufficient to prove that the defendant had acted in a reckless manner. In R v Le Brun, the defendant struck his wife on the jaw, rendering her unconscious.15 In order to hide his crime, he lifted her and tried to move her to a place of concealment. Whilst doing so, he dropped her, with the result that she fatally fractured her skull. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter, and his appeal on grounds of absence of coincidence was rejected by the Court of Appeal.16 Moreover, in R v Fagan, the defendant injured a police officer’s foot, by driving his car on to it.17 When the police officer alerted the defendant about this occurrence, the latter used intemperate language and deliberately waited for a few minutes, prior to moving his vehicle away. The defendant appealed his conviction for assault. The court held that the mens rea came into existence the moment that the defendant had decided to let his car rest on the police officer’s foot.18 The defendant’s appeal was therefore dismissed. Furthermore, the difficulty associated with separating the mens rea and actus reus of an offence has been clearly illustrated in the following cases. In R (on the application of Young) v Central Criminal Court,19 the intention of the accused was considered to constitute a material fact. The defendant, in this case, had been accused of dishonestly concealing facts, in violation of Section 47(1) of the Financial Services Act 1986. The court concluded that the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, involved, could not be separated straightforwardly.20 The actus reus included the intention of the accused to engage in dishonest concealment. Furthermore, in R v MB,21 the defendant was accused of voyeurism contrary to the provisions of Section 67(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The relevant act of the accused was the intentional observation of another person carrying out a private act. In addition, the specific objective was to procure sexual gratification for the accused. It was alleged that the appellant, who had a learning disability and the autistic spectrum disorder was accused of indulging in this act, in order to derive sexual gratification. 22 It was the contention of the prosecution that it would suffice to demonstrate that the accused had observed a private act being carried out by the boys. This was accepted by the trial court, which imposed a two-year suspension order upon the accused and directed that he was to be registered on the Sex Offenders Register for a term of five years. During the appeal, in this case, one of the grounds related to whether the jury should have been asked to evaluate whether the element of sexual gratification should have been taken into account, during the trial court proceedings. This would have incorporated a factor of mens rea into the hearing.23 In R v Antoine,24 the House of Lords had stated that it was contradictory to come to a decision regarding the mental state of the defendant, when he was unfit to be tried on account of his being devoid of a normal mental state. This ruling of the House of Lords was taken into account in R v MB. In addition, the Court of Appeal referred to the comments made by Ormerod, on the R v Antoine ruling. These comments declared that the defences of accident, mistake, and self-defence were fundamentally the forswearing of mens rea.25 Therefore, other defences that influenced the mens rea of the accused had to be included in the trial of facts. Whilst permitting this ground of appeal, Aikens LJ observed that the relationship between deliberate observation and the purpose of sexual gratification on the part of the observer was crucial to voyeurism.26 Thus, deliberate observation and the explicit objective of deriving sexual gratification constituted a single activity. In addition, Section 4 A of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, introduces uncertainty in the law. As a consequence, a mentally unfit accused could be accorded less fair treatment than a mentally fit accused. In addition, there exists the very real danger that an inadequate distinction could be drawn between the protection of the vulnerable accused and the criminal responsibility of the person being tried.27 However, it would be inequitable to subject a mentally unfit person to the rigours associated with a criminal trial. At the same time, such individuals should be accorded protection that is not inferior to what is provided to a fit defendant. Several scholars have pointed out that the introduction of defences would serve to further complicate a Section 4A hearing. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to discard such compromise. This perspective provides a perfect summary of the difficulty involved. Thus, a compromise has to be made, whilst striking a balance between the protection of the public and the rights of the unfit. It is to be borne in mind that the unfit individual is a potentially dangerous person. In the majority of the instances, the risk is undertaken by society, as an individual is deemed innocent until it is established that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 28 This attitude should be extended to the unfit, and the possible risk to the public has to be similarly endured. Conclusion According to the case law discussed above, a defendant can be convicted even in the absence of a blameworthy state of mind. Moreover, it is not essential, in offences against the person, for the mens rea to correspond to the actus reus. In addition, there is no necessity for the mens rea, in such cases, to correspond to the actus reus. Bibliography Chan W and Simester AP, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ [2011] 70(2) Cambridge Law Journal 381 Clarkson CMV, Understanding Criminal Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 Financial Services Act 1986 Howard H, ‘Unfitness to Plead and the Trial of Facts: A Critical Review of the Law Commissions Proposals and the Decision in R v MB’ [2012] 76(5) Journal of Criminal Law 421 Loveless J, Complete Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) Moore MS, ‘Actus Reus’ in Joshua Dressler (ed) Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice (Macmillan Reference USA 2002) Morse SJ, ‘Inevitable Mens Rea’ [2003] 27(1) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 51 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 Sexual Offences Act 2003 R v Antoine [2001] AC 340 R (on the application of Young) v Central Criminal Court [2002] EWHC 548 R v Fagan [1968] 3 All ER 442 R v Kingston [1994] 3 WLR 519 R v Le Brun [1991] 3 WLR 653 R v MB [2012] EWCA Crim 770 Williamson v Norris [1899] 1 QB7 Read More