Control Systems Security - Resilience Capability Plan - Essay Example

Control Systems Security: Resilience Capability Plan Name: Course: Tutor: Date: 1.0 Introduction As far as the infrastructure around us is concerned, be it transportation, health, or even supply of essentials the dependency of these critical activities can only achieved through a reliable energy system. The stability as well as continued steadiness in managing energy resources is important if the wellbeing of any economical entity is to survive. Ensuring sufficient cyber security measures is the only way through which delivery systems that supports energy distribution is key in facilitating continuity as well as protecting the interest of all shareholders who rely on energy based resources. Such measures should involve a strategic and well coordinated measure between the relevant authority and TISN’s industry sector groups to safeguard against both domestic and foreign threats. If TISN’s industry sector group is to achieve this in its energy system, then the need for a concrete solution has to emanate from a wide scope of providers. This could be from an industry, academic, governmental or vendor point of view. 2.0 Scope The road map to providing a sound resilient plan entails several scopes. These are production, the transmission as well as the distribution of energy to clients. Secondly is the scope that covers risks as functions of threats as well as well as their vulnerability they poses and their resulting consequences. The strategies will also cover all prevention, detection, response plus recovery efforts entailed thereof. Lastly is the consideration of the cyber scope. This will look at cyber threats brought about by either intentional or unintentional cyber attacks as well as attacks emanating from cyber-physical sources. 3.0 Purpose and objectives The performance of creating resilient security systems is to achieve several objectives aimed at mitigating challenges that come about with energy sector security risks. More clearly this can be subdivided as follows: first is the creation of a culture of security. This involves extensive awareness on what security is all about as well as the ramification that come with operating under a given level of risk as depicted by Gheorghe (2011). Secondly is to promote the continuous monitoring of energy delivery systems and especially along cyber-physical realms. Therefore the need here is to have all entities have thorough background knowledge of the current security situation to facilitate the continuous assessment of evolving cyber threats and risks. Another objective is to enable the development of new defense architecture that offers an in-depth defense and which employs interoperable, extensible as well as fail-safe systems that enhances the continuous performance even under cyber attacks and threats this has been well looked at by Gheorghe (2011). 4.0 Current security environment At present TISN’s industry sector group lack a long term cyber security plan. With their present insecurity state, they are vulnerable to recurring threats if they do not provide a solid security policy that will adapt to future challenges. The present security environment does not also involve all stake holder involved in energy distribution ventures. This is major contributor to their low capacity to mitigate risks as the scope of measure risks does now allow for sharing and participation of all responsible stake holders. 5.0 Security strategies and actions In order for TISN’s industry sector group to create resilient capability plan aimed at strengthening its energy control system security, several strategies have to be set up. This has to be categorized from a short term, mid-term and long-term point of view. Goals that are to be achieved through implementing either these milestones have to be analyzed so that progress can be ascertained at a particular expected stage. An effective way would be for TISN’s industry sector group to organize the strategies into five key groups. These would include: creating a culture of security, assessing and monitoring of risks, developing and carrying out new protective measures aimed to minimizing risks, managing of occurring incidents as well as providing a continuous and sustainable security improvements. 5.1Creating a culture of security 5.1.1 Short term milestones This refers to at least three years duration to which expected milestones is to be realized. This should include participation of executives in supporting cyber resilience strategies. At an industrial level, this should entail responsible code creation and software assurance sensitization. This can be well facilitated through trainings as presented by Gheorghe (2011). 5.1.2 Mid-term milestones These are milestones expected to be realized within a period of four to seven years. In the case of building a culture of security this would entail incorporating vendor systems that use sophisticated and secure software architecture and assurance practices that are recognized as standard. Secondly, this should involve the use sound practices that support energy deliverance systems. In this case security should be widely employed. 5.1.3 Long-term milestones Long-term milestones should be realized between eight years and ten years. This strategy should provide for increased number of professionals both in energy delivery as well as cyber security and information technology as illustrated by Knapp(2011). 5.1.4 Goals expected The goal to be realized through the adoption of creating a culture of security, should seek to ensure that cyber security procedures are undertaken across in all of TISN’s industry sector group energy sectors. 5.2 Assessing and monitoring of risks 5.2.1 Short term milestones When considering the issue of risk assessment and monitoring, then milestones to be expected have to certain undertakings such as basic terms and procedures pertinent to each energy sub-sector have to be established. This should provide an underlining security framework in any operational environment. 5.2.2 Mid-term milestones Mid-term milestones in this category should be realized on the creation of metrics aimed at addressing the state of each energy subsector. This should be undertaken by most of the asset owners. 5.2.3 Long-term milestones This can only be realized through creating real-time systems that checks on the security levels of the systems as well as perform risk assessments on a day to day basis. This should be undertaken across all information technology and physical realms that are present in the energy eco-system as presented by Ness (2006). 5.2.4 Goals achievable through assessing and monitoring of risks One of the key goal in this case ids the facilitation of unending assessment of energy delivery systems. This is expected to be realized across all domains that would comprise of assets, users and cyber systems. 5.3 Developing and carrying out new protective measures aimed to minimizing risks 5.3.1 Short-term milestones On the near-term this strategy should be capable to assess the efficiency and soundness of emerging platforms, design policies, system links as well as other system variables. 5.3.2 Mid-term milestones For Mid-term milestones to be visible, then flexible and accessible controls for all energy management system infrastructures have to be established. Also the use of modern and upgradable solutions as well as routable data exchange among hardware at all levels of energy delivery management infrastructure. 5.3.3 Long-term milestones Long term milestones would entail use of automatic energy delivery infrastructure which should be widely adopted. There should also be provision for redundancy in security procedures that should facilitate continuity of operations even in the event of a cyber attack. This should be rendered as upgrades embedded into new security systems as explained by Gheorghe (2011). 5.3.4 Goals expected in carrying out new protective measures aimed to minimizing risks The expectations that TISN’s industry sector group is to accrue through this strategy will often been seen as a result of installations of modern energy delivery infrastructure. In depth defense in all system components as well as operations as far as cyber security is concerned will definitely be realized. 5.4 Management of occurring incidents Mitigations of insecurity incidents can take several approaches which can be realized in the short-term such as use of systems that can identify cyber threats across all levels of the energy delivery networks. These systems should also be capable of providing and supporting cyber attack response decision as put across by Campbell (2011). Mid term measures under this strategy would entail provision of real-time forensics as well as use of dynamic cyber event tracking systems. Long term measures should facilitate automated response capabilities aimed at providing sound practices during implementation. Goals accruable under these strategies see energy subsectors as well as stakeholder with the ability to counter cyber incidents as they occur and provide for a means to resume normal operations as presented by Knapp (2011) . 5.5 Providing a continuous and sustainable security improvements Measures that need to be undertaken in the short-term include sharing of cyber threat mitigation strategies. Increased investments aimed at speeding up the adoption of resilient energy delivery systems. For mid-term milestones to be visible, this strategy should see to it that there is sound partnership between mechanisms, interconnected security, research, asset owners and vendors. This may also take a strategy that involves corporate funding through partnerships aimed at making energy delivery systems become self sustaining in offering cyber security. On the long term measures such as providing mature and proactive processes that will immediately share threat potentials as well as facilitate mitigation means that will be implemented throughout the all energy sub-sectors and levels. The goal of this strategy is to encourage the participation of industry, academic and other energy agencies in advancing cyber security. 6.0 Residual risks Even when all avenues that are focused on mitigating risks are put in place, these strategies cannot be relied in ensuring a fool prove resilient plan. As such risk may emanate upon the evolution of new threats. This could take the form of new cyber attacks by attackers focused on countering the set-up cyber security measures. Other threats may also come from the lack of fully implementing security procedures that are required in the new system. For instance the lack of awareness campaign in some energy delivering subsectors may result in laxity in ensuring these threats are mitigated as illustrated by Campbell (2011). It is therefore necessary that these loopholes are countered in delivering secure systems. 7.0 Implementation schedule The implementations of these resilient plans involve the active participation of all stakeholders such as vendors, asset owner, researchers as well as operators. The creation of a timely sufficient schedule is then required to ensure the entire process runs as expected. However the creation of an implementation process will greatly rely on strategy already set up. According to the strategies above the implementation schedule be divided into three sections. First, is the short-term goals that will be implemented in a span of at least 3 years, this should cover common terms as well as measures aimed at addressing each sub sector in an operational setting. A second schedule should also be up and running only that this will cover for mid-term goals and objectives; this should be expected to time period of between 4 and 7 years and should see to it that asset owners are covered in this scope during their baseline security state using their subsector centered metrics as pointed out by Grady (2006). As for a long term schedule this should involve covering a time frame of 8 to 10 years. This will involve the development of real-time security told as well as development of energy delivery architecture that cut will cut across all cyber domains. 8.0 Resources To facilitate the strategies that have already been set up, adequate resources needs to be put in place to realize this. This may take the following form: first being quality assurance adaptive service protocols which that will aim at providing real time data delivery. A second resource would be the use of advanced cryptographic technology that will be used solely to secure devices. Also the use of trusted platform modules and network connections that will be used in real time communication as well as will be scalable embedded security systems within operating systems. The cost involve will generally be determined by several factors key being the scope of usage as well as the maintenance requirements of such resources. 9.0 Review Creating of resilient and effective control mechanisms that will safeguard and energy based industry is challenging. However we should not negate the fact that there exist strategies and means that avail sound measures that can be undertaken both from a physical point of view as well as from a cyber based environment as depicted by Knapp(2011). These measures as we have seen will not fully provide a failsafe resilient control mechanism although it is worth undertaking as it serves not only as a starting point but as a continuous undertaking aimed at achieving a sound security platform. This however should not be affected on a one time basis but should be deployed continuously making sure it meets the demands of evolving risks. If all these strategies are put in place as a plan in ensuring that resilience is achieved in an energy subsector, then there is no doubt that observables milestones and goal would be realized as elaborated by Spellman(2010). And it should also be so with the organizations way of understanding the cost associated with risks as well as being empowered to always seek solutions that will further improve how they mitigate cyber threats and challenges that pose security threats to energy delivery systems. Reference Gheorghe, A 2011, Energy security: International and local issues, theoretical perspective and critical energy infrastructure, Springer, Bucharest, Romania. Knapp, E 2011, Industrial Network Security: securing critical Infrastructure Networks for smart Grid, SCADA and other Industrial Control systems, Elsevier, Waltham. Ness, L 2006, Security Utility and Energy Infrastructures, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey. Campbell, J 2011, The smart grid and cyber security – Regulatory Policy and issues, Congressional Research Service, Washington. Spellman, F 2010, Energy Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security, Government Institutes, Plymouth, United Kingdom. Grady, F 2006, The Law And Economics of Cyber Security, Cambridge University Press, New York. Read More