Desert and Entitlement - Assignment Example

Desert and en ment Nozick’s argument on distributive justice is that a distribution is just “if everyone is en d to the holdings they possess under the distribution.” (Nozick 233). Irrespective of whether those holdings have come into their possession by luck or inheritance, the basic argument Nozick offers is that this does not in any way erode their entitlements, which need not necessarily be deserved in order to merit the right of possession. He contends that possessions that people are entitled to cannot be seized merely to provide equality of opportunity to others on the grounds that they are not deserved. So long as the holdings have been obtained in a manner that does not specifically violate another person’s rights, the entitlements would be deserved, whether or not the possession of such an entitlement was necessarily just. According to Nozick, “it needn’t be that the foundations of desert are themselves deserved, all the way down.” (Nozick 225). Hence he does not support the argument that a person will deserve to possess something only if s/he also deserves the natural talents and anything else that was used in the process of obtaining it. His argument is that if a person has acquired an asset X through an acquisition, transfer or rectification without appropriating someone else’s rights, then he is entitled to that asset. Extending this argument, s/he will also be entitled to any other asset, for example Y, that arises out of X through a process that does not violate any one else’s rights.(Nozick, 225). Possibly, there may be differential distributions, but Nozick argues: “Whether or not peoples natural assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view they are entitled to them, and to what flows from them.” (Nozick 226). Hence, Nozick’s entitlement theory is based upon the assumption that entitlement does not necessarily have to be built out of desert and entitlement can exist, even if desert is not fully satisfied, all the way down. According to Sandel’s views however, Nozick in setting out his entitlement theory, has failed to take into account the fact that entitlement is an institutional concept, as opposed to desert, which is a moral concept. In respect of institutional assets, Sandel states: “for the community as a whole to deserve the natural assets in its province and the benefits that flow from them, it is necessary to assume that society has some pre-institutional status that individuals lack.” (Sandel 99). This would accord society with some claim on the distribution of assets, especially those that are common to the community. Hence “society’s claim on the distribution of assets” would need to be viewed as an entitlement given by legitimate expectations founded upon social institutions. established for prior and independent social ends.” (Sandel 99). On this basis, Sandel contends that entitlement and desert cannot essentially equate to the same thing as Nozick appears to suggest through his entitlement theory. Sandel states that “for Nozick, the absence of desert creates a presumption in favor of letting assets lie where they fall.” (Sandel 98). This requires a basic assumption to be made that all talents did not come into being in a manner as to make them accessible to everyone, but rather that they come into being already in the possession of some persons who are “entitled” to them. Hence no attempt has been made by Nozick to take into account the acceptance that may be required from existing social institutions before individuals can be held to be entitled to certain assets. Sandel states, “In Nozick’s usage, the concept of entitlement does the same work as desert, but without its pre-institutional credentials ever being established.” (Sandel 99). Sandel however clarifies that there is a distinction between desert and entitlement. The basis of desert is to be rewarded for some asset or attribute and people would need to actually deserve those assets or attributes from a moral perspective. Desert is therefore morally premised and may be dependent purely upon individual attributes. Entitlement however is not an acquisition that can occur without the approval of the institutions of society, because to some extent, society will have some say in the distribution of common assets in particular. But in Sandel’s view, Nozick has failed to take into account, the pre-institutional elements that would be required to establish entitlement in the first place. Hence his premise in equating desert and entitlement is itself flawed. Sandel also contends that Nozick appears to accept the element of arbitrariness in entitlements on the basis that “arbitrariness does not undermine desert………. even if it did, a version of natural liberty and not the difference principle would emerge as the preferred result.” (Sandel, 82). Sandel is in agreement with Nozick that the foundations of desert may not be deserved “all the way down”, because it is difficult to establish that anyone deserves anything unless “there is some basis for the desert” (Sandel 83), but the basis for desert is itself hard to establish. As Sandel points out, where desert is concerned, the basis for possession must start at some possession “that is not itself possessed” (Sandel 84), hence arriving at such a determination would itself not be possible. But while this may mean that there could be an element of arbitrariness in desert because different people might possess different attributes and different characters that would help them to accrue different kinds of assets, this cannot also be extended to entitlement. Sandel’s main argument against Nozick is therefore that desert and entitlement cannot be held to be the same thing in determining whether a person is entitled to an asset. Rather, it would be necessary to also take into consideration the pre-institutional aspects of entitlement and whether or not such an acquisition of an asset is given by legitimate expectations founded upon social institutions.” (Sandel 99). Sandel may have some justification for his objection against Nozick, but on an overall basis, Nozick’s position appears to be more authentic. Nozick defines a just holding as “one that has been obtained through acquisition, transfer or rectification”. (Nozick, 15-51). He also clarifies that the entitlement to an asset, to be just, should not have been acquired at someone else’s expense. This effectively covers everything that is possible in establishing whether a distribution is just or not. If a piece of land was for example transferred voluntarily from A to B, then B would be entitled to the land, but if B had taken the land by force from A, then he would not be entitled to it. The basis of everything we do in this world is based upon a set of circumstances that may have already been in existence, as a result the principle of justice can only be applied to what derives from the set of circumstances. Nozick sums this up as follows: “The complete principle of distributive justice would simply say that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution.” (Nozick 223). Nozick appears to have a valid argument that is realistic, as opposed to Sandel’s. Every acquisition of an asset that was made cannot be examined and rearranged to satisfy a perception of what would be just. For example, many individuals have acquired their wealth as an inheritance that has passed down to them from their ancestors. To try and set right any injustices in acquisitions made years and years ago would be completely outside the scope of a practical application of justice. If the descendants and inheritors of those assets have received it handed over the years as a gift, those assets cannot be taken away from them and rearranged among others less fortunate in order to achieve a just distribution. Nozick’s conception of justice in distribution is based upon the distribution of the existing state of assets and also allows scope for the finding of injustice if the asset has not been acquired through the means he has prescribed, or if it has been acquired at someone else’s expense. To accept Sandel’s position and question whether those assets are founded upon “legitimate expectations founded upon social institutions” would perhaps be feasible for assets that have been acquired in the recent past, but it would be very difficult to execute this principle by going back over the generations and determining whether an asset was acquired in a just manner, thereby entitling the person possessing it to hold on to it. In some cases, individuals could have acquired those assets by using their own superior talents or abilities. If they were able to retain possession of the assets long enough to pass them on to their children or their assignees, then the assumption that must be made is that none of the existing societal institutions of that time questioned the possession of that asset, or it would no longer be his/hers. On this basis, Sandel’s objection to Nocizk’s entitlement theory is relevant as an argument but may be lacking when applied to the reality of the world that exists. Works cited: * Nozick, Robert. “Anarchy, State and Utopia”, Basic Books, 1974. * Sandel, Michael. “Liberalism and the Theory of Justice”, Cambridge University Press, 1998. Read More