Pepper Versus Hart 1993 - Report Example

PEPPER V. HART 1993 (ENGLAND AND WALES) i. Introduction Over the centuries, there has been a growing attention in mutual law nations in the appeal of a more supple law for the clarification and development of statutes. The European community is the most affected because most countries involve closely in legal matters of neighboring nations that exercise flexibility when it comes to the interpretation of statues. This is among the many issues that form the basis for questioning of different acts, standards and methods in some of the legal systems, especially in England where some of the rulings in past cases prompt desirable re-examination (Stubbs 2006). Unlike Europe, the US, a mutual decree nation, experiences a suppler tactic in statutory interpretation. Some of the law specialists argue that the problem might be that most of the constitutional laws overlook interpretation as a vast facet in statutory provisions. Naturally, the ‘interpretation’ of the statutory laws should cover the comprehensive approach to the issue by evaluating the materials (outside the statute) that should apply, as a practice of legitimacy and in ascertaining the intentions of the parliament (Barnes 1995). One way to establish this is examining the application of past preliminaries and annotations by specialists; however, this requires additional examination of other rules hence requiring the court to contemplate on the law prior to the representation of the decree. Generally, this shows that the interpretation of statutory provisions has a vast basis that requires better understanding for specialists in places like Europe to come up with a solution. Obviously, this does not only affect Europe since in the past there have also been cases where codified law from international conventions becomes part of a nation’s law. All the same, there are different angles that one can view the interpretation as a general aspect of statutory provision but in this paper, the main concern is on the Pepper V Hart case relative to its impact in England and Wales. Today, the ruling of the Pepper V. Hart case brings multiple arguments in most of the European legal systems; in fact, some of the law experts see it as exclusive superfluity because it has noticeably augmented the price of litigation to having diminutive gains. Consequently, the application of such references has resulted to additional urgings especially on the intentions of executives that substitute this with what the legislature or other laws state. Largely, different experts have dissimilar perceptions about the outcomes of the Pepper V. Hart cases depending on the beliefs and knowledge of the European Law. However, according to most professions, it allows the interpretation of an abstruse decree against both the state and the citizen. Secondly, it is a source of inspiration for the courts finding the parliament vague, even when all factors are clear, because the legislature has a different opinion on the matter at hand. Lastly, most people argue that it is an introduction of novel kind of sophistry hence restricting the courts’ ability to take control when conditions alter. Typically, there is a lot to the Pepper V. Hart Case in terms of comprehensive interpretation and statute provisions; nonetheless, the focus of this discussion is on the particular extent that it allows court of England and Wales to draw on extrinsic aids when interpreting the statutory provisions (Baillie 1993). The comprehensive argument entails a closer examination on the notion that it is advantageous to divulge more material that is parliamentary. Principally, the only positivity is that the code of legislative dominion needs extensive exploration of parliament’s intentions. ii. Background of the Pepper V. Hart Case Pepper was an inspector of taxes and filed a lawsuit against Hart; however, the main attention on the cases was on the House of Lord’s ruling on the application of parliamentary history in interpreting statutory provisions. The court recognized that when principal statute is unclear, then depending on the status, it can use statements made in the House of Lords or Commons as part of the reference. This applies as a basis for comprehensive interpretation of the statute’s connotation. This brought a lot of attention because in the past, this kind of stroke in court was illegal and a deliberate breach of legislative license (Bennion 1995). Hart and his colleagues were tutors at one of the local colleges, where they took advantage of one of the institution’s fee initiative. These teachers facilitated the education of their children without paying even half of the required amount for each pupil. The Inland Revenue took charge of the taxing processes according to the Act set a few years back; as a result, there were multiple disagreements on the correct construal of the Finance Act of 1976. The Professional Representatives responsible for evaluating the tax of Hart supported their actions. However, the High Court of England and Court of Appeal of Wales were in full support of the Inland Revenue (CLRI 2009). Due to the indifferences and misunderstandings, the next stop for the case was the House of Lords, and surprisingly, they ruled in favor of Hart but using recorded declarations from Hansard. One of the Lords (Mackay) was against the whole idea claiming that the House made a mistake by considering the recorded statements as admissible evidence. In support of his notion, Mackay added that application of such secondary evidence adds on to expenses and wasted time because it forces the lawyer to take up more tasks of looking up every debate and discussion (Davies 1994). Generally, the House of Lords’ decision was contradictory and different people had differing receptions and arguments concerning the same. All the same, judge had no option but to accept the ruling even though some of the law experts contended that it desecrated laws of substantiation, impaired separation of authority amid the policymakers and legislature and supplementary expenditure in cases (Matthew 1997). Lord Steyn gave one of the most popular lectures based on the Hart V. Pepper case and his argument explored all the necessary facets of the ruling by the House of Lords. However, he was against almost all of their actions, mostly the decision, by attacking the lucidity and permissible concepts behind them. Since the re –assessment by Lord Steyn, most of the jurisdictional pronouncements are against the application of the Pepper V. Hart case by the courts of law (Manknell 2004). Generally, the limitations and changes result from the multiple assessments and analysis that reduce the ruling from this case to a point where it seems hollow. iii. Discussion Parliamentary discussions never applied as admissible evidence in court before the Pepper V. Hart case; however, the argument remains on whether the ruling should apply as a reference in the England and Wales courts. Definitely, to a certain extent courts reviewing of irrational lawmaking puts the legislation at a lower level hence giving the judiciary power over them. Nonetheless, this is a theory discussed by law experts because most of the courts in England and Wales had been more indulgent under the idea that the only people with the necessary knowledge to interpret the legislation are the primal writers (Bennion 2010). Multiple views from Lord Steyn and Lord Wilkinson evaluate the interpretation of statutory provisions based on aspects such as legislature true and force intentions or actions of the courts. Typically, there is no particular conclusion that discusses how England and Wales’ courts could use the ruling of the Pepper V Hart case because of the contradictory laws that should have applied but never did (Pedlars Info 2014). All the same, based on these laws, then legislative statements should not act as admissible material in the court; moreover, the courts should not make decisions such as the ruling solely from such statutory provisions. Reflectively, in any court cases where Hansard applies, only statements help in making some of the conclusions; however, speeches also apply in giving an idea of what certain clauses mean. In the legislature, speeches definitely apply in convincing people the significance of certain divisions depending on the basis of the argument and the minister’s intentions as perceived by the rest of the parliament (Dublin 2000). Nonetheless, there lacks clarity on whether the same should apply in England and Wales courts mostly because the intentions of the sponsoring minister are vague. Naturally, pre-legislative statutes are permissible in some courts that use the basis of the Pepper V. Hart case; however, this is consequential because not all information is admissible such as reports advocating for a certain change in ministerial statements. This is rational because the reports are not actually ministerial statements hence the limitation that their interpretations cannot apply in court. Significantly, one of the critics of the ruling is keen to point out that the interpretation of statutory provisions such as statements (like in the Pepper V. Hart case) has additional costs and takes up a lot of time (Ling 2004). Definitely, this depends on the extent to which the involved parties decide to do the investigation and the type of evidence to look for; all the same, there are additional costs. Moreover, England and Wales’ courts should not base the decision to make an all-inclusive classification of theoretically pertinent material precluded (Dyson 2014). Nonetheless, court has the right to question statutory provisions like the recordings of the Pepper V. Hart case that had some parts cut and some disputes excluded. In fact, Lord Steyn’s criticism on this particular aspect was rational relative to his powerful argument on principle. The interpretation of statutory provisions should take place with the notion that the will of parliament does not stand for the will of the executive. The executive has more power than the legislature, mostly as the policymakers in England and Wales hence in situations where the provision is honourably abstruse the court and all other parties require more input. Legal advisors can play a significant role when relevant because most of the times the interpretation of the legislation might be against them. iv. Conclusion Decisively, there is an upsurge of provision for narrow interpretation permitted on legislative material with a series of discussions by the House of Lords but there still lacks a comprehensive review of the ruling in the Hart case. There are critics of the decision made by Hansard, a result of hastiness, reducing the depth in which court can rely on it. Definitely, there was no consideration of most legal aspects and technology acted as a barrier to the necessary judicial protocols (Kennedy 2005). The interpretation of statutory provisions is now more of a burden because of the enquiries made in the Pepper V. Hart case; moreover, the court never upheld the fundamental rights leading to significant concerns like those of Lord Steyn. All the same, extent to which extrinsic aids apply when interpreting statutory provisions relative to the case depends on the context on the evidence and the core references. Typically, where parliament is justly vague, the extrinsic aids should only apply after a clear examination of parliament’s primal intentions by the law. Bibliography Barnes, J. 1995, ‘Statutory Interpretation, Law Reform and Sampford’s Theory of the Disorder of Law’: Australia Education, viewed 18 December 2014, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/FedLRev/1995/3.pdf Baillie, 1993, ‘Pepper V. Hart’: United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions, viewed 18 December 2014, http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1992/3.html Bennion, F. 2010, ‘How They All Got it Wrong in Pepper V. Hart’: British Tax Review, viewed 18 December 2014, http://www.francisbennion.com/pdfs/fb/1995/1995-003-pepper-v-hart.pdf Bennion, F. 1995, ‘Use of Hansard and Other Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation’: FAR Bennion, viewed 18 December 2014, http://www.francisbennion.com/pdfs/fb/1964/1964-001-hutton-report.pdf Common Law Reasoning and Institutions (CLRI), 2009, ‘Pepper V. Hart- Statutory Interpretation’, viewed 18 December 2014, http://justin-santiago.blogspot.com/2009/02/peper-v-hart-statutory-interpretation.html Davies, A. 1994, ‘Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation after Pepper V Hart’: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.14, no.1, pp.151-158 Dyson, J. 2014, ‘The Shifting Sands of Statutory Interpretation’: Statute Law Society, viewed on 18 December 2014, http://www.statutelawsociety.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Sir_John_Dyson.pdf Dublin, S. 2000, ‘Statutory Drafting and Interpretation: Plain Language and the Law’: The Law Reform Commission, viewed 18 December 2014, http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rPlainLanguage.htm Howie, J. 2006, ‘Statutory Revision; Review of the Interpretation Act’: SA Law Reform Commission, viewed 18 December 2014, http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp112_interpretation.pdf Kennedy, R. 2005, ‘A Flood of Light; Comments on the Interpretation Act 2005’: Judicial Studies Institute journal, Vol.6, no.1, pp.92-139 Ling, S. 2004, ‘Citing Legal Authorities in Court’: Supreme Court of Singapore, Vol.16, pp.168-191 Manknell, D. 2004, ‘Time to Revisit Pepper V. Hart’: Judicial Review, One Crown Office Row, Vol.9, no.40, pp.2-27 Matthews, J. 1997, ‘Extrinsic Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation’: The Law Commission of Hong Kong, Viewed 18 December 2014, http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/rstatutory-e.pdf Pedlars Info, 2014, ‘1993 Pepper V. Hart’ viewed 18 December 2014, http://www.pedlars.info/statutes-bills-case-law/16-authorities/42-1993-pepper-v-hart.html Stubbs, M. 2006, ‘From Foreign Circumstances to First Instance Considerations; Extrinsic Material and the Law of Statutory Interpretation’: Federal Law Review, Vol.34, pp.104-225 Read More