Case Notes - Report Example

1. The brackets in general are used within which year is signified. UKHL means United Kingdom House of Lords and this means that the case was cited in the House of Lords. The ‘30’ means the page number of the citation that is where the case was cited. The same goes for the second part in respect of the bracket and the year that is the brackets are generally used within which year is signified and the year of the case is put in, in the current case. WLR stands for weekly law reports which are published and 478 signifies the page that the case would be found on. 2. In the case Mr. Godin-Bendoza brought the action in the West London County Court. The action was brought for the right of Mr. Godin to succeed the tenancy of his decease same-sex partner. 3. Judge Cowell in the current case found that the death of Hugh-Wallwyn James (deceased) did not entitle Mr. Godin to succeed tenancy of the property and therefore the claim of surviving spouse as provided for in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977 and its meaning within did not apply. However, he was entitled the assured tenancy of the aid property on the law of succession as he was a member of Hugh’s family as provided by paragraph 3(1) of the same Schedule. 4. The prime distinction between the both cases is that in the case of Fitzpatrick above it was decided that homosexual’s will not inherit statutory tenancy, whereas in the case of Ghaidan v Godin- Mendoza 1 it was concluded that by using article 3 of Hra, Section 2(2) is brought in compliance with Human Rights Law and is thus covers homosexual partners in that regard. 5. (i) The fact that the defendant was homosexual is material fact as it would be taken in to account in deciding whether he should be regarded as statutory tenant or not as in Fitzpatricks case. (ii) It is not a material fact that the defendant and the original tenant were not married as it is established law that event people cohabiting together and especially when both of them have contributed towards the home, then both should have security of tenure and it is irrelevant whether they were married or not. (iii)It is an immaterial fact that the defendant and his heterosexual partners have lived together for ten years as it is established law that people of same sex are not included in the provision 2(2) of the Rent Act 1977 as decided in Fitzpatricks case by Lord Nicholis. (iv) It is a material fact as in 1988 it was added that heterosexual cohabiting partners living together fall under Section 2 (2) of the rents act and the survivor would have a statutory right under the section. 6. In Brief Lord Nicholis said that the intention of the parliament for enacting Section 3 of the Human Rights Act2 was to give powers to the Courts to interpret legislation in compliance with the Human Right convention and to clear any ambiguities in this regard. Even though lordship did not see any ambiguity in this case Section 3 was applicable to bring the legislation in compliant with Human Rights Convention and not to discriminate against any one. 7. The said phrase according to Lord Nicholis meant that under section 3 any meaning construed should be consistent with the parliaments intention in enacting the legislation and should not go beyond that, whereas Lord Millet view was that section 3 does not allow courts to supply words which are inconsistent with a fundamental feature of the legislative scheme; nor to repeal, delete, or contradict the language of the statute in question. 8. Lord Borowness approach differs, as her view was that it was not possible for parliament in 1988, when the extension was given to cohabitants at that time homosexual partnership was not common and could not have been possible for parliament to intend to include homosexual in that, hence it should not be allowed as it would not be in compliance with parliaments intention at the time of enacting legislation. 9. According to Lord Millett, it is a difficult exercise when section 3 of HRA has to be used as when using the same the courts have to “give an abnormal construction to the statutory language and one which cannot be achieved by resort to standard principles and presumptions”3 and furthermore it has been described as ‘dangerously seductive’, for in using the method there is a enticement to apply the section beyond its proper compass and trespass upon the privilege of Parliament in what will almost always be a good cause. 10. The very fact that parliament has announced its intentions to bring corrective legislation led Lord Millett to dissent as in his view section 4 should have been used to declare the said legislation as not complying with Human Rights Convention and it should have been left on the Parliament to legislate on the matter as the parliament had already announced its intentions to do so. Lords Millett view was that section 3 and 4 have been very carefully crafted by the parliament to preserve the existing constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and it was not the job of judiciary to start legislating and it was that reason section 4 of the Human Right Act was enacted, so that wherever it is not possible for the courts to interpret legislation in such a way which would be seen as judicial activism but Courts getting in to the shoes of legislature, it was for the Courts to use its discretion under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act and declare the provision non compliant of the Human Rights Act and leave it for the legislature to repeal the provision and/or find the solution. 11. In my view decision of the House Lords was in the best interest of the people in light of the Human Rights Convention as speedy justice was provided by using section 3, whereas if the courts would have used its discretion and would have only declared the said legislation non-compliant it would have further taken time for the defendant to get justice and justice delayed is justice denied. References DIXON, M. (2004). Dixon on land law. London, Cavendish. Read More