Priorities of Montgomery Operations - Essay Example

Montgomery was appointed in August 1942 in charge of the Eighth Army operation in North Africa. Unlike his predecessor, he resisted pressure from Churchill and concentrated to build the army strength, added a pursuit formation X Corps to Army’s XXX Corps and XIII Corps. His reputation was immensely reflected by training tactics, raising the morale of the British Army, clear thinking, organizational skills and multiple novel ideas was much notable in his operation after he embarked for N. Africa taking the command of Eighth Army. The huge effect seen by Montgomery upon Eighth Army was primarily seen by how he applied the military doctrines similar to those he developed and had applied in South East England1. Atkinson (2013) further observes that, immediately after he entered in North Africa, he brought some changes which the main one was to bring together the RAF and Eighth Army headquarters that war set several miles apart together. Through this tactic, he was able to utilize a combined force power and arms in the war. This was a significant change as it promoted efficient and effective commanding, training and reporting. The RAF and Eighth Army were able to work in close conjunction where they were able to target, put pressure on Rommel and pursue the Axis army. His doctrines worked and he carefully positioned the British forces, revamped the tanks and instructed his troops through his tactical battle plans. The best use of Army-Air cooperation in Western Desert forced Rommel to retreat as their armor were continually bombed by RAF that they would not afford the losses. Training was the highest priorities of Montgomery operations. This was prior to his experience with the South Eastern Army in Britain. He advanced his tactics to North Africa’s Eighth Army. Training tactics worked as in November 1942, the Eighth Army was able to defeat Rommel in a decisive Second Battle- El Alamein across Libya where the Axis were pushed to Mareth defensive line along Tunisian border. This was later rejuvenated by the fact that Eighth Army out-tanked Mareth defenses. In August 1942, at the entry to North Africa, the Eighth Army had been demoralized by the rate it retreated hundreds of miles in the desert to avoid attacks from the superior Panzers under the command of Erwin Rommel. Rommel had a reputation as A ‘Desert Fox’ and this aggravated the retreat of Eighth Army2. Montgomery was able to raise the Army morale through application of training doctrines that instilled confidence and competence to his Army. He visited the soldiers regularly to promote high morale, through personal conversation, speeches to promote confidence and optimism. The use of deception techniques and the effect of huge concentrated artillery made a possible barrier to Germans African Corps and attacks which were key feature of 1942 battles. Montgomery continued his operation in North Africa after he pursed Rommel troops to Tunisia. He combined the forces with the 1 st Army and attacked South Tunis from one side while the 1 st Army attacked from the North. Intelligence played a key role n North Africa battle. Montgomery tactics aided the supremacy of Eighth Army in the fight. The marshaled army maintained supply while preventing the Africa Corps from pushing toward them. The British Army had information about the German Air Force and the Army, dispositions and movements. This helped their strategies leading them to take positive actions to move forward as well as defensive actions. There was therefore an overwhelming British victory through strong command. Intelligence was very important when it came to supplies. Germans were devastated and in short of fuel, the British were able to equip themselves with the supply throughout. Events turned out quickly through supplies tactics3. The knowledge of the enemy played a supplementary role for Eighth Army in North Africa and they used it as a decisive factor. Rommel was held by the fact that he would not fight back due to lack of ammunition and fuel and Montgomery was able to surround the Panzers and destroy them and mostly the one left along the desert. With the massive loss of Panzer, through a campaign of destruction adopted by the Eighth Army, Germans lost to British in North Africa. Surprise attacks, encircling of the army and deception tactics were critical among the Montgomery strategy. The effective tactics were in most cases not original but on demand response. While Germany overstretched themselves by pushing the Eighth Army backwards, they wasted a lot of resources which exposed them to further attacks. This distinguished Montgomery commanding superiority that devastated the African Corps4. Both Hitler and Churchill put pressure on the commanders in charge in North Africa and this affected the way the battle was won at times. The tendency to interfere was accelerated by their strategic and political aims and this promoted the need for obsessive offensive action without an analysis off the satiation on the ground. Their involvement, like Hitler’s overruling the advancement of German African Corps against the Eighth Army which was considered by Rommel. The delay to attack as instructed by Hitler was of futile to the Germans and allowed counter-productive moves of British Army5. Montgomery on his side was reluctant on Churchill [pressure allowed him to settle for better judgment of when to advance, train and attack. He gained an overall mandate over North Africa and this promoted clear plans which immensely followed his plans for attack. His refusal to be rushed for immediate offensive operations skillfully worked for the outcome of the battle. A close analysis of deployed troops was a major effect in the battle outcome. The close working together of the British troops was of significant effect for British victory. This allowed the communication and commanding tactics where in a vast desert most troops got disorganized or cut contact with the other. Montgomery ensured that the forces moved tactfully without much defensive actions. This was promoted by the guidance by RAF through Air attacks and control. The Eighth Army did not lose much of their tanks which were also lighter for the movement and less consumed the fuel. On the North, the 1 st Army work led to surrounding of the African Corps which restrained their retreating and equipping strategies. At such point, most ways of supplies were hampered by British forces and Germans lost6. Despite the fact that the Rommel African Corps had more effective and advanced equipments compared to those of the Eighth Armies, the campaign did not last any longer. This is because, the African Corps were outnumbered by Eighth Army where the Eighth Army had 118,000 men compared to Axis force 113,000. The Eighth Armies had 680 tanks which were either in supply or in reserve while Rommel’s had 390. 1,000 British planes were confronting 320 Axis aircraft. However, the statistics were in a way misleading as one Germany tank was incomparable to those of British. Panzers were far much stronger than British tanks. The defensive forces were quite a determinant in the outcome and perhaps the most significant of all the ability to marshal the Air Forces and the Army7. The Eighth Army’s supporting air force was numerically superior. The second battle of El Alamein shows the Allies gaining and possessing superiority to offset most technical superiority which was enjoyed by the Axis. Technical superiority was an utmost and important factor in supplying of army in North Africa. British learned quickly how their weapons were inferior in standard compared to those of the Axis. This was dome when those weapons captured were sent to British for analysis. This forced British to add to Grant and Matilda tanks an extra armor plate to harden the face and 88mm guns. This resisted the penetration effect of German lethal weapons which were able to attack at 2000 yards. However, the supply of these superior weapons was limited to German such as the Panther and Tiger tanks which resisted the decisive action of the campaign8. Reflected approaches of the British Expeditionary Force of 1918 A number of war aspects practiced by the British Expeditionary force of 1918 were also reflected in the methods the 8th British Army under the control of Montgomery experienced in North Africa in 1942. Montgomery was quite inspirational to his force, and was in for defeat and nothing else. The British army under the command of Montgomery was well equipped to manage the war against the German force. They maintained stockpiles of war equipments and reserves. At some point during the war, the British guns ambushed the German men before they organized themselves, a technique that was used by the British Expeditionary Force in 1918. After a short time, Montgomery’s Eighth Army had made a lot of destruction, and the German war force could not launch a fresh attack on Egypt which had been strongly defended by the British Army9. The success of the British Eighth Army in 1942 was due to its infiltration tactics, and use of tanks and artillery against the enemies. This was not any different from the way the British Expeditionary Force of 1918 carried out its operations. With the availability of such equipments, the Montgomery’s men were able to successfully build breaches in their enemy defenses, and were able to push them forward forever. The army also used friendly infantry that was well equipped with communications. This facilitated the supply of fire support equipments like tanks and guns. Most of the war tactics and procedures use by Montgomery in 1942 were a continuation of the British force of 1918, and it worked out successfully for him10. Continuity and changes occurred which were also a factor for the outcome of the battle. The British army assumed different commanders in charge from 1941 to 1943. This brought into the front the use of superior skills compared to the prior ones. The entry of Montgomery was such an effective tactic. The divergent troops were brought together under one training and commanding. Orders were centralized and superior involvement was limited in the later end of the war for British. They weaponry were greatly strengthen after use of skills to learn the enemy’s tactics in weaponry11. References Alamein, El. "The Second Battle of." 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