Does the GATT/WTO Agreements effectively protect the interests of the developing country members of the WTO - Essay Example

?Does the GATT/WTO Agreements effectively protect the interests of the developing country members of the WTO? Developing countries have achieved greater access to developed countries’ markets and to other developing countries’ markets via the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers as promulgated by the various agreements of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Moreover the WTO’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) doctrine has enabled developing countries to gain access to some sectors in other WTO countries without having to reciprocate. Even so the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers in some sectors that are of significant interest to developing countries have been insignificant. Even more troubling for developing countries is the cost implicit in implementing WTO agreements in terms of administration, legislation and compliance is too great and becomes a financial burden for many developing countries. This research study therefore argues that although the WTO multilateral trade framework has served to reduce some trade barriers and has stimulated world trade in several sectors, the various GATT/WTO agreements have not served to protect effectively protect the interests of developing countries. This is particularly so in the areas of services and agriculture, which is of significant interest to developing countries. This study will demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the GATT/WTO agreements in protecting the interests of developing countries by analysing the main agreements. Does the GATT/WTO Agreements effectively protect the interests of the developing country members of the WTO? Contents Abstract 1 Does the GATT/WTO Agreements effectively protect the interests of the developing country members of the WTO? 2 Contents 2 I.Introduction 3 II.The Interests of Developing Countries in the Multilateral Trade System of GATT/WTO 5 III.The Protection of the Interests of Developing Countries under GATT/WTO Agreements 9 A.TRIMS 10 B.TRIPS 14 C.GATS 17 Conclusion 21 Bibliography 23 Does the GATT/WTO Agreements effectively protect the interests of the developing country members of the WTO? I. Introduction With the introduction of GATT in the post-Second World War era, developing countries were opposed to an international multi-trade system. The popular belief among developing countries was that internationalization would compromise any hope that they had of becoming industrialized as industrial countries would not be amendable to new entrants.1 As a result, for most of the post-Second World era, developing countries were at best, minimal participants in GATT.2 By the 1980s more and more developing countries began to accept the merits of liberalized trade and supported the multi-trade system over bilateral trade systems because the latter left them vulnerable to pressure from the larger and more developed trade partner.3 This new shift in attitude among developing countries gave way to increasing GATT membership among developing countries. However, developing countries insisted on preferential treatment on the basis of their limited resources and in particular their difficulties with balance-of-payments which were perceived as a significant barrier to trade liberalization and economic integration.4 Thus the principle of MFN as the rule and special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries as the exception was imported to the WTO from GATT when the WTO was formed in 1995.5 On the surface, it appears that developing countries have fared well under the WTO system. From the 1980s onward developing countries have increased exports in manufactory products demonstrating an increase from 10% to 20%. Moreover, more than one third of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is directed to developing countries.6 Still there is evidence that the interests of developing countries are still marginalized within the WTO multilateral trade framework. For instance, Subramanian and Wei reported that as of 2007, the WTO has positively influenced trade with international trade proliferating up to US$8 trillion in the year 2000. However, the overall impact of this lucrative trade outcome is imbalanced. Reciprocal trade agreements between industrial countries had greater trade increases than non-reciprocal trade agreements between developed countries and developed countries.7 When examined in light of the fact that developing countries’ main interest in the multilateral trade system is the facilitation of their relative disadvantages over developed countries, the WTO’s special and differential treatment policy has not worked well for developing country. This research study illustrates the ineffectiveness of the GATT/WTO’s ineffectiveness in protecting the interests of developing countries by conducting an analysis of the main GATT/WTO’s agreements. Thus this paper is divided into two main parts. The first part of this paper identifies and analyses the interest of developing countries in seeking special and differential treatment. The second part of this paper analyses the WTO’s response to these interests in the various GATT/WTO agreements. II. The Interests of Developing Countries in the Multilateral Trade System of GATT/WTO During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries were of the opinion that their interests in international trade were better served under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as opposed to GATT. As a result a majority of developing countries did not join GATT and the few that did, minimally participated in negotiations and concessions relative to reciprocal transactions.8 However, the participation of developing countries intensified during the Uruguay Round which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and ultimately resulted in the formation of the WTO.9 There were several developments that contributed to the change in developing countries’ participation in the world trade system. First, developing countries were becoming increasingly integrated in the world trade system and a number of developing countries were particularly active in manufacture exports. In addition, a number of developing countries were liberalizing their trade policies and focused on outward progression and reduced protectionism. At the same time there was an increasing acknowledgement of the need for a rules’ based system to regulate trade in trans-border situations.10 It also became clear to developing countries that a rules-based system under the auspices of the WTO came at a cost. The Uruguay Round embraced regulatory areas for establishing the business and economic policies on a domestic level. These regulations would be technical, environmental and would reach into intellectual property laws, services and sectors. The problem for developing countries was that the Uruguay Round was not poised to address their specific interests: the high cost of reforming policies, laws, regulations and institutions conducive to the WTO’s regulatory regime.11 The interests of developing countries are informed by the Uruguay Round and subsequent negotiations. These interests are the need for special and differential treatment, “technical assistance” with the implementation of WTO agreements and the ability to benefit from the WTO’s dispute settlement process, to apply anti-dumping and protection regulations and difficulties confronting least developed nations.12 GATT and its predecessor, the WTO, recognized that developing and least developed countries were different from developed countries in that the former did not have the resources to automatically implement the uniform standards promulgated by the GATT and WTO agreements. The Enabling Clause of 1979 was the first representative recognition by GATT/WTO of the need for special and differential treatment of developing and least developed countries. The Enabling clause came about as a result of the efforts of developing countries in their membership to UNCTAD. As a result of the combined efforts of developing countries, a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) system was negotiated with UNCTAD. Developing countries were able to negotiate the terms of the GSP with GATT. Article 1 of GATT 1947 and 1994 makes provision for non-preferential treatment among contracting states.13 As a result of the efforts of developing countries, Article 1 of GATT 1947 and 1994 GATT issues the Decision of 28 November 1979 implementing the GSP system which effectively provided an exception to Article 1 of GATT.14 This Decision was adopted by contracting states.15 Paragraph 1 of the Decision of 1979 provides that despite the requirement of non-discriminatory treatment and MFN standards as expressed in Article 1 of GATT, member states are required to treat developing countries more favourably and differently. In doing so, developed countries are not bound to accord the same treatment to other member states.16 Essentially, the Enabling Clause facilitates agreements to which developing countries are parties to provide for the removal or reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade.17 Even so, developing countries entered the Uruguay Round with a feeling that they had been disadvantages since a number of developing countries had narrowed both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and did not successfully negotiate for similar concessions.18 The Uruguay Round was determined to remove any permanent requirements for differential treatment. However, the Uruguay Round did retain the Enabling Clause.19 Thus developing countries’ interest in special and differential treatment remains a source of tension within the WTO’s regime.20 The Uruguay Round therefore failed to safeguard the interest of developing countries. This failure alone was a result of the inability or the unwillingness of the WTO and the previous GATT’s agreements to identify the interests of developing countries and to accommodate those interests. Based on the outcome of the Uruguay Round and the subsequent agreements it was obvious that developing countries were palpably inexperienced in negotiating WTO multi-lateral trade frameworks. It therefore follows that developing countries were unable to effectively articulate their own interests and others were unable to understand the interests of developing countries.21 Clearly, there was no real appreciation for how the result anticipated by developed countries would disadvantage developing countries. The result of the Uruguay Round was therefore inconsistent with the realities of developing countries. As will be demonstrated below, developing countries were left with largely unattended interests. They would be left with the challenge and burden of having to finance administrative, legislative and policy reforms in exchange for an opportunity to gain limited access to other markets. III. The Protection of the Interests of Developing Countries under GATT/WTO Agreements For a great part of the post-Second World War era, a majority of develop countries were only marginally, participating in the international economy. Eventually, this practice shifted and developing countries became more and more involved in the international economy. The Uruguay Round represented a significant fortifying step in that direction for developing countries. It is described as the beginning of major transformation in terms of developing countries moving forward with integration into the international economy. Theoretically at least, the Uruguay Round guaranteed that developing countries could enter the world economic stage and participated at the same degree as developed countries.22 The main issue however, as this part of the paper will demonstrate, is that developed and developing countries cannot realistically be expected to participate equally in the global economy. There is a major gap in the relative wealth between developed and developing countries. Developed countries are at the stage of economic and industrial development that developing countries hope to achieve. At the same time developed countries are also striving to gain even more economic strength as they compete with one another for world dominance. Thus there is a potential for conflicting interests to forego any chance of developing countries realizing their goal of equal participation in the world economy. Even so, developing countries did make some progress toward asserting their interests at the Uruguay Round and made some progress toward the expression of those interest in the agreements negotiated at the Uruguay Round. The three main agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round are the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).23 Together these three agreements are designed to make it difficult for developing countries to limit the operational paradigms of businesses within their own territories and facilitates the easy entry and exit of foreign firms.24 Each of these agreements and their inability to effectively protect the interest of developing countries are analysed below. It will be observed that while the TRIMS and TRIPS Agreements are arguably ineffective in terms of protecting the interests of developing countries, the GATS Agreement is effectively protecting the interests of developing countries. A. TRIMS During the Uruguay Round there were two essential issues negotiated. First there was discussion over whether or not trade-related measures should simply revolve around GATT with some modifications to TRIMS that distorted competition in trade. Secondly, discussions centred around banning TRIMS altogether or dealing with it as it arose by reference to the harm caused in specific cases.25 Ultimately the resulting TRIMS Agreement called upon Member States not to implement TRIMs that contravene Articles III and XI of GATT 1995.26 Article III of GATT 1995 provides for the national treatment principle requiring that all member states treat the products coming from other countries in the same way that like products from other countries are treated. Likewise national products should not be protected from competing products.27 Article XI places constraints on quantitative restrictions and the distribution of licenses.28 The idea is to ensure that domestic measures are not manipulated to restrict trade to and from member states. Ultimately, the TRIMS agreement is intended to establish a regulatory framework for constraining the implementation of investment measures that would limit and distort trade internationally. Although the TRIMS agreement does not define what amounts to a prohibited measure, it provides a long list of trade-related investment measures that are deemed to be restrictive. The illustrative list includes the requirements for national production contents, requirements relative to domestic consumption, trade balancing criterion among others. These requirements are prohibited in terms of establishing conditions for trade and for providing the member state with a tactical advantage.29 TRIMS was intended to create and facilitate enhances transparency among member states. At the onset all member states were given 3 months to notify WTO’s TRIMS’ Committee of all requirements that were not in conformity with GATT. Once the TRIMS Agreement came into force, developed countries had two years, developing countries 5 years and least developed countries had 7 years to eliminate measures that were initially notified to the committee.30 Any country could apply for an extension of the time limited for eliminating TRIMS.31 From the outset, developing countries experienced difficulties with the TRIMS agreement. Many developing countries were unable to identify and thus notify the Committee of existing TRIMS within the 3 month time period stipulated for doing so. A number of developing and least developed countries reported that they did not have the capacity to identify measures that were inconsistent with GATT 1995’s Articles III and XI. This was a problem because unless, notification took place, these countries could not take advantage of the 5 and 7 year period for which they were required to eliminate these measures. For example, Indonesia withdrew a notification relative to its automobile sector because it was of the opinion that it was not a prohibited TRIMS product. Yet, the WTO informed Indonesia that the measures relative to its automobile industry were inconsistent with GATT and because they had not notified to the Committee, they were not included in the period for elimination of TRIMS.32 More importantly, TRIMS was not intended to dictate how member states could or should regulate FDIs. It was only intended to regulate and conform trade related aspects of FDI to GATT/WTO’s MFN principle so as to ensure liberal and competitive international trade. However, the consequences of TRIMS are that it restricts a country’s ability to implement measures intended to appeal to FDI.33 For the most part, developing countries are stifled in their ability to establish economic policies that foster economic growth and development on a domestic level.34 In particular, it has been argued that the TRIMS denies countries the flexibility to navigate investments in a way that satisfies and is consistent with their economic development requirements.35 Although Article V(3) of TRIMS recognizes the significance of taking into consideration the financial, trade and development needs of developing countries in terms of trade-related investment regulations36, it has not been effective because it is not a compulsory obligation.37 It is also argued that the TRIMS agreement fails to take account of the inequities between all countries which cannot be eliminated during the period allowed for eliminated TRIMS. The reality is, developing countries would have to make long-term policy changes and would require funding that they do not have to make these policy changes.38 In short, developing countries are of the view that TRIMS has restricted trade and distorted competition in a negative way for them.39 There is therefore an urgent need for TRIMS to be revisited with a view to providing more flexibility for developing nations so that they may utilize TRIMS to benefit from technology transfers and economic development. As it is, the only definitive special and differential treatment accorded developing countries under TRIMS is the longer period allowed to eliminate TRIMS. However, as previously noted, this longer period is ineffective when developing countries lack the wherewithal to identify TRIMS that are inconsistent with the core principles of GATT as contained in Articles III and XI. Even when and where developing countries are in a position to identify and notify TRIMS, it is difficult for them to make to the necessary reforms for establishing institutions and laws that are consistent with the objectives of TRIMS. B. TRIPS TRIPS 1995 was a response to the concerns of developed countries, especially the USA with the aggressive sale of counterfeit and pirate products internationally. Developed countries were of the opinion that the problem of trade in counterfeit and pirated products persisted because of poor intellectual property laws and regulations in developing countries. There was therefore a need for harmonization of standards for the protection of intellectual property internationally.40 The TRIPS agreement was therefore negotiated to remove conflicting intellectual property law conflicts and to set a minimum standard of protection among member states. It was not intended to stimulate trade in relation to intellectual property.41 In general TRIPS provides for a minimum standards of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.42 The TRIPS Agreement implements international conventions on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Thus, the Berne and Paris Conventions are included in the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement incorporates duties relative to copyright which includes 50 years protection; trademarks with 7 years protection; geographical indications which protects against false use of wines and other alcoholic beverages; industrial designs which protects for 10 years; designs which are protected for 10 years; undisclosed information which is protected indefinitely; and patents which are protected for 20 years.43 The TRIPS Agreement provides for flexible approaches by permitting consideration of the special and differential treatment with respect to developing countries and permits exclusions from the TRIPS regulatory framework so as to take account of the special and different needs of some countries.44 However as some concepts are not described in the TRIPS agreement, different countries interpret and apply these concepts differently.45 In this regard, flexibility does not necessarily achieve the intended outcome: standardized protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. As it is, a number of developing countries are already confined to specific bilateral agreements with either the EU or the US. In these various bilateral agreements, developing countries are tied to far higher standards of intellectual property rights protection and enforcement legal frameworks. This becomes problematic for developing countries because the TRIPS Agreement incorporates the MFN principle46 and thus developing countries are thus required to apply these high standards of intellectual property rights protection and enforcement to all other countries with which they trade.47 Developing countries were given until January 1, 2000 to implement the TRIPS Agreement and were provided the opportunity to extend the time for a further four years.48 Moreover, by virtue of Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement, developed countries are required to render technical and financial assistance to developing and least developed countries who request this assistance for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.49 However, as Kleen reported, assistance is not forthcoming or at least not to the satisfaction of developing countries. The primary complaint that the assistance offered by developed countries is inconsistent with the need for assistance on the part of developing countries. Technical assistance is typically offered on the basis of offering models for intellectual property protection and enforcement legislation implemented by developed countries. Developing countries are typically resistant to copying the models of developed countries.50 Thus the cost of implementing the TRIPS Agreement must be offset against the gains that developing countries hope to achieve. As Kleens observed, even where developing countries successfully implement the TRIPS Agreement with adequate technical assistance, they incur greater costs when they attempt to enforce the intellectual property rights accorded as a result of implementing the TRIPS Agreement. As it is law enforcement and local agencies do not fully understand intellectual property rights since they have been largely operating in a system where counterfeit and pirated products were freely and openly distributed.51 Thus, for developing country there are further costs involved in the recruitment and training of law enforcement and government agents for understanding and effectively enforcing intellectual property rights. It is also worth noting, that the gains involved in intellectual property rights are typically allocated to the intellectual property rights holder. For the most part, the holder of intellectual property rights are usually located in developed countries.52 It therefore follows that developed countries have more to gain from the TRIPS Agreement than developing countries do. Therefore, the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement is more geared toward protecting the interest of developed countries and the only concern it has for developing countries is ensuring that they make the necessary changes to accommodate the interest of developed countries. C. GATS Trade in services is especially important to developing countries as it makes up nearly half of the GNP in a majority of developing countries.53 However, the increase and proliferation of trade in services in developing countries is uneven. For example, Asia and Latin America have benefited from increased gains in trade in services while Africa has suffered declines in trade in services. For developing countries, the greatest gains in trade in services typically accrue to tourism, transportation and the movement of personnel across borders. It is important to note however, that the success of trade in services, like the trade in goods, is intricately tied to the economic and development conditions in each country.54 The main purpose of the GATS Agreement is the equal proliferation of economic growth and development for WTO member states, particularly developing countries. Theoretically, the free movement of people is just as important as the free movement of goods in the proliferation of economic growth for developing countries. Thus the GATS Agreement takes the position that this will occur through liberalizing trade in services.55 It is therefore important to take account of the goals and degree of development of each of the member states to the WTO. The GATS Agreement requires that special attention be given to the financial needs of the least developed countries.56 In general the GATS Agreement requires MFN treatment and transparency as well as equal treatment in the trade in services between member states.57 With respect to transparency, member states are required to make information available to other member states relative to their respective services sectors.58 The provisions contained in the GATS Agreement require that domestic regulations are such that they are administered fairly. Standards, licences and services’ requirements must be in accordance with the MFN principle and the objective of promoting liberalized trade. Account must be taken of the level of education and professional qualifications in individual member states.59 The GATS Agreement also regulates competition to the extent that monopolies are discouraged. Members are also encouraged to exchange and share knowledge and expertise so that conduct that compromises competition does not prevail.60 In addition, there are a number of exceptions contained in the GATS agreement. In this regard there are important exceptions to the MFN principle which permits those indorsing GATS to derogate from the MFN principle for ten years from the date of implementing GATS. Moreover, member states are exempt from their commitments under the GATS Agreement in respect of the protection of public morals, public order, life or health.61 Generally, the GATS Agreement has provided all member states with a framework relative to trade in services which consist of rules that provide all member states with identical duties and rights. It also provides for on-going negotiations in trade in services and promotes liberalization in this regard. The GATS Agreement also serves to provide access to a number of markets abroad.62 Therefore from the perspective of developing countries, GATS can be said to effectively protect the interest of developing countries. By providing a framework for equal rights and duties, GATS facilitates predictability in the services sector. Developing countries benefit by being able to assess the market for services with respect to the partners with whom they trade.63 Predictability also has a downside for the interest of developing countries. As Kleen explains, a majority of companies doing business in developing countries are nationals of developed countries. Developed countries are growing increasingly concerned about the deflection of jobs abroad to developing countries and are aggressively trying to protect against this trend.64 Theoretically, the GATS Agreement should prevent the protectionist provisions of developed countries, but in practice developed countries do have the exceptions under GATS to derogate from their commitments on the grounds of public morals or public policies. In general however, the GATS Agreement is particularly beneficial to developing countries as it provides for the exchange of knowledge and expertise. Moreover it provides for the fair competition. As a result, developing countries are required to provide services that are comparable to developed countries in order to gain market access and to receive services from abroad. In this regard, improvements in the level of services transferred abroad only helps to develop the economy and offered at home. As Mattoo explains, improvement in services helps to improve production and efficiency for the benefit of the domestic economy.65 It is also possible for the reception of services from abroad to improve efficiency and productivity at home. From the perspective of developing countries, services from developed countries bring with them, the transfer of technology and expertise. When foreign services are provided in developing countries, there are opportunities for training local staff as well as opportunities for research and development.66 Thus developing countries stand to gain from the MFN, transparency and competition policies enshrined in the GATS Agreement. Kleen also informs that for the most part, the GATS Agreement does not incur the kind of costs that other WTO agreements cost for implementation. This is largely because the GATS Agreement is more aptly described as a codification of the status quo.67 In other words, the movement of people and services across borders has been picking up momentum for many years now and is a new reality of globalization. The GATS Agreement, if anything simply serves to recognize this reality as it provides for the lawful movement of services and people across borders. It can therefore be argued, that out of all of the WTO/GATT Agreements, the GATS Agreement is arguably more compatible with the interests of developing countries. It essentially facilitates a method by which developing countries can improve their own services and at the same time benefit from the services of developed countries for the improvement of sector products and services. In this regard, the GATS Agreement offers developing countries a method by which benefits are not compromised by costs, as with the TRIMS and TRIPS Agreements. Conclusion In assessing the manner in which the GATT/WTO agreements protect the interest of developing countries, this paper focused on the main agreements emanating from the Uruguay Round. This approach was taken because a large number of the current agreements are founded on Agreements that came under GATT 1947 and have been expounded on over more than 50 years. In order to adequately assess the effectiveness of the agreements originating under GATT 1947 it would have been necessary to conduct a comparable analysis of the original text and the numerous changes over the years. More importantly, history informs that developing countries had very little input (by choice) in GATT 1947 and onward. It was only during the Uruguay Round that developing countries played a more active role in the GATT/WTO multilateral trade system. In assessing the three main agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round it was possible to evaluate GATT/WTO’s effectiveness in protecting the interests of developing countries. It was at the Uruguay Round that we are able to identify the needs and interests of developing countries because it was only during the Uruguay Round that developing countries became more visible. This research study concludes that developing countries entered the Uruguay Round concerned about the relative inequities and economic strengths between developing countries and developed countries. Thus, developing countries argued that in order for them to gain market access and to develop their economies and to compete with developed countries they required special and differential treatment. An analysis of TRIPS, TRIMS and GATS informs that for the most part, the interests of developing countries have been marginally protected. Theoretically at least, TRIPS, TRIMS and GATS focus on GATT/WTO’s MFN principles and trade liberalization with some concessions to the special and differential treatment of developing countries. Many of these concessions come in the form of technical assistance and extended transition periods relative to TRIPS and TRIMS. However, developing countries continue to weigh the cost and benefit of implementing TRIPS and TRIMS, especially since technical assistance is inadequate for facilitating the policy, administrative and legal reforms necessary for adopting TRIPS and TRIMs. The GATS Agreement however, has not been problematic for developing countries. For the most part it has not only safeguarded the interests of developing countries but it has in fact promoted their collective interests in obtaining market access by ensuring that they have the opportunity to improve services and by extension products and efficiency. It is suggested that the reason for the effectiveness of the GATS agreement in the protection of the interests of developing countries is because the interests of developing countries in this regard are quite similar to those of developed countries. Had it been otherwise, the GATS Agreement would suffer from the same difficulties that the TRIMS and TRIPS Agreements share. Bibliography Brown, B. S. (1994). “Developing Countries in the International Trade Order.” Northern Illinois University Law Review, Vol. 14: 347-406. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903). Ezeani, E. (2010). The WTO and Its Development Obligations: Prospects for Global Trade. New York ,NY: Anthem Press. Finger, J. (September 2001). “Implementing the Uruguay Round Agreement: Problems for Developing Countries.” The World Economy, Vol. 24(9): 1097-1108. Finger, J. and Nogues, J. 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(2003). “The WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures and the Flow of Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Meeting the Development Challenge.” Pace International Law Review, Vol. 15: 181-201. http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=pilr&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dthe%2520gatt%2520agreement%2520on%2520trade%2520related%2520investment%2520measures%253A%2520implications%2520for%2520developing%2520countries%2520and%2520their%2520relationship%2520with%2520transnational%2520corporations%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D4%26ved%3D0CDIQFjAD%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.pace.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1176%2526context%253Dpilr%26ei%3Duu7sToG7GOHV0QH4hLm6CQ%26usg%3DAFQjCNGsll9k8lNY_HOzpN558KA6Uq-PUQ#search=%22gatt%20agreement%20trade%20related%20investment%20measures%3A%20implications%20developing%20countries%20their%20relationship%20transnational%20corporations%22 Kleen, P. (March 2004). “Consequences of the WTO-Agreements for Developing Countries,” Sweden: The Research Group, 1-287 http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/Publikationer/Consequences%20of%20the%20WTO-agreements.pdf Sherwood, R. (1997). “The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries”. The Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 37: 491-544. http://ipmall.org/hosted_resources/IDEA/37_IDEA/37-3_IDEA_491_Sherwood.pdf United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007). “Elimination of TRIMS: The Experience of Selected Developing Countries”. New York and Geneva: United Nations http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20076_en.pdf Rupa, C. (November 2002). “GATS and Its Implications for Developing Countries: Key Issues and Concerns”. United Nations DESA Discussion Paper Series, 1-29 http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2002/esa02dp25.pdf Mattoo, A. (April 2000). “Developing Countries in the New Round of GATS Negotiations: Towards a Pro-Active Role”. World Economy, Vol. 24(4): 471-489. http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/upload/2008/08/18/1219036800094_267852.pdf Read More