Political Upheaval and Insurrection are Unwarranted by Hobbes Words - Essay Example

UNJUSTIFICATION OF POLITICAL REVOLUTION OR REBELLION As one may read from the book, Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is balking at the possibility of (political) revolution or rebellion. With this as a lead, this essay, firstly, makes an attempt to explain why Hobbes spurns violent mode(s) of political transformation and, secondly, tries to determine whether his (Hobbes’s) rejection of political revolt is connected in any way to his concept of the nature and creation of commonwealth. Towards the end of this paper, an assessment of the plausibility of Hobbes’ position is going to be rendered. Philosophies are more than a pure product of abstractions (as in, a result of deskwork) but an upshot of a critical reflection on one’s concrete life experiences. At the outset, this paper takes note of the conventional observation that Thomas Hobbes’ concern for stability – the collateral damage in instances of revolution and/or rebellion – is explainable by the terror that he himself experienced during the English civil war (1640-49) (Rodee, et al., 1983, pp. 24; Zeitlin, 1996, pp. 81; Thompson, 2002, pp. 88; Wooton, 1996, pp. 99). In the 13th chapter of Leviathan, one reads about the incommodities of (such a) war: “In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” At the base of Hobbes’ resolute disdain of political revolution or rebellion is his rather negative anthropology maintaining that “(man) is so naturally aggressive, and civilization is so transparent a cover of man’s darker passion” (Rodee, pp. 25; see also Thompson, 306.). Although evidently less virulent than the egoism of Friedrich Nietzsche, Hobbes’ steadfastly holds that human nature is basically self-interested (Sim & Walker, 13), so that it makes no sense to ask people to be altruistic. Accordingly, altruism is a merely disguised act of selfishness (Pojman, 1994, pp. 286). Given this natural (human) composition, when human beings determine what is good or bad, (that is, in their natural state [for further exposition, see Sim & Walker, 2003, 22.; Hampsher-Monk, 1992, 23-29]), each would only seek life for oneself (Thompson). For, as creatures of passions, human beings are only for continual satisfaction of their desires. As Hobbes puts it: “For there is no such finis ultimus, utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers… Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the latter… So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death” (Leviathan, chapter 11). This natural state of man would breed no agreement or standard of good and evil. As such, there will be “no common ways of life, no means of settling conflicts of interest without violence, no reliable expectations of how other people will behave – except that, as psychological egoists, (individuals) will follow their own inclinations and perceived interests, tending to act and react and overreact in fearful, capricious, and violent way”(Pojman, 286). Because reason does not advise that one depends on anyone except oneself, one must always be on guard, protecting one’s vital interest, and finally brings one to preventive or preemptive aggression en route to a “war of all against all” (Pojman; see Leviathan, chap. 13). These conditions and the fact that human beings are more or less equal in their capacities to satisfy their desires would ultimately devolve into chaotic anarchy. For this reason, Hobbes sees the need for mechanism(s) of checks and balances to be put in effect so that society is assured of, at least, civility. Betting that it is better to have any power than to have no power at all, Hobbes’ suggestion is a single power or a sovereign state (without regard for a particular form of government for, accordingly, the effectiveness of government consists of its capacity to enforce its will) called commonwealth (see Rodes, pp. 24; Thompson, pp. 306-307). Hobbes adds that within the context of commonwealth the good and the bad may be agreed on, which subsequently would serve as basis for morality and laws. That goodness as a value is not inherent, but is created, may be inferred from Hobbes. And the foundation of a commonwealth would come out of individuals’ contract among themselves. Fear of death – or, conversely, the desire to live – prompts individuals to aspire for state of order (Thompson, 307; Wooton, 97). And, one does not start from the scratch, for human reason would disclose what is called “laws of nature,” such as impartiality, equal treatment, and non-particularity (Thompson). One reads in the 17th chapter of Leviathan, “(the) only way to erect such a common power, … is, confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; … This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that you give up your right to him, and authorize all his action in like manner. This done the multitude so united in one person, is called a commonwealth, in Latin civitas.” Once the commonwealth is set up, the sovereign institutes civil laws and enforces the laws of nature with the intent of bringing about peace that would make individuals free to pursue their desires (Thompson, 308). For Hobbes, the power of the state is absolute and its purpose is freedom. The commonwealth is neutral, but with enough power to ascertain that individuals with differing desires, passions and interests, can live together peacefully. Just as Hobbesian reason is an instrument of the passions, so the state is an instrument of artifice designed to control and adjudicate the conflicting passions and interests of (equal) individuals. In this way, the state ensures that each can seek to satisfy his or her own concept of what is good. To conclude, this paper tries to show the un-justification of political revolution or rebellion for Hobbes. Revolution, according to him, is characteristic of the state of nature of human beings. In this natural state, the law of the jungle – in a manner of speaking -- applies. Hence, Hobbes pins his hope on the institution of what he calls a commonwealth, which is set to regulate the differing passions and interests of human beings and check on the egoism of individuals. This paper has begun by acknowledging that philosophy is practically a conclusion that one makes out of his experiences. And, in relation to this, there is a mention that to Hobbes’ memory the horror of the English civil war was still fresh (especially as he was penning the Leviathan). Concisely, in this constitutes the limitation or un-tenability of Hobbes’ political theory. While the genius of Hobbes shines as he justifies the institution of state out of a negative conception on human beings, one can definitely have a breather knowing that Hobbes is succeeded by philosophers like John Locke who posited a positive anthropology as foundation of their ensuing political theories. Today, given the current state of the discipline of psychology, an emphasis on the positive conception of human nature is always made. Another contestable element of Hobbesian political theory is his refutation of violent political transformation (Sim & Walker [pp. 13-24] focuses on this point). While that he repudiated the revolutionists or the rebels is understandable because of his personal experiences during the civil war in England (about which no one can debate against), Hobbes must have not turned a blind eye on revolution’s merits. For there are positive results of revolution, and these may be validated in the history of different countries in the 20th century. Lest it is forgotten, this paper states the obvious: Hobbes is and will remain as among the great political philosophers ever. References: Hampshire-Monk, I. (1992). A history of modern political thought: Major political thinkers from Hobbes to Marx. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. Hobbes, T. (1996). Leviathan. (R. Tuck, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pojman, L. (1994). Philosophy: The pursuit of wisdom. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Rodee, C., et al. (1983). Introduction to political science (4th ed.). Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Sim, S. & Walker, D. (2003). The discourse of sovereignty, Hobbes to Fielding: The state of nature and the nature of the state. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing. Thompson, M. (2002). Ethics. In Mel Thompson (Ed.), World philosophy (64-105). London: Vega. Wooton, D. (1996). Modern political thought: Readings from Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Zeitlin, I. (1996). Rulers and ruled: An introduction to classical political theory from Plato to the Federalists. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Read More