Doctrine of Precedent - Essay Example

? DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT Doctrine of Precedent Reliance on precedent decisions is an important aspect of any systematic and consistent decision procedure. Considering the experience of past decisions plays a crucial role in securing the needed consistency and stability in application of law. Therefore, there is a dire need for a coherent case law. This is because it helps in strengthening the predictability of decisions and improves their authority. The doctrine of precedent also known as stare decisis provides that the decision of a higher court within the same jurisdiction acts as binding authority on a lower court within the same jurisdiction (Brassil & Brassil 2000). However, the decisions of higher courts act only as persuasive authority to lower courts in different jurisdiction. Therefore, the concept of judicial precedent requires cases to be decided in a similar way when the material facts are the same. The doctrine is only concerned with the legally material facts in order to arrive at similar decisions (Siltala 2000). On the other hand, Ratio decidendi translates to “reason of deciding” and can be defined as the material facts of a given case in addition to the decision thereon. Under common law, the doctrine of precedent is used to offer direction, certainty, consistency, and impersonality (Harlow 2005). Even as the doctrine of precedent is one of the most significant features of the common law, this doctrine is not without challenges. It is very important for any judge to identify a clear ratio decidendi in any precedent (Duxbury 2008). One of the main challenges in making decisions guided by precedents is the possibility of two conflicting methodologies employed by Lords to reach a decision. This paper will focus on the impact of the two conflicting approaches used by Lords Wilberforce and Bridge in McLoughlin v O’Brian 1983 and show how the choice between these two conflicting approaches would result to completely different results for the claimants in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992. McLoughlin v O’Brian 1983 AC 410 In this case, the plaintiff’s husband and their three children were involved in a road accident that was allegedly caused by negligence of the defendants. The accident caused the death of one of the plaintiff’s children while the husband and the other two children sustained serious injuries. When the accident happened, the plaintiff was at home two miles away from the scene. A motorist who witnessed it at the scene passed the information on the accident to the plaintiff. After the information, the plaintiff was taken to the hospital where her family members were admitted. When she looked at the extent of their injuries and the news of the death of her daughter, the plaintiff suffered severe and continuous nervous shock. The plaintiff sued the defendants claiming damages against them for the nervous shock, distress, and injury to her health ultimately caused by the defendant’s negligence. However, the suit was not successful because the judge felt that the plaintiff’s injury was not reasonably foreseeable. The plaintiff believed that the defendant’s negligence led to her suffering. This case involved the tort of negligence that has been a topic of discussion on the evidence of negligence (Stephenson 1996). In tort law, negligence is defined as the failure to execute reasonably, that is, as a normal man would perform. Therefore, according to Harlow (2005) “negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which normally regulate the demeanor of human affairs, would do, or do something which is prudent and reasonable man would not do.” Having defined negligence as a tort, it is of importance to note that it has remained the most vital tort in modern law (p. 8). This is because it utterly concentrates on the infringement of a legal duty to take care, which may result to damage of property or injury to the claimant. Negligence is known to cause individuals personal harm, damage to belongings and economic loss. In practice, the obligations of the tort of negligence may vary according to the kind of damage suffered by the claimant (Harlow 2005). In order to succeed in suing a person or organization for negligence, an individual is supposed to prove his or her case according to the elements of tort of negligence. These elements include; the defendant must owe the claimant a duty of care, the defendant must breach that duty of care and that failure must cause damage to the claimant. Bearing in mind the duty of care, negligence is essentially hesitant of compensating people who have suffered injury caused by the carelessness of other individuals (Harris 2007). However, the law does not offer a solution to all persons who suffer such injuries. Similarly, the suit in the McLoughlin v O’Brian 1983 case was not successful because the judge felt that the plaintiff’s injury was not reasonably foreseeable. The plaintiff appealed the decision in the court of appeal but the judge dismissed her claim. The dismissal was carried out on the basis that she was not entitled to claim against the defendants either because as a matter of policy a duty of care was not to be imposed on a negligent defendant beyond that owed to persons in close proximity, both in time and place. The plaintiff appealed in the House of Lords claiming that the injuries she suffered were reasonably foreseeable because of the defendant’s negligence (Stephenson 1996). Effects of the two conflicting methodologies employed by Lords Wilberforce and Bridge in McLoughlin v O’Brian 1983 AC 410 The two main methodologies utilized by Lords Wilberforce and Bridge in the case involved the efforts to prove negligence to the plaintiff who is not present when the defendant caused injuries out of negligence. Lord Wilberforce thought that reasonable foreseeability was not the only test. Lord Wilberforce argued that the risk of opening the door to an infinite number of claims required that the law should compel additional closeness tests of the class of persons whose claims may be accepted. He thought that the closeness of such individuals to the accident should be considered and the manner in which the shock was caused. On the other hand, Lord Bridge argued that these three factors should be weighed in applying the reasonable foreseeability test. He also suggested that the factors were not limitations on foreseeability. However, in all aspects of the case facts and decision reached, Lord Bridge agreed with Lord Wilberforce on the criterion used in deciding the foreseeability that would successfully moderate the claims in the field and the magnitude of damages they will attract (Wasserstrom 1961). Lord Wilberforce and Lord Bridge sought to clarify that it was necessary to assess the circumstances as they actually occurred and consider whether the hypothetical normal man, when directing his mind to the act or omission would result to what happened to the plaintiff (Harlow 2005). The McLoughlin v O’Brian case was held that the test of liability for damages for nervous shock suffered by the plaintiff was reasonable foreseeability being injured by nervous shock because of the defendant’s negligence. Applying the test, the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages from the defendants because although the plaintiff was not at or close to the scene of the accident at that time, or after a short while, the nervous shock suffered by the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable (Hodgson et al. 2007). Her appeal was accordingly permitted. The choice of these conflicting methodologies used by the judges would lead to entirely different outcomes for the claimants in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992. This would be because identifying a clear ratio decidendi in any precedent is crucial to decisions made. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 A major football match at a stadium was a scene of an accident where 95 spectators died and over 400 sustained injuries after the police in charge of crowd control allowed extremely large number of spectators to enter. However, the television images did not broadcast the suffering or dying of recognizable individuals consistent with the set broadcasting guidelines (Stephenson 1996). Later, sixteen people sued the chief constable of the force responsible for crowd control. They were identified as relatives, and in one case a fiance of people who experienced the disaster. The sixteen individuals claimed damages for nervous shock resulting in psychiatric infirmity suspected to be a result of seeing or hearing the news of the disaster (Harlow 2005). At the proceedings, the judge found favor in ten of the plaintiffs and ruled against the other six. However, the defendants appealed against nine of the successful plaintiffs while the other six unsuccessful claimants also cross-appealed. The court agreed to the appeals and disallowed the cross-appeals from the six plaintiffs. The appeal judges ruled that neither of the plaintiffs was entitled to recover any damages for nervous shock. The ten plaintiffs appealed again to the House of Lords arguing that the only way to ascertain liability for shock-induced psychiatric illness was whether such illness was reasonable foreseeable. It was held that an individual who sustained nervous shock that led to a recognizable psychiatric illness because of apprehending the cause of physical injury or the risk thereof to another person could only claim damages from the individual whose negligence resulted to the physical injury (Steele 2010). The methodologies and decision made by Lords Wilberforce and Bridge in McLoughlin v O’Brian were likely to affect the outcomes for the claimants in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police. This is because the former asserted that the risk of opening the door to an infinite number of claims required that the law should compel additional closeness tests of the class of persons whose claims may be accepted (O'Cinneide et al. 2010). However, in the latter case, the judge believed that a person who suffered from nervous shock that resulted to a recognizable psychiatric illness because of experiencing the infliction of physical injury or the risk thereof to another individual could only claim damages from the person whose negligence resulted to the physical injury (Lunney & Oliphant 2008). This conflict of decision-making is evident in that the judge in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police could not use the precedent of the McLoughlin v O’Brian case. In addition, the judges argued that having watched the persons on television that followed the broadcasting guidelines could not be considered as close enough for the plaintiffs to suffer the nervous shock (Patterson 2010). Eventually, not all the plaintiffs would succeed in claiming for damages since they had seen the disaster on television or their relations with the victims were not sufficiently close enough to cause the shock. Such a conclusion by the judges involved in the Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police ultimately conflicted with the precedent decision made by Lords Wilberforce and Bridge. If the judges in the Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police case relied on the Lords Wilberforce and Bridge’s precedent, the decision would be completely different. The law of negligence has its foundation of moral judgments and social norms. Therefore, it can be described as of uncertain content. This is because of the aspect of duty of care that does not have a definite means to determine whether an individual owes the duty of care either directly or indirectly. The modern history of the duty of care gives a warning aspect about the utilization of analytical labels (Horsey & Rackley 2013). The labels such as test, proximity/closeness, or principle may be misused during the actual practice of law. Reliance on past accurate decisions is a significant aspect of any logical and consistent decision process during a present case. However, a conflict in methodologies used to reach the conclusions and the final decision existed in the two discussed cases. Lords Wilberforce and Bridge in McLoughlin v O’Brian decision was different from the case that of the judges involved in the Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police trial. Reference Brassil, B., & Brassil, D. 2000, Excel preliminary legal studies. Glebe, N.S.W., Pascal Press. Duxbury, N. 2008, The nature and authority of precedent. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Harlow, C. 2005, Understanding tort law. London, Sweet & Maxwell. Harris, P. 2007, An introduction to law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Hodgson, J. S., Hodgson-Lewthwaite, & Lewthwaite, J. 2007, Tort law textbook. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Horsey, K., & Rackley, E. 2013, Tort law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lunney, M., & Oliphant, K. 2008, Tort law: text and materials. Oxford, Oxford University Press. O'Cinneide, C., Letsas, G., & Campbell-Holt, C. 2010, Current legal problems. Vol. 62, Vol. 62. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Patterson, D. M. 2010, A companion to philosophy of law and legal theory. Chichester, West Sussex, Wiley-Blackwell. Siltala, R. 2000, A Theory of Precedent From Analytical Positivism to a Post-Analytical Philosophy of Law. Oxford, Hart Pub. http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic. Steele, J. 2010, Tort law: text, cases, and materials. Oxford, Oxford University Press, USA. Stephenson, G. 1996, Sourcebook on torts. London, Cavendish. Wasserstrom, R. A. 1961, The judicial decision: toward a theory of legal justification. Stanford, Calif, Stanford Univ. Press. Read More