Terrorist Training - Research Paper Example

? Terrorist Training Terrorist training is teaching learners of methods and strategies of terrorism. Terrorist training usually entails teaching terrorists on how to initiate attacks, participate in field attacks and others terrorist activities such as suicide bombing. This paper points out that terrorist training usually takes place in regions that are convenient for those who train the terrorists or in well known extremist areas such as Somalia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Major terrorist training units that have been involved in the training of terrorists in the above mentioned areas include Al Qaeda and Taliban. Over the years, numerous worldwide campaigns have been launched with the aim of fighting terrorism. Terrorist training has been continuously propagated by extremists such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They are said to be the leadership and minds behind Taliban and Al Qaeda. These terror groups expanded their terror activities by establishing terror training camps in Afghanistan and other regions of the world. Terror training can be blamed for the deadly terror attacks that have been carried out in Europe, USA and other regions of the world. One of the most common of these terror attacks include the 9/11 attacks in the USA. The main aim of this paper is to help readers to understand the way in which terrorist training and recruitment has shifted, changed and evolved over the past decade. Terrorist Training Although there are many issues that define the way in which the world seeks to counteract or avert terrorism, one of the primal means by which governments can seek to disrupt terrorism is by seeking to interfere or stymie the means by which terrorist groups train and/or recruit new members. Ultimately, nations such as the United States have made it a primary goal of its intelligence and/or military to seek to disrupt or destroy terrorist training facilities and capabilities at each and every juncture. In such a way, many analysts have noted that this process in and of itself is more effective in helping to stem the tide of terrorism than targeted assassinations of high ranking terrorists. Nonetheless, when performed in tandem with other actions, seeking to disrupt and destroy terrorist training capabilities comes to be seen as an effective tool in the arsenal of counter terrorism agencies and governments the world over. As a result of the relatively high level of success that the United States and other nations have experienced with regards to depriving these entities of their training capabilities, groups such as Al Qaeda and others have been forced to integrate with new dynamics. As such, these new dynamics in terrorist training will be the primal thrust and unit of analysis within this brief research paper. In seeking to understand the way in which terrorist training and recruitment has shifted over the past decade, the reader can come to a more appreciable level of understanding with regards to how these entities continue to be represented within the world. Looking back but a few short years, the reader can note that a far different system existed as compared to what is evidenced now. Taking Al Qaeda as the case in question, it can be noted that there existed defined and extant philosophy of integration with regards to the way in which training facilities existed in and around the globe. What is meant by this is that Al Qaeda operated a litany of different physical training facilities in far flung reaches of the globe to include Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, the Philippines and others. Up until the attacks of September 11th, 2001, these training bases served as the backbone by which newly recruited warriors would learn the basics of how to engage in Al Qaeda’s definition of jihad. It should be understood at this particular juncture that although Al Qaeda represents one of the most salient threats and perhaps one of the best known terrorist entities within the world today, it should not be understood that this group alone accounts for the lion’s share of terrorist activity in the globe or that recognition and appreciation for the means of operation that Al Qaeda engages in should be indicative of global terror in general (Johnson, 2007). Rather, this particular group has been chosen as a case study due to the fact that it is visible and well known as well as the fact that it ascribes to certain norms of behavior that are indicative of many terrorist training realities that exist within the current system. Moreover, due to the fact that this particular group has been under the greatest level of strain within the past several years, it has also evidenced a great deal of evolution that is indicative of many other terrorist training programs and the ways in which the realities of the current system have forced them to adopt a new paradigm. As has been stated, the previous paradigm that was engaged by Al Qaeda, as well as many other terrorist organizations throughout the world, was to utilize physical bases and employ staff that could include hundreds of personnel as a means of training future terrorists on the skills of the trade. Moreover, these bases, by very nature of such a definition, necessarily required a physical presence within a nation in order to operate. By and large, this presence was oftentimes granted with the full knowledge and understanding by the host nation of what such a camp was intended on creating and effecting within the world (Kennedy, 2010). Other times, the level of lawlessness or remoteness of these camps prevented interested governments from paying much heed to the ways in which these groups operated. However, the events leading up to and including September 11th clearly changed the overall level of support and dynamic of relations that many nations had previously engaged with regards to Al Qaeda. This can be understood as something of a marriage of convenience or a relationship of mutual gain. Whereas in the early to mid 1990’s there was little emphasis paid to such groups by third party nations or global powers, once attacks such as the ones on the US Embassies in Africa or the USS Cole took place, a heightened level of focus was placed upon terrorism’s funding and logistics; up to and certainly including training and the means by which this was effected (McLeskey, McCord & Leetz, 2007). With this increased level of scrutiny came a decreased level of support by many nations that had allowed elements of Al Qaeda to exist within their borders. Ultimately, the existence of Al Qaeda came to be seen as too much of a liability for many of these host nations that had traditionally allowed one form or other of logistical/training support to such entities. Likewise, after the events of September 11th, all but a handful of nations were more than willing to seek to push Al Qaeda from their boundaries; thereby reducing the number and prevalence of these training bases to but a handful in the far flung reaches of Afghanistan and the tribally administered regions of Pakistan (Mainas, 2012). With this bold and drastic attack upon the world, groups such as Al Qaeda found it necessary to engage in something of a new paradigm of action. Realizing that it was no longer feasible to engage with the United States and continue to operate an extensive level of training bases around the globe, it came to be understood that the only means by which the group could continue to exercise a degree or relevance was by seeking to segment the structure and operate in a less synonymous and unified pattern (Dixon et al, 2006). Due to the fact that the United States and other nations had engaged in a determinate program of seeking to target senior members of the group for assassination, it became unreasonable and counterproductive to maintain any semblance of a formal terrorist training program and seek to promote this within interested parties and recruits (Lia, 2008). Instead, it became clear to what was left of Al Qaeda’s leadership that the best approach must necessarily be to segment the elements that had previously been engaged and work to take the organization underground as a means of protecting it from any further level of destruction. One reality with regards to the way in which terrorist training takes place within Al Qaeda as well as many other terrorist organizations around the world within the current context is with regards to the fact that a clear and definitive transition was noted after the pressure from the international community reached a fever pitch. As a result of this new paradigm, groups such as Al Qaeda, and many others for that matter, sought to engage potential recruits via the technology of the internet. Within such a dynamic, it came to be realized, both by terrorist groups and those that wished to foil their plans, that since the existence of training centers was no longer feasible, the best means to engage with future terrorists was to put the knowledge in their hands concerning the skills of the trade and encourage them to acts of terrorism in this way. This necessarily allowed the group in question, as well as many others, to continue to be active with regards to recruiting further terrorists yet not harboring the distinct and measurable danger of operating physical training locations that would place them under the target of those entities that wanted to neutralize them. It should be noted that although these “internet” training manuals have been widely distributed and have served to coax many a malcontented terrorist into action, they are ultimately not as effective in achieving the goals that these entities originally hoped to effect due to the low level of sophistication and complexity that such “self-taught” terrorists are able to bring to bear. A clear and definitive set of examples concerning this is with regards to the so called “underwear bomber” or the Boston bombing suspects. These individuals were apparently engaged to commit violent “jihad” based upon their own level of “self training” gleaned from a variety of internet handlers as well as manuals. Due to the low level of sophistication, these terrorists, discussed above, noticed a limited level of success; and in the case of the “underwear bomber” no success was achieved. Another reality of this current shift in terrorist training is the fact that it has become extraordinarily cheap to engage with potential terrorist via this online medium. Yet, from the perspective of those individuals and nations seeking to stem the tide of global terrorism, this new dynamic poses an especially difficult threat to protect against. Whereas key individuals within the structure of terrorist training activities could be monitored and even the operations and total membership of individual terrorist training camps could be counted and understood by intelligence agencies utilizing satellites and primary intelligence of other means, this new reality creates a litany of different factors that could be potential terrorists. In such a way, seeking to find an actionable means against protecting against this new form of terrorist training becomes something impossible. One perfectly pertinent example of how this has taken place within the past few years is with regards to the Inspire magazine put out by Al Qaeda. Such a magazine serves both as a call to arms for potential militants as well as something of recipe book for a variety of different ways to engage in “jihad” for even the individual that may not have access to advanced weaponry or tactics. Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups, has utilized such an approach to engage something of a force multiplier. Whereas it was true that the previous paradigm of the terrorist training camp was able to churn out reasonably well trained and educated terrorists with regards to the skills of the trade and tactics involved, it was also true that the overall volume of individuals that could engage in such training was limited due to outreach and funds required to run these operations. However, with the global nature of the internet, proximity and funding to engage potential militants has been removed as a stumbling block, making it far easier and more practical to increase overall volume of disaffected and otherwise militant individuals. Conclusion In summary, from the analysis which has been conducted within this paper, the reader can come to the understanding that the tactics and methods by which terrorist training is being engaged within the current paradigm is fundamentally different than the way that it was engaged in a decade or so ago. The single largest reason for this is the fact that the reality and interoperability of the internet has created an attractive alternative to operation of the formerly utilized training facilities. Additionally, stakeholders within terrorist groups have understood that this also has the unique benefit of serving as a force multiplier, serving to protect the remaining stakeholders within the terrorist group, and engaging a wider audience with their message. From the standpoint of those entities that seek to stem the tide of terrorism, this new dynamic is a scary reality because it is extraordinarily difficult to engage such a nebulous entity and seek to diminish its strength or component parts as it’s organization becomes more and more loose every year. For this reason, nations such as the United States have sought to engage a different tactic which involves a much higher level of electronic and internet surveillance with regards to the individuals that begin to integrate with the messages that these groups put out. However, such an approach is costly as it then requires the intelligence community to monitor a litany of individuals that may or may not be threats; practically over their entire lifetime. More countries need to join the fight against terrorism by nipping terrorism training at its bud. References Dixon, M. R., Rehfeldt, R., Zlomke, K. R., & Robinson, A. (2006). Exploring the development and dismantling of equivalence classes involving terrorist stimuli. Psychological Record, 56(1), 83-103. Johnson, M. (2007) Is Training a Cost-Effective Way to Meet Evolving Terrorist Threats? Security Director's Report, 6(10), 2-5. Kenney, M. (2010). 'Dumb' yet deadly: Local knowledge and poor tradecraft among Islamist militants in Britain and Spain. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(10), 911-932. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2010.508508 Lia, B. (2008). Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training. Terrorism & Political Violence, 20(4), 518-542. doi:10.1080/09546550802257226 Mainas, E. D. (2012). The analysis of criminal and terrorist organisations as social network structures: a quasi-experimental study. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 14(3), 264-282. doi:10.1350/ijps.2012.14.3.285 McLeskey, E., McCord, D., & Leetz, J. (2007). Underlying reasons for the success and failure of terrorist attacks. Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Institute. Read More