Application of Facts to Extracts of Statutes - Essay Example

Interpretation and Application to Facts of Extracts from Three Statutes Number Department Case A: Alec’s Criminal Liability for Attempted Criminal Damage to Bruno, under the S1 Criminal Attempts Act 1981 and the Criminal Damage Act, 1971 There is a solid ground for this case. In the first place, there is the Actus Reus (the voluntary and wrongful act or wrongful omission that makes up the physical aspect of a crime). This is clearly seen in Alec seizing the sniffer dog, Bruno by the collar towards the van, with the intent of destroying the dog’s sharp olfactory senses. He intends to do this by exposing the dog to a chemical-impregnated rag. Just as is usually the case, there are several acts that make up for Alec’s Actus Reus. Although the main criminal act done by Alec is an attempted harm of a sniffer dog, yet Alec has also trespassed Claire’s property, which is her cottage. It is important to note that by destroying the sniffer dog’s olfactory organs, Alec was committing the crime of destroying someone’s property. Despite the destruction of property often being legally referred to as vandalism, Alec’s destruction of property can be fittingly called as such, only that it borders on mutilation, since the property in this case is a living being, a dog. The part of the dog that is being mutilated is its olfactory organ, whether this mutilation is permanent, r temporary, that notwithstanding (Biles, et al., 2011, 177). Conversely, Alec is also acting in collusion with drug dealers, which is another criminal offence. While freedom of association may be cited by the defendant as an explanation to Alec’s tete-a-tete with drug barons, his very act of mutilating Bruno amounts to a (willful) obstruction of justice. Alec’s act is not only classifiable as an anticipatory obstruction of justice, but it also totally proscribed and described. Particularly, by destroying Bruno’s outstanding olfactory capabilities, Alec would be frustrating the antinarcotics police efforts and advancing the interests of the drug barons. Bruno, being the best sniffer dog in the country was being used by the police. Therefore, Alec’s act of destroying Bruno’s sniffing abilities was an affront to antinarcotics police work and efforts. Conversely, it is also important to note that Alec’s action makes him complicit to a crime. Guam v. Dela Rosa, 644 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (1981) sheds light on the fact that Alec has knowledge of an anticipated criminal act (drug dealing and destruction of police property) and continues to strengthen their cause (by attempting to disable a police dog). This totally and explicitly renders Alec an accomplice to crime. Even the mere fact that Alec knew about the drug dealers and maintained contact with them, still serves as exculpating evidence against him. This is because, both points of legal references describe an accomplice as one who is party to an offence by the virtue of having encouraged the principal offender with acts or/ and words, and thereby facilitating the crime. This accomplice needs not participate in the main crime; he merely enables it. Alec by all means is an accomplice since he verbally agreed in a binding agreement and also actively tried to incapacitate a police dog, with the chief aid of abetting and enabling the transpiration of narcotics. By also entering Claire’s cottage without permission, Alec became guilty of the crime of trespass. Another salient component that gives the case a strong ground is Mens Rea (the state of a guilty mind, a criminal intent and a wrongful purpose). Alec, having formed a liaison with drug dealers, had planned to destroy Bruno’s sense of smell. He seized Bruno by the collar, drag him towards his van, so as to expose his nose to the chemical-impregnated rag. The conclusion to the foregoing is that there is no room whatsoever for any lawful excuse that may be extended in favor of Alec. Besides this, it is most probable that Alec has a case to answer and that he is likely to be found of an offence. It is obvious that there are certain measures that Alec took in order to carry out his criminal act. These acts show clearly that Alec carried out his criminal acts willfully, voluntarily and in full knowledge of the fact that he was contravening the law. For instance, Alec in attempt to trespass into Claire’s cottage drove his van into Claire’s premises, but also with a criminal intent. Again, that Alec had full knowledge of the criminal pursuit, is a matter that is underscored by him waiting until Clair had left, before he carried out his attempted act of mutilating Bruno the police dog. Had he been ignorant of the weightiness and criminal nature of his actions, Alec would have just attempted to carry out his assault on Bruno the dog under Claire’s glare. As a side note but still in a closely related wavelength, there is no way Alec can be declared as non compos mentis which many lawyers are presently in a hurry to cite as part of defense. This is because, Alec’s ability to orchestrate measures towards his covert criminal act of assaulting a police dog shows that he is sane and cognizant of the criminal liability of his acts. This means that Alec is possibly guilty of an attempted assault of a police dog, destruction of police property, subverting the course of justice and being complicit to a crime. Case B: Criminal liability of Alec for Burglary and Aggravated Burglary under S.S.9 and 10 Theft Act Even in this case, Alec is still culpable of criminal prosecution an offence of burglary and aggravated burglary. Both fundamentals which are Actus Reus and Mens Rea support this. As for the Actus Reus, it is a fact that Alec used his sharpened bread knife to force his way into Claire’s house (by using the knife to manipulate the door lever open). This is in total contravention of S.9 Theft Act 1968. This section 9 of this Theft Act 1968 clearly renders Alec culpable, since it asserts that one is considered a burglar upon entering a building, or part of a building with the intent of committing a crime, or as a trespasser. The same section also goes ahead to declare one as a guilty of the crime of burglary, if he entered a building or part of it, with the intent of stealing, inflicting or attempting to inflict grievous bodily harm or as a trespasser. All the above render Alec legally answerable or liable to a legal prosecution of the crime of burglary. It is a fact that Alec entered the premises belonging to Claire, with the intent of causing Bruno, grievous bodily harm. In a separate wavelength, S.10 of the Theft Act 1968 incriminates a person of aggravated burglary, when that person commits burglary, but has a weapon with him. Alec’s culpability is also underscored by the fact that S.10 (1) (b) of Theft Act 1968 also goes ahead to include an article that has been made for use, for exacting injury or incapacitating a person within the rubric of weapon of offence. It is definite that Alec’s bread knife had been sharpened for use against members of a rival gang. It is also probable that had Alec met an adversary in Claire’s building, he could have used it as a weapon. As for the Mens Rea, Alec is still subject to legal prosecution, since he willfully used his knife as a tool for forcing his way into Claire’s premises. He was fully aware of his criminal intent, since he had waited for Claire to leave, before embarking on his act of trespass. Case C: Criminal Liability of Alec under S.1 Criminal Damage Act 1971 for Criminal Damage to This Ornament In this case, there is an obviously strong ground for a criminal case against Alec and for Alec’s conviction. The fundamental grounds for Alec’s culpability and prosecution are Actus Reus and Mens Rea. Concerning Actus Reus, it is very clear and beyond any meaningful gainsay that Alec is the one who destroyed Claire’s glass ornament. Criminal Damage Act 1971 (1) does not only incriminate Alec, but also demystifies the possible counterargument that it is the dog that destroyed Claire’s glass ornament. This is because this act brings to legal account, the person whom out of sheer recklessness, destroys another person’s property. This is the case since Alec’s act is the triggering factor that led Bruno into scuttling the glass ornament to the ground. Conversely put, it is possible to damage property through the act of another agent (Dimock, 2011, 15). As for the Mens Rea, it is clear that Alec had not intended to damage Claire’s glass ornament. Nevertheless, it is clear that Alec was apprehensive of the danger of following Bruno to the table where he lay, within immediate proximity of valuable but fragile glass ornaments (this is according to information that has been provided). This ultimately shows that Alec was aware of the risk that accosted following Bruno to the table, but he deliberately and willfully undertook the risk. This shows that either Alec was reckless, or did not respect Claire’s property. In respect to the foregoing, it is given that there is no other factor that may be produced before the court of law, as a lawful excuse in favor of the defendant. Simply put, Alec is by all means guilty of the criminal charge of damaging Claire’s glass ornament. Case D: Criminal Liability of Alec for Theft under S.1 and Burglary under S9 Theft Act 1968 Even in this case, Alec is still liable for legal prosecution both in light of Actus Reus and Mens Rea, for the crime of burglary. For Actus Reus, it is a fact that he has stolen the police dog Bruno, which was under Claire’s care. This is especially the case with S.9 Criminal Damage Act 1971 and S.9 (a) and (b) of the Theft Act 1968 which describe a burglar as one who has entered a building or part of it, as a trespasser, or attempts to steal from the building, or attempts to cause grievous bodily harm. Indeed, Alec entered the building as trespasser and with a criminal intent of assaulting the sniffer dog. Above all, he went on ahead to steal the dog from the premises he had unlawfully accessed (Taylor, 2009, 17). As for the Mens Rea, Alec willfully and knowingly deprives Claire and the police of the crucial services of the dog by stealing it. That he is able to figure out that 20 miles is too far away for the retrieval of the dog is a matter that shows that he was knowingly and willfully acting on a criminal intent. Case E: Criminal Liability of Denise for Handling Stolen Goods under S.22 Theft Act 1968 In this case, Denise is guilty of being in possession of goods obtained through larceny (handling stolen goods). As for the Actus Reus, she keeps a police dog, even after Alec has told her plainly that he stole it from police custody. This she does, even as S.22 (1) Theft Act 1968 and S.33 Larceny Act 1916 continue to criminalize the act of keeping or transporting products or goods that have been stolen. Even when it comes to Mens Rea, Denise is still guilty of the offense of handling stolen goods, and thereby denying the police and the entire country of the dog’s crucial services. Although her honesty can still be debated or contested, given that Alec had told her that police abuse their dogs and she could have thus kept the dog out of sympathy, yet she could have refused to keep the dog and reported the matter to the police. This is because Alec had confessed to her of stealing the dog. Reference Biles, G. et al. 2011. “The College of Law: Believing in Your Future.” Introduction to Criminal Law. Dimock, S. 2011. "What are Intoxicated Offenders Responsible for? The 'Intoxication Defense' Re-examined." Criminal Law & Philosophy, 5 (1), 1-20. Taylor, R. 2009 .“ Complicity, legal scholarship and the law of unintended consequences." Legal Studies, 29 (1), 1-18. Read More