The United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. SORTA Appeal Case - Essay Example

United Food & Commercial Workers Union Case number 97-4126, United Food & Commercials Workers Union (UFCWU), et al, Plaintiff-Apellees, vs. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority (SORTA), Defendant, Appellant, was argued from June 15 1998 and decided on December 10 1998. The defendant, SORTA, which is a state agency, had appealed against a district court’s ruling that granted UFCWU preliminary injunctive relief whereby the defendant was required to accept a proposed bus advertisement. In the case’s prior history, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and on grounds of First Amendment, UFCWU challenged SORTA’s decision to reject the planned wrap-around advertisement, which they (SORTA) termed as aesthetically unpleasant and too controversial. Among SORTA’s commercial ventures is the sale of advertising space on the buses and bus shelters it owns. However, UFCWU’s proposed wrap-up advertisement, which portrayed protesting union workers fleeing from the police and boarding a bus belonging to SORTA was rejected. In its ruling, the district court concluded that UFCWU was favored by the balance of equities and, therefore, granted the preliminary injunctive relief (Moore 1). Case number 07-2105, Rita Miller, Plaintiff, vs. Clinton County; Honorable Richard Saxton, Appellant, was argued from May 13 2008 and decided on October 1 2008. The civil rights action was brought against Richard Saxton, the Court of Common Pleas’ President Judge, by Clinton County’s former probation officer, Rita Miller. It was asserted by Rita Miller that Richard Saxton violated her right to free speech (First Amendment) and right to due process (Fourteenth Amendment) by firing her after she wrote him a complaint letter claiming hostility and intimidation from her supervisor. Miller appealed against Saxton’s decision to fire her, and a district court permitted the wrongful termination case to proceed. However, the case was dismissed by a federal appeals court, effectively reversing the ruling made by the district judge. Miller had alleged that her supervisor had acted unprofessionally by stating the probationers were a scum and did not merit the money spent on them by the probation office. In his move to dismiss the claims, Saxton wanted to be granted a summary judgment motion and alleged to be immune to suit. In the UFCWU v. SORTA appeal case, the court stated that a preliminary injunction aims to avert irreparable injury and uphold a court’s capacity to deliver significant decisions based on merit in reference to Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir.1974). The district court ought to have considered the four factors of preliminary injunction which would determine whether it was likely for UFCWU to succeed basing on the merits; whether they would otherwise incur irreparable injury; whether the granting of preliminary injunction would serve public interest; and whether others would be put under harm by the granting of preliminary injunction (Moore 1). UFCWU tabled a number of grounds that showed its likelihood to succeed on merit of the claims that its First Amendment rights were violated by SORTA. This included their argument that the outside space on the buses owned by SORTA are designated public forums and SORTA failed the scrutiny of standards applicable to denial of protected speech based on content in a public forum. In contrast, in the Miller vs. Clinton County case, the federal appeals court determined that although Miller’s letter partially touched on matters considered to be public concern, it appeared in a context that established her speech was not protected. Effectively, her letter was based on personal grievances in her capacity as an employee under the supervision of Mrs. Foresman. It was, therefore, on this ground of unprotected speech that the appeals court ruled that she could not build a First Amendment reprisal claim. In the reversal of the district court’s ruling, the appeals court further concluded that the district judge erred by failing to dismiss Miller’s complaint of violated due process. This is because, the court ruled, the arrangement of collective bargaining that Miller had relied on did not make her more than a willing employee as concerns the law of Pennsylvania, therefore, no due process was violated. Pennsylvania’s law on collective bargaining limits matters between local governments and public employees to conditions and terms of employment, hours and wages as referenced by Stumpp vs. Stroudsburg Mun. Auth., 540 Pa. 391, 658 A.2d 333, 335 (1995) Further, Miller’s case was dismissed largely because of the personal context she painted by criticizing her seniors and giving Saxton an ultimatum that she cannot go back to her employment so long as Mrs. Foresman remains her supervisor. Referring to Connick vs. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), the personal context minimizes the force of any public concern that could favor her First Amendment claims, while it adds more weight to Saxton’s allegations that her speech was not protected. She could, therefore, not meet the four factors of injunction and there was no likelihood of her succeeding. In comparison, although both Miller and SORTA had the same grounds to present their appeals, they failed due to different technicalities. It can be seen that SORTA improperly argued that the granting of the preliminary injunction was wider than necessary to achieve the sought results. However, the court found that UFCWU had sufficiently established likelihood to succeed on its claim’s merit that its First Amendment rights were violated by SORTA’s hindrance of access to advertising space. It also established that UFCWU had shown it would suffer irreparable harm if the denial of access to the advertising space was continued by SORTA (Moore 1). This rules out SORTA’s argument of the injunction being wider than necessary. With reference to International Union, UAW vs. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1484 n. 11 (6th Cir.1983), the substance of argument challenged SORTA’s policy guidelines that were found to be vague and unconstitutionally broad in the way they allowed officials to decline proposed advertisements because of the expressed viewpoints. In contrast, Miller failed to illustrate that the statements she included in her letter touching on public concern could be viewed in any context other than personal and could, therefore, not uphold her claims to property interests in her employment. It can be concluded that both cases had elements of violation of right to due process and free speech, but the contrast in judgment correctly arises from the contexts in which they are argued. Works Cited Moore, J. United Food Commercial Workers Union Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority, . 2013. Web. Read More