Legal systems and skills - Essay Example

The House of Lords (HL) believed that the Act’s purpose was meant to protect human embryos made externally, rather than the manner in which the embryo formed. They ruled that parliament did not intend any distinguishing between CNR and fertilization created embryos, especially since CNR at the time was thought impossible. The HL decided that parliament did not mean to leave CNR formed embryos unregulated; therefore, the Act applied. For this reason, the Court opined that CNR was legal. Summarize the facts and legal arguments in this case Bruno Quintavalle undertook litigation on behalf of a claimant, Pro-life Alliance, in order to seek a declaration that CNR created human embryos were not created via fertilization.

He claimed that embryos from CNR were not within an embryo’s definition for the Act’s purpose. The Secretary of State, as the defendant, argued that Section 1(1) of the HFE Act should be purposively interpreted so that the fundamental subject the Act referred to was a live human embryo, rather than the manner in which the embryo was created1. The sub-section, in this case, would be read with the words, defining the embryo was a live human embryo where fertilization has been completed, in the event that the embryo was produced by fertilization2.

Parliament’s clear intention, thus, was the control of human reproduction through licensing or prohibition using the HFE Act. Crane J., despite acknowledging that purposive interpretation was a powerful argument, he held that this interpretation would allow an impermissible extension and re-writing of the definition3. Crane J.’s decision, however, was appealed successfully by the Secretary of State for Health with Lord Phillips MR, who gave the Court of Appeal’s main judgment, contended that parliament’s legislation was mostly related to how embryos were treated.

Therefore, although the legislation expressly contemplated embryos as being created through fertilization, the question, fundamentally, was whether the CRN produced embryos did fall into a similar category or genus as fertilization-produced embryos. Considering that both embryo types were fundamentally identical in their ability to develop into adults of their relevant species, the two types of embryos were clearly held as being in the same genus4. As far as legislative policy was concerned, Lord Phillips held that the intention of parliament was in order to control the use and creation of human cells; therefore, it was essential that those embryos created through CNR should be considered as part of the regulatory scheme that the Act created.

In addition, the Master of the Rolls contended that no countervailing considerations existed that could militate against a purposive approach to the case. Even though, some of the provisions in the legislation were not applicable to CNR created embryos, it did not remove the importance of enhancing effect of parliament’s intention. These inconsistencies were not as serious because, in various cases, they are remediable by HFE Act regulations, and in some different cases, they do not have much practical significance that those embryos produced through CNR should undergo exclusion from the HFE Act.

After the Appeals Court, denied authorization of appealing against this judgment, the petitioners were still able to petition the HL successfully5. However, following Pro-life