Criminology and the Criminal Justice System - Report Example

Criminology and the Criminal Justice System Introduction Pinky Salmon, the Mayor of Stratford, was the leader of Independence for Stafford Party. Hetampered with the chandelier in Allie Darling, the Deputy Mayor’s house, in order to terrorise him. Allie was opposed to Pinky Salmon’s independence movement. Moreover, Pinky Salmon destroyed the ballot papers of the election, wherein his campaign for independence had been rejected. Allie escaped from the falling chandelier. For assessing the criminal liability of Pinky Salmon, under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, the following issues have to be considered. Criminal Damage Criminal damage is the offence of deliberately or recklessly bringing about damage to property, which has been precluded in the Criminal Damage Act 1971. This offence exists as arson and other aggravated varieties, or as an act that endangers life. Criminal damage induces allocation and sending procedures that are determined by the quantum of the damage caused (Gibson, 2009, p. 49). The Criminal Damage Act 1971, deems a person guilty of an offence, when the following transpires. A person, without a lawful excuse damages or destroys property that belongs to himself or another person. Such person should have intended to damage or destroy property, or he should have acted with disregard for whether any property would be damaged or destroyed. Moreover, a person is guilty of an offence when the intention behind destroying or damaging the property was to endanger the life of another (Storey & Lidbury, 2011, p. 209). Such guilt is also ascribed to a person who acts with disregard for the danger that could ensue to the life of another person. Actus Reus When a person damages property, despite it being his own, then the actus reus is that associated with criminal damage. It is not necessary for the lives of others to have been endangered. The crux of the matter is whether that person had intended to harm others or whether he had been reckless regarding the danger that could be caused to others by his actions (Storey & Lidbury, 2011, p. 210). Similarly, in our present problem, Pinky Salmon damaged the chandelier, belonging to Allie, with the claimed intention of merely threatening the latter. Despite the latter not being harmed by the falling chandelier, Pinky Salmon cannot evade liability for criminal damage, according to the provisions of Criminal Damage Act 1971. In R v Sangha, the appellant, in an inebriated state lit a mattress that was on the floor of the flat, wherein he was consuming alcohol. The construction of the flats in that building was such that fire would not spread to the other flats. All the same, Sangha was convicted of aggravated criminal damage. The court held that it was not necessary for life to be actually endangered. The test prescribed in such cases, by the court, was that of a prudent bystander who would have concluded that the property would be damaged or destroyed by the fire, and that life could be damaged or destroyed (Storey & Lidbury, 2011, p. 210). Mens rea It is incumbent upon the Crown to establish that the defendant’s state of mind had been one of the following. First, there was an intention to damage property and to endanger the life of another. Second, there was an intent to damage property, and this was accompanied by recklessness regarding the danger that could be caused to another. Third, there had been recklessness as to any possible damage to the property, and recklessness as to life of any person being endangered (Storey & Lidbury, 2011, p. 210). Moreover, in DPP v Smith, a car containing stolen goods was being driven by Smith. Upon being challenged by a police officer, Smith increased the speed of his vehicle. The police officer cleaved to the speeding vehicle, and Smith, noticing this, commenced to swerve the car at very high speed. The police officer was flung away from the car and overrun fatally by another car (Lord Irvine of Lairg, Lord Chancellor, 2001, p. 7). The trial court convicted Smith of murder. In his appeal, Smith contended that the trial judge had misdirected the jury regarding the evidence of the mens rea element in murder. This was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeal, which set aside the trial court conviction. At the House of Lords, the decision of the trial court was upheld. Their Lordships opined that the presumption that people intend the natural and probable outcomes of their actions was appropriate (Lord Irvine of Lairg, Lord Chancellor, 2001, p. 8). In our present problem, the probable outcome of the falling chandelier would have been the endangering of Allie’s life, as he had been seated underneath it, in the Council Chamber. According to the decision in DPP v Smith, it is appropriate to conclude that Pinky Salmon intended to endanger the life of Allie. Actus reus consists of the terms belonging to another person, damage, destroy, and property. Thus, mens rea necessitates the presence of recklessness or intention. The Criminal Damage Act 1971 does not define the terms damage and destroy. However, there is reference in the case law to the type of damage that would be deemed to be the actus reus for this offence. The following case law, discloses the intention of the courts, with regard to the state of mind of an offender. For instance, in Gayford v Chouler, the court held that trampling grass was damage. Moreover, in Roe v Kingerlee, the defendant was held guilty of damage for having covered the walls of a police cell with mud. It was held by the courts that determining whether property had undergone damage was to be decided by the presiding justices, who were to direct the jury accordingly. From these rulings it becomes evident that the damage caused need not be permanent. Thus, in Hardman v Chief Constable of Somerset Constabulary, it was held that the figures drawn on concrete constituted damage, as its cleaning entailed expenditure. Moreover, in Fiak, the defendant attempted to flush a blanket down his cell toilet. The flooded cell and blanket had to be cleaned and this was held to be criminal damage. All the same, in A (a juvenile) v R, the damage was such that it could be rectified with a modicum of effort. Hence, it was not deemed to be criminal damage. Similarly, in Morphitis v Salmon, damage due to a scratch to a scaffolding pole was not regarded as criminal damage, as such scratches could occur during normal use. Section 10(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, includes property that has a tangible nature, regardless of whether it is real or personal. Intention or recklessness is required under Section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Subjective recklessness involves the following; the accused had anticipated the specific type of harm; and had continued to undertake the risk. Moreover, in R v Steer, the appellant fired gunshots at the doors and windows of his erstwhile business partner. His conviction, by the trial court, under Section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage act 1971 was set aside as the danger to the latter’s life was from the firearm and not the damage caused to the property. In R v G, the trial court convicted the defendants for arson, on the basis of the Caldwell ruling. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal. However, the House of Lords closely scrutinised the Caldwell decision, with specific regard for the issue of recklessness as being of general public significance. Their Lordships concluded that the majority ruling in Caldwell had been erroneous, with reference to parliamentary intent and the Criminal Damage Act 1971, during their interpretation of the term reckless in Section 1 of this Act. The Law Lords opined that the subjective test of recklessness demanded evidence that the accused had anticipated the danger and had unjustifiably decided to take the risk (Ormerod, et al., 2011, p. 123). Accordingly, the conviction of the defendants in R v G was set aside. In Castle, the defendant had broken and entered an office, with a view to burgle it. At the time of leaving the scene of the crime, he set fire to the office. The fire caused some damage to the flats located above this office. However, no person was injured. The trial court directed the jury, in accordance with Caldwell. The conviction was rescinded by the Court of Appeal, as the Caldwell test was inappropriate (Martin & Storey, 2013, p. 534). A test of recklessness for criminal damage is provided by the following. Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 states that a person acts recklessly with respect to a circumstance when he is cognisant of a risk that is in existence or will come into existence (e-lawresources, n.d.). Moreover, a person acts recklessly with respect to a result, when he is aware that a risk will transpire and he knows that it is unreasonable to undertake that risk. The Caldwell recklessness was introduced by the ruling in Caldwell. According to it, a person is deemed to be reckless as to the destruction or damage to property, when he acts in a manner that generates an obvious risk of damage or destruction to property. In addition, that person should have committed the act without considering the possibility of any such risk or should have ignored the risk involved and carried out the reckless act. In Caldwell, the defendant was tried for arson. In his defence, he stated that his drunkenness had prevented him from envisaging the danger that he could cause to others by his act. The House of Lords ruled that a state of intoxication did not constitute a defence to a crime involving basic intent, such as arson (Monaghan, 2012, p. 65). In addition, taking an unjustified risk can be regarded as the general description of recklessness. There is considerable difficulty involved, regarding recklessness, in the criminal law. Specifically, it is an onerous task to determine whether an objective or subjective test has to be applied to recklessness. In R v Cunningham, it was held that recklessness had to be determined by a subjective test. It attempted to determine whether the defendant had foreseen the harm that had transpired, could have occurred from his action. The defendant should have persisted in his action despite the risk entailed. This test was adopted in R v Briggs and R v Stephenson. The flaw with a subjective test is that it is solely founded upon the state of mind of the defendant. In several instances, offenders had escaped punishment, as the prosecution had failed to establish that the defendant had foreseen a risk. Nevertheless, Caldwell recklessness can result in a miscarriage of justice, as it renders criminally liable, individuals who had genuinely failed to foresee a risk of harm. Thus, in Elliott v C, a 14 year mentally retarded girl started a fire in a shed. Upon applying the Caldwell test, the court held her guilty. The court declared that limited intelligence was not a defence. Conclusion In our present problem, Pinky Salmon, tampered with the chandelier, thereby revealing his criminal intention to endanger the life of Allie. However, he claimed that his intention was to merely threaten Allie. According to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, a person will be deemed guilty, if he commits damage to property with an intention to jeopardise others life. An application of the Cunningham recklessness, test would clearly establish Pinky Salmon’s liability, since he continued in his actions, despite having knowledge of the danger that he would cause to Allie. Even if the Caldwell recklessness test were to be applied to this case, Pinky Salmon would be liable for criminal damage under the provisions of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. This is because, any prudent man would have foreseen the danger that would be caused to Allie, due to the falling chandelier. Consequently, Pinky Salmon will be liable under the provisions of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 for an offence of criminal damage. References A (A Juvenile) v R (1978) Crim LR 689. Criminal Damage Act (c. 48), 1971. London, UK: Her Majestys Stationery Office. DPP v Smith (1961) AC 290. e-lawresources, n.d. Mens rea-Reckless. [online] Available at: [Accessed 22 December 2014]. Elliott v C (1983 ) 1 WLR 939. Fiak (2005) All ER (D) 103. Gayford v Chouler (1898) 1 QB 316. Gibson, B., 2009. The Pocket a-z of Criminal Justice. Hampshire, UK: Waterside Press. Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary (Crim LR 330) 1986. Lord Irvine of Lairg, Lord Chancellor, 2001. ADDRESS: Intention, Recklessness and Moral Blameworthiness: Reflections on the English and Australian Law of Criminal Culpability. Sydney Law Review, Volume 23, pp. 5-18. Martin, J. & Storey, T., 2013. Unlocking Criminal Law. 4 ed. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell (1982) AC 341. Monaghan, N., 2012. Criminal Law Directions. 2 ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Morphitis v Salmon (1990) Crim LR 48. Ormerod, D., Smith, C. J. & Hogan, B., 2011. Smith and Hogans Criminal Law. 13 ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. R v Briggs (1976 ) 63 CAE 215. R v Cunningham (1957 ) 2 QB 396 . R v G & R (2003) 3 WLR. R v Sangha (1988 ) 2 All ER 385. R v Steer (1988 ) 1 AC 111. R v Stephenson (1979 ) QB 695 . Roe v Kingerlee (1986) Crim LR 735. Storey, T. & Lidbury, A., 2011. Criminal Law. 5 ed. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Read More