Columbia Pictures versus Robinson Case - Essay Example

? Columbia Picture Industries Inc. v Robinson: Why the Search Orders had a “Dragonian and Essential Unfair Nature” Introduction In Columbia Pictures Inc. v Robinson, a court has issued an order against the applicant for breaching copyrights1. The order permitted the plaintiff to search his premises, which included his home, to remove specified documents and films that had been thought to be pirated. The order was executed at the same time with the police search warrant. The court rules unanimously that the action was not a to contravention human rights laws. However, Scott argues that search orders represent a “draconian and essentially unfair nature”. The doctrine of Anton Piller is one of the most controversial of laws regarding underlying search and entry. Of particular interests is to understand the premises that inform Scott’s stand. Unraveling the “draconian and essentially unfair nature” of the Search order In labeling the search order as “draconian and essentially unfair nature”, one would not miss the point in inferring that Scott felt the orders were far from being justified. Thus, in seeking the premise in which Scott’s stand rests, the question of how unjustified the order was is imperative. Indeed, such a question leads to various sound arguments against the search orders. In particular, it can be inferred that search orders, in all their forms, are generally draconian owing to their nature of lacking adherence to the laws and statutes that protect human rights. Additionally, the Piller principle and other associated principles, such as ex parte, also go against the laws of equitable remedies2. Such laws fail to take into account the rights of both parties, but only end up in disadvantaging one party at the expense of the other. They also tend to be biased in giving the plaintiff advantage while punishing the defendant without listening to both perspectives before a decision is reached. Questioning the Pivotal case terms and contexts Before digging dipper into the case, it is crucial to understand the pivotal contexts that inform the argument, as well as the counterarguments. One of the widely cited terms in is the interim remedy. An interim remedy is preliminary relief granted by the court in order to ensure that the status quo is maintained pending the trial. As such, the court may make utilize injunctions, which creates that allowance for inspection of property and conducting searches. Another term is interim injunction. An interim injunction is an order from the court prohibiting a person in a civil suit from doing or compelling to do something and this is in order to maintain the status quo. Indeed, the premises for the ruling may be considered as those consistent with those in the Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd3, wherein it was upheld that the court has the powers to injunct a person from meddling with what is deemed evidence in order to maintain the status quo prior to the issue going to trial. It cannot be disputed that the goals of the provisions are well set. However, they can barely dispel one crucial question­ --- what is then the place of fundamental human rights? Whereas it could be inferred that the court decision was began as a noble means of ensuring justice through interim injunctions, it mutated to become a tool for the abuse of human rights due to most of the order being issued ex parte4. An order issued ex parte is a breach to the stipulations that underlie the bill of rights. Here, Anton Piller law is deemed to be one of the most Draconian of laws since it creates the allowance to acknowledge that the right to privacy, one of the fundamental rights, was breached. The debate on the human rights aspect of the law is however two fold since its contravention of one seems to promote the observance of the other. Article eight of the human rights convention asserts that everyone has the right to respect to his private and family life5. As clearly set in Chapter 8 of the convention, every person is entitled to right to respect of privacy, as well as family life, his correspondence and family life. It also provides that there shall be no interference with the right provisions. However, interference may only happen based on the legal stipulations, which may be inclined towards the interests of the public safety, national security, and prevention of crimes, economic wellbeing, health morals and for the wellbeing of other members in the society. It has been variously argued that, in seeking to maintain the status quo in a civil case before trial, the court action on Anton Piller is merely adhering to the rights of the parties by ensuring the equality and fair trial through making sure that evidence is not tampered with. On the other hand such a principle allows one of the parties to enter the premises of the other and in so doing violates the right to privacy of the given individual. Clearly, such a provision only agitates a contest, creating allowance for both sides to support each other. There is another point that could be derived from the circumstances underlying the ruling, and which present the search order as misplaced in the face of justice. There is always no provision for the party targeted for searching to turn down the orders through court battles. In the essence, there are always no provisions of overturning the ruling. The point is that, if this was to happen, it would result in a charge of contempt of court. As argued, having the provisions that allow the search orders to be challenged frustrate the process of seeking justice, considering surprise is the instrument of the searches, as argued in MI Ltd v Pandit. The provisions in Third Chandris Shipping Co v Unimarine Sa6, a similar case, proves to be relevant to this case. Court of Appeal. Lord Denning set out basic guidelines that are crucial in guiding justice in such disputed contexts. One of the provisions was that the claimant must show full and frank disclosure, give particulars of his claim and show grounds for believing the defended owns questionable property. In Columbia Pictures Inc. v Robinson7, one of the provisions is that there must be strong prima facie case, the potential or actual the damage must be very serious for the applicant and lastly, there ought to be clear evidence that the defendant has in his possession incriminating evidence and a real possibility of their destruction before trial exists8. Clearly, the provisions coincide. However, the draconian and unjustified nature comes out clearly when one questions of how evidence to warrant search orders could be substantiated. How could evidence be ascertained in the absence of one party? Who represents the other party? How would the court rate evidence when the targeted is not consulted? Moreover, the same argument is made with regard to orders made ex parte; the orders are intended to catch the recipient by surprise in order that he does not have the opportunity to hide or destroy evidence sought by the plaintiff9. On the other hand, it may be argued that the recipient of the order needs time to consult with the court solicitor before making a decision on whether to allow the claimant into his premises. Since the court makes orders ex parte, it is not unsurprising that such an action may result may not have knowledge of incriminatory evidence which the plaintiff may defendant may have in his premises. Furthermore, there are various problems that underlie the search orders. Hugh and Dockray10 document various problems associated with search orders. Ex parte service orders and impromptu entrance into the targeted premises for search could be accompanied by strong emotional reactions, confusion, anger and sense of violation, as well as powerlessness. In some case, the execution of the orders may result in disruption of other activities and property. For instance, search of business premise may result to its closure. To eliminate the draconian and unjustified nature, it is imperative for the pillar search order provisions to be reviewed. They should be made to reflect the centrality of fundamental human rights in all court battles, as well as informed consent prior to any search order execution. Otherwise, when left as it is, it is a step that is far from equity, which fits the Scott’s notion. Conclusion The subject of search order issuance is undoubtedly controversial, as presented in Columbia Pictures Inc. v Robinson. The order permitted the plaintiff to search his premises, which included his home, to remove specified documents and films that had been thought to be pirated. The court ruled unanimously that the action was not a to contravention human rights law. However, Scott argues that search orders represent a “draconian and essentially unfair nature”. Of particular interests has been to unravel the premises that inform Scott’s stand. In examination of the case, various point surface as valid reasons for why Scott must have been very assertive. In particular, search orders, in all their forms, are generally draconian owing to their nature of lacking adherence to the laws and statutes that protect human rights. Additionally, the Piller principle and other associated principles, such as ex parte, also go against the laws of equitable remedies. Such laws fail to take into account the rights of both parties, but only end up in disadvantaging one party at the expense of the other. They also tend to be biased in giving the plaintiff advantage while punishing the defendant without listening to both perspectives before a decision is reached. Once issued, there are always no provisions for the targeted parties to overturn them through court challenge. Bibliography Columbia Pictures Inc. v Robinson [1987] ch 38. Hugh, Laddie and Dockray, Martin. Pillar Problem. Law Quartely. Sweet & Maxwell and its Contributors. 2013. MI Ltd v Pandit [1975] 1 WLR 302. N. H. Andrews. Abuse of Anton Piller Orders. The Cambridge Law Journal, 46 (1987): 50-52. Ng, Peter Lee Tong, The Anton Piller Order 2 Decades Later: The Balancing Act Goes On. Singapore Academy of Law Journal, Vol. 9, p. 170, 1997. Perkins, Mills, Patent infringement and forum shopping in the European Union, Fordham International Law Journal, 20 (1996) 579 Third Chandris Shipping Co v Unimarine Sa (1979) 2 All Er 972 Zuckerman, A., The Undertaking in Damages – Substantive and Procedural Dimensions, Cambridge Law Journal, 54(1997) 546. Read More