The concept of precedent with reference to the doctrine of promissory estoppel - Essay Example

? The Concept of Precedent The concept of precedent with reference to the doctrine of promissory estoppel as developed in the caseof Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 The Concept of Precedent The concept of precedent is a key component of the common law system of duties and rights. It binds courts-within certain set limits-to prior decisions made by superior courts on similar cases. Two objects of legal order are achieved when precedent is adhered to. The concept of precedent constitutes greatly to the maintenance of stable laws or legal regimes1. The achieved stability allows for predictability in law in addition to offering some degree of individual rights security. Precedent also ensure that the law only develops with regards to the changing view-points of communities, thereby, reflecting, more accurately, the expectations and morals of the community. The concept of precedent makes a system adaptable to changing and varying circumstances; rational, highly practical, and puts into consideration various human experiences2. The doctrine of precedent also referred to stare decisis, is not only the most important aspect of Common Law, but is indeed a distinctive feature of the said tradition. It is true that, for dynamism and coherence, Common Law depends on precedent for the preservation of its tradition. Therefore, what is this concept of precedent, which is so much a key part of Common Law? Precedent is an expression-shorthand-of stare decisis, which means to stand by the decisions3. In practice and theory, the concept of precedent implies that courts of lower cadre must follow or ensure their decisions are in tandem with those of courts of higher cadre in questions of law, and that, those higher courts should, by themselves, depart from decisions that they had prior made on questions of law, only in the event that there are important reasons for them to do so4. In simpler terms, the concept of precedent requires that court stand by their decisions in questions of law that are similar. The principles of precedent apply to decisions interpreting positive law as much as it applies to customary laws5. It should be noted that, in the event that lower courts fail to follow precedent of a higher court in its decision, chances are, such decisions can be reversed in appeal. In the case of ‘Central London Property Trust Ltd V. High Trees House Ltd [1947] Kb 130’, 1947, in which Central London had sued High Trees House for full payment of rent despite their previous agreement in 1940, where High Trees House was to pay rent reduced by half6, is a perfect example of how the concept of precedence has been utilized in making decisions of questions in law. Judge, Lord Denning, J., in his ruling or judgment, that the full rent was payable from mid-1945 when the flat was fully occupied, followed past precedent from previous decisions such as that in the case of Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co7. According to the principles of precedent, a court can only depart from past precedent only with strong justification. Deviation from precedent is permissible in the event that earlier decision has obvious error or the principle of law that the precedent established is not reasonable; or in the event that there are changes in law that render the reasoning behind the earlier decision weak8. This is evident in Judge, Lord Denning, J., judgment, which in his continued obiter statement; he claims that Central London would not have been able to receive full rent if they had tried to claim it from 1940 onwards. This statement was not in binding with precedent; however, it led to the creation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The judge reasoned that, in the event that a person lead another person to believe that he/she will not enforce strict legal rights, the courts are obliged to prevent them, at a later stage, from doing so9. Courts have the obligation of distinguishing its case from precedent already established in the scenario where the facts in the current case differ from those of the case that set the precedent. The decision made by the judge in the ‘Central London Property Trust Ltd V. High Trees House Ltd [1947] Kb 130’, 1947, considered the developments in law at that time and at the time the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract. In summary, the judge argued that Central London Property Trust Ltd could have, in accordance with the old common law, been able to recover the full rent from the beginning or the contract term, since that contract could not be altered by agreement but only by deed. This was in tandem with the decision held in a prior case, Berry v. Berry [1929] 2 K. B. 316, which argued based on the doctrine of equity. This did not hold in the case of ‘Central London Property Trust Ltd V. High Trees House Ltd [1947] Kb 130’, 1947, since based on its facts, the variations might have been made with no consideration. The judge in this case was able to distinguish the facts of this case and those in the cases that established the precedent. With regards to the principle of promissory estoppel, the judge argued contrary to the decision made in Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H. L. C. 185, that there is need of a contract for a representation as to the future to be enforceable. The judge deviated from the precedent set by the Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H. L. C. 185 because he considered the developments that had occurred in law since that decision. Special reference was made to the In re Wickham (1917) 34 T. L. R. 158, Fenner v. Blake [1900] 1 Q. B. 426, Buttery v. Pickard [1946] W. N. 25 and Re William Porter & Co., Ld. [1937] 2 All E. R. 361 cases. These, he argued, were not in real sense, cases of promissory estoppel since they constituted promises that were only intended to be binding only when acted upon. According to common law, only promises where the promisor makes an inference of intending or not-intending to be bound to the promise, gives rise to estoppel. The ruling in ‘Central London Property Trust Ltd V. High Trees House Ltd [1947] Kb 130’, 1947, deviated from the above precedent based on the reasoning that it was time that a promise is binding, even without inference or consideration, if it is acted upon. In general, it is an obligation for the court to follow precedent established unless there are reasons compelling enough to warrant a change. It is also within the discretion of the court to overrule precedents or its own past decisions, and for higher courts to overturn decisions made by lower courts. Detrimental Reliance The concept of detrimental reliance is entrenched in the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which was crafted by the common law courts as a way of dealing with the demerits of the principle of consideration; in as far as legal contracts are concerned10. Common law requires that in any promise, there must be something that if bargained for and offered in exchange for a promise; this is what is referred to as consideration11. This brings about a legal shortcoming, which, promissory estoppel acts as a substitute for, rendering promises or contracts that lack consideration enforceable and binding. In this case, the promisee’s reliance is considered as a sufficient and independent basis for enforcing the contract or promise. In essence, promissory estoppel has been used as a legal tool for prohibiting a promisor from denying that a contract exists when consideration is lacking. According to Judge Lord Denning’s ruling, the case ‘Central London Property Trust Ltd V. High Trees House Ltd [1947] Kb 130’, 1947, was not considered a promissory estoppel despite it lacking neither consideration nor inference to bind. The judge in his ruling argued that, had the case been one of promissory estoppel, the estoppel would only end when the conditions to which implied representation applied ceased or it would come to an end on notice. High Trees House Ltd relied on the promise made by Central London Property Trust Ltd and paid half the rent during the period in which the flat was not fully occupied, thereby rendering the promise enforciable only until when the flat became fully occupied. Bibliography Adcock, Jon C., ‘Detrimental Reliance’ (1985) 45 Louisiana Law Review, 753. Holland, J., and J. Webb, Learning Legal Rules (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2010). Hondius, Ewoud, ‘Precedent and the Law’ (2007) 11 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law. Martin, Peter W., ‘Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age’ (no date) 53 Vilanova Law Review. Schauer, Frederick, ‘Precedent’ (2008) 39 Stanford Law Review, 571. Waddams, Stephen, ‘Authority, Precedent, and Principle’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal, 127. ‘Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130’, 1947. Read More