Criminal Liability - Coursework Example

?CRIMINAL LAW of Criminal Law Q1; Fitzerald’s Criminal Liability regarding His Negligent Behaviour The behaviour of Fitzerald of throwing stones at passing cars and people amounts to criminal acts. As such, he is liable to be charged under criminal law. According to Mitchell and Farrar (2008, p. 6), criminal law is a body of statutes and rules that deals with crimes and their punishment; the law defines conduct that is prohibited because it can harm, endanger or threaten the welfare and safety of the public. Fitzerald is aged 13 years and is engaging in behaviours that can threaten public safety; he threw stones at passing car and it hit Gordon’s car and severely injured Gordon. In the second instance, he threw a stone at Dan but missed him and hit John instead. In advising Fitzerald, I will tell him the following legal facts relating to his behaviour; one, under UK law, age 13 years (his age) is under the age of criminal responsibility (The National Archives, 2011). Therefore, his behaviour should not be based on the assumption that because he considers himself a child he cannot be found guilty of a crime. As a matter of fact, within England and Wales, a child over the age of 10 years is considered to be responsible for crime as a result of their actions and should face legal consequences if found guilty (Law Library of Congress, 2011). Children below the age of ten years are considered doli incapax and are therefore not capable of forming criminal intent. The law assumes that children under the age of 10 years do not adequately understand differences between right and wrong acts and cannot be responsible for their actions. But children over 10 years are assumed to understand this difference just like adults and can be tried for their actions which may be deemed to amount to a crime. In addition, I will advise Fitzerald on what constitutes a crime according to the law. Glazebrook (2011, p. 49) explains that a person can be found guilty of a crime if it can be proven that that person had intended to commit the act before. Secondly, a crime can be committed through reckless actions of a person; that is, a person not caring about the consequences of his or her actions. Therefore, in Fitzerald situation it is clear that he can be accused from the two perspectives of what constitute a crime. For example, in the first instance where he was throwing stones at passing cars, it can be said he did that with an intention to harm motorists or he was simply reckless and did care about the consequences of his actions. In the second instance, he had intention to hit Dan but he missed and hit John instead. In both instances, his actions can cause harm to the public and threatens public safety as well. Without doubt his actions which can be supported by substantial evidence in the court of law can result to him being charged and convicted. I will let him know what will inform the decision to convict him in court; one of the major reasons will be retribution which will make him ‘suffer’ in some way as a punishment of harming and making others suffer due to his actions (Mitchell and Farrar, 2008, p. 70). The second reason for his punishment will be rehabilitation. Law Library of Congress (2011) notes that the main aim of punishing criminal offenders especially children is to transform them into members of society who are valuable and can coexist peacefully with others. I will tell him that rehabilitation will aim at preventing future offense through convincing him that his conduct was wrong. Thus, in the light of the legal facts that I will have given to him, I will advise him to desist from such acts in the future to avoid being arrested. Instead, he should divert his time and energy to more constructive activities such as reading. Q2: A’s Criminal Liability and B’s Possible Legal Position Considering the circumstances surrounding the incident involving person A and B, A is not criminally liable for his actions because the intent to cause harm to person B is remote. The intention of A when firing was to frighten B and not to actually harm him. Unfortunately, the round hit a concrete post and ricocheted and hit B who was seriously injured. According to the definition of what constitutes a crime, harming or endangering the safety of people is one of several factors constituting a crime. In the case of A and B, B was harmed through reckless behaviour of A. However, this was not the intention of A. Even though A can be accused of crime on the basis of recklessness; not caring about the consequences of his actions, this will be against the principle of proximate cause. Glazebrook (2011, p. 103) argues that in a crime that involves harm to a person, the action of another person must be the proximate cause of the harm. He further argues that in an event that there are more than one cause in regard to the harm caused to the other person, the act must have more than a slight link to the harm caused. Serious injuries to B were not caused directly by the round fired by A but because the round hit a concrete post and ricocheted. As such, actions of A were not the proximate cause of the harm. According to Mitchell and Farrar (2008, p. 66), causation can be broken by an intervening act or by another unpredictable event. In this situation, injuries caused to B were as a result of unpredictable event thereby absolving A from any criminal guilt. However, A can be held guilty because of recklessness that caused serious injuries to B. Before deciding to frighten B he ought to have thought of the possible consequences of his actions. It will be wrong to judge the consequences of A’s action on the basis of proximate cause only. Ormerod (2011, p. 55) argues that not all crimes require particular intent; therefore, it would not be sufficient to show that A is not guilty because he did not intend to harm B. Recklessness can also be considered to amount to crime if the actions harm or threaten the public. The questions that arise are; why did A want to frighten B? Was it necessary to do that; were there any foreseeable benefit of doing that? Therefore, in the light of these arguments, A can be exonerated from this crime but should be warned of reckless acts in the future especially when using devices that can cause harm such as rifles. Q3: Modern Approaches to the Definition of “Intention” In English Criminal Law In criminal law the term “intention” plays a very critical role in the criminal proceedings that ultimately result to a decision being made on whether the accused person is guilty of a criminal offence or not. Generally, intention can be defined as the person’s or group of person’s specific purpose in doing a certain action or series of actions in order to achieve a certain goal or aim. Under the English Criminal Law, the term “intention” is defined as the foresight of specific outcomes or consequences and the desire to act or failure to do so, so that there is occurrence of those specific consequences (Angelus, 2011, p. 9). In criminal law this term is often contrasted or used together with the term “recklessness” in deciding criminal cases. DPP v Smith (1961) AC 290 and R v Moloney (1985) among others are some of the cases that have been crucial in setting the standards for the term “intention” in the English Criminal Law (Ormerod, 2011, p. 17). In law, “intention” is explained by the Latin term Mens rea which is translated as “guilty mind” and is seen as one of the essential crime elements. According to the Law Commission (2010, p. 12), there are five modes of culpability in regard to “intention” in English Criminal Law. These four modes are the approaches used to define “intention” and evolved from the traditional English Law to the present and are applied in criminal proceedings in England. The first mode is direct intention where the actor is considered to have a clear foresight of his or her actions’ consequences and wishes that those consequences happen; the purpose is to achieve particular consequence. The second mode of culpability is oblique intention where the consequences are as a result of virtual certainty of the actor’s actions in which he or she appreciates it occurred. The third mode is criminal negligence where the actor had not foreseen specific outcomes as a result of his or her actions but it is considered that any reasonable person would have foreseen them. In addition, recklessness is a mode of culpability which argues that the actor can foresee that certain consequences could occur as a result of his actions and proceeds with those actions without caring about the occurrence of the possible consequences. Lastly, knowingly as a mode of culpability in relation to intention is based on the argument that the actor knows or ought to know that the consequences of his or her actions are bound to occur, certainly (Angelus, 2011, p. 73-76). Farmer (2000, p. 161), notes that there have been various debates and proposition on what should constitute “intention” in English Criminal Law especially in regard to murder. Most recently, in 2006, the Law Commission made recommendation that the existing law that governs the meaning of the term “intention” in English Criminal Law should be codified to read as follows” 1) “A person should be taken to intend a result if he or she acts in order to bring it about.” 2) “In cases where the judge believes that justice may not be done unless an expanded understanding of intention is given, the jury should be directed as follows: an intention to bring about a result may be found if it is shown that the defendant thought that the result was a virtually certain consequence of his or her action” (The Law Commission, 2010). Reference List Angelus, J, 2011, Intention in English Law, Duct Publishing. Farmer, L, 2000, “Reconstructing the English Codification Debate: The Criminal Law Commissioners”, Law and History Review 18 (2). Glazebrook, P, 2011, Blackstone’s Statutes on Criminal Law 2011- 2012, 21st ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Law Library of Congress, 2011, Children’s Rights: United Kingdom (England and Wales), Available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/child-rights/uk.php#f94 (Accessed: January 21, 2012). Mitchell, B, and Farrar, S, 2008, Blackstone’s Statutes on Criminal Justice and Sentencing, 4th Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ormerod, D, 2011, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Law Commission, 2010, “Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales”, Law Com 177, Vol. 1, p.12. The National Archives, 2011, Children and Young Persons Act 1933, Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/23-24/12 Read More