Virginia Tech Massacre - Brief Background - Research Paper Example

Virginia Tech Massacre - Brief Background Contents A. Purpose of the Analysis 3 B. Brief Background of the Case A. The Incident 3-4 B. The Shooter 4-5 C. The University 5-6 D. The Intervention 6-7 C. Issues Identified 7-8 D. Analysis A. Seung-Hui Cho’s Behavior 8-9 B. The Ability of the VPI Campus Police to Predict Cho’s Action 9-10 C. The Failure of the VPI Campus Police to Identify Cho’s Threat 10-11 D. The Importance of SECR5090 to Identify Cho’s Threat 11-12 E. Preventing and Mitigating Cho’s Shooting Spree 12 E. Findings 13 F. Recommendations 13-14 G. Implications for Security Management 14 H. Conclusions 14 References 15-16 Virginia Tech Massacre Case Analysis Paper A. Purpose of the Analysis For a horrible incident like the Virginia Tech Massacre – the deadliest shooting rampage so far in the most advance nation of the world to happen in a supposedly secure and peaceful place of learning is already terrifying, but for such incident to happen again after many recent precedents – the joint study of US Secret Service and Department of Education revealed that from 1974 to June 2000, there were 37 incidents of lethal attacks on schools in the country involving 41 attackers, who were either current or former students of the schools (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004, p. 8) – merits societal concern and in depth study. Thus the purpose of this case analysis is to thoroughly examine the horrible Virginia Tech Massacre focusing on the following: understanding the behavior of the shooter, rooting out the cause of the lapse and the responsibility in VPI’s security, and learning from the implications of the incident for policy formulation and future interventions. B. Brief Background of the Case A. The incident According to the Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007), in the morning of April, 16, 2007, 23-year old senior AB English student Seung-Hui Cho, cool-bloodedly and freely gunned down 32 students and faculty, injured 17 others, and shot himself in two separate incidents: First, at West Ambler Johnston residential hall, where he shot two students: Emily Hischer and Ryan Christopher Clark at Hischer’s room (7:15 am); and second, after changing his bloodied clothes (7:17 am), erasing his files and accounts from the university’s email accounts (7:25 am), and mailing his package to the NBC News in New York expressing his rage and grudge against his oppressors and his letter to the English Department against Professor Carl Bean (9:01 am) – with whom he previously had unreported heated argument – Cho did his shooting spree (9:40 - 9:51 am) at Norris Hall going in to every room (206, 207, 205, 211, 204) sparing no one, then alerted by the police shotgun blast, shot himself. (pp. 24-28) B. The Shooter Seung-Hui Cho, as described by Kim and Dickson (2007) is a young Korean American of 1.5 generation – one born in Korea and grew up in the US. Compared with the second generation – Koreans born in the US – the 1.5 generation was believed to be bilingual and multi-cultural, which unfortunately, did not fit Cho at all, as he was found neither to speak Korean and English effectively and he had difficulty adjusting to his environment, which could have forced him to create his own world (pp. 939-940) – a world as gleaned from Morewitz (2008) account, was filled with hatred, obscenities and resentment “against rich kids, debauchery, and deceitful charlatans,” whom he also blamed for the violence he did (p. 86). In his suicide note, Cho reveals these all: “You just love crucifying me. You loved inducing cancer in my head, terrorizing my heart and ripping my soul all the time… you decided to spill my blood” (as cited in Erickson & Erickson, 2008, p. ix) . The VTRP’s (2007) investigation of Cho’s background revealed disturbing facts that could be factors to Cho’s mental health: His paternal uncle committed suicide in Korea, which means they had a suicide history in the family; he was emotionally traumatized by a heart procedure at the age of three that he did not want to be touched since then; the family’s migration to US caused them financial and emotional difficulty with none of them speaking English, causing Cho to be further withdrawn and isolated since he doesn’t speak the language added by the unpleasant experience of being bullied sometimes; Cho’s father would not praise him that Cho in his writings talk of his father negatively (pp. 31-32). VTRP’s report also showed that since childhood, Cho had displayed unusual behaviors that merited psychiatric evaluations. At 7th grade, he was diagnosed of ‘selective mutism’. At 8th grade, he was found harboring suicidal and homicidal ideations and was prescribed one year of anti-depressant medication to which he responded positively. Although continuing his therapy at Westfield High School, he showed significant improvement and graduated with a 3.5 GPA in the Honors Program. And then, during his junior years at Virginia Tech – the school he chose to enter college against the advice of his parents and high school counselors fearing that Virginia Tech is too large for Cho to be provided the sufficient individual attention he needed – his behaviors became observably disturbing and bizarre and his writings were alarmingly violent to which he received mental health examinations. Bur despite these indications of mental illness, the inconsistent findings of the New River Community Services Board, which found Cho mentally ill, posing “an imminent danger to himself or others” and the staff psychiatrist at Carilion, who admittedly without collateral information ruled out any indication of “psychosis, delusions, suicidal or homicidal ideation” in Cho had recommended Cho for out-patient treatment, Cho was released from the hospital and failed to complete his supposed out-patient therapy sessions. (pp. 21- 24) C. The University Virginia Tech, based on VTRP’s (2007) description and assessment, is a large state school both physically and demographically. In its 2,600 acres property lay its main campus’ 131 major buildings, populated by 26,370 students of which 9,000 live in dorms, 7,133 university employees excluding student employees, and 1,000 visitors, contractors, transit workers, and others, totaling to 34,503 residents. Virginia Tech is not enclosed neither guarded; anyone can freely enter the area. It has its own police department composed of 35 officers. To strengthen is law enforcement department, the VPI Campus Police work collaboratively with the Blacksburg Police Department (BPD) and work closely with the regional offices of the state police, FBI and ATF. The buildings in Virginia Tech are secured by keycards for the residence halls, locks for the offices, and loud speakers for some buildings for emergency cases. Other than these, most of the buildings are 24-hour open to anyone. During the incident, the alert system of the school is a broadcast-email system with 36,000 registered email addresses at low distribution capacity of 10,000 emergency messages only every minute. It also has a web site of high volume capacity but intended for post emergency warnings. In addition, it has established contact with the local media that events could be broadcast after 20 minutes. Furthermore, the school has an emergency response plan that covers preparedness and response to varied emergencies, but excluding violent incidents like rampage shootings, despite the many prior school shootings in other states. It is also noteworthy that entry into Virginia Tech is based mainly on grades and SAT scores. No need for personal interview, essay and letters of recommendation (p. 38). Thus, the health history of the student applicant is never a consideration to be accepted to the VPI. D. The Intervention The intervention on Cho’s case failed at two levels: Prevention and mitigation. First, the school failed to prevent Cho’s shooting rampage because, they were unable to detect earlier, despite clear indications, that Cho was undergoing deep emotional and mental problems that makes him a threat to his safety and to others. Because of this, Cho was not taken seriously that he needs individual attention and professional help. Instead, he was treated just like any other mentally healthy students left on his own to struggle with a highly demanding college life. Second, on the day of the horrible incident, the VPI Campus Police failed to mitigate the fatal act of Cho on two counts: One, the police barked at the wrong tree because they concentrated on pursuing an innocent suspect based only on circumstantial evidence and without alerting the campus regarding the first shooting incident; and two, they did not lock down and tightly secure the campus despite an unsolved crime which both victims and attacker were university students. Meaning, the attacker who was still presumed unknown and could be a student who had the access to the campus and on the loose, had all the opportunity and access to commit a crime. In other words the failures of the VPI Campus Police are lack of understanding criminal behavior, and disregarding security protocols. On the other hand, the VPI administration despite having been advised for the need of threat assessment team due to prior school shooting incidents did not form its own threat assessment team. This vital security lapse was aggravated by the University’s weak and deficient systems like communication system, care system, security system, student services and support system, and mental health laws that could have helped the VPI Campus Police to prevent Cho’s violence. C. Issues Identified The Virginia Tech Massacre perpetrated by a lone shooter who had earlier displayed emotional and mental problems, raised issues vital to school’s safety and security, especially of a large and open school like the VPI: (1) The necessity of knowing the entrants’ health history and determining their physical, emotional, and psychological fitness to undergo the pressures of college life of which the Virginia Tech disregards in its selection process, despite findings of various studies (Rembolt, 1994, pp. 6-8, Vossekuil, et al., 2004; Cornell, 2006, p. 24; Morewitz, 2006, p. 86; Fallahi, Austad, Fallon, & Leishman, 2009, p. 120) suggesting that attackers were most probably suffering from mental disorders; (2) the vital importance of having a threat assessment team that could have put the seemingly disconnected Cho’s dots together and could have earlier alerted the school authorities that Cho was a highly potential threat to himself and to the campus security; (3) the crucial importance of an efficient school’s care system and student services and support system, as this could have helped prevent the incident, but Virginia Tech’s systems are flawed and inadequate in many aspects: professional expertise, coordination, health history, correct interpretation of federal laws; (4) the necessity of an efficient and effective school security system – accurate and in-time intelligence, effective number of police force, appropriate security measures for each building and the whole campus, and an efficient emergency response plan for campus violence – especially with a very big, multi-diverse, very liberal and physically open school, although it is most undesired has been many times proven to be highly possible; (5) a clearly defined gun control laws with clearly drawn implementing guidelines involving concerned agencies; and (6) the importance of having laws conform with behavioral science as indicated by the findings from the Safe School Initiative that: “Most incidents of targeted school violence were thought out and planned in advance. The attackers’ behavior suggested that they were planning or preparing for an attack” (Vossekuil, et al., 2004, p. 40). D. Analysis 1. Seung-Hui Cho’s Behavior Seung-Hu Cho’s criminal behavior fits well with the wide model of Rational Choice Theory, which Brezina (2002) explains: The offender although under limited rationality decides to commit a crime based on the his/her subjective beliefs motivating him/her by a variety of possible personal needs such as greed, lust, anger, revenge, hopelessness, envy, adventure, attention, vanity, etc. and that the act will satisfy him/her (p. 244). Cho actually knew what he was doing. However, his mental illness caused him to misjudge his experiences and to disapprove his self blaming these ill-feelings on others and building in him an evil choice – to revenge against his oppressors, which in his act was the school community itself – this could explain why his shooting was randomly done – and by hurting his perceived oppressors he was satisfied as he must have believed that through this he had reclaimed his denied place on the planet. 2. The Ability of the VPI Campus Police to Predict Cho’s Action The weak care system and insufficient security system of VPI made the Campus Police incapable to predict Cho’s rampage shooting spree because they did not have the necessary information that could provide them of Cho’s bigger picture that would have revealed to them Cho’s violent and suicidal tendencies. This, the VTRP (2007) reports was attributable to the school’s lack of information sharing system among its academic, administrative and public safety entities failing them to see the big picture (pp. 52-53), thus, failing them to realize Cho’s fatal threat. Given the bigger picture, the Campus Police might have predicted Cho’s rampage shooting spree because according to the Secret Service study, attacks are planned, premeditated, prepared for, and are hinted to others (Vossekuil, et al., 2004, pp. 32-34). Meaning Cho’s preparation for the attack could have warned the police. However this deficiency could have been augmented by a threat assessment team. But again, the University, despite a number of earlier school shooting incidents of which it should have found itself vulnerable due to its largeness and lenient policies, did not form its own. These failures are basically a failure of strategic leadership. Meaning, the ultimate responsibility to have prevented the horrible April 16, 2007 incident was the school administration’s not the police, because as school leader, the administration is the one in the position to put things together and see the bigger picture. Besides, the police was in fact quick to respond; however, it was plainly reactive, rather than proactive, which in fact, led it further away from seeing the bigger picture. However, the inefficiency of the school’s surveillance system could be blamed on the police, because it is the one who should have the expertise to see the flaws of the surveillance system. For example, as recommended by the VTRP, it could have helped, if video cameras were installed in critical areas of the buildings and the school premises. 3. The Failure of the VPI Campus Police to Identify Cho’s Threat The VPI Campus Police failed to identify Cho’s threat and not taking appropriate actions because in the first place, the school had no threat assessment team that could have made them realized that Cho’s consistent problem in the school since 2005 were actually warning signs of the April 16, 2007 incident. According to Bove (2008) threat assessment team “has long been recommended in the school violence prevention literature… to evaluate at-risk students and respond appropriately to avoid a violent occurrence” (p. 76) And this is negligence had proven fatal. This deficiency is further worsened by the tendency of the police to deal with complaints against Cho’s misdemeanor or misbehavior as criminal issues, when according to Remboldt’s (1994) “most incidence of violence are really ‘behavioral health’ issues (p. 11). In support to this, Siegel (2005) argued, “crime is a manifestation of feelings of oppression and people’s inability to develop the proper psychological defense and rationales to keep these feelings under control” (p. 113). So, Police piecemeal treatment of complaints against Cho’s did not only mislead them from identifying the real problem but could have even strengthened Cho’s resentment and violent tendency. Second, the police should have been more cautious that week because it was the same week that the Columbine killings happened. This becomes more significant because Cho had indicated fascination with that tragic incident. As Bove (2008) noted, basic security protocol prescribes more caution during anniversaries of horrible events (p. 76). The failure to identify Cho’s threat apparently shows that the police and school officials lack understanding of behavioral theory, because if only they could have understood behavioral theory, specifically criminal behavior, then they could have pursued knowing Cho’s family background more which could have led them to be alerted of Cho’s threat. This unfortunately is compounded by their lack of grasp on privacy laws and the civil liberties of the students. These had gravely affected their correct judgment and decision making, as manifested by their failure to secure the school residents. For example, they did not install surveillance cameras in the buildings because this might intrude the University’s privacy. But, while the University highly regarded its privacy it did not ensure to strengthen its care system to be able to strengthen the mental, emotional, and psychological well-being of its students so that nobody would have fallen into such kind of horrible crimes. As the Secret Service research study recommends: the best way to prevent school violence is to create an environment that would make the students feel secure to tell their stories – meaning a school that listens and cares. 4. The Importance of SECR5090 to Identify Cho’s Threat Acquiring knowledge in a course like SECR5090 could have surely aided the VPI Campus Police in identifying Cho as a highly potential threat because this course deals with behavioral issues, specifically those behaviors that may potentially result to violence. Having taken this course, the police could have been alerted by Cho’s consistent bizarre behavior for almost two years prior to the April 16, 2007 incident because among the contents of this course is the ability to identify and understand the personality characteristic that could be determined as criminal behavior, which according to the Secret Service study findings has no typical profile and that “most attackers had no history of prior violent or criminal behavior” (Vossekuil, et al., 2004, p. 22). Furthermore, this course could have also enabled the police to identify and analyze the patterns of criminal threats that Cho had been apparently displaying. As the Secret Service study revealed, “Most attackers showed some history of suicidal attempts or thoughts, or a history of feeling extreme depression or desperation” (p. 21). 5. Preventing and Mitigating Cho’s Shooting Spree Assuming that Cho’s threat had been identified earlier by school authorities, to prevent the fatal incident, the school authorities could have done the following: (1) Put Cho under compulsory hospitalization with his parent’s approval. Compulsory, because he denies having mental illness, thus the more he needs well-supervised professional help until declared well. (2) The school’s care system should have been improved in terms of expertise on behavioral science, the system of coordination, and the proper monitoring of adult students, for them to have understood Cho’s mental and emotional state and closely monitored his activities. They could have interviewed Cho’s family instead of having done this after the incident. (3) Since almost all fatal school violence is shooting incidents, the school should have banned guns in the campus. A study (DeConde, 2001, p. 301) revealed that having firearms within reach increases domestic violence rather than protects against intruders. (4) To have prevented the shooting at Norris Hall, which had taken place almost two hours after the first shooting, surveillance cameras should have been installed for in-time intelligence – although the VTRP (2007) views this as an intrusion to University life (p. 18). (5) The school should have been locked immediately after the first shooting as the attacker was still presumed unidentified, on the loose, and worst a university student. As stressed in the revised “Practical Information on Crisis Planning” (2007): to “evaluate or lock down the school is crucial and should be one of the first decisions made, regardless of the order in which initial decisions are implemented” (as cited in Bove, 2008, p. 77). E. Findings Findings of the study support the necessity of understanding criminal behavior not only by law enforcers but also by school officials to make their security and safety policy, emergency response plans, and decisions responsive to the diverse needs of the students and even their teaching and non-teaching employees. It also reveals the dilemma being undergone by school authorities in protecting their community without being sued of human rights violation or intrusion to privacy. These gray areas of the laws, which become grayer in real life, blur the dividing line between responsibility and civil liberty. And as dangerous technologies become more accessible to everyone, this dilemma further deepens. Specifically, the study reveals the big security lapses of the VPI authorities in detecting, preventing, and even mitigating the fatal incident which may be attributable to the school’s weak strategic leadership, weak communication system, deficient security system, very weak care system, flawed mental health laws, and weak selection system. F. Recommendations Based on these findings the following courses of actions are recommended: (a) Review the identified weak systems of the university and address their improvements, which initially are: (i) to install an efficient and effective discreet communication system to report and coordinate information, (ii) install surveillance cameras at least in the hall ways, gates, and isolated areas, (iii) educate the campus police, the administration, students and employees in distinguishing threats and the necessary actions to be taken against these; (iv) establish a threat assessment team that should be composed of the right people, (v) train every member of the school community on emergency preparedness and response – all possible types of emergency incidents; (b) strengthen the university’s student services and student support system; (c) arm the Campus Police and the school officials with knowledge and training in understanding criminal behavior; (d) clarify the gray areas of the federal laws on privacy, gun ban, and civil rights as applied to schools in the wake of a number of undeterred school shootings. G. Implications for Security Management The implications of the study for Security Management are as follows: (a) Understanding criminal behavior is crucial to security management; (2) observing security protocols – which VPI Campus Police and school officials disregarded – should not be failed; (3) the crucial importance of threat detection – thus the critical need for an effective and efficient threat assessment team to achieve successful security management; (4) the preparation for even the remotest violence to occur in peaceful places like the school, because as experiences proved, schools have no immunity to violence; (5) cooperation between and among law enforcers, school authorities, employees and students to deter violence remains the best option. H. Conclusions In conclusion, the VPI Campus Police failed to prevent Cho’s rampage killing because they have no understanding of criminal behavior as implied by their failure to be alerted of Cho’s bizarre behaviors for almost two years before the incident, but this could have been corrected if only they had formed a threat assessment team in the aftermath of incidents of school shootings; worse they failed to mitigate the incident because of the very open climate yet deficient and weak security and surveillance system of the school. In this context, the study proves the critical importance of the study in criminal behavior in crime prevention. It also proves that effective security management greatly depends on the strategic leadership to put proper and efficient systems in place and on the conscious full cooperation of the school officials and residents in making the school safe and in promoting peace and order. References Bove, Vincent J. (2008). 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Kim, Sun S. and Dickson, Geri. (2007). Revisiting mental health issues in young immigrants: A lesson learned from the Virginia Tech massacre. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 28, 939-942. Morewitz, Stephen John. (2008). Death threats and violence: New research and clinical perspectives. New York: Springer Science and Business Media, LLC. Rembolt, Carole. (1994) Solving violence problems in your school: Why a systematic approach is necessary? Minnesota: Hazelden Information and Educational Services. Siegel, Larry J. (2005). Criminology. California: Thomson Wadsworth. Virginia Tech Review Panel. (2007, August). Mass shootings at Virginia Tech. (Report of the Review Panel to Governor Kaine). Commonwealth of Virginia. Retrieved from http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport-docs/FullReport.pdf Vossekuil, Bryan, Fein, Robert A., Reddy, Marisa, Borum, Randy, and Modzeleski, William. (2004, June). The final report and findings of the safe school initiative: Implications for the prevention of school attacks in the United States. United States Secret Services and United States Department of education. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf Read More