Network Neutrality Principle - Coursework Example

 Network Neutrality Principle The general goal of network neutrality or net neutrality is to create an equally accessible, non-discriminatory and global Internet in which users can connect with other individuals and information without interference; however, there is no single definition of “net neutrality.” In 2003, Timothy Wu coined the term in his article, "Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination," in which he discussed the idea that networks should be neutral distributors of data. Essentially he put forward that networks should not prefer specific content, applications, services and devices; networks should be “dumb” and deliver data in a “best effort manner” where data delivery is treated equally (Meinrath & Pickard, 2008, p. 227). However, an absolute ban on discrimination would be ridiculous, as he would later determine, because of the emergence of real-time technologies (Meinrath & Pickard, 2008). Therefore, the current goal of net neutrality proponents is to limit certain types of discrimination (Rupert, 2008). The two questions that result are “how much discrimination should be permitted and whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should be able to exploit this technology to produce revenue” (Rupert, 2008, p. 332). Under net neutrality principles, cable companies and ISPs do not regulate the content that users access nor do they demonstrate preference to certain content or applications. Today, the general principles of net neutrality are that “owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the Internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network; and should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network” (Gilroy, 2007, p. 2). On the other end of the spectrum, opponents of net neutrality favor a “smart” network, a centralized infrastructure that can “inspect and shape network traffic based upon its content, origin, and/or destination,” as a way of realizing profits and providing better services to consumers who have the ability to pay for it (Meinrath & Pickard, 2008, p. 236). The discussion of net neutrality is not limited to the technical aspects of how data moves from one location to another or how users receive the data, but also involves a social contract “that supports equity and justice through data communications to help ensure a socially and politically neutral network” (Meinrath & Pickard, 2008, p. 237). This paper aims to analyze the network neutrality principle and how this principle along with debate around it contribute to the development of creativity, innovation and open marketplace. THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE AND PRIORITIZATON In essence, net neutrality opponents argue that ISPs should be able to prioritize data packets. The least discriminatory action is to only use prioritization when the router is overcapacity, therefore under normal circumstances, packets would not be inconvenienced. Some ISPs design their routers to prioritize packets at all times, which would allow higher priority packets to be delivered before lower priority ones, therefore creating a time delay for the user even when the buffer memory is under capacity. Another form of discrimination occurs when ISPs divides the network’s capacity into high priority “lanes” and low priority “lanes,” which translates to packets experiencing delays if its own lane is overcapacity and the other lanes are under capacity. Prioritizing packets is one of several aspects of Quality of Service (QoS), which is a technical term that describes the quality of communication that an application receives from the ISPs. With the introduction of real-time applications and activities, such as streaming video or online gaming, the need arises for increased QoS metrics. Real-time applications are timesensitive; therefore it is useless to recover extremely delayed or lost packets. The QoS metrics for real-time applications are end-to-end delay bounds and packet drop rates; an end-to-end delay bound is the maximum end-to-end delay that an application expects from the network, and a packet drop rate is the percentage of the packets that are lost due to full buffers or by failing to meet the end-to-end delay bound. If the network is not meeting the application’s QoS requirements, then the application may become useless as quality communication is not ensured for its user. For example, if a viewer is watching a video on YouTube and the video plays for a few seconds, then stops to buffer, then restarts for a few more seconds and again stops to buffer, then the QoS is not met. Most likely the viewer would stop watching the video because the application has become too cumbersome to use. In order for real-time applications to be useful, QoS practices ensure that the application receives the proper level of service, such as increased bandwidth on the network, packet prioritization by the router or even a dedicated line for the application. In addition to prioritizing the packets sent by the application, the network prioritizes applications as well. To provide QoS, networks also use three additional methods: resource reservation to reserve bandwidth or buffer space for new applications, call admissions control to determine if there are sufficient network resources for that application (and therefore either admit or reject the application to prevent overcrowding of the network) and finally, traffic conditioning to monitor the application to make sure its traffic is not significantly greater than expected. The concept of QoS is vital to the technical dimension of the net neutrality debate as some data and applications receive a preference over others, specifically how ISPs determine the priority. FRAMING THE DEBATE ON NET NEUTRALITY Under net neutrality principles, an end user, not the cable broadband provider, decides on what content is viewed and what applications they use. Practically, without net neutrality safeguards in place, there is an increased opportunity for cable providers to become gatekeepers of the Internet, using their market power to discriminate against applications and content at the expense of the consumer and competition. The fact that ISPs have the ability to prioritize applications and content or, in the more extreme discrimination case, grant exclusive access to specific content providers or applications through their routers is a central problem for net neutrality proponents. Net neutrality opponents primarily include large cable and telecommunication companies such as AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast as well as their equipment vendors such as Cisco, Qualcomm and Motorola. Net neutrality opponents are represented by the political action committee, Hands Off the Internet, which argues against further regulation so that they can realize profits and provide better services to consumers. Cable modem providers maintain that they should be allowed to charge consumers for discriminatory tiered-access and do not participate in harmful discriminatory activities. Net neutrality opponents argue that ISPs have no motivations to discriminate against independent applications. According to opponents, the industry is competitive; therefore by blocking content or charging enormous fees, consumers will take their business elsewhere and the offending ISP will fail or take corrective action. However, this competition is assumed, and in reality many consumers have no options besides cable broadband. In addition, the 2005 case with Madison River ISP demonstrated that when independent applications do in fact threaten the bottom-line, ISPs surely have a profit-driven reason to block services. From the critical perspective, opponents argue that currently there is no widespread behavior that warrants preventative regulations; therefore current reactionary regulations are sufficient. Rupert contributes the good behavior by ISPs to the fact that they are listening to customers who demand open access to content and applications (Rupert, 2008). However, many customers often blame a bad or degraded service experience on an application or content related malfunction. Yet, opponents believe that the cases of blocking and discrimination by ISPs have not had a negative effect. Hass (2007) states that “the relatively few attempts to impose blocks have had no measurable effect on the innovation and growth of Internet networks, services, and content” (p. 1583). Yet Hass fails to consider an effect on the consumer. Yoo further argues that regulators should not create preventative regulation unless they can demonstrate a “concrete harm to competition” (Yoo quoted in Hass, 2007, p. 1593). However, like Hass, Yoo’s argument fails to account for the harm imposed upon consumers. Net neutrality opponents also require the consumer to actively take charge in determining if he receives discriminatory content or applications. Opponents shift responsibility from the ISPs to the consumer so that ISPs can position themselves as responsible providers who informed the consumer of their policies and practices. For net neutrality opponents, “individuals do not have a right to neutrality, but have a right to know how service differentiation policies could affect the services they purchase from Internet service or content providers” (Hass, 2007, p. 1581). Opponents propose that the informed consumer has power to assert control on the cable providers. However, this scenario is unlikely as most consumers will not know when they receive degraded service and typically will not read (and also comprehend) the detailed service disclosure policy. On the net neutrality proponent side, there is a range of answers to the question of how much discrimination should be permitted. The strictest proponents determine that all forms of unnecessary discrimination, including prioritization of packets prevent net neutrality. However, support for this extreme view has lost traction, since a major proponent, Professor Lawrence Lessig, has reached a more moderate view (Rupert, 2008) and QoS requirements have increased. The introduction of real-time applications, such as VoIP, that require priority over technologies with lesser QoS requirements, such as email, demonstrates how this strict view is outdated with the advent of new technologies. The next group of proponents on the spectrum allows some prioritization but not access-tiering. Wu (2003) acknowledged that some applications necessitate higher QoS requirements, or prioritization; however, this group believes that tiered access should not be allowed. Tiered access is the “discrimination by a provider based on any criteria, including the price paid, the speed of the service requested, the geographical location of the service, or the nature of the traffic transmitted and received” (Hass, 2007, p. 1578). With the ability to provide varying QoS, comes the risk that tiered-access may follow and ISPs could favor applications that pay for faster or exclusive access to consumers or affiliates of the ISP. Therefore, the end user is not in control of the content they receive. While net neutrality proponents advocate for a non-tiered access system to encourage equal opportunity for access and end user control of content, opponents believe that a tiered Internet, which promotes innovation, is more fruitful for consumers. Opponents, such as Yoo, complain that large content providers, such as Google or Yahoo!, utilize a disproportionally large amount of the network’s capacity and therefore, create a degraded experience for the average consumer. Broadband cable providers claim that they should be able to charge the major content providers an additional fee because they are “bandwidth hogs” (Yoo at Hearing before the Task Force on the Competitive Policy and Antitrust Laws, 2008, p. 58). With various pricing models, ISPs argue that they can then provide better QoS for those willing to pay the additional fee as well as invest in improving the infrastructure and expanding the network. The investment in infrastructure leads to faster service and innovation in services and applications since networks will be able to offer better QoS for emerging application technologies (Rupert, 2008). However, with tiered access, existing content or application providers who are less financially secure may be unable to pay for a higher level of priority, therefore limiting the potential for robust competition. In addition, the tiered pricing model will, in fact, hinder innovation since new and innovative applications or content providers requiring high QoS, may not have the financial means to enter the market due to cost associated with receiving high QoS. If ISPs charge access fees that correspond to the value of the application delivered to their subscribers (such as charging a higher fee for a popular application which requires the same QoS as a less popular application), then creating new applications becomes less attractive for innovators since there is less incentive and a higher cost associated with innovation (Rupert, 2008). Moreover, new applications may not be able to enter the market if current applications have established exclusivity contracts with ISPs, which hinder innovation and competition. Practically, access to the network for content providers without bottlenecks is important to the free and open Internet; however access for consumers is vital as well. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for managing the Universal Service Program so that consumers may have the basic level of telecommunication service. Based on the 1996 Telecom Act, universal service currently includes "voice grade access to the public switched network, with the ability to place and receive calls; touch-tone or dual tone multi-frequency signaling ... or its functional equivalent; single-party service; access to emergency services; access to operator services; access to interexchange services; and access to directory assistance” (Telecom Act of 1996, 30). If the FCC deems broadband Internet access to be a universal service, then the government would subsidize access in areas not served or underserved. However, since FCC has not deemed broadband as a universal service yet, then according to Zichterman (2006), “the lack of access to affordable high-speed Internet access may widen the digital divide between the "haves" and the "have-nots"(p. 593). Physical access to broadband does not guarantee that the end user has the ability to control the content that they see and the applications they use. At the 2008 Hearing on Net Neutrality, Professor Susan Crawford states that “we do not have a functioning competitive market for Internet access in this country… a third of Americans have, at most, one choice of high-speed Internet access provider” (Crawford at Hearing on Net Neutrality, 2008). She acknowledges that a duopoly exists in the United States with either cable broadband access or DSL service. With cable and DSL broadband defined as an information service and not subject to Title II regulation, coupled with a lack of competition, cable and DSL companies can leverage their domination of the physical infrastructure to control of citizens’ access to and use of the Internet. In this scenario, without competition, consumers have no choice in their ISP and potentially receive degraded service. IN SEARCH FOR SOLUTION ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY DILEMMA If proponents can easily point to the issues with the current state of network neutrality principle as well as the cable broadband, they offer specific avenues to resolve the problem. Rich (2006) believes that for the future, “it is essential that the FCC and Congress both act in a manner that is even-handed and promotes competition, but also creates certainty for service providers while protecting consumers and advancing important social goals such as continued affordability of basic telephone service” (p. 223). Rich’s argument demonstrates a balance between a desire to advance the economic marketplace and the public interest. For net neutrality proponents, the main solution to ensure net neutrality and protect the market is further regulation. While Spulber and Yoo would not advocate “net neutrality” as a component of reasonable service, net neutrality proponents certainly would. They offer that one solution “is to pick the most efficient competitor at the outset, give him a monopoly, and extract from him in exchange a commitment to provide reasonable service at reasonable rates” (Spulber & Yoo, 2008, p. 42). In addition, instead of waiting for cable broadband providers to introduce harmful policies and behaviors, net neutrality advocates propose that Congress should pass preventative legislation to ensure access and nondiscriminatory behaviors do not arise again. The solution is to pass proactive legislation to prevent future harm as opposed to the “wait and see” attitude of the FCC’s reactionary policy that is cumbersome, slow and expensive. With ‘DSL and cable ... free of any real obligation to protect the original neutrality of the Internet’ and no more competition in broadband, Lessig sees regulation of a cable/DSL monopoly to prevent discrimination as the only way to "protect the promise of the Internet" and ensure continued application competition and innovation (Haas, 2007, p. 1573). Therefore, the adoption of a single, coherent and proactive regulatory framework, which prevents discrimination and provides equal access, would be a step in the right direction to promote Internet innovation and development with the marketplace stability needed to encourage investment and to foster growth of new services and applications (Gilroy, 2007). Some net neutrality opponents, such as May (2006), would agree that an adoption of a singular model is required for broadband; however his model would remain “market-oriented,” employ antitrust law or antitrust-like principles and essentially deregulate broadband. His model would focus on the structure of the marketplace, and not on “distinctions grounded in particular technology platforms or arcane functional characteristics that have little to do with existing marketplace realities” (May, 2006, p. 10). The solution for many opponents of net neutrality is simply ISP self-regulation, essentially no regulation at all. More moderate opponents reject the idea of more legislation and take the stance of “if it’s not broke, don’t fix it.” They advocate that neutrality can be reached if ISPs continue their current policies and the FCC and proponents continue to serve as a watch dog. Since the FCC has the authority to pursue violators (and exercise that authority as they have done so in past), then there is no need for further regulation. Former FCC Chairman Powell continued the “hands off” trend with the solution to put the power in the hands of the consumers with disclosure agreements. In this solution, consumers take the role as “the ultimate judges of whether the industry is successfully preserving ‘Net Freedom,’ or falling short” (Powell, 2004, p. 4). Overall, net neutrality opponents believe that further regulations put providers in “a regulatory straightjacket” which deters investment and innovation. While both sides disagree on several aspects of net neutrality, they both agree that broadband regulation must promote the innovation of network infrastructure and new applications. REFERENCES Gilroy, A. United States. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. 20 Dec 2007. CRS report for Congress: Net Neutrality: Background and Issues. Washington: GPO. Hass, D.A. 2007. The Never-Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed End Users Can End the Net Neutrality Debates. Berkeley Technology Law Journal. 22, 1565-1635. May, R. J. 2006.Why Stovepipe Regulation No Longer Works: An Essay on the Need for a New Market-Oriented Communications Policy. Federal Communications Law Journal. 58(1), 103-114. Meinrath, S.D. and Pickard, V.W. 2008. The New Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom. International Journal of Communications Law and Policy. 12, 225-243. Powell, M. 2004, Feb 8. Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry At Silicon Flatirons Symposium on “The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age.” University of Colorado at Boulder School of Law, Boulder, CO. Retrieved Nov 16, 2010 from Rupert, B. 2008. THE 110TH CONGRESS AND NETWORK NEUTRALITY: S. 215- THE INTERNET FREEDOM PRESERVATION ACT. DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law 18, 325. Rich, J.S. 2006. Brand X and the Wireline Broadband Report and Order: The Beginning of The End of the Distinction Between Title I and Title II Services. Federal Communications Law Journal, 58 (2), 221-244. Spulber, D.F. and Yoo, C.S. 2008. Rethinking Broadband Internet Access. Harvard Journal Of Law and Technology. 22. United States. Congr. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Hearing before the Task Force on the Competitive Policy and Antitrust Laws. Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet. 110th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 11 March 2008. United States. Senate and House of Representatives. Telecommunications Act of 1996. 104th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1996. Wu, T. 2003. Net Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination. Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law. 2, 141. Zichterman, A.J.(2006. Developments in Regulating High-Speed Internet Access: Cable Modems, DSL, & (and) Citywide Wi-Fi. Berkeley Tech. Law Journal. 21, 593-612. Read More