IT Project Failure and Success - the CAD System - Case Study Example

IT Project Failure and Success Name Institution Tutor Date (1a)The interaction failure of the CAD Interaction failure is the shifts from the requirements of the system, or poor development in the performance and the usage consideration of any system. The key issue is that when a given system is used heavily, then it can constitute a success. But when the system is not used, or if there exist several complications in using a given system, then it can lead to a failure. The CAD system was abandoned by the users due to several reasons. There was a problem in using the CAD system which led to the interaction failure in the CAD system (Adetokunbo, 2004). Indeed, the CAD project displayed several features of the Perrow concept of the normal accident. The accident was particularly hard to foresee since it involved various failures in most parts of the system. The interaction failure of the CAD was mainly constituted by the stakeholders who were involved in the whole process. The staffs were also not well trained on the use of the new system. This led to the interaction failure of the CAD system (Beynon, 2000). (1b) The CAD system process failure Process failure can be characterized by the unsatisfactory occurrence that takes place in the performance development. Process failure can be seen in terms of two different failures. First is when a working system cannot be produced by the development process of the IS. Secondly, when the process of development is able to produce IS but the system project is more than the budget in terms of time and cost. The two primary characteristics of the process failure system are when the project misses the deadlines and when the project exceeds the budget (Beynon, 2000). The CAD system failed in the performance development. The developers of the CAD system did not follow the correct methodology in the developing of the CAD system. This made the system to fail in its stipulated function. Again the development process of the CAD system exceeded the budget in terms of cost and time. The failure of the CAD system resulted in the delay of the ambulance making many patients lose their lives. Some of the ambulance vehicles took over three hours to arrive at the scene. This led to the process failure of the CAD system (Lehaney et al., 2011). (2) Factors that Led to the failure of the system Incomplete system The CAD system was incomplete; it was not properly tuned and not fully tested. The CAD system that was implemented in 1992 was very over ambitious, and it was developed and implemented on an impossible time schedule. The management of the LAS applied more pressure on the system contractors to advance the timeline of the system more quickly than was required. This resulted in the low-quality CAD system. Due to the reduced timeline, the LAS management implemented the system making it go live on October 1992 with the staff having little training on the new IT system. This system that was deployed lacked adequate testing and the required critical oversight. The software was incomplete and was unstable; precisely the emergency system for backup was not well tested. There were several questions on chosing of the visual basics as the tool for development and using the Microsoft windows as the primary systems for operations. The training on the CAD system was also inconsistent and incomplete. This contributed to the subsequent disaster (McGrath, 2002). Communications problems of the CAD system The other factor that led to the failure of the CAD system was outstanding problems related to the data communications of the CAD system, especially communication from different data terminals. The ambulance crews were pressing the wrong buttons, and the ambulance were on the radio black spots. As the number of the ambulance increased, the amount of the incorrect vehicle information that was recorded by the system increased. This created a knock in the CAD system and made the system make different incorrect allocations depending on the information it received. For instance, several vehicles were sent to attend to the same incident (Beynon, 2000). The CAD system placed wrong calls that were not able to follow the expected protocol in the waiting list and in created various signals for the incidences where it had received the incorrect in formations. The number of the exception messages increased to an extent that the staff could not be able to clear the queue. This made it more difficult for the staff members to attend to different messages that were scrolled on the screen. This increase in the queue made the CAD system to be very slow. With few resources to allocate and waiting incidents, it took long time to allocate different resources to the events. This led to the failure of the CAD system (Beynon, 2000). Poor leadership by the LAS Management Poor leadership by the LAS Management also resulted in the failure of the CAD system. The management changed the layout of the control room; this meant that the staffs were to work in unfamiliar positions without the paper backup. The staffs were also not able to work with the colleagues whom they had previously worked with before. In 1991, the number of middle and senior management posts was reduced by 53. There was no appropriate consultation on the restructuring, and this led to the anxiety in the organization. This cites the major reason for the unfavorable condition in the LAS as management failure. The different changes made the management be under pressure to succeed. This compelled the management to implement the LASCAD system on time (Beynon, 2000). Again, there was ambiguity and ambivalence in the use of the Lascad. For instance in the management level, the previos history of the weak relationship between the workforce and management at the CAD systems. The failure of the CAD system can also be attributed to the prior history of the IS systems that had failed before. There is an elaborate proof of the effort by the LAS management to introduce new working patterns using the CAD systems. This led to inadequate user involvement in the implementation of the CAD system (Coakes, 2012). Poor operation and maintenance The system did not fail when it was implemented since it operated the way it had been designed to work. The problem arose in the implementation of the system. The control room and the Ambulance crew were trained differently, which with the absence of the personal contact and feelings of remoteness was thus generated. The training did not create the sense of confidence in the CAD system. Due to this, there resulted in difficulties such as the ambulance crew not being able to press the right button in the ambulance, and taking the vehicles not assigned to them. When the system was started, small errors could be easily corrected manually, however, just a limited number of the control room members had this ability. This led to the failure of the CAD system (Lehaney et al., 2011). Lack or misapplication of the regulatory framework The full process of procurement was taken to develop the system. The regulatory framework that illustrated how the procurement process was to be done was given by the RHA. The instructions stated that during the process, the lowest tender was to be accepted unless there existed sufficient reasons contradicting the decision. There was a lack of specific guidance on the IT procurements. Several tenders said that they were able to meet the requirement for making the system within the required timescale (Hall and Fernandez, 2007). The cheapest tender, the consortium comprised of the Apricot, Datatrak, and the system options won the tender. This tender was awarded according to the stipulated regulatory framework for obtaining the lowest price. There was a lack of requirement within the financial institutions for the technical review of the winning tender. Due to the absence of the framework regulatory standards for procurement for the IT projects, the cheapest tender was chosen, rather than the best option. There was a lack of proper investigation to identify the ability and experience of the winning choice I the development of the CAD systems. The significant contribution to the failure of the system was that the developer who was chosen lacked adequate experience in providing the emergency dispatch systems (Banham et al., 2005). Factor name Characteristics of Factors Type of factors Incomplete system (a) The system was very over ambitious, and it was developed and implemented on an impossible time schedule. (b) The management of the LAS applied more pressure on the system contractors to advance the timeline of the system more quickly than was required (c) The system lacked adequate testing and the required critical oversight Technical Poor leadership by the LAS Management (a) The management changed the layout of the control room; this meant that the staffs were to work in unfamiliar positions without the paper backup. (b) The changes made the management be under pressure to succeed. (c) There were ambiguity and ambivalence in the use of the Lascad. (d) An attempt by the management to use the IS system in introducing the new work patterns Management Communications problems of the CAD system (a) The ambulance crews were pressing the wrong buttons, and the ambulance were on the radio black spots (b) . As the number of the ambulance increased, the amount of the incorrect vehicle information that was recorded by the system increased (c) The increase in the queue made the CAD system to be very slow Technical Poor operation and maintenance (a) The control room and the Ambulance crew were trained differently, which with the absence of the personal contact and feelings of remoteness was thus generated. (b) The training did not create the feeling of confidence in the CAD system. (c) . Due to this, there resulted in difficulties such as the ambulance crew not being able to press the right button in the ambulance, and taking the vehicles not assigned to them Technical Lack or misapplication of the regulatory framework (a) The instructions stated that during the process, the lowest tender was to be accepted. (b) There was a lack of specific guidance on the IT procurements. (c) The significant contribution to the failure of the system was that the developer who was chosen lacked adequate experience in providing the emergency dispatch systems. Management (3a) key stakeholders involved in the CAD project Stakeholder no Stakeholder name Type of stakeholder 1 IS practitioners External 2 LAS management Internal 3 Ambulance crew Internal 4 The IS company External 5 NHS External 3(b) role(s) played by each stakeholder identified in Q3a that may have contributed to the failure of the CAD project Stakeholder no Stakeholder name Stakeholder role explanation 1 IS practitioners Some of the failures of the CAD systems can be cited from the violation of the set rules and standards that should be followed in the domain of software engineering. For example, the project was lacking relevant accepted methodologies; it was hurried and was over ambitious. The practitioners did not conduct thorough testing on the system (Duquenoy et al., 2008). There exist several pieces of evidence that illustrate that Lascad was not unusual on how the developers considerably diverged from different behaviors that are described in the development literature. The main difference is that the developers did not follow the development methodologies yet they claimed they were following different development methodologies (Guy and Russo, 2005). 2 LAS management Several factors that led to the failure of the CAD project can be attributed on the part of the management. The study states in the 1980s, the LAS management did not modernize the service systems. This was seen due to the absence of more investment in the working force likes the career advancement and parametric training (Duquenoy et al., 2008). In 1991, the number of middle and senior management posts was reduced by 53. There was no appropriate consultation on the restructuring, and this led to the anxiety in the organization. This cites the major reason for the unfavorable condition in the LAS as management failure. The different changes made the management be under pressure to succeed. This compelled the management to implement the LASCAD system on time (Guy and Russo, 2005). It is clear that the LAS management was very naïve in making an assumption that the introducing the CAD system would lead to changes in the working practices automatically. If they wished, the stations and the crews would still encourage the sprevious practices by employing different strategies like failing to mobilize, failing to acknowledge, sending various resources or report status (Duquenoy et al., 2008). 3 Ambulance crew The Ambulance crew contributed to the failure by pressing the wrong buttons. The crews were highly frustrated at the incorrect allocations. This is believed to have led to the increased number of cases where the crew failed to press the right button or took the different vehicles to the other incident than the incident suggested by the by the CAD system. The frustration of the crew also contributed to the high volume of the voice radio traffic. This later led to rising of the radio communication bottlenecks. This bottleneck led to the slowing down of the radio communications that led to the increased frustration in the crew (Guy and Russo, 2005). 4 The IS company It can be noted that the company that handled supplying the major parts of the software for the CAD system had no previous experience in the building of the dispatch systems for the ambulance services. The company had received £1-million contract for the CAD system in 1991. However, the London Ambulance Service had in the previous scrapped the BT subsidiary IAL development at the cost of £7 million in 1990. Because scrapping the earlier project revolved around the faulty software. The LAS sought for the damages from the IAL for the faulty dispatch module in 1990 (Macaulay, 2012). 5 NHS The failure of the CAD system can be seen from several the tensions that existed in the NHS. For instance, the study reflects on different strains and stresses that existed due to several changes present in the NHS before the Lascad was implemented. Under different reforms of the NHS,several parts of NHS undergone variouse changes in their culture in the prior years, and the LAS was to improve its operations if it wanted to offer successful services. However, the impacts of the initiative that the LAS management took did not revitalize the managers and the members of the staff as was required, it even worsened the existing climate of obstructiveness and mistrust (Macaulay, 2012). The management did not intend to go wrong in their agenda. The program speed and size and the intensity of the change were very hostile for the various circumstances. Several difficulties that were involved in the changing of the CAD systems were underestimated by the management and they misjudged industrial relations, this made the staff to be alienated to different changes s(Duquenoy et al., 2008). Conclusion One of the lessons that can be learned is that it is important to recognize different risks to the practitioners and the managers. The risks of the project threaten the plan of the project. That is to say, if the risk affects the project plan, the project is likely to fail and the cost is likely to increase. The risks of the project identify the potential schedule, resource, requirement and budgetary problems and their effect on the project. The second lesson learned is that it is to consult different experts on specific applications to help the project team identify the appropriate candidate for the project implementation. For instance, the LAS management ignored advice from the outside agencies. The management was advised that the specification was inadequate and left several places undefined. This was one of the mistakes of the LAS management. References Adetokunbo S.C. (2004). An investigation of the information systems projects failure and its implication for organizations. International Journal of Services Technology and Management.5 (1). Pp, 233-344. Retrieved from: 10.1504/IJSTM.2004.004024 Banham S, Nadjie B, Onesti A, Rice T, Round A and Tomlinson, N.(2005). London Ambulance: CAD Failure 1992. Retrieved from Beynon P. (2000). Human error and information systems failure. Oxford Journals.11(6). pp. 699-720.Retrieved from Coakes, E. (2012). Technological change and societal growth: Analyzing the future. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference Duquenoy, P., Blundell, B. G. and Jones, S. (2008). Ethical, legal and professional issues in computing. Australia: Thomson. Guy F and Russo N. (2005). The turnaround of the LASCAD system. European Journal of Information Systems. Vol 14, pp 244–257. Retrieved from Hall, P. A. V. and Fernandez-Ramil, J. (2007). Managing the software enterprise: Software engineering and information systems in context. London: Thomson Lehaney B, Lovett P and Mahmood S.(2011). Business Information Systems and Technology. New York: Routledge Macaulay, L. A. (2012). Requirements Engineering. London: Springer London McGrath, K. (2002). The Golden Circle: the way of arguing and acting about technology in the London Ambulance Service. European Journal of Information Systems. 11, no (4), pp.251-266. Retrieved from:http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/pal/0960085x/2002/00000011/00000004/30 00436 Read More