Employment Law in the United Kingdom - The Current Situation - Assignment Example

 Introduction Throughout the twentieth century the United Kingdom was home to a widespread and influential trade union movement. The United Kingdom also led the world in the twentieth century in social welfare measures. From the Liberal government at the beginning of the century through revolutionary government action such as the Whitley and Beveridge Reports the United Kingdom set the standard throughout Europe in social assistance, public health care, employment insurance and other aspects of social welfare law and legislation. Towards the end of the last century and at the beginning of this century that emphasis shifted significantly under the Conservative government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) through the Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997-2007) and New Labour. What had once seemed an irresistible march towards a growing labour movement and increasingly comprehensive social welfare legislation changed direction. The following discussion will focus on employment law in the contemporary United Kingdom. Thematically it will focus on the delicate balance between 'fairness' and legal certainty. Topically it will focus on subjects such as employee status, contractual terms of employment, unfair dismissal and equality. Organizationally it will commence with a general discussion of fairness (or equity) and legal certainty and then proceed into consideration of specific aspects of employment law. Finally, a concluding section will draw these various argument threads together, offer conclusions about the state of employment law in the context of fairness and, consider the future of employment law in the United Kingdom. Fairness and Legal Certainty In Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 [Canada]. ('Canson'), Stevenson J. delivered his own reasons as he disagreed with the majority opinion's reasoning “on two points.” His second point related to the relationship of equity to legal judgments It was in that set of reasons that Stevenson J. wrote, “talk of fusing law and equity only results in confusing and confounding the law.” To paraphrase, and return to the theme of this analysis, Stevenson J argued that 'legal certainty' is undermined when one attempts to fuse 'law and equity (or fairness)'1 In straightforward terms, Stevenson J. argued that legislation and precedent determine what is legal or illegal and provide the basis for all legal decisions including those relating to employment law. Further, that clarity of law demands that legislation and precedent override issues of fairness or equity. Neither provide any grounds for determining the outcome of the judicial process on questions of equity. The establishment of equity as a fundamental principle in the justice system demands that a second train of liability, rules of evidence, linkages and values be initiated, and requires performance metrics be developed. It places judges in a situation where they have to measure two issues – strict application of legislation and precedent and equitability – and then calculate their relative importance to determine a judgment A man cannot serve two masters, nor can the law pursue both legal clarity and fairness at the same time in the opinion of Stevenson J. Stevenson' J.'s interpretation of the role of fairness in law does not stand alone and unchallenged. In the Melbourne University Law Review, writing in 1982 Ian E Davidson defends equity as a principle within the law asserting that, “compensation or damages in equity were traditionally said to aim at restoration or restitution, where as common law tort damages are intended to compensate for harm done.... [And] that is a difference without a distinction.”2 In “The Equitable Remedy of Compensation” he argues that fairness has always been an aspect of lawmaking and that claiming otherwise is merely verbal gymnastics or, in his particularly apt phrase, 'a difference without a distinction. If fairness and equity are perceived as a balancing of issues within the context of legislation and precedent the symbol of the justice system as a set of scales, balancing competing interests, is particularly applicable. This discussion will attempt to determine if the 'scales of justice' are an appropriate metaphor for the justice system as it relates to issues of employment law in the contemporary United Kingdom. Contemporary employment law, ideally, will maintain clarity while also granting due consideration to the question of equity and fairness. Employee Status Historically, the position of temporary workers was ill-defined and prior to the emergence of employment agencies of limited importance in the United Kingdom. O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc [1983] ICR 728 ('O'Kelly') addressed this issue in the context of irregular employees of the Grosvenor House Hotel in London. The hotel hired a group of casual workers to serve at banquets. These casual workers were not obliged to work when contacted by the Hotel and the hotel was under no obligation to employ them regularly of for a set number of hours per pay period. Regardless, the casual employees attempted to organize a union and were fired during the organizing activity. The court decided that these workers were not employees and therefore while they had the right to organize a union they could not claim unfair dismissal for doing so as they were not employees in the strictest, legal sense of the word, as there existed no 'mutuality of obligation': That being that the employer was obliged to provide work and the employee was obliged to take it.3 The court ruled that the workers were free to accept or decline proffered work and that the employer was also free to offer or not offer work and that this arrangement defied definition as an employer/employee relationship. The issue arose again in the case of Carmichael and Another v. National Power Plc [1999] UKHL 47; [1999] 1 WLR 2042; [1999] 4 All ER 897 (18th November, 1999).  In that case Lord Irvine of Lairg, L. C. ruled, “The issue is whether they were employees under contracts of employment and therefore entitled under section 1(1) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (see now section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996) to written particulars of the terms of their employment from National Power Plc., the successor to Blyth Power Stations, formerly operated by the Central Electricity Generating Board ("C.E.G.B.").”4 The facts of the case were that the employer offered work on an irregular basis and the employees were free to decline proffered work with no repercussions. They were not required to attend at work on a regular schedule or whenever requested to do so. Lord Irvine concluded that, “The arrangement turned on mutual convenience and goodwill and worked well in practice.... Mrs. Leese and Mrs. Carmichael had a sense of moral obligation to the C.E.G.B., but would infer no legal obligation.” Further, he quoted the original Labour Tribunal conclusion that the claim to be employees “founders on the rock of absence of mutuality.” They were determined not to be employees because the employer was not obliged to provide work and when work was offered the employees were not obliged to undertake it.5 In the context of this discussion the fairness or equity of these rulings must be considered. Basically these rulings on 'mutuality' held that an employee is one who is obliged to work on the employers schedule while an employer is obliged to provide work on a regular or semi-regular basis and these shared obligations constitute 'mutuality' and define the two parties as employer and employee. Conversely, it excludes from the definition of employer and employee those who work together through “ mutual convenience and goodwill” but not on an established and regular basis. This situation seems to satisfy both the requirements of fairness and of legal certainty. In terms of legal certainty these rulings provide a definite definition of both an employee and an employer – a hirer and a hiree who have specific mutual obligations, particularly to provide work and to accept work. If this mutual obligation exists one is an employee and entitled to all the rights and benefits of that status. If that mutual obligation does not exist than an employer-employee relationship also is not existent. One might argue that this definition provides protections to employers but not equal protection to employees. However, that is not an accurate perception. The rulings place obligations on both employers and employees they simply define the nature of an employee and in so doing actually affirm the rights of employees. Also, this rigorous theoretical definition of an employee avoids the slippery slope that an alternative definition might introduce. For example, if employee status were defined by hours worked a person might work years, on a regular schedule for an employer on a permanent part-time basis but discover that their hours worked were not enough to define them as an employee and entitle them to the rights of an employee. The question would then arise as to how many hours an individual had to work to be defined as an employee. The mutual obligation to offer work and accept work, as the basis for definition of a worker as an employee is both legal clear and fair. In the United Kingdom a worker may not necessarily be defined as an employee. A worker may be a contract worker employed under specific terms of an employment contract and not considered a regular employee. Also, a worker may be employed in a temporary capacity through an employment agency. The “Temporary and Agency Workers (Equal Treatment) Bill, 2008” attempted to address these classifications of workers but it was never passed. It has since been superseded by Europe-wide legislation, the Temporary and Agency Workers Directive (2008/104/EC) . The latter directive states, “This Directive applies to workers with a contract of employment or employment relationship with a temporary work agency who are assigned to user undertakings to work temporarily under their supervision and direction.” Further, it asserts that, “The basic working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers shall be, for the duration of their assignment at a user undertaking, at least those that would apply if they had been recruited directly by that undertaking to occupy the same job.”6 To this point there is no U.K legislation applying the provisions of this directive and the area of law, as it now stands, is not favourable to agency workers. In James v. London Borough of Greenwich [2008] EWCA Civ 35 ('James') this issue came to the fore. James was employed by an employment agency. However, her employment with the agency had consisted of three years of regular employment as a housing support worker with the London Borough of Greenwich.7 Lord Justice Mummery noted the significance of this particular case:8 The question whether a claimant in an unfair dismissal case is or is not an employee within the meaning of the 1996 Act is increasingly litigated before employment tribunals in unfair dismissal cases, particularly those brought by workers on the books of employment agencies.... there has been an explosion of numbers in the workforce (estimated at 1.3m) engaged to work under arrangements with employment agencies.... pending guidance from this court on this appeal, proceedings in the tribunals concerning the disputed legal status of agency workers have been put on hold. The emergence of employment agencies as a key mediator between employees and employers available has given new urgency to these debates debates over the contractual status of a worker. Lord Mummery went on to note that “the correct legal question is not whether the claimant was "an agency worker" (whether working for an employment agency or for an end user under an employment agency agreement) but whether the claimant was employed by the respondent end user under a contract of employment.” Citing 'Carmichael' Lord Mummery concluded that an implied tripartite agreement involving James (the employee), the employer (the agency) and the end user (the London Borough of Greenwich) could not be established. At the same time, however, Lord Mummery acknowledged that the position of agency workers was dividing the labour market with potentially dangerous consequences. That reservation merits significant quotation:9 On the other hand, a significant move in the direction of the casualisation of labour and the growth of a two tier workforce, one tier enjoying significant statutory protection, the other tier in a legal no man's land being neither employed nor self employed, vulnerable, but enjoying little or no protection, may create social injustice and a festering sense of grievance which would not be satisfactory in the interests of an efficient workforce, a competitive economy, a healthy society or anything else. There is, however, nothing to prevent wise employers from recognising that their long term interests may be better served by treating their entire workforce in a responsible and considerate way than by insisting on the strict letter of the law. Lord Mummery is correct that there is 'nothing to prevent wise employers' from adopting a different approach. However, implicit in that statement is that there is nothing to protect employees from unwise employers. In fact, he goes on to assert that, “policy decisions have to be taken by others about what changes (if any) to make, what rights to confer on whom, what qualifying periods to set and so on.”10 At present the EU has taken steps in that direction but the government of the United Kingdom has not. Most importantly, this case makes clear that the United Kingdom needs to define policy and take legislative action on that redefinition of policy. When casual work could be defined simply by lack of 'mutuality of obligation' the situation was relatively clear. However, with the predominance of temporary agencies this situation changed. With almost 1.5 million workers employed by temporary agencies, and many working for a single end-user for multiple years (in the case of James three years) historic precedents are no longer adequate and cannot be considered to be either fair or legally clear. Contractual Terms of Employment “The National Minimum Wage Act, 1998. Chapter 39” asserts, “A person who qualifies for the national minimum wage shall be remunerated by his employer in respect of his work in any pay reference period at a rate which is not less than the national minimum wage” and that “the national minimum wage shall be such single hourly rate as the Secretary of State may from time to time prescribe.”11 However, contractual terms of employment extend far beyond mere minimum wage legislation. Moreover they may be either expressed or implied. Expressed contractual terms of employment include wages, hours of work, holidays and holiday pay, and notice of termination. Implied terms are, as the name implies, more amorphous, but may include corresponding agreements with trade unions or professional associations and customary rights and obligations. One of the most important contractual employee rights under the “Employment Rights Act 1996. Chapter 18” is the right to notice of termination. Section 86 outlines an employee's right to notice of termination:12 (1) The notice required to be given by an employer to terminate the contract of employment of a person who has been continuously employed for one month or more (a) is not less than one week’s notice if his period of continuous employment is less than two years, (b) is not less than one week’s notice for each year of continuous employment if his period of continuous employment is two years or more but less than twelve years, and (c) is not less than twelve weeks’ notice if his period of continuous employment is twelve years or more. The only exception to these terms is in the case of unacceptable conduct: “This section does not affect any right of either party to a contract of employment to treat the contract as terminable without notice by reason of the conduct of the other party.” Returning to the case of James this situation highlights the anomalous conditions that affect agency workers. If James had been an employee of the Borough she would have been entitled to at least three weeks notice (for three years of service) if her dismissal were justified (and to an appeal for unfair dismissal – to be considered in the following section – if her termination was not justified). As an employee of an agency, and not the borough, she was entitled to no notice whatsoever. Beyond the situation of agency employees the question of notice can be analyzed, both in terms of fairness and in terms of legal clarity. In terms of the latter the legislation is very straightforward, graduated according to time of employment and in objective and quantifiable terms it is perfectly clear. It is also difficult to challenge the fairness of the legislation from the perspective of either an employee or an employer. A long-term employee is potentially entitled to at least three months notice: This is a reasonable period in which to search for another job and make any other lifestyle and budgetary changes to adopt to changing circumstances. At the other end of the scale the legislation is fair to employers and allows them to dismiss new employees with alacrity. Contractual terms of employment as they relate to dismissal are, however, sorely tried when issues of unfair dismissal arise. Unfair Dismissal Dismissal and termination of employment in the United Kingdom are covered by the “Employment Rights Act 1996. Chapter 18”. Part 9 of the Act covers “Termination of Employment” and Part 10 relates to “Unfair Dismissal” and “Remedies for Unfair Dismissal”. Part 9 states, “An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.”13 Section 98, Subsection 1 outlines the precise link between fairness and dismissal:14 (1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show— (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. Subsection 2 identifies “capabilities or qualifications”, conduct, redundancy and “contravention (either on his [the employee's] part or on that of the employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment” as potentially non-discriminatory justifications for dismissal. Unfair dismissal amounts to dismissal when the employee feels that none of these 'capabilities of qualifications have been violated. There is a second category of dismissal known as 'constructive dismissal' that is also an important aspect of United Kingdom employment law. In simplest terms, 'constructive dismissal' amounts to an employee feeling forced to resign as a result of the performance of the employer. If an employee is harassed, forced to accept a demotion, or without reasonable notice forced to change their contractual terms of employment they may leave their position but have a labour tribunal determine that they were 'constructively dismissed' (or dismissed in practice) and did not willingly leave employment. While constructive dismissal is a legal term that is difficult to define it is integral to fairness. The courts have also recently demonstrated a willingness to place clear limits on the use of 'constructive dismissal. In Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v. Buckland, Professor Buckland resigned when the university was dissatisfied with the failure rate in one of his courses and, without his knowledge or approval, had various assignments remarked and determined that many fails were in fact acceptable academic work and deemed to be passes. Professor Buckland resigned and claimed he had been 'constructively' dismissed when the University rejected his marks (and his judgment) and reconsidered them without his awareness or approval. 15 However, the Court of Appeal held that the university had acknowledged its errors, corrected them by using approved avenues to have the papers regraded and corrected the grounds for dismissal before the plaintiff resigned: “It follows that we allow the appeal and substitute a finding that the Claimant was not dismissed and hence his complaint of unfair dismissal fails and is dismissed.”16 In other words they concluded that here had been no dismissal and that Professor Buckland remained an employee (who had not been constructively dismissed) unless he refused to continue to fulfill his responsibilities and if he did so he had resigned and not been constructively dismissed. This case highlights the fairness of 'constructive' dismissal law. An employee can claim to be 'constructively' dismissed when they are harassed or the workplace is made unbearable. However, they cannot take a personal slight or questioning of their judgment as grounds to resign and claim they have been 'constructively' dismissed. This situation represents a fair and equitable balancing of the rights of an employer and an employee. Consider, by way of illustration if a machinist in a factory claimed that having his parts checked by the quality control department amounted to questioning his abilities and grounds for dismissal. A case of this nature would be dismissed immediately by an employment tribunal if it was presented to them. Furthermore, the case establishes that 'constructive' dismissal cannot be claimed when an employer takes action to re-mediate and address an employees concerns. 'Constructive' dismissal is an important element of employment termination however it has to be balanced and moderated by common sense. This would seem to be the case in the contemporary United Kingdom. However, there is also evidence that there may be unfair elements to unfair dismissal tribunal hearings in the United Kingdom. In the wake of the Employment Relations Act 1999, K. G. Knight and Paul L. Latreille analysed “Gender Effects in British Unfair Dismissal Tribunals” using data from 1992. They concluded that gender discrimination cases relating to unfair dismissal were overwhelmingly likely to be approved by the predominantly male tribunals if they were brought by females and overwhelmingly likely to be dismissed if they were brought by men.17 Ideally, legal research should be conducted using more recent data to determine if this apparent gender bias persists: If it does, the fairness of the Tribunals as they relate to sexual harassment and gender bias are seriously undermined. Equality The “Race Relations Act, 1968” extended the earlier 1965 Act to apply to employment (and housing and public services). Superseded by the “Race Relations Act, 1976” this remains, with amendments, the basis of employment equity legislation in the United Kingdom.18 In a broader sense the most important piece of legislation is the “Equality Act, 2010. Chapter 15”. The “Equality Act, 2010. Chapter 15” outlines the categories of discrimination that are prohibited, known as 'protected characteristics: “The following characteristics are protected characteristics— age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation.19 Part 5, “Work” outlines the application of this act to employment situations. It prohibits discrimination against the protected characteristics in offers of employment, terms of employment, dismissal and 'other detriments'.20 Subsequent sections extend the term discrimination to include harassment and the term employee to include contract workers. Importantly, the legislation does not identify agency workers or 'temps' as a protected category and does nothing to improve the status of these workers. The Equality Act, 2010 offers excellent protection to workers over a wide range of potential sources of discrimination including gender, sexual orientation or preference or gender reassignment. All of these categories have historically been grounds for discrimination. It is equally impossible to see how these issues could impair a workers ability to carry out their duties. For example, it is difficult to see how a workers sexual orientation could have any impact directly on their job performance. It is categorically impossible to see how sudden awareness of the part of an employer could be conceived of as impacting a worker's ability to fulfill their employment obligations. Therefore, in the interests of fairness the Equality Act must be judged positively. It can also not be seen as in any way impairing the clarity of the law. However, the issue of age discrimination raises some difficult issues. In the current employment situation technological change is both pervasive and rapid. An employer could find themselves in a difficult situation if technological change (the introduction of a new computer system, for example) significantly changed workplace circumstances and an older employee struggled with adopting the new system. If that employee were then dismissed would this be an example of age discrimination, would it be an instance of 'constructive dismissal' or would it simply render the employee no longer relevant and would their dismissal, therefore, amount to justified rather than 'constructive' dismissal? Arguably, this would then become a labour tribunal case. Moreover, it would seem that it would be decided on the basis of the training that was offered the older employee. If the employee had taken reasonable measures to train the employee and they had proven unable to assimilate the training the dismissal would seem to be justified. However, if the employee had not received an adequate opportunity to retrain and adopt to the new system then it would seem to be a case of 'constructive' dismissal. Moreover, this issue could arise without the age of a worker being an issue. A similar situation could arise in a warehouse that shifted from a traditional inventory method to a computerized system and the employees effected could be young workers without adequate education to adopt to a new computerized system. In this case, without age being a factor it would seem that the quality and quantity of training offered to the effected workers would be the key determinant. In these cases related to technological change it would seem that the fairness of a given decision would have to be determined on a case by case basis. Certainly, it would be unfair to an employer if efficiency improving technological applications could not be employed due to employee rights. Another problem with the Equality Act is that it does nothing to clarify the position of agency workers. This is not a specific fault of the Equality Act. However, it does serve to highlight the persistent problems presented by the emergence of temporary agencies as significant sources of employment. Conclusions At this point it is appropriate to return to the quotation that initiated this discussion: 'Critically assess the extent to which current Employment Law in the areas of; Employee Status , Contractual Terms of Employment , Unfair Dismissal and Equality, meet the demands for ‘fairness’ whilst maintaining the need for legal certainty.' According to Stevenson J., “talk of fusing law and equity only results in confusing and confounding the law.”21 However, it would seem that Stevenson J.'s comment is unjustified in the context of contemporary United Kingdom employment law, with one significant exception. The Equality Act, 2010 provides an excellent basis for ensuring that discrimination in the workplace is minimized. In this sense it can be seen as an extension to the United Kingdom. “Human Rights Act 1998” and related EU legislation. Issues of sexual preference, gender and gender reassignment are basic human rights and issues of basic fairness dictate that they should not be issues in the workplace. Other aspects of law require a more delicate balance be maintained between legal clarity and fairness. Case law as it relates to unfair dismissal is illustrative. The law as it relates to termination provides a fair period of adjustment for workers facing termination or redundancy. At the same time it reserves to both parties the right to leave a position or terminate an employment contract if the behaviour of either party represents an egregious violation of fair play and honesty. That assertion extents to issues of 'constructive' dismissal. At the same time, however, recent case law clearly indicates that there are rational and realistic constraints on what constitutes constructive dismissal. A demotion or persistent sexual harassment clearly constitutes 'constructive' dismissal. However, this right is constrained by the ability of the employer to take remedial action and constraints on defining questioning an employees performance or opinion as de facto 'constructive' dismissal. Similarly the terms surrounding contractual obligations of both employers and employees seem to be both fair and legally clear. The largest problem that persists and is evident throughout all aspects of this discussion is the position of temporary workers placed through employment agencies. Historically this issue was not a pressing problem as the number of workers employed in these situations was relatively limited. However, in the contemporary United Kingdom the number of agency employees working for other end users has grown to almost 1.5 million and precedent does not provide an adequate guide as to how to deal with this situation and protect the rights of workers employed in this context. The EU has provided some direction on this issue through “Temporary and Agency Workers Directive (2008/104/EC)”. However, the United Kingdom has yet to pass congruent legislation. The current situation of agency employees working for third-party end-users is neither fair not clear. This is the most pressing problem confronting contemporary employment law in the United Kingdom in terms of both legal clarity and basic fairness. References Cases Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v. Buckland [2009] Appeal No. UKEAT/0492/08/DA ('Buckland') Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534. ('Canson'). http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1991/1991scr3-534/1991scr3-534.html. Carmichael and Another v. National Power Plc., [1999] UKHL 47; [1999] 1 WLR 2042; [1999] 4 All ER 897 (18th November, 1999). (Carmichael'). http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/47.html. James v. London Borough of Greenwich [2008] EWCA Civ 35 ('James'). http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2008/35.html. Metrobus Ltd. v. Unite., [2009] EWCA Civ 2009. ('Metrobus'). http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/829.html. O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc [1983] ICR 728 ('O'Kelly'). http://www.egos.co.uk/cases/okelly.htm. United Kingdom Legislation “Race Relations Act, 1968. Chapter 71”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/71/pdfs/ukpga_19680071_en.pdf. Equal Pay Act 1970. Chapter 41”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1970/41/contents. “Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Chapter 65”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1975/65/contents. “Race Relations Act, 1976. Chapter 74”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/74/contents. “Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRA). Chapter 52”.http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/52/contents. “Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Chapter 50”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/50/contents. “Employment Rights Act 1996. Chapter 18”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/contents. “National Minimum Wage Act 1998. Chapter 39”. http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=1571667. “Human Rights Act 1998”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents. “Employment Act 2002. Chapter 22”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/22/contents. Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. No. 1661”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/1661/contents/made. Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. No. 437”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/437/contents/made. “Equality Act, 2006. Chapter 3”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/3/contents. “Disability Discrimination Act 2005 (Commencement No 3) Order 2007. No. 1555. Chapter 63. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/1555/contents/made. “Equality Act, 2010. Chapter 15”. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents. European Union Legislation “Temporary and Agency Workers Directive (2008/104/EC)”. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:327:0009:0014:EN:PDF. Other Sources “British Employment Law”. http://www.emplaw.co.uk/. Davidson, Ian E. (1982) “The Equitable Remedy of Compensation”. Melbourne University Law Review 13: 349+. Department of Trade and Industry (U.K.). Employment Legislation: Unfairly Dismissed? (PL712 Rev 20 - URN 05/1911)”. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/individual/unfair-pl712.htm. Directgov (UK). “Employment Terms and Conditions”. http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/Employees/index.htm. Knight, K. G. and Paul L. Latreille “Gender Effects in British Unfair Dismissal Tribunals” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54: 4 (July 2001) 816+. Read More