Briefing a : Craft v. State - Case Study Example

Craft v. GA Court of Appeal, 2005 Legal History: The appellant was convicted of child molestation by a jury on two counts. He was subsequentlysentenced to a ten year custodial sentence with thirty years’ probation. He appealed his conviction and sentence in the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Facts: The facts of the case reveal that on August 26, 2002, the appellant called out to two 15 year old minors walking to school and when the minors looked toward the appellant he was standing in the doorway of his home nude and masturbating. The incident was reported to the authorities and the appellant was subsequently arrested. At the trial the court examined a witness about the character of the victims and the court constrained the appellant’s cross-examination of that witness by confining the cross-examination to four basic questions. Legal Issues: Is it permissible for the trial judge to ask questions of a witness indicating that that judge has formed an opinion of the veracity of the victims’ evidence? Is the courts’ refusal to grant the defendant leeway in the cross-examination of prosecution witness an abuse of the court’s discretion? It was also alleged by the appellant that the court’s examination of one of the victim’s was improper in that it gave the impression that the court wanted to bolster the victim’s credibility. Holding: At the trial, the appellant did not object to the court’s examination of the witness and thus waived the right to appeal on this particular ground. Likewise, the appellant’s failure to object to the court’s examination of one of the victims constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal on this ground. However, the court’s refusal to allow the appellant leeway in the cross-examination of a prosecution witness and its attempt to bolster the credibility of a victim were erroneous and constitute grounds for reversal. The conviction and sentence were reverses and a retrial ordered because a jury properly directed could convict on the evidence. Legal Reasoning: Relying on the Official Code of Georgia, the Georgia Court of Appeal reasoned that constraining the appellant’s cross-examination constituted an error in that it did not permit the appellant sufficient leeway to counter significant evidence elicited by the court and abridged the appellant an inalienable right to cross-examination. Citing James v State 260 Ga. App. 536 (2003) the Court of Appeals of Georgia reasoned that the right to cross-examination is a significant right and is entirely important for preserving the “proper administration of justice” and such a right “should not be abridged” (Craft v State 2005). Citing Paul (a precedent from the Georgia Courts of Appeal which was not cited in full), the Georgia Courts of Appeals further reasoned that the courts’ attempt to bolster the credibility of a witness was a serious error in that it impacted the integrity, fairness and the reputation of the judicial process. Underwood v. State Supreme Court of Mississippi 1998 Legal History: The appellant was charged, tried and convicted of capital murder and kidnapping in 1995. He was sentenced to death by lethal injection on 7 July 1995. The appellant filed a motion with the trial court of a retrial. The motion was denied and the appellant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Facts: Legal History: On February 16, 1994 Mr. Harris reported his wife, Mrs. Ann Harris missing. A subsequent investigation found that witnesses had seen the appellant’s car at the Harris’s home around the time the victim disappeared. The victim’s body was discovered with four gunshot wounds that were fired from a pistol found in the appellant’s possession. The pistol was discovered as a result of a burglary claim by Underwood’s uncle. A confession obtained from the appellant admitted to shooting the victim. The evidence was presented to a grand jury and the appellant was arrested, charged, tried and convicted. Legal Issues: Did the trial judge err in refusing to quash the indictment on the grounds of insanity notwithstanding the appellant’s failure to adduce evidence of insanity? Did the prosecution’s exclusion of blacks jurors on the grounds that they are opposed to capital punishment violate the appellant’s right to due process and equal protection of the law? Is the admission of an involuntary confession a violation of the 5th and 6th Amendments to the US Constitution? Is the admission of evidence from a previous crime a violation of the appellant’s right to a fair trial? Is the admission of explicit videos and photographs more prejudicial than probative? The appellant also argued that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence. Holding: The judge was entitled to proceed with the trial on the basis of the court appointed psychiatrist that the appellant was competent to stand trial and was competent at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. This was particularly true since the appellant did not present evidence to the contrary. Thus the appellant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of insanity was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Mississippi also ruled that the prosecution’s challenges were all proper and thus the appellant’s argument that the challenges and exclusion on the ground that blacks did not support the death penalty failed. The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that the confession was obtained involuntarily and therefore was inadmissible. Likewise the court ruled that evidence of prior bad acts were properly admitted against the appellant. The court took a similar stance with respect to the admission of evidence (photograph and video tapes) ruling that it was for the trial judge to determine whether or not the admission of that evidence was more probative than prejudicial. Legal Reasoning: Relying on the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Witherspoon 391 US 522, the court reasoned that the question is whether or not the jury can be impartial regardless of their views on capital punishment. The appellate court will generally rely on the discretion of the trial judge who observes the jury during the voire dire. Citing Agee v State 185 So. 2d 671(Miss. 1966), the court reasoned that the confession statement was voluntary as the prosecution presented evidence from officers that no oppressive means were used to adduce the confession. Relying on Hentz v State 542 S. 2d 913 (Miss 1989) the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that the trial judge has a wide discretion relative to admitting relevant evidence and that discretion will only be successfully challenged if it is abused. Moreover, evidence of other crimes are generally admissible if it proves motive, intent, preparation, planning, identity or opportunity. The Supreme Court of Mississippi also ruled that pursuant to Stringer v State 548 So. 2d 124 (Miss 1989) that it is for the trial judge to determine whether or not the admission of evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Only where that evidence has no evidential value and is particularly inflammatory will it generally be held to be more prejudicial than probative. State v Jordan Court of Appeals of Ohio 2002 Legal History: The appellant was convicted of cocaine possession. The appellant had filed a motion to suppress evidence and when the motion was denied he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a six month custodial sentence and his driver’s license was suspended for a year. He appeals on the grounds that the court erred in not allowing his motion to suppress. Facts: In July 2001, a police officer Richard Martinez responded to a report that a black mail was observed on a porch taking drugs and drove a blue Pontiac that was observed at the address in question. When the police arrived at the address there were two men on the porch and a blue Pontiac parked at the location. One of the men fled and the appellant who remained on the porch was questioned and searched for weapons. The appellant admitted that the Pontiac was his and the search resulted in the discovery of a crack pipe on the appellant. He was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of cocaine. Legal Issues: Did the officer have probable cause pursuant to the 4th and 14th Amendments of the US Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution to believe that the appellant committed a crime to such an extent as to justify stopping, questioning, searching and arresting him? Holding: There was probable cause and therefore the 4th and 14th Amendments of the US Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution were not violated. Legal Reasoning: Relying on the ruling in Illinois v Wardlow (2000) 528 US 119, the Ohio appellate court reasoned that complaints about drug activities in the area are common place, and the report about drug activity in the area constituted reasonable grounds for the officer responding to the report to justify approaching and questioning the appellant. The Ohio appellate court, citing State v Warren (1998) 129 Ohio App. 3d. 598 reasoned that since it was well known that drug activities typically involved weapons, the officer had probable cause to search the appellant. Moreover, when the other man fled, the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that there was a large quantity of drugs involved. Taken together all of the facts supported probable cause and the officer’s subsequent approach, questioning, searching and arrest. Thus there was no violation of either the US Constitution or the Constitution of Ohio. Commonwealth v Preshaw Appeals Court of Massachusetts 2003 Legal History: The appellant was convicted of various offences including drug possession, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of fireworks and a knife and attempt to commit crimes and disturbing the peace. The appellant appeals against her conviction on the grounds that photographs admitted into evidence were more prejudicial than probative. Facts: In December 1999 a fire at a house where the appellant lived with her husband was investigated by the police. The police initially discovered a shot-gun and marijuana butts and thus obtained a search warrant to search the house thoroughly. The appellant who had fled the house just prior to the fire as a result of domestic violence returned to the house as the police were investigating and entered the house although advised not to do so. She subsequently returned to the house with a black male who broke into the house. Believing that the appellant was involved in the break-in, she was arrested, questioned and search. A crack pipe with crack residue was discovered on her person. Additional search warrants were discovered and items for which the appellant was charged were discovered in home and a car driven by the appellant. 18 photographs in which the appellant was posing in a sexually provocative fashion were also obtained and admitted into evidence. Legal Issues: Is the admission into evidence of sexually explicit photographs in which there is only minimal evidentiary value the proper exercise of the judge’s discretion in weighing the probative value against the prejudicial impact? Holding: It was determined by the court that where a defendant is being prosecuted for non-sexual criminal activity, admitting into evidence sexually explicit photographs of the defendant constituted reversible error. The photographs were unusually prejudicial and thus far outweighed its probative value. Legal Reasoning: In assessing the probative value of the photographs which were intended to establish previous possession of items charged in the indictment, the court reasoned that the photographs did not rebut the presumption that others with access to the house may have had access to the same items. The court cited Commonwealth v Rarick 23 Mass. App. Ct. 912 (1986) in which it was held that other evidence such as personal belongings that connected the defendant to the items found in a commonly shared location dispensed with the need to introduce inflammatory photographs. Thus where there is other evidence it is entirely prejudicial to introduce sexually provocative photographs. In this case, since the items were found in the defendant’s bedroom and care, the photographs only served a prejudicial purpose. Read More