The Hurricane Katrina Catastrophe - Research Paper Example

?Running Head: The Hurricane Katrina Catastrophe The Hurricane Katrina Catastrophe [Institute’s The Hurricane Katrina Catastrophe Hurricane season of the year 2005 marks one of the deadliest and most destructive hurricane seasons in American history. Hurricane Katrina was the largest hurricane of its strength to approach the United States (Knabb, Rhome & Brown, 2005). Its size alone caused damage in a region of a hundred miles from the center of the storm. The states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama faced the most destruction (Knabb et al., 2005). This paper aims to discuss the statistical facts of the storm and then goes on to analyze it in terms of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery measures. The hurricane Katrina catastrophe remains a somber reminder of the massive destructive force of nature, and the way the American nation confronted its position ‘in the eye of the storm’. “Hurricane Katrina formed over the southeastern Bahamas on August 23, 2005. The storm moved towards Florida made landfall between Hallandale Beach and Aventura on the morning of August 25. From there it moved on to the Gulf of Mexico, growing from a Category 3 hurricane to a Category 5 hurricane in a matter of mere hours. On Saturday, August 27, the storm reached Category 3 intensity on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale becoming the third major hurricane of the season. It gained strength and reached Category 5 status on the morning of August 28. Katrina made two more landfalls in the region before finally confronting absorption by the frontal boundary on August 31” (Knabb et al., 2005). In particular, Katrina was one of the five horrifying hurricanes of USA that resulted in deaths of approximately 1,836 people (Knabb et al., 2005). In addition, about 700 missing people were not included in the death count. Hundreds of thousands of local residents were left homeless and unemployed. It was the most expensive hurricane in U.S history, with physical damages worth about seventy-five billion dollars. This estimate does not include the damages to the economy caused by a disruption in oil supply and export of commodities as well as disruption to the sugar and tourism industry in the affected states. “It is estimation that the total economical effect in Louisiana and Mississippi may exceed $150 billion” (Burton & Hicks, 2005). The destruction caused by such a large hurricane is inevitable. It resulted in an impact on a region of approximately 90,000 square miles (DHS, 2008). However, the amount of damage caused could have been reduced had there been proper preparations for such a natural disaster. The biggest tragedy occurred in New Orleans due to the failure of the levee system. This resulted in heavy flooding and as much as 80% of the city became submerged under water (DHS, 2008). Experts indicated that this failure was due to design flaws in the system along with inadequate maintenance. The blame for the failure of the levee system was assigned to “the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the designers and builders of the levee system” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006), and a lawsuit was filed against them for failing to pay sufficient attention to public safety. In addition, certain flood gates were not closed, this carelessness resulted in further flooding. Beachfront towns suffered worse property damage where 90% of the residential areas were flooded due to lack of proper preventative methods (DHS, 2008). The failure of the levee system is responsible for many deaths in the state of Louisiana. Max Mayfield, director of the National Hurricane Research Center stated, "I do not think anyone can tell you with confidence right now whether the levees will be topped or not, but that is obviously a very, very great concern” (Blanco, 2006). This in effect marks on of the most fundamental planning failures of the government. In the case of a typical hurricane, the plan was for the disaster relief forces to reach the affected areas by land. However, in case the levee system failed and heavy flooding occurred, there was no planned alternative for disaster relief (Blanco, 2006). What is striking is that despite realizing the danger of the levee system failing, the government took no further precautionary measures. Response to any national disaster as delineated in the National Response Plan is a bottom-up mechanism. The same was the case with hurricane Katrina. The local authorities called for emergency evacuations of their constituencies while the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided assistance in the form of necessary logistical needs for the affected areas. “Of 60,000 people stranded in New Orleans, the Coast Guard managed to rescue 33,500” (Nigg, Barnshaw & Torres, 2006). Volunteers from all around the country gathered to assist the refugees in any way possible, both before as well as after the storm hit. Following the storm, the task of rebuilding the affected cities as well as facilitating the affected people was started. “FEMA provided housing assistance to over 700,000 applicants, providing them with temporary homes, as well as necessities” (Nigg et al., 2006). The US government provided health care and medical treatment to the victims in addition to social security and welfare payments. It undertook the important task of rebuilding the roads, the infrastructure in addition to environmental restoration of the affected areas (DHS, 2008). Not only the government but also NGO has also played a major role in assisting the victims by raising donations, providing food, shelter, as well as medical services. In addition, the United States received aid from over seventy countries, from both the developed as well as the developing world (DHS, 2008). It is not that the respective authorities did not take any measures to curtail immense loss of life and property; it is that their plans were insufficient and inadequate. On the morning of August 28, “the New Orleans mayor ordered the first mandatory evacuation of the city and the American President George W. Bush declared a state of emergency in selected regions of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi” (Nigg et al., 2006). Residents were encouraged to evacuate their homes and take refuge in surrounding states and a number of last resort refugee centers were set up for people who were unable to leave their homes, the biggest example being the Louisiana Superdome. The Superdome sheltered more than twenty-six thousand victims along with provision of food and water during the catastrophe (Nigg et al., 2006). Evacuation orders were also given in the states of Florida and Mississippi although these were largely voluntary rather than mandatory evacuations. Although as much as eighty percent of the population succeeded in evacuating its homes and a large number of lives were saved owing to this, other features of the evacuation plan and orders were far from swift. The local governments failed to make transportation arrangements for the elderly, disabled, or the underprivileged. Many criticisms point towards the mayor of New Orleans who refused to follow the original evacuation plan, which stipulated that school buses would be used to provide transport to all such categories of people. In addition, the shelters that were set up ended up having to house many more refugees than they were intended for. One such example being the Louisiana Superdome, designed for eight hundred yet thirty thousand victims arrived, and the excess resulting in insufficient food, waters, and poor sanitary conditions for the refugees (Nigg et al., 2006). Another problem that arose during the disaster relief plan was several organizational and interpersonal conflicts. One primary example of this is when “Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security was designated by the then President George W. Bush to administer the federal response. Chertoff appointed Michael D. Brown as head of FEMA” (Blanco, 2006). He received all power to lead the federal responses including the deployment of resources as well as forces to the affected areas. When the government was subjected to heavy criticism due to mismanagement of affairs, Brown blamed Governor Blanco by saying that she was unhelpful and refused to help the federal efforts. Blanco however refused to accept this allegation and a few days later, Brown resigned as director of FEMA (Blanco, 2006). This blame game no doubt wasted a lot of precious time and energy that would have been better spent helping the Katrina victims. In addition, later accounts gave reports of people that had been stranded for days without food or water, before they were finally rescued. Dead bodies remained in the water for weeks before they were finally taken out and identified. Overall, the lack of preparedness for a natural disaster of this magnitude and the inefficiency of the local and federal governments in dealing with the problems, led to a much-needed reevaluation of the country’s disaster relief plans. Many of the strategic and management failures that occurred during the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe have been come under attribution to the placement of “FEMA under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) formed after the September 11 attacks in 2001” (DHS, 2008). FEMA since its inception in the 1980s carried out the responsibility of running stimulations and emergency evacuation plans in the event of a natural disaster, such as a hurricane or a flood. Historically, FEMA had successfully carried out this task. However, after the formations of DHS, many of the research funds used by FEMA began to be used for other DHS objectives, mainly terrorism. Thus, this change from a focus on preparing for all sorts of disasters to a focus on terrorism reduced the capabilities of the government to respond to natural disasters, such as Katrina. This led to a lag in the upkeep of the nation’s disaster relief plans that was reflected once the need for disaster relief arose due to Katrina (Haddow, Bullock & Coppola, 2007). Realizing the shortcomings in the defense strategy against natural disasters, the government decided to take quick action. The Senate as well as the House of Representatives undertook investigative action to determine what exactly went wrong during the Katrina catastrophe and why. The 109th Congress took radical steps to this account by passing legislation that revised federal emergency management policies that gave more power to the president, outlined the function, powers and divisions of FEMA with regard to its parent organization DHS more clearly so as to avoid confusion in the future (Haddow et al., 2007). It also enacted six statues, which would be applicable to any future federal emergency management plan. These laws included laws such as “The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, The Security, and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2005, The Pets Evacuation, and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 among others” (Haddow et al., 2007). Another very important piece of legislation was “the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA)” (DHS, 2008). This one reform in particular had long bearing impacts on FEMA as well as other federal authorities (Haddow et al., 2007). This act largely focused on empowering FEMA as an organization and as the primary disaster management organization in the country. It hoped to ensure more efficient relief plans in the future by reversing government actions that had initially led to the problems during Katrina. This act elevated the status of FEMA within DHS and provided it with the sole authority and responsibility of emergency management. It further prevented the re-allocation of FEMA funds within the DHS, as had originally occurred after September 11 2001 (Haddow et al., 2007). Thus, the government made clear efforts to prevent the disaster that occurred during Katrina. Many other attempts were made to prevent ‘another Katrina’. These included changes within FEMA. A primary change was the adoption of a top-down approach to disaster management as opposed to the one that existed pre-Katrina which was bottom-up (DHS, 2008). Now the federal government would impose its plans on the state and local governments. In addition, “the US Army Corps of Engineers was given the responsibility to repair and strengthen infrastructure that had been damaged during Katrina” (DHS, 2008). New levees and floodgates were commissioned to be built along with the intensive repairing of the existing system (DHS, 2008). In his report entitled "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Frances Townsend, the DHS advisor to the President” (DHS, 2008) made specific recommendations to help the government perform better in future disaster situations. Since then, the DHS has led a series of hurricane exercises to increase senior official skills and awareness. It has also ‘hurricane incident management teams’ (DHS, 2008) and has conducted formal training and exercises. In addition, one can observe steps to ensure better preparedness of FEMA in areas, such as “debris removal, temporary housing, and victim management programs” (DHS, 2008). The HHS has set up medical stations and gathered health teams that can be deployed within 24-hours when needed. Special adjustments to all procedures have been made to aid people with disabilities (DHS, 2008). Over all, the government has indeed done very best to prevent another debacle such as Katrina from happening. The hurricane itself caused immense destruction accumulating a heavy death toll and leaving countless others homeless, jobless, and depressed. The crux of the hurricane Katrina catastrophe was not the hurricane itself, but how little precautionary measures were taken and how unprofessionally this massive disaster was dealt with. The name ‘Katrina’ may have been officially retired, the cities may have been re-built, but memories of Katrina still serve as a painful reminder of a massive government mishap, and will probably continue to do so for years to come. References Blanco, K. (2006). “Brown warned on Katrina.” CNN Politics. Retrieved on June 14, 2011: http://articles.cnn.com/2006-03-02/politics/fema.tapes_1_levees-flood-protection-system-transcript?_s=PM:POLITICS Burton, M. L., Hicks, M. J. (2005). Hurricane Katrina: Preliminary Estimates of Commercial and Public Sector Damages. Marshall University. Retrieved on June 14, 2011: http://www.marshall.edu/cber/research/katrina/Katrina-Estimates.pdf DHS. (2008). The First Year After Hurricane Katrina: What the Federal Government Did. Retrieved on June 14, 2011: www.dhs.gov/xfoia/archives/gc_1157649340100.shtm Haddow, G. D., Bullock, J. A., & Coppola, D. P. (2007). Introduction to Emergency Management. Elsevier Inc. Hurricane Katrina 23-30 August 2005.” National Hurricane Center. Volume 1, pp. 1-11. Knabb, R. D., Rhome, J. R., & Brown, D. P. (2005). “Tropical Cyclone Report Nigg, J. M., Barnshaw, J. & Torres, M. R. (2006). “Hurricane Katrina and the Flooding of New Orleans: Emergent Issues in Sheltering and Temporary Housing.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Volume 604, pp. 113-128. U.S. House of Representatives. (2006). A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. U.S. Government Printing Office. Read More