Analysis of St. Clair v. Commonwealth, Sate v. Bergmann, and Osbourne v. State Cases - Case Study Example

St. Clair v. Commonwealth Supreme Court of Kentucky, 2005 Legal History: The appellant was convicted of capital murder and subsequently receivedthe death sentence. The appellant appealed and his conviction was affirmed but his sentence was reversed and the case was sent back to the court of first instance for a rehearing of the sentencing trial. Following the rehearing of the sentencing, the appellant was once again sentenced to death. He appealed his death sentence yet again. Facts: The appellant escaped from an Oklahoma jail where he was waiting to be sentenced for two murders. A few weeks after his escape with co-accused Dennis Reese, Frank Brady was shot to death. In the interim, the appellant and his co-accused travelled around the South West US committing a number of crime including the murder and kidnapping of Timothy Keeling. Upon arriving in Kentucky, the appellant and Reese kidnapped Brady and stole his truck which was subsequently burned to destroy evidence. Brady was subsequently shot. Shortly thereafter, the appellant and Reese were stopped by a Kentucky law enforcement officer while driving Brady’s vehicle. The appellant fired at the officer. The pair were arrested and charged with Brady’s murder. Reese pleaded guilty and agreed to give evidence against the appellant who pleaded not guilty. At the appellant’s trial he produced alibi evidence. The main issue at trial was whether Reese, the appellant or an unknown accomplice killed Brady. Legal Issues: The main issue on appeal was whether or not the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on aggravating factors during the sentencing hearing pursuant to the statutory guidelines for doing so. Holding: The trial judge erred in that he failed to follow the appellate court’s guidelines for instructing the jury on aggravating factors pursuant to the applicable statutory provisions. Legal Reasoning: The applicable statute is Kentucky Revised Statutes 532-025 (2)(a)(1) which directs that an aggravating circumstance exists when the “offence of murder or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record for a capital offense”. When the case was returned for a rehearing of the sentencing part of the trial, the courts was instructed to use this specific language in explaining aggravating circumstances to the jury. At the rehearing of the sentencing phase of the trial, the trial judge instructed that jury to ascertain whether it has been established that the defendant committed the murder and that he had an antecedent for a capital murder conviction. Thus the court’s jury instructions did not require that the jury determine whether or not at the time of Brady’s murder the appellant had a capital murder conviction. Since the court explained that the statutory language required that the aggravating factor only existed if a defendant had a prior capital murder or kidnapping offence at the time of the murder for which he is subsequently convicted, the trial judge erred in its instructions to the jury. The instructions are further compromised since the jury heard evidence of several prior capital convictions all of which did not occur prior to the murder in question it was impossible to know whether or not the jury considered only those convictional that predated the murder of Brady. Thus the death sentence in this case is unsafe and unsatisfactory. Name Sate v. Bergmann Iowa Court of Appeal, 2009 Legal History: Bergmann was convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Bergmann appealed his conviction to the appellate court. Facts: In January 2006, Bergmann was found passed out in his vehicle with the engine on and the vehicle geared. Bergmann was awakened and transported to the hospital via ambulance. At the hospital a blood sample was drawn and revealed that Bergmann’s blood alcohol level was at .216. Bergman informed the persons rescuing him that he had a back injury for which he was taking fentanyl and fentanyl was found in his vehicle. Bergmann also claimed that his blood alcohol level was caused by the fentanyl and the fact that he had also taken Nyquil. Bergmann’s attorney sent a letter to the Sheriff’s office containing the results of the blood work. Bergmann was subsequently charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Bergman sought to have the records of his blood work results excluded on the grounds that they were privileged. However, the district ruled that the privilege was waived once the records were disclosed to the sheriff’s office. The State subsequently issued a summons for the identity of the individual who conducted the blood work and an order was granted accordingly. Legal Issues: Did Bergman’s disclosure of medical records waive patient-doctor privilege relative to confidentiality? In holding that the privilege was waived by disclosure, did the district court err? Holding: The district court did not err in refusing to allow Bergmann’s counter argument that patient-doctor privilege prevented the use of the evidence of his blood alcohol level being used against him. Thus, Bergmann’s conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated was affirmed by the Iowa Court of Appeal. Legal Reasoning: Pursuant to Iowa Code S 622.10 a doctor may not disclose the communications with his patient unless the patient consents to such disclosure thus waiving the doctor-patient privilege. It therefore follows that unless the privilege is waived the hospital is not entitled to release the results of the blood work to anyone including the police (State v Demaray, 704 N.W.2d 60, (Iowa 2005)). On the facts of the case, Bergman disclosed his medical records to the sheriff’s office. It has been held that “voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged communication constitutes waiver as to all other communications on the same subject” (Miller v Continental Ins. Co. 392 N.W. 2d 500, (Iowa 1986)). It therefore followed that Bergmann waived the privilege by voluntarily disclosing the records of his blood work to the sheriff’s office. By doing so, Bergmann not only waived the privilege relative to the medical information provide but also waived the privilege pertaining to all other medical information on the question of his blood alcohol level. As a result the court did not err in holding the disclosure constituted waiver and did not err in permitting the State’s application to obtain the identity of the person conducting the blood work on Bergmann. Name Osbourne v. State Court of Criminal Appeals, Texas, 2002. Legal History: The appellant was convicted of marijuana possession and sentenced to 25 days in the county jail. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed a review to determine whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in allowing the officer making the arrest to identify the substance as marijuana as “a lay opinion” pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 701. Facts: The appellant was in vehicle as a passenger which had been stopped by Nicole Saval, a police officer. Saval detected the odor of alcohol and marijuana in the vehicle and formed the opinion that the vehicle’s operator was under the influence of both substances. The appellant was interrogated by Saval while another officer conducted a field sobriety test on the driver of the vehicle. The appellant denied smoking marijuana ad claimed that the odor must have come from cigarettes. Once Saval informed the appellant that the two have different odors, the appellant admitted to smoking marijuana and told Saval that there was no marijuana left. However, Saval found a bag containing marijuana in the vehicle between the passenger and driver’s seat. Saval identified the marijuana and recorded this identification in a report detailing the particulars of the offence. Once the appellant received the offense report she asked the court and the court obliged to make an order requiring the State to serve notice of its intention to call an expert witness to identify the marijuana pursuant to Section 39(14)(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The state did nothing and proceeded to call Saval to identify the marijuana at the trial. Legal Issues: Did the state err in not serving notice of an expert? Was the evidence of Saval evidence of an expert or a lay person? The significance of this latter question is that if Saval was offered as an expert witness, she was improperly called because the state failed to serve notice of the expert witness pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 701. Holding: The Court of Appeal did not err in holding that trial court could admit the identification evidence of Saval to be presented as evidence by a lay person rather than an expert. As a result notice of expert evidence was not required in this case. Legal Reasoning: Testimony identifying an odor is admissible and does not require expertise for its identification. Thus persons testifying as lay persons may provide evidence of odors as means of identifying the source of those odors (Chess v State 172 Tex. Crim 412 S.W. 2d (1962)). The smell of marijuana, although not likely to be encountered frequently, is distinctive enough to allow for odor identification (Kemner v State 589 S.W. 2d 403(Tex. Crim. App. 1979)). There are many well documented incidents of lay persons detecting the odor or marijuana and subsequently discovering that in fact, the source of the odor was marijuana. Thus the trial judge was at liberty to exercise his discretion to allow evidence of a lay person as opposed to an expert for the identification of marijuana. When a trial judge exercises his discretion it will only be interfered with if the exercise of that discretion was an abuse. In this case, the court was perfectly within its discretionary limits in deciding to allow Saval to testify as a lay person and since Saval was offered as a lay person, it was not necessary for the State to serve notice of an expert witness to the appellant. Name In re Ryder United States Court of Appeal, 1967 Legal History: Richard Ryder , an attorney, was judged guilty of unprofessional conduct by judges sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia and subsequently suspended from practice for 1 and a half years. Ryder appealed against the finding of guilt and the corresponding punishment. Facts: Ryder represented a person who was suspected of committing an armed robbery. Ryder transferred money that was stolen and a sawed-off shot gun from the robbery suspect’s safety deposit box to his own safety deposit box. Ryder admitted that the transfer was conducted to erode appearances of guilt on the robbery suspect client’s part . Legal Issues: Was the transfer of the sawed-off shot gun and stolen money from Ryder’s client’s safety deposit box to Ryder’s safety deposit box protected by privileged communication between client and attorney and thus could not be used against Ryder? Holding: There was no attorney-client privilege and Ryder’s guilt relative to unprofessional conduct and his suspension was upheld and enforced. Legal Reasoning: Regardless of how the facts of the case are interpreted, there is no reasonable ground for holding that an attorney-client privilege existed. When an attorney with knowledge deliberately retrieves and hides evidence of a crime it is an “abuse of the lawyer’s professional responsibilities” (In Re Ryder, 1967, para. 2). Moreover, Ryder’s conduct do not in the slightest resemble privilege and the corresponding responsibility to deny disclosing confidential communications from a client. In conducting himself as he did, Ryder became an accomplice to a crime, “ostensibly wearing the mantle of the loyal advocate, but in reality serving as accessory after the fact” (In Re Ryder, 1967, Para. 2). The court also rejected Ryder’s evidence in his defence; namely that he wanted to remove the appearances of guilt relative to his client. The Court of Appeal went on to reason that in affirming the lower court’s finding of guilt and the subsequent punishment, it was of the opinion that the punishment was not harsh enough, giving the gravity of the professional infraction. The appellate court therefore noted that the least that it could do was suspend Ryder from practice for the remainder of his suspension as ordered by the lower court. Therefore the lower court’s finding of guilt and the suspension from practices was affirmed. Read More