International Law: Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia - Essay Example

 GEORGIA, ABKHAZIA, AND SOUTH OSSETIA In August 2008, as Russian tanks rolled into Georgia, many people in the world heard for the first time the names of two breakaway enclaves called South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These remote and impoverished parts of Georgia have had a long and conflicted history, in some ways similar to their Caucasian neighbors and in some ways different. They are proud, feisty, and want independence from a country—Georgia—that they feel does not respect them or give them enough autonomy. In some way their struggle for independence is similar to other such struggles around the world. One of the biggest similarities is the way that they have appealed under international law to have their right to self-determination recognized. This tactic of relying on international norms rather than what they see as oppressive, Georgian national norms, is one that has proved successful to varying degrees in other regions of the world. But something else they will have to look as their future continues to unfold is to look at the twin tactics of principle and pragmatism in pursuing their goals. Many successful independence or nationalist movements have had the most success when they have built up moral capital through principled behavior and then used this capital in a pragmatic way. This essay will look back at the history of the self-determination movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, how they have appealed to international law, and how their struggle is similar and not so similar to those struggles undertaken in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and South Africa under apartheid. Although unknown to much of the world, South Ossetia has a rich and storied history. Many of Ossetians were forced out of their original home, north of the Caucasus mountains, by the Mongols, settling in the northern portion of the Georgian kingdom. In 1801, they were annexed by the Russian empire. After the Russian Revolution in 1917 they were incorporated into Georgia, but given a special autonomous status and were able to preserve their own language for the most part, thus ensuring their culture and tradition would be maintained. They are a proud people with a proud tradition. They look to Russia for protection and desire unification with North Ossetia, which is part of Russia.1 In recent years, not only has violence torn the enclave apart, but the destruction of the economy has led to an increase in crime. For some criminals, quasi-states like South Ossetia, Kosovo, and Abkhazia offer the perfect location to ply their trade, as laws are weak and there are plenty of willing henchmen because unemployment is so high. For example, in 2006, Georgian and American officials uncovered a counterfeiting ring in South Ossetia. According to the Washington Post: “From a printing press in South Ossetia, a sliver of land with no formally recognized government, more than $20 million in the fake bills has been transported to Israel and the United States, according to investigators. The counterfeit $100 notes have also surfaced in Georgia and Russia, officials said.”2 This is just one of many incidences that illustrate the high crime rate in the enclave. For a long time South Ossetians have been clamoring to be free from Georgia. This essay will more closely examine this struggle in a few brief moments. Abkhazia has a similar history to South Ossetia. The only difference is that during the 15 and 16th century it was its own principality and was under Ottoman rule with the majority of its population converted to Islam. In this respect is a bit similar to Chechnya, the Russian breakaway enclave that has been brutally pacified in the last few years. Under Russian oppression in the 19th century, here too Muslims were driven away, with a large number emigrating to the Ottoman Empire at the time to avoid persecution.3 This is just one of many examples of ethnic cleansing that has occurred in the much put-upon people of the Caucasus. During Stalin’s rule, the Abkhaz, like the South Ossetians, were oppressed. Large numbers of Russians and Georgians moved to the region and Georgian became the official language. Despite the fact the enclave was given a semi-autonomous title, it was ruled directly from both Moscow and Tbilisi. South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s destiny became more entwined following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both enclaves tried to seize the opportunity that came with the collapse, fighting and arguing for independence. Like the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, they felt they had to strike while the iron was hot if they were to gain their independence. Wars erupted in both enclaves, with Abkhaz and South Ossetians fighting the Georgian army that was trying to maintain territorial integrity. Georgians living in both regions were ethnically cleansed from their homes as Cossacks and Russian soldiers fought alongside ethnic Abkhaz and South Ossetians.4 The nationalists were fighting for independence, while the Russians who helped them wanted to destabilize Georgia. Lots of human rights abuses were reported. This was the beginning of a new era of relations between Georgia and these two regions, one we are currently living through. Its beginnings were described in this article: In August 1992, Georgian guardsmen seized the Abkhaz regional capital of Sukhum by force. In the eyes of the Abkhaz and the Ossetian minorities, the new Georgian state seemed bent on asserting by force its power over all of Georgia. The unifying (and it quickly became disunifying) ‘idea’ behind the Republic of Georgia seemed then to be preponderant power in Georgian hands in Tbilisi. For the Abkhaz, their very existence as a people and culture seemed to be at stake.5 The fall of the Soviet Union was clearly a precipitating cause for these conflicts. We can see the situation erupting and becoming much more complicated. Under the Soviet Union all of the ethnic tensions in Eurasia were tamped down not only by the police state, but also by Communism which tried to educate people to believe they are all brothers and sisters and there are no important differences between people except for their class. This policy worked for the most part as there were not many ethnic tensions in the Soviet Union despite the fact that there were many, many different ethnic groups. With the Soviet Union’s collapse all of these problems exploded into the open. There was conflict and fighting in Central Asia, and also especially in the Caucasus. Many of the countries that gained independence after 1991—for example the Baltic countries and Georgia—hated Russia for the oppression they had been subject to for the last 70 years. So there were now two types of political tensions at play. The tension between central governments—for example the Georgian government—and the ethnic groups and enclaves that also wanted independence and which had been held in check for so many years by powerful Soviet authorities, and also tension between these newly independent governments and the Russian government which wanted to maintain control however it could over them, in spite of their independence. The war in August between Georgia and Russia is the most violent example so far of this tension breaking out into the open. Russia’s own history in the Caucasus is important to understand. Where they might take a milder view of a territorial dispute in Siberia or Kamchatka, they have a hair trigger when it comes to the Caucasus due to the huge violence and loss of life in the Chechen wars of the last 15 years. Russian policy, especially under Vladimir Putin, is to crackdown hard on breakaway enclaves within their own territory; but when it comes to breakaway enclaves in their neighbors, they are only too happy to welcome them into the fold, in a kind of annexation. Russia has historically dominated Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and no doubt it hopes to maintain that control even in a post-Soviet world. Its supremacy, however, has been challenged in recent years by a sequence of "color revolutions" in (Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, all of which have rejected Russian-style government in favor of Western alignment. The latest showdown with Georgia would seem to suggest an increasingly enfeebled Russia that is trying vainly to control its former subjects. But this view is overly simplistic, particularly in consideration of the recent oil boom and the flood of petroleum revenues filling Russia's coffers. What the recent situation actually indicates is an emboldened Russia once again seeking to flex its muscles.6 The war in August changed not only Russia’s relationship with the West, but Russia’s relationship with its Caucasian neighbors. The situation is very tense and ongoing. Russia has continued to push its embargo against Georgia, and tried to get international support for an arms embargo against Georgia. It has also called its recognition of the independence of South Ossetia—independence which is recognized by virtually no other country in the world—as “final and irrevocable,” in the words of President Dmitri Medvedev.7 As the International Crisis Group describes the current situation: The Russia-Georgia conflict has transformed the contemporary geopolitical world, with large consequences for peace and security in Europe and beyond. Moscow’s initial moves into South Ossetia as large-scale violence broke out there on 7-8 August were in part a response to a disastrous miscalculation by a Georgian leadership that was impatient with gradual confidence building and a Russian-dominated negotiations process. But Russia’s disproportionate counter-attack, with movement of large forces into Abkhazia and deep into Georgia, accompanied by the widespread destruction of economic infrastructure, damage to the economy and disruption of communications and movement between different regions of the country, constitutes a dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations.8 Whether or not the Georgian government acted foolishly or not in August is an open question, but what is not subject to debate was how closely Georgia has moved to the West in recent years and how much this had annoyed Russia. Georgian-Russian relations have been in deep freeze since the 2003 Rose Revolution that toppled Edward Shevardnadze, the long-time Georgian president who had been accused of corruption. In the fall of that year, following a rigged election, massive street protests led to the rise of Mikhail Saakashvili’s government, supported by NGOs and youth groups. This “Revolution” was conspicuous for the involvement of both the United States and Russia. The fall of Shevardnadze was welcomed by the United States9 who wanted to a more pliable leader who would advance economic reforms and stand up more to Russia. In an article on the subject, political scientist Dan Jakopovich had this to say: “Interestingly, the US Ambassador to Georgia, Richard Miles, was also the Ambassador for Azerbaijan during the 1993 coup and the Chief of Mission (effectively Ambassador) to Yugoslavia immediately prior to the toppling of Milosevic in 2000.”10 Russia for its part vigorously opposed the protestors, seeing the whole event as an American inspired coup. This also added to the bad blood between the parties. Following the deposing of Shevardnadze, Mikhail Saakashvili became president. Saakashvili was educated in the United States and was a Georgian nationalist who wanted to moved his country not only economically to the right, by embracing free markets, but also out of the Russian orbit by pursuing very vigorous diplomatic relations with the United States and the West. He also was controversial. Although he came to power in free and fair elections, he was accused of being too authoritarian. He has tried to justify this by claiming that a strong hand is needed to rebuild Georgia. For many there is evidence that he has worked hard to accomplish this goal: The nation-building so far has been impressive. Large-scale corruption, especially in the police, is down; despite disgruntlement, most people when asked say they haven't given a bribe in the past year; educational reform has clamped down on pervasive graft in higher education, instituted self-government (parent councils), and competitively appointed secondary-school directors; public-private partnerships have been forged to revitalize the collapsed medical system; and despite Russia's embargo, the economy will grow at least 10 percent this year, the country's credit ratings have improved, and foreign direct investment is at 2 billion euros annually.11 He has also, over the last few years, infuriated the Russian government. In 2006, Russia launched an embargo on certain Georgian products following the arrest of men Georgia claimed were Russian spies. A number of air space violations occurred. In 2007, The Russian ambassador to Tblisi said that Georgia was a dying nation and that Russia was “a large country, a huge country. It can digest this. You, the Georgians, will fail to digest this.”12 This was widely interpreted by Georgians to be a view into Russian intentions toward Georgia. So who is in the right in all of this mess? It is difficult to tell, but one compass we can use to make a judgement is international law. According to legal experts, in Germany, for example, the declaration of independence made by South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the war this past August—and Russia’s recognition of it—is meaningless. "The right to self-determination does not come with a right to secede," says a law professor at the University of Kiel. "It's a right to autonomy, to minority rights and the like. It only becomes a right to secede when we're talking about a situation of genocide, hence when fundamental basic and human rights are no longer guaranteed."13 There was a case for Kosovo to declare independence—which angered many Russians who supported the Serbian government—under this idea, but it isn’t the same for South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Russian activities, other experts say, go far beyond their peacekeeping mandate in the region and may be illegal. Says one, "It's a punishment of Georgia with military means. It's an expansion of war-like measure to Georgia's core territory and that's clearly a violation of international law."14 The current situation is changing day by day. What possible outcomes can we expect? To help come up with an answer to this important question, it is useful to look at other examples of separatist or nationalist movements throughout the world. By comparing and contrasting other countries’ situations we may be able to determine what will happen to Georgia and its separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Two important examples in this essay will be the Palestinian situation, which to this day remains unresolved, 60 years after the creation of the state of Israel and four major wars between participants. This example is especially significant because the Middle East is a focus of global attention and vital for international peace. Many important players are involved in the situation, like the Caucasus, and to this day it is still evolving. The second major example is the African National Congress and its fight to end apartheid and white rule in South Africa. This is an example of a successful group, representing a certain segment of the population (a majority in this case) dramatically altering the political landscape of a country. It is important to examine what methods and techniques the ANC used in its successful battle—some of these may be instructive to nationalist groups both on the Georgian side and the Abkhazian and South Ossetian side. Both groups have also tried to use international law to their advantage with different levels of success. In some ways the Palestinian’s second intifada more closely resembled Chechnya’s struggle for independence than South Ossetia or Abkhazia’s. The second intifada, inspired, many believe, by a provocative visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in 2000,15 featured widespread suicide bombings and targeting of Israeli civilians. Israel’s response, though far less brutal, was in some way similar to Russia’s response to Chechen terrorist attacks on theatre-goers and other civilians—massive retaliation and a security clampdown. Both Israel and the Palestinian activities have been condemned under international law, which can prove very pliable in an emotional and violent conflict. Have the tactics of those fight for the Palestinian cause been in any way responsible for their peoples’ continued marginalization. This is a highly controversial question, but one that those who fight on the side of the South Ossetians or Abkhaz may be very interested to answer. It is possible to see two strands of activism in the Palestinian cause, especially over the last 20 years or so. One strand is represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which could be said to be politically engaged and willing to negotiate with the international community and Israel for a peaceful and adequate resolution to the conflict. The second strand would be represented by Hamas, a terrorist organization, which advocates the destruction of Israel and terrorist tactics.16 What makes this distinction more complicated, however, is that recent years have seen something of a blurring of what was once a quite clear-cut difference between the two organizations. In January 2006, Hamas was elected the government of Gaza, following Israel’s withdrawal from the territory, and this was followed by what some have seen to be a moderation of Hamas’ more extremist tendencies—although it is still an international pariah and still refuses to renounce terrorism. One tactic used by Hamas (and also by Hezbollah) is provocation. By provoking the Israeli government into using violence or launching a large scale attack, the Palestinians can claim to the international community that international law is being violated, they are being abused, and they desperately need help. This makes Israel look bad and brings in donations from abroad. This tactic was used recently in 2006, when Hamas militiamen in Gaza kidnapped a member of the Israeli Defense Force. Israel launched an invasion of Gaza and destroyed a lot of Palestinian infrastructure. By expanding the conflict, Hamas brought more attention to its cause and did what it could to make Israel look bad under international law. This tactic is not unlike that used by South Ossetian and Abkhaz nationalists against Georgia. The only problem is when the opponent, be it Georgia or Israel, has a policy of massive retaliation. In this case, huge damage will be done in terms of death and destruction in exchange for bringing attention to the cause. It is debatable whether provoking the enemy in this way can lead to a strategic victory. The methods used by Hamas, Hezbollah, and in the past the PLO have actually done very little for the Palestinian people.17 The nationalist organizations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia should keep this in mind. The refusal to compromise on any material terms and instead make impossible claims of their opponents (for example the Palestinians would like a right of return for all those expelled from their property in 1948 and their ancestors, a notion that would effectively destroy the state of Israel by other means) will always stall a resolution of the problem. By maintaining impossible ideals, both nationalist groups will kneecap themselves. No matter what happens in the future they cannot change their geography. They will have to be living next to Georgia and if they want to be economically prosperous they are going to have to come to some sort of economic arrangement with their neighbors. War involves vilifying your opponent, but in order to survive after a war it is important to find some common ground with your enemy, much like France and Germany did after the Second World War, paving the way for the success of the European Union. It is important for all parties to the conflicts in the Caucasus to remember that in the future they are going to have to depend on one another in one way or another. Therefore, the Palestinian tactics, which have so poisoned relations between Israel and the Palestinian people, and which are so marked by ideology and idealism over practical political considerations are very unlikely to bear any fruit. A more successful model lies in South Africa. The modern history of South Africa was truly cruel. Bad enough was the informal and general racism that had marked the country since its founding, but after the Second World War these racial attitudes were codified in law in a system known as apartheid.18 This institutional racism which shut out the majority black population from government and business and many other opportunities while giving all the power to small group of whites was condemned the world over. Riots, massacres, secret police, and widespread torture all contributed to a truly poisoned polity that was considered one of the most disgusting and inhumane regimes in the world. It is also illegal under international law.19 No one could imagine the system ending in anything but a bloodbath. But something amazing happened in South Africa. Things began to thaw. In 1990, the ANC leader Nelson Mandela was released from power. Instead of calling for massive strikes and riots, Mandela, who had been imprisoned for 27 years, turned to peaceful negotiation with the government of F.W. De Klerk. An arrangement was made for new multi-racial elections in 1994, elections which the ANC won and which made Mandela president. Instead of seeking retribution against those who had treated the country’s majority so cruelly, Mandela instead created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to bring people together and to examine the crimes of the past outside of a judicial, adversarial arena. The result was a period of national soul-searching where torturers repented and victims had a chance to share their horrible stories with their fellow citizens. The process was far from perfect, but it was a release valve for the powerful emotions that plagued people during the apartheid era. How did Mandela and the ANC achieve this amazing accomplishment? Through a combination of principle and pragmatism. In the 1950s the ANC, under Mandela’s leadership, was influenced by Gandhi and a non-violent approach to address apartheid. But after the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, Mandela felt he had no choice by to pursue violent measures against the state.20 He founded the ANC’s armed wing called Umkhonto we Sizwe or Spear of the Nation that dedicated itself to sabotaging government and military targets. The aim was to avoid causing civilian deaths or any death at all, but nevertheless attack powerful symbols of apartheid. In this change in philosophy—which was clearly enunciated by Mandela—the ANC differed dramatically from the unrestrained terrorist activities of Hamas, for example, which has dedicated itself to a total war against Israeli military and civilian targets, making no distinctions between the two. In a sense this is the difference between freedom fighters and terrorists: the latter seek to minimize or avoid altogether civilian casualties, while the latter do their best to maximize them. Mandela’s powerful defense of his methods was condemned by some countries, but also had widespread sympathy. It was both a principled and pragmatic approach to the overwhelming repression of a government that had massacred its own civilians at Sharpeville and had by then banned the legitimate political expressions of the ANC. After he was imprisoned, Mandela again stood tall for his principles. Offered early release in exchange for a promise to effectively give up his struggle against apartheid, he responded that, "What freedom am I being offered while the organization of the people remains banned? Only free men can negotiate. A prisoner cannot enter into contracts.”21 By providing a firm moral centre to anti-apartheid activities, Mandela was able to accumulate a massive amount of political credibility. Opportunism and wanton violence—hallmarks of many of the Palestinian organizations—can bankrupt nationalist or independence movements, but clarity and principle can provide them with a powerful hand. Additionally, such behavior almost always is on the side of international law. The other important aspect of the ANC’s successful struggle was its pragmatism. Mandela was eventually released from prison in 1990 by the government of F.W. De Klerk. Upon his release he promised to continue his struggle, but his principled position had not calcified into ideology: he was able to negotiate with the government and pragmatically seek a path that would be acceptable to all. Rather than demagogically declare that the majority African population of South Africa would unilaterally take power, Mandela realized he would need to work with all of South Africans in order to build a strong post-apartheid country. This he would be unable to do if he did not negotiate in good faith and also make concessions. As Jeff Warner writes in an article describing the conclusion of apartheid: Mandela's policies of reconciliation and negotiation, developed in conjunction with Bishop Desmond Tutu, were critical for a peaceful and constructive transition from apartheid to a multiracial democracy in South Africa. He believed that the Afrikaners had a right to be in South Africa, and never threatened to drive whites from the country. Mandela recognized the Afrikaner "story" — he recognized their humanity. He understood the difficulty of the voortrekker great treks in the mid-19th century and their victories and losses in battles with the Zulu; he commiserated with Afrikaner suffering in concentration camps during the Boer Wars at the end of the 19th century. Most important was Mandela's appreciation of the economic accomplishments of the Afrikaners — he recognized that they were necessary for the South African economy to grow and raise the living standards of blacks. Mandela's acceptance of whites as South African citizens facilitated a peaceful transition and guaranteed that "white flight" was minimized.22 Unfortunately, these are qualities that are not present in the Palestinian factions, and this may be one of the reasons why South Africa is a stable (though still with its share of problems) country, while the problems in the Middle East are still far from resolved. It should also be considered how rare it is to have leaders of the quality of Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. Neither man is in any way ordinary. Few individuals can resist the urge to become embittered and vengeful following a 27-year imprisonment. South Africans were greatly blessed to have powerful and credible leaders. South Ossetians and Abkhazians may not be so fortunate. There are many lessons from around the world that South Ossetians, Abkhazians, and Georgians can look as they ponder their collective future, be at as a single nation, a union, or three independent states. Some models show that rigid ideology and the pursuit of violence against civilians leads nowhere. Other models show that a recognition of differences and an effort to acknowledge past wrongdoing and pursue political reconciliation has a better track record. As the political scientist Dan Jakopovich writes: Structural violence also has to be recognized. Presently, however, it seems that the furthest civil society can go in advancing peace-building processes is to keep the politicians in check, ensuring that they respect obligations they have made, and pushing for multilateral, conciliatory interethnic policies. Real change will have to start from below, through a process of democratic empowerment and reconciliation, so that the socio-economic tensions stop being channeled and sublimated according to the interests of the elites.23 This is something all of the leaders in the Caucasus should ponder over the next few months as the dust hopefully settles on their conflict and a better situation emerges. Bibliography Barron, Owen. “A Rivalry Renewed.” Harvard International Review. Spring 2007. p 11. Finn, Peter. “Probe Traces Global Reach of Counterfeiting Ring.” Washington Post. November 26, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/25/AR2006112500963.html Jakopovich, Dan. “The 2003 "Rose Revolution" in Georgia.” Debatte: Review of Contemporary German Affairs. August 2007, Vol. 15 Issue 2. Lynch, Dov. “De facto ‘States’ around the Black Sea: The Importance of Fear.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. Vol. 7, No. 3, September 2007. Mandela, Nelson. Long Walk to Freedom. London: Back Bay Books, 1995. Toameh, Khaled Abu. “Hamas armed force readies for action.” The Jerusalem Post. May 6, 2006. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1145961290193&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull United Nations. "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Part 2, Article 5.” 2002. http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian . . . Independent?” Open Democracy. November 11, 2006. http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/south_ossetia_4100.jsp Warner, Jeff. “Different Lessons from the South African Experience.” Palestine-Israel Journal. 2007, Vol. 14 Issue 4. “A War Won.” Time Magazine. 9 June 1961. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,938112,00.html “Abkahzia.” Encyclopedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1358/Abkhazia/278281/History “Al-Aqsa Timeline.” BBC News. September 29, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677206.stm “Experts: South Ossetia, Abkhazia Have No Right to Secede.” Deutsche Welle. August 12, 2008. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3556349,00.html “Georgia's Wilted Rose.” Transitions Online. November 19, 2007. “Mandela Speaks.” ANC Press Release. http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/64-90/jabulani.html “Recognizing Right of Return for Georgian Refugees.” UN General Assembly Resolution. May 15, 2008. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/ga10708.doc.htm “Russia to Push for Arms Embargo Against Georgia.” Deutsche Welle. September 12, 2008. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3641331,00.html “Russia versus Georgia: the Fall Out.” International Crisis Group. August 22, 2008. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5636&l=1 “Russian envoy calls Georgia ‘Dying-out Nation.’ Eurasian Net. September 24, 2007. http://www.eurasianet.org/posts/092407gru.shtml “Shevardnadze to stay in Georgia.” BBC News. November 24, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3234566.stm “U.S. seeks a cutoff in all aid to Hamas.” International Herald Tribune. January 30, 2006. http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/30/news/hamas.php?page=1 Read More