The of Mr.R.Abel Rowser - Case Study Example

First off, while reading the Statute, one should underline several points in it. It is all about the intent to provoke, attempts to congregate with others, willingness to disturb the peace and peaceful development of the society at the moment (Schultz and Sirico 60). Following these prescriptions of the law, it is necessary to pay attention to the postulates, so to speak, of the democratic society keeping the freedom of speech in mind. On the other hand, Mr. Rowser did not have straight-forward confrontations with the people gathered nearby at the moment of his fulfilled “gesture”.

Nevertheless, the D.C. Statute pays one’s attention to the clear identification where cases of disorderly conduct take place, namely: Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others…shall be fined not more than $250 or imprisoned not more than 90 days, or both (Schultz and Sirico 60). It is about time to take a glimpse at the somehow similar cases, Rodgers v. United States and District of Columbia 290 A.2d 395 (D.C. 1972) and Rockwell v. District of Columbia.

The question is that both of them touch upon the cases of direct and violent confrontation between appellants and the crowd or other parties. Definitely, the law defends those who live and act in line with its values and prescriptions. Thus, Mr. Rodgers as well as Mr. Rockwell intentionally provoked disorders and physical contradictions harmful for the rest of the society. In case of Mr. Rowser, this confrontation was evaded by the appellant himself, as he escaped and disappeared at the moment when the pressure grew its apogee.

To say more, Mr. Rowser was not inclined to provoke a disorder by means of his behavior, as the main intention was to attract the government’s attention in the course of the military activities provided by the US. The freedom of speech is not the same as the violence and assault or an offense able to hurt feelings of other communities within the multinational country like the United States (Rockwell’s case). Furthermore, if there is a legal restriction for trespassing a definite area, no illegal attempts to do so shall be appreciated (Rodger’s case).

In addition, if the government is still blind to see the national problem from inside out, Rowser’s case omits the points stated in the D.C. Disorderly Statute. That is to say, no one can accuse him in non-patriotic intentions, but in the patriotism starting from the rational analysis of the nationwide problem still unresolved. What Mr. Rowser did not expect was the reaction of public-spirited Vietnam veterans. Probably, they thought that Mr. Rowser was a representative of some radical or terrorist groups whose argument against the USA is in burning the US flag.

However, the act by Mr. Rowser was neither about yelling during the nighttime not about the disturbance in the places of public significance. First, his demonstration was silent as the main slogan was carved on his back. Second, he cut and ran while the crowd perceived his action in a wrong way, as he meant initially. Thus, the formal element of a definition of a crime is incomplete for Mr. Rowser due the aforementioned arguments on the background of other similar precedents. The Statute is still vital for re-discovery of the exact intentions of the appellants.

However, if such intentions do not coincide with the points of the Statute, there is no reason to find a person guilty. By the way, the