The Case of Tremblay Versus Daigle - Report Example

Tremblay v. Daigle Chantal Daigle, appellant; v. Jean-Guy Tremblay, respondent; and The Attorney General of Canada, the Attorney General of Quebec, the Canadian Abortion Rights Action League (CARAL), the Womens Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Campaign Life Coalition, the Canadian Physicians for Life, the Association des médecins du Québec pour le respect de la vie, and the REAL Women of Canada, interveners. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 [1989] S.C.J. No. 79 File No.: 21553. Supreme Court of Canada 1989: August 8 * The case examined was Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. No.530 from the supreme court of Canada. The parties involved were Ms. Chantal Daigle as the appellant, and Mr. Jean-Guy Tremblay as the respondent. The judges present at the hearing were Brian Dickson C.J. and Lamer, Wilson, Gérard La Forest, Claire, LHeureux-Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin The Facts The parties in this case were in a relationship which ended after five months of cohabitation. This was because of the beating which Tremblay used to hand Daigle, despite knowing of her pregnancy. At the time of separation, the appellant was 18 weeks pregnant. She, however, decided to undertake an abortion following the separation. The respondent sought an injunction from the court seeking to prevent the mother from having the abortion. The father of the unborn child wanted the court to grant his unborn child right to life. The trial judge in this court found that a foetus is a "human being" under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. He therefore concluded that the foetus should be accorded a "right to life" under s. 1 (Tremblay, para. 2). Through considering this, the judge ruled that the respondent had the necessary “interest” to make the request for an injunction. The Quebec charter of human rights and freedoms provides for the protection of a foetus before birth (Art. 945). In this article, mechanisms for the protection of a foetus are provided. The article does not, however, accord any additional rights and freedoms to the foetus. The Supreme Court considered these facts before rendering a decision on the appeal. The Anglo- Canadian law does recognize a foetus to be a “human being” with the aim of protecting its future. It however, goes ahead to define that the rights and freedoms enjoyed by humans can only be accorded to a foetus when it is born alive. This meant that the foetus had to be born first for it to enjoy the privileges enjoyed by other “humans”. The father at this point was seeking to protect the unborn baby. The foetus is not in a position to defend itself in a court of law. The protection of a foetus can only be done by a third party who has an interest in the future of the baby. The lower court based its ruling on the fact that the father had interest on the baby and was acting as a third party to protect the foetus. The ruling by a lower court awarding the respondent in this Supreme Court case injunction is what led to the appeal. The court of appeal, however, dismissed the appellant’s case and upheld the injunction that had been earlier awarded. Ms. Daigle, the appellant, then went on and appealed in the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court made its decision, she left the province of Quebec and went to the United States of America to terminate the pregnancy. Prior proceedings In the Quebec superior court, the father was the plaintiff while the mother was defendant. The father sought injunction to bar the mother from having an abortion. The court concluded that a foetus is a “human being” under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. It therefore should enjoy a “right to life” and a “right to assistance” under ss. 1 and 2 respectively. While recognizing the inconvenience that would be caused by the injunction, the court decided the foetus’ rights should prevail in the situation (Tremblay, para. 3 & 4). The defendant appealed to the Quebec court of appeal and the case was dismissed for two reasons. First, neither Quebec nor Canadian charter of rights and freedoms recognized the rights of a foetus. Secondly, a foetus had no “natural rights” that could be carried to term. This right could only be overridden for a just reason and the court found no such reason in the case (Tremblay, para. 4). Following this judgement, the mother went on to file an appeal in the supreme court of Canada. In both appellate cases, the defendant in the first case was the appellant while the plaintiff was the respondent. Ms. Daigle, the mother, was not satisfied by the decisions of the two courts. She cited, among other things, her desire to raise children in a peaceful and stable environment, an interest to never see Tremblay again, and her own psychological health. These were the reasons which led to the appeal in the two superior courts. The issues At the Supreme Court a different number of issues arise. The court put into consideration the following two issues: Whether there were any laws within various charters providing the rights of foetus as ruled in the other courts Whether by undertaking an abortion, the mother was infringing on the right of the father. The Supreme Court exhausted all the charters which the other courts had used in making their judgement and concluded that none of the issues which arose was provided for in the charters. The court considered the case as private and did not find the need to apply the Canadian charter as the case seemed more civil from the court’s perception (Tremblay,para 20). Appellant and Respondent Arguments The respondent argued that under Quebec law the foetus has a right to life. He also argued that under the same law, a father should be granted the right to veto a mother’s decision to have an abortion (Tremblay, para 19-20). The respondent wanted to abort his “potential progeny” and therefore regarded that this should grand him the right to veto the decision of the mother. The father continues to argue that the mother was infringing each of these rights. Through an abortion, the respondent argues that the fundamental right of the unborn child to life shall have been denied. The lawyer representing the respondent pleaded with the bench to award his client an injunction. He argued that this was an appropriate remedy aimed at protecting the rights of the unborn child. As a father to the unborn baby, the respondent presented himself as the protector of the right to life for the foetus (Tremblay, para. 20 – 21). The appellant on the other hand argued that there were no rights whatsoever which existed on the part of the foetus. She argues that the rights purported to support the injunction are mere allegations which do not exist (Tremblay, para 45). In this appeal, the appellant argued against the court’s decision to give an injunction. She insisted that it was an inappropriate remedy to the issue at hand. This argument prompts the court in to considering the courses of action to take towards delivering a just decision. The mother further argues that an injunction would amount to an encroachment into the provincial law. She further argues that this would underrate the federal power over criminal law. Encroachment would come due to the fact that there is no existence of a law within the province that would substantiate the injunction (Tremblay, para 45). Ratio Decidendi The court concluded that there was no necessity to deal with the issues of Canadian federalism raised by the appeal. This led to the unanimous decision that the issue of foetal rights would suffice to solve this particular dispute. The court believed that the decision which was arrived at would be enough to serve as precedence towards preventing similar legal incidents in the future. The court rejected all the arguments presented by the respondent regarding the right to life of the foetus and “potential progeny” to the father (Tremblay, para 49). The court further noted that its prime role in the case was the foetus’ legal status. By declaring so, it arrived at the decision that there was no legal precedent providing foetal rights under the Quebec charter as the charter was “much generalised”. Reasons for Judgment The judges to the Supreme Court had different reasons for vindicating Ms. Daigle. Though it recognized the philosophical, theological, and metaphysical issues that arose in the case, it only dealt with the legal aspect of the case. The issue here changed and focus was shifted from the foetus being human to the legal status of the foetus. The court found that the Quebec charter which had been referred to earlier did not accord any right to the foetus. The rights which were purported to exist were substantial to the state of the foetus at birth (Tremblay, para. 58 – 60). The fact that definition of human within the charter did not include foetus helped the court to rule out any rights to life for the foetus. The civil code described a foetus as a juridical personality which was not applicable in this case. Since the court was only dealing with the legal aspect of the case, the civil code was not viable in this private matter. The case on appeal was regarded as private between the two parties and therefore the Canadian charter could not be applied in the situation. The court further found that the foundation of substantive rights on which the injunction was supposed to be founded to be lacking. The right of the father to veto a mother’s decision to terminate pregnancy did not exist in any charters reviewed by the court (Tremblay, para. 20). This led to the rejection of the last argument by the respondent. Decision The decision by the court to vindicate Ms. Daigle was sound and just. Though no damages were awarded to any party, the court was able to deliver what can be said to be a clearly legal verdict to the issue. In this case there were no issues referred to any lower courts as the Supreme Court was able to deal with the case conclusively. The reasoning demonstrated by the judges here seems to be right. There were no stated rights which existed as defined by the previous courts. The Quebec court of appeal only based its judgement on the previous court’s findings. It did not dig further to find more information concerning the issues which arose during the trial. Though it cited lack of precedent as contributing to its ruling, the court showed a clear interpretation of law. This decision can be merited with setting the precedents for future litigations on similar matters. References Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530. Read More