EU Law Peculiarities - Essay Example

?SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS I. a) Non-Profit Orgnizations such as Animal Protection Association (APA) cannot be considered an independent entity within thecontext of Article 34 since it receives substantial funding from Sagoland’s Ministry of Environment geared to promote activities having as their objective and effect to reduce the demand for wares sourced from another Member State. The measures were attributable to the Sagoland primarily because APA initiated the Animal Protection Mark (APM) at the behest of the Sagoland; its failure to arrest members of the APA found to have committed illegal acts such as threats, coercion, blockade of roads, burning of lorry and other similar activities. b) The enactment of Sagoland of a national policy prohibiting fur farming and restricting the entry of fur products in its territory is indeed a hindrance to competition. It is clear that its intention is to impede, prevent or reduce patronage of products source from other Member States which is contrary to the EU’s objective of a single and integrated market. This would promote locally produce products giving it undue economic advantage. Thus, the act of Sagoland falls within the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU. II. Measures of another Member State to protect the health and life of the animals found in the other Member State cannot be justified under Article 36 TFEU. National law of Sagoland intended to protect the life and health of animals found outside its jurisdiction do not have extra-territorial application. Scandonia likewise violates the principle of mutuality because the member state cannot use their quantitative restrictions and laws in another state. Another basis is the principles of proportionality were not fulfilled where the means employed to achieve the objectives must not go beyond what is necessary. Lastly, public morality is not a sufficient justification to restrict the importation of goods to and from another Member State. III a.) In the case of Mr. Zack, and Henrietta L’s relationship, it is clear that the promoter contract governs the relationship of the two. Mr. Zack’s action of purchasing additional products from Henrietta’s website will not transform that relationship since the purchase of the product supports the promoter contract. As its ambassador Mr. Zack is compelled to only use and endorse Henrietta’s products, purchasing Henrietta’s product from its website supports this relationship since as the endorser Mr. Zack cannot use or purchase other products. b.) Henrietta’s website was meant to only cater to customers within Scandinionia. The website’s disclaimer declared and intimated as much and the use of the LAX currency as the only currency entertained by the websites absolutely proves this position not to mention the use of Scandinionian as one of its language. The use of a primary domain name by the website and the use of English is of no moment since the content and intent of the website is only meant to cater to customers within Scandinionia as proven by its disclaimer and the use of LAX as the only means of payment. The disclaimer is sufficient in form and in substance, therefore it cannot be considered as an unfair item in a binding contract. It should be noted that the disclaimer was not ambiguous and it was conspicuously displayed within the website. PLEADINGS FOR HENRIETTA L I. a) GOVERNMENT ACTION IN FAVOR OF APA ESTABLISHES PUBLIC MEASURE Animal Protection Association (APA) is a non-profit organization founded according to the Law of Non Profit Associations in Sagoland. Although it is established denoting a social objective, it cannot be considered an independent entity within the context of Article 34 since APA receives substantial funding from Sagoland’s Ministry of Environment geared to promote activities having as their objective and effect to reduce the demand for wares sourced from another Member State. The issue arose when Sagoland implemented a measure to ban fur farming and to dismantle existing fur farms in its territory. Following the implementation of the measure, Sagoland instituted policies to protect its local products which do not use animal fur against imported products from other Member States where fur farming is legal. To pursue this objective, Sagoland significantly funded APA and supported its activities and measures undertaken under the guise of public morality. According to the Report, the initial measure undertaken by APA did not target fur farming in general but only the fashion industry in Scandionia which has successful fashion industry. Another report was released containing information that Sagoland has high demand and huge market for animal fur products as shown by the robust sales in Henrietta L’s store in Sagoland. The high demand for animal fur products prompted Sagoland to protect its fledging domestic non-fur products but since it cannot publicly discourage patronage of imported animal fur products from its neighboring Member States or criticize these products, APA again initiated another measure which is the "Animal Protection Mark" (APM). It is asserted that the mark is optional however such marking requirement falls under product requirements which are prohibited under Article 34 TFEU. Moreover, the measure is deemed an unjustified obstacle to trade since the designation promotes or is likely to promote the marketing of the product concerned as compared with products which do not benefit from its use.1 The two measures undertaken have to be assessed in light of the political and social dynamics in Sagoland. The general sentiment of the Members of Sagoland legislature is that animals are being slaughtered to gratify the desire of consumers for a fashionable outfit. And, there is likewise tolerance in favour of APA as its members were spared from arrest even when they commit violent and criminal acts against traders to prevent or obstruct fur trade such as coercion, threats, burning of lorry and blockade of roads to stop deliveries coming from Scandionia. This clearly indicates the moral inducement emanating from the States as hereafter discussed and analyzed. The TFEU provision on free movement of goods prohibits government funded non-profit organizations to undertake measures which create trade difficulty or obstruction. Therefore, the measures made by APA constitute as public measures which falls within the scope of Article 34 TFEU. Article 34 targets measures undertaken by public bodies however this principle has been loosely interpreted by the Court to encompass a broad spectrum. The European Commission’s Guide2 on free movement of goods states that a body established under private law does not negate the measure from being attributable to the State. Thus, APA which is clearly established under private law but which is primarily financed by the government funds can be attributed to the state3 as a public measure. Another ECJ ruling shows that the lack of government funding and control over the activities of private entities will not put a measure outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU. In the Quality Labels case4, it was ruled that the body that awarded quality labels to German products although a private limited company still falls within the coverage of Article 34 TFEU notwithstanding that the German government could not directly influence its actions and is financed by compulsory contributions of economic operators rather than by government subsidies. A “state measure” therefore includes professional associations or undertakings that fall under private law if they are used by the State in carrying out its functions under its direct supervision.5 The ECJ ruled that a “public measure” is not solely determined by its source of funding but it should include the body’s functions, statutory basis or management. The CMA decision may appear at odds when compared with the APA case considering that the CMA operated on funds that comes exclusively from the private sector while APA draws funds from Sagoland government for its expenditures. The ECJ ruled that CMA label awards transgress Article 34 notwithstanding that its funds are sourced from the private sector but the State intervenes by collecting and supervising the contributions. Thus, the non-governmental body is essentially acting on behalf of the state which situation squarely fits in the instant case. APA’s measures constitute as public measure because its main source of funds is the government and it acts pursuant to the objective of Sagoland to reduce animal fur patronage in its territory. This is further shown by issuance of Animal Protection Mark which partake a regulatory function. In R v Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain,6 the ECJ held that measures adopted by professional bodies that exercise regulatory or disciplinary powers were “measures taken by Member States”. APA is given the discretion to pass upon the application of traders or producers, if they comply with the requirement thus APA is therefore exercising governmental functions derived from public law.7 It is likewise apparent that Sagoland commissioned APA to extensively campaign for the patronage of its domestic products while promoting the boycott of imported products made of fur source from other Member States. The ECJ ruled that such action promoting or advertising domestic products which discriminate products of foreign origin based on a purely moral inducement8 from a public authority violates Article 34 TFEU. If a body receives funding from the State it is prohibited from engaging in unfair, discriminatory or unjust conduct. APA cannot not freely advertise or promote its advocacy compared to a private and independent establishment. The ECJ emphatically declared that a government funded body cannot engage in publicity intended to discourage purchase of products from Member States or criticize those products sourced from another Member State. Article 34 mandates that bodies funded with government money should remain neutral and should not induce its citizens to patronize its local products and boycott products from another Member State. Thus APA, owing to its status as a government funded entity, is not at liberty to exercise at its discretion any discriminatory or anti-competitive acts which other private undertakings can enjoy. Furthermore, it cannot be argued that APA is a non-State actor. It is a government funded organization that exists for the main purpose of eliminating imported fur products on the market. APA’s act cannot be justified under a business or trading transaction since it is not engaged in a proprietary or business transaction. There are no selling arrangements or contracts which would support an economic activity between two contracting parties thus it is clearly shown that the sole purpose of APA is to restrict free trade on behalf of the Member State. The private nature of the company was rejected by the ECJ in Buy Irish case.9 It ruled that the Irish Government cannot claim that the campaign was conducted by a private company to escape any liability under the provisions of the Treaty. Indeed, APA is a private company however its functions and public funding point to public measures attributable to Sagoland. The argument that the Irish Government merely provided moral support and financial aid to the activities undertaken by the Irish industries10 was already rejected and this is likewise untenable to the present. The practice of giving moral support and financial aid will not escape the prohibition laid down in Article 34 TFEU but more importantly, it is not based on decisions which are binding upon undertakings. The deliberate failure of Sagoland and its police authorities to arrest members of the APA who commit criminal acts with impunity is another indication that the measures constitutes public measure as the acts were undertaken under the authority and moral inducement of Sagoland. Article 34 applies to violent measures such as threatening shops, burning of lorry, blockade of deliveries on roads and other similar activities, but since such measures were made by a handful of APA members coupled with the disclaimer made by the spokesperson that APA does not support violence or condone vandalism, Article 34 TFEU does not apply to APA, the entity itself. However, the provisions on free movement of goods clearly apply to those measures since they are attributable to the Member State of Sagoland. Applying well-settled jurisprudence, it is apparent that Sagoland has blatantly violated Article 34 TFEU and it reneged on its obligations under the Treaty by refusing to take appropriate actions against such measures committed by private individuals that include the pronouncement of the police master general are all attributable to the State. A recent ECJ decision placed opinions of a public of?cial given to the media as a public measure as well since the statements were given by the of?cial with the authority of his of?ce11. APA having been stripped of its private personality has become the mouthpiece of Sagoland thus all its pronouncements are attributable to Sagoland. It may be argued that the government of Sagoland was not made a party defendant however this fact will not oust the ECJ of its jurisdiction to rule that the measures undertaken by APA are attributable to the Member State which is of utmost significance in future cases relating to liabilities of Sagoland for infringement under the free movement of goods provisions of the TFEU. b. National Legislation has its object and effect to reduce patronage of imported products hinders to intra-community trade If the measures undertaken by APA in accepting funds constitute a public measure attibutable to the government of Sagoland squarely falls under the prohibition,12 then it stands to reason that a national legislation that has for its object or effect the reduction patronage of imported products is a concrete proof that Sagoland is committing acts that hinders intra-community trade.13 The national legislation of Sagoland must be assessed in its legal and economic context. In the opinion of Advocate General Kokott14, he stated that concerted efforts that hinder competitive objectives are acts that prevent, restrict and distort competition within the common market. He further stated that there is no need to show that there is actual prevention, restriction or distortion of competition or a direct link between the concerted practice and consumer prices but it is sufficient that there is a government policy to this effect. It is therefore necessary to examine the intention for the enactment of a national policy prohibiting fur farming and restricting the entry of fur products in its territory is indeed a hindrance to competition. From the promulgation of Sagoland, it is clear that its intention is to prevent or reduce patronage of products source from other Member States. This would promote locally produce products giving it undue economic advantage and thus create an economic imbalance outside its territory. The provisions of the government promulgation are to promote the reduction of patronage of wares source from other Member States. From the legal perspective, it is intended to frustrate active competition and therefore, contrary to the Treaty’s objective towards the establishment of an integrated and single market thus the act of Sagoland falls within the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU. The act of Sagoland likewise interferes with the contractual obligations between trading partners where only synthetic fur products shall be traded within its territory. This requirement shall prevent competition between synthetically produced goods and those from authentic animal fur which is in direct conflict with the internal market policy. Therefore, the act of Sagoland cannot be justified in any manner as it is incompatible with the single market policy. Applying this standard, there is no necessity to show that its ill-effects have actually happened—infringement is already present. II. The measures taken by the Animal Protection Association (APA) in Sagoland cannot be justified to protect the health and life of animals found in another Member State, particularly Scandionia, or to impose its own brand of public morality. Sagoland put a stop to fur farming and ordered the dismantling of existing fur farms to protect the health and lives of animals in its national territory. Thereafter, Sagoland wants to extend the application of its prohibition to its neighboring Member States, including Scandionia, where fur farming is legal. Otherwise stated, a Member State is protecting animals found within the territory of another Member State. The issue of the extraterritorial application of Article 36 TFEU thus arises. This opens up the need for assessment because of the broad interpretations made by the ECJ. National laws do not have extra-territorial application Extra-territorial jurisdiction cannot be invoked to justify the implementation of the fur farming ban outside Sagoland’s territorial boundaries based on the earlier cases of Van den Burg15, Hedley Lomas16, CIWF17. The ECJ stated when Member States may be allowed to protect animals situated within and outside its territory, including export restriction policies. The ECJ decided in all these cases however that Article 36 does not have extra-territorial application. It emphasized that Member States are free to implement a stricter national animal protection policy but it cannot unilaterally demand compliance from other Member States whose animal protection policies are less strict so long as they conform to the minimum standards based on the EU Directive.18 The Member States, although members of the EU, are autonomous and independent from each other thus a Member State cannot intervene on policy matters. The ECJ further stated that Article 36 shall be only applicable if the animals are classified as endangered. In the instant case, the animals used in the fur industry were farm raised and has not been classified as endangered species. Thus, for this reason alone, the measure undertaken by Sagoland and APA is improper. The measure violates the principle of mutuality The ECJ ruled in the parallel case of Van den Burg that Article 36 cannot be used to justify a protection or prohibition on the importation and marketing of bird species which are not endemic or do not occur in the territory of the legislating Member State but is found in another Member State where it may be lawfully hunted. By virtue of this decision, Sagoland cannot justify measures having equivalent effect (MHEE) to quantitative restrictions for the purpose of protecting the health and life of animals in another member state. The ECJ properly ruled that the action undertaken by the legislating State is a usurpation of a sovereign act. The opinion of the Advocate General in the Van den Burg is worth repeating—extra-territoriality should not be recognized as a policy since it is an issue solely addressed to the discretion of the Member States under the principle of mutuality. Thus, it is necessary for the promulgating Member State to procure the consent Member States to implement a more strict policy or standard. On its own, Sagoland does not have legal grounds to say that it is empowered to protect the animals that are from another member state since there is no report that the farm animals are treated below the standards imposed by the EU. In fact, Scandionia’s standards for animal safety and protection in its fur farms compared with other Member States are at par with or even higher than the global requirements. The view of the Advocate General in Hedley Lomas is an affirmation that Article 36 applies exclusively within the territorial boundaries of the Member State when the primary goal is to protect its own national interest. This opinion is echoed in Dassonville.19 In the CIW case, on the other hand, the ECJ had categorically stated that they are not in favor of the extra-territorial application of Article 36 TFEU. It is also emphasized by General Advocate Trabucci in Dassonville that States do not use Article 36 to protect other States but rather the Article 36 is used to protect their own national interests. States possess identities peculiar to its customs, traditions and beliefs. States may be bound by the community of nations and common goals but it is independent nonetheless. It crafts its own laws and policies that they deem would be in the best interest of its people. Thus, it is within the rights of Sagoland to ban fur farming in its territory but it cannot dictate upon another sovereign to do the same. In the event however that the ban is extended outside its territorial boundaries then Scandionia or other Member State for that matter is surrendering its sovereignty to Sagoland. Scandionia’s national integrity should be protected as well thus Sagoland should not be allowed to invoke the protection of life and health of animals to prohibit or restrict free movement of goods outside its territory. To do so would give the right to Sagoland to impose its own will upon Scandionia. In the landmark cases of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon,20 the extraterritorial application of domestic laws were likewise declined since it is contrary to the principle of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition demands that the rules observed by one State with respect to its goods shall be the same rules applied to another State. The products regardless of origin should be subject to the same laws. There should be no prohibition or restriction within or outside the Member States’ territory. In Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ applied the rule on country of origin thus the products are subject to the laws of its origin shall not be subject to further requirements based on the laws of the destination state. Applying this standard to the instant case, Sagoland does not comply with the principle of mutual recognition as it seeks to hinder the sale of fur products within its territory. More importantly, Scandionia’s fur products should not be subject to the local ban since fur production in the country of origin is lawful. There should be no restriction or prohibition imposed by Sagoland on imported fur products notwithstanding that the local production of the products are banned or restricted thus the strict application of the mutual recognition rule must prevail over the Sagoland’s national law. All fur products must therefore be allowed to be freely traded in Sagoland. PRINCIPLES OF PROPORTIONALITY, NOT FULFILLED On the assumption that Article 36 TFEU has extra-territorial application, it cannot however be used to justify the measures undertaken by APA pursuant to the principle of proportionality. Trade restrictions is allowed if it is intended to protect interest however the measure undertaken should be reasonable, appropriate, necessary and proportionate21. The ECJ has consistently22 ruled that Article 36 must be interpreted to give meaning to its spirit and letter but should not extend beyond its intendment. Measures enacted pursuant to Article 36 may be justified if competition continues and the measures do not or restrict or prohibit free trade. Tested against this standard, the measures implemented by Sagoland and undertaken by APA went beyond the mandate of Article 36. Indeed, the discretion lies with the State to determine the extent and nature it extends within its territory.23 Since Sagoland chose to extend protection to animals which are not endangered species, the measure is not necessary, proportionate and reasonable protection of farm animals could be achieved by imposing standards as well as implementing strict monitoring and inspection on farms. Decidedly, the act of Sagoland is arbitrary, whimsical and capricious and it is intended to promote locally produced products and to discriminate products originating from other Members. It is a direct attack on the very spirit and letter of competition law and that of the single market policy of the EU. Indeed, Member States can enact laws to promote greater protection for animals but it must still be based on the EU standards and not an arbitrary or self-interest declaration of the Member State to favor its local traders. Public morality, not sufficient justification to restrict importation Consistent with the spirit and letter of Article 36 TFEU, public morality is a valid justification to restrict or prohibit trade however it can only be invoked on matters involving pornographic materials24, to protect human dignity25 or to protect the right to life of an unborn child26. Article 36 does not justify the promotion of animal welfare. The ruling in Schindler’s case27 stated that the restriction must be based on common legal principles prevailing among all Member States. The Omega case upheld human dignity since it is common to all Member States. This standard is not present in the issue involving fur farming—the animal welfare protection invoked by Sagoland is not common to all Member States thus the justification pursuant to public morality must fail. The belief of Sagoland legislature that animals should not be confined in corrals and that they are killed simply for pleasure and vanity for those who patronize fur fashion is unacceptable and shows its feeble argument. It is not likewise supported by clear evidence. It is simply the personal opinion and belief of the proponents of the ban or restriction to prop up their puny position. Since there is no showing that Scandionia has violated the standards imposed by the EU on the care and protection of its farm animals, the production and unimpeded sale of its products should be allowed. Sagoland cannot impose its own beliefs over other States which believes otherwise. Scandionia should be allowed to determine its moral standards—Scandionia believes in fur farming and it is advocating fur farming, it cannot be said that it is a lesser nation. It cannot be claimed that its society is callous to the plight of farm animals. There is no reported animal abuse committed by it. In fact, based on reports, Scandionia has one of the highest standards and requirements for animal care and protection. It must be emphasized that the power to determine the standards for animal welfare or protection is vested upon the European Commission and not upon the Member States thus any moral beliefs by one State cannot be imposed upon another notwithstanding it is against public sentiments. ANSWER TO QUESTION 3 (a) Mr. Zack was involved in two transactions with Henrietta L. The first transaction relates to Mr. Zack being appointed as ambassador to capitalize on his popularity as a rock star. Despite being given several items for free as the ambassador of Henrietta L. Mr. Zack ordered several more items from Henrietta L’s website. It should be noted that there are seemingly two transactions that transpired in the case at bench. However, Mr. Zack cannot be considered as a consumer in accordance with the definition enunciated under Article 3 of Directive 93/13/EEC to wit “any natural person who in contracts covered by this directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession”. Please note that in symmetry the same can be found under Directive 2005/29/EU specifically Article 2(c) “any natural person who in commercial practices covered by this Directive is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession”. Therefore, under Article 15.1.c of Regulation EC no 44/2001 Mr. Zack cannot be afforded the protection given to consumers. In Shearson Lehman28 it was decided that Article 15.1.c of Regulation EC no 44/2001 affect only a private and final consumer that is not engaged in transactions that would be construed as his trade or profession. In Benicasa v. Dantalkit29 the court was specific in the use of the term consumer as strictly referring only to the position of the person in a specific contract after considering the nature of the contract and not the subjective situation of the person concerned. The court ruled that the protective rules only apply to contracts concluded outside the trade and professional activity. Considering the use of the terms “ambassador” and “image model” one of the responsibilities of Mr. Zack is to represent and promote the product of Henrietta L. In the process of complying and perfecting the contract with Henrietta Mr. Zack is bound to only use the products of Henrietta and no one else. The process of purchasing the products online if in case Mr. Zack’s free supply of the products ran out is another way of complying with the terms of the contract. This is congruent with Directive 9330 and Directive 200531, as defined Mr. Zack, is still “acting within his trade, business and craft” when he purchased the items through Henrietta’s website. Mr. Zack was primarily constituted as an image model before Mr. Zack availed of Henrietta’s product through its website. It should be noted that the purchase of goods did not modify the first contract therefore Mr. Zack cannot be considered as a consumer since what is predominant is his professional relationship with Henrietta is the first contract. Any personal transaction is subsumed or included under the professional relationship.32 In Dietzinger33 the court ruled that even a minor connection with any professional activity of the person involved in the contract is enough to preclude the application of the consumer provisions. In the instant case being an ambassador is a deafening and strong connection between Mr. Zack and Henrietta via the first contract and therefore this would frustrate the application of the consumer protection. ANSWER TO QUESTION 3 (b) If in case Mr. Zack is considered a consumer under Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 the website of Henrietta L. cannot be considered as “directing activities” in relation to Article 15 (1) (c). The disclaimer indicating that the website is only intended for persons living in Scandinonia clearly states that the website is intended for customers within Scandinonia. Joined case C-585/08 and C-144/09 supports this position to wit “it should be ascertained whether, before the conclusion of any contract with the consumer, it is apparent from those websites and the trader’s overall activity that the trader was envisaging doing business with the consumers domiciled in one of more Member States” Further examination of the joined case C-585/08 and C-144/09 that would determine if the website has an international tenor are the use of language and currency. Henrietta’s website was in English and the native language the currency used was in SAK and there was no mention of any conversion rates nor any other items that would indicate that the website is intended for customers outside of Scandinionia. The use of a primary domain name does not necessarily mean that the website has an international tenor. The disclaimer is a relevant factor if in case the customer is outside and domiciled in Scandinionia. The disclaimer does comply with the provisions of Article 17 of Regulation No 44/2001 if the customer is in Scandainionia since the disclaimer clearly state its intent nor was it ambiguous in its meaning therefore it cannot be considered as an unfair contract item. Bibliography: Case Law Eur.lex. AGM-COS MET Srl v Finland. Case C–470/03. < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0470:EN:HTML> 10 January 2012. Eur.lex. Apple & Pear Development Council v KJ Lewis Ltd, Case 222/82, accessed 8 January 2012. Eur.lex. Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl. Case 269/95 8 January 2012. Eur.lex. Campus Oil v Minister for Industry and Energy and others. Case72/83. < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61983J0072:EN:HTML> 8 January 2012 Eur.lex. Cassis de Dijon. Case 120/78. < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=61978J0120> accessed 6 January 2012. Eur-lex. Commission decision 2002/884/EC of 31 October 2002 concerning national provisions on restrictions on the marketing and use of creosote-treated wood notified by the Netherlands under Article 95(4) and (5) of the EC Treaty (notified under document number C(2002) 4116); OJ L 308, 9.11.2002, p.30). accessed 7 January 2012. Eur.lex. Commission of the European Communities v. Germany. Case C-1/96. accessed 9 January 2012. Eur.lex. Commission v Germany. Case C-325/00. accessed 8 January 2012 Eur.lex. Commission of the European Communities v Ireland.Case 249/81. accessed 8 January 2012. Eur-Lex. Dietzinger Case C-45/1996 ECR 1998 I-1214 accessed 15 January 2012 Eur.lex. Football Association Premier League Ltd and others v QC Leisure and others Joined by Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd. Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, respectively. < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008O0403C(01):EN:NOT> accessed 12 January 2012. Eur.lex. Gruber v BayWaAG. Case C-464/01. accessed 9 January 2012 Eur.lex. Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v Schindler. Case C-275/92. accessed 12 January 2012. Eur.lex. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel. Case 11-70 10 January 2012. Eur.lex. Ortscheit v Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH. Case C-320/93. accessed 7 January 2012. Eur.lex. Procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville. Case 8-74. accessed 7 January 2012. Eur.lex. R v Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain Cases 266 and 267/87. accessed 7 January 2012. Eur.lex. Regina v Henn and Darby (Case 34/79) accessed 12 January 2012. Eur-lex. The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd. Case C-5/94. accessed 10 January 2012. Eur.lex. The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan and others. Case 159/90. < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=61990J0159> accessed 12 January 2012. Eur.lex. Van den Burg. Case C-169/89. accessed 8 January 2012 Eur.lex. Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v Karl Heinz Henkel. Case C-167/00. < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000J0167:EN:HTML> accessed 15 January 2012. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc v. TVB Treuhandgesellschaft fur Vermogensverwaltungund Beteiligungen mbh, (Case C-89/91) [1993] ECR I-139 Primary Legislation Eur-lex. Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version) - D. Protocols annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community - Protocol (No 30) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (1997). accessed 10 January 2012 Eur.lex. The Treaty of Amsterdam. 2 October 1997 http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf accessed 15 January 2012 European Union. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. accessed 9 January 2012 Secondary Legislation Eur Lex. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013:en:HTML> accessed 10 January 2012. Eur.lex. Council Directive 98/58/EC. Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Animals kept for farming purpose. accessed 10 January 2012. Eur.lex. Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens, Official Journal L 203 , 03/08/1999 P. 0053 – 0057. accessed 10 January 2012 Eur.lex. Council Directive 2005/29/EU of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation. < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0029:EN:HTML> accessed 10 January 2012 Eur.lex. Council Regulation EC no 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001R0044:EN:html> accessed 10 January 2012. Esma. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council accessed 15 January 2012 European Union. The European Commission’s Guide to the application of Treaty provisions governing the free movement of goods. accessed 10 January 2012. Journals Eur.lex. Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union. 2006. accessed 12 January 2012. Online Articles JRS. Detention in Europe. 2011. accessed 9 January 2012. Read More