Why Was Operation Barbarossa Unable to Achieve Victory against the Soviet Union - Essay Example

Name: Course: Tutor: Date: Despite initial success why was Operation Barbarossa unable to achieve victory against the Soviet Union? Introduction Operation Barbarossa, which lasted from 22nd June 1941 to 5th December 1941, was arguably the largest military operation ever carried out in world history. This is because prior to and during the operation, heavy planning, logistics and mobilisation of both military equipment and personnel was undertaken, first by the Axis armies, and later, by the Soviet armies. Planning for the operation had started earlier in 1940, following victories of the Axis armies in Western Europe during World War II. Victory in Western Europe coupled with a sudden massive attack on the USSR assured the Axis armies unprecedented success during the first months of the operation. The invasion had three main targets: the capture of Smolensk, Leningrad and, finally, Moscow. The invasion involved three army groups: South, North and Centre. Army Group North was composed of four army units and had the Kiev as their primary target. Army Group South targeted Leningrad and was composed of two armies, while the Army Group Centre comprised two army units and focused on Moscow as the primary target. Early tactical victory was witnessed in the capture of Smolensk and increased advance towards Moscow. But these fortunes changed in the course of time as a strong counteroffensive by the Soviet armies caused the operation to be extended longer than what had been anticipated. Thus, in the subsequent months, the axis forces were successfully repulsed, causing the Eastern front to turn into a graveyard of the German forces. Hence, Operation Barbarossa was unable to achieve victory over the Soviet Union, despite its initial success. This paper discusses some of the factors that contributed to the failure of Operation Barbarossa to deliver victory against USSR despite its initial success. Factors that Contributed to the Failure of Operation Barbarossa Several factors contributed to the failure of Operation Barbarossa; first, it is important to look at the German preparation and planning for the operation. According to Kirchubel, planning for the operation, which started as early as 1940, was marked with general disagreements between Hitler and top generals of the German military (11). The disagreements were mainly attributed to the fact that Hitler’s main ambition of attacking the USSR in the autumn of 1940 was met with opposition from his generals. The initial competing plans of the army high command and the armed forces high command were cleared in the spring of 1940 when detailed directives and orders were drawn for the operation. These disagreements coupled with logistical weaknesses in the preparation forced Hitler to postpone the invasion from the original date to spring 1941 (Kirchubel 12). In the opinion of the German military, war against the USSR would be quick and easy. The German ideology had strongly disregarded the strength of the enemy in the face of perceived superiority of the German forces (Forczyk 10). This ideology assumed that the operation would deliver ultimate success within the first few weeks. It also ignored the actual military preparedness and capability of the USSR forces which, incidentally, had undergone massive development and expansion plans prior to the German-led invasion. By extension, the initial assumptions of the German forces concerning the incapability of the USSR military contributed to the eventual failure of Operation Barbarossa. Further, the scope of the Wehrmacht’s (the unified forces of Germany’s) war against the USSR was unrealistic from its initial conceptualisation. Kirchubel observes that although it took eleven full months to plan for the operation, the planning was not without fundamental flaws; there were also insufficient resources in launching the operation (11). The Axis armies did not have the capacity to penetrate the frontlines of the Soviet armies and at the same time stage huge encirclements deep in the USSR frontier (Kirchubel 13). The operation itself, therefore, had envisioned very high targets which were not practical, considering the military standards of the time. The second major factor that contributed to the failure of the operation was Hitler’s continued interference in the leadership of the German military during the operation. His insistence for the generals not to retreat but rather to stand and fight caused the Axis armies to be trapped in the USSR in the face of growing Soviet counterattacks. Lemay notes that at the peak of the ensuing conflict, Hitler issued the “stop and fight” directive to the soldiers of the Axis armies who were evidently besieged by the strong Soviet counteroffensive, as a way of stopping a massive withdrawal in the face of the repulsion (218). On December 5th, the Germans believed that the Soviet counteroffensive had reached a critical point. This forced the Axis armies to take a defensive position, forcing many generals to order retreats. The retreats were carried out so recklessly and hastily that there was total abandonment of tanks and other vital military equipment by the retreating forces (Forczyk 21). Although it has been argued that the order of Hitler to his enemies to halt the retreat saved the German army from total collapse (Lemay 219), resulting consequences of the order arguably contributed to the defeat of the operation. Immediately after the crisis, Hitler dismissed more than 35 generals for the slightest hint at retreating (Lemay 220). Later, he accepted the resignation of the Field Marshall Brauchitsch, assuming the command of the military himself. This meant that Hitler assumed the role of the head of state, supreme commander of the army as well as the commander-in-chief of the army. This interference by Hitler compromised the operational efficiency of the army in the battlefield because the whole army structure was directly subordinate to Hitler. Even the chief of the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) or Germany's Supreme High Command of the Heer staff generals found themselves sidelined in the combat operations in the theatres of war. This conflict of interest further caused divisions between the OKH and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) or the Supreme of Command of the German forces, thus weakening the general performance of the Axis armies in the operation. Another factor that contributed to the failure of the operation was the strong counteroffensive mounted by the USSR armies. The bravery of the USSR forces in carrying out the sieges of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad was far beyond what the Axis armies had anticipated. According to Wiest and Barbier, the Russian army, under the leadership of General Zhukov, reinforced their defensive positions on Moscow and planned major counteroffensive operations against the invading army (57). These repeated defensive operations took a toll on the German forces, in that every repeated attempt at an offensive showed diminished effort and scale (Wiest and Barbier 58). In addition, the major counteroffensive launched by the Russian forces on 6th December 1941 further weakened the already overstretched and exposed German forces. It was during the counterattack that top German military generals, convinced that the operation was doomed to fail, sought permission to withdraw (Wiest and Barbier 58). Repulsion of the invasion on Moscow allowed the Russian generals to return to their original doctrine of organisation and operation. It also allowed the Russian army the much needed time to reorganise their operations, having been caught by surprise at the onset of the operation (Forczyk 23). The period between the end of 1941 and early 1943 was marked by heavy rearmament exercise by the Soviet army (Wiest and Barbier 59). This was driven by heavy industrial production of new weapons that allowed the creation of additional tank corps. These operations created a cohesive tank army, a highly mechanized infantry, more tank brigades and heavy armoured formations. The invigorated Soviet military system managed to successfully repulse a sudden German attack on Stalingrad. This was achieved by launching a successful counterattack operation (Operation Uranus) under the leadership of General Zhukov as the deputy Supreme Commander of the Soviet armed forces (Wiest & Barbier 61). Although the factors mentioned earlier contributed to the eventual failure of operation Barbarossa, logistical mistakes by the Axis armies is arguably the single major reason for the failure of the operation. The operational plan for the campaign involved three army units: army group South, North and Centre. Army Group North, with four army units, had the Kiev as their primary target. Army Group South had the prime target of Leningrad and comprised of two armies, while the Army Group Centre comprised of two army units and focused on besieging Moscow (Forczyk 30). First, the Axis armies faced serious shortfalls in material supply during the operation. This resulted from the fact that German industrial capacity was operating below capacity during the operation and, therefore, industrial production could not match heavy consumption during the period of the invasion (Stahel, Operation Barbarossa 133). It has been argued that initial military activities in Norway, France and the Balkans had stretched German industrial productivity to such an extent that at the onset of the operation, the industries were operating way below capacity (Stahel, Operation Typhoon 64). This lack of industrial capacity to match the magnitude of the conceived operation, which was ignored by Hitler and the army commanders during the planning stage, created a shortfall in resources for the Axis armies during the operation. Second, there was failure in the transport operations of the army during the operation. This was a result of lack of uniform command in the transport and logistical operations of the armies. The responsibilities for transportation were shared between the Chief of Transport who commanded rail and inland water ways, and the Quartermaster General, who commanded motor transport (Stahel, Operation Typhoon 200). This situation created conflict whereby replacement of all motor vehicles lost in the field as well as large scale repairs failed during the operation. This forced the armies to resort to large scale use of horses to replace motorised transport in the field operations, which went against the initial and traditional German war strategy of using transport means that favoured rapid movement (56). Third, there was total lack of standardisation in the machinery and equipment used in the operation. There were different types of vehicles and lorries used in the artillery units and groupings. This resulted in a severe lack of a steady supply of spare parts for the machinery (Van Creveld 199). There were also no available maintenance unit for the armies because it had been assumed that the war would take a short period. This situation created severe resupply problems during the operation. Tactical field operations were suspended for weeks as resupply of fuel and ammunition was awaited from the rear. This in turn contributed to lost time and failure to exploit tactical advantages which would have otherwise enabled the army to maintain the momentum of the operations. Another point is that erroneous logistical planning was witnessed in the supply of food (Stahe, Operation Barbarossa 133). During a critical phase of the operation, Hitler chose ammunition as the top priority item that needed to be addressed at the expense of food and warm clothing. This created serious food shortage problems to the soldiers who resorted to feeding on foraging livestock and their own horses before food supply was resumed (Stahel, Operation Typhoon 44). Acute logistical problems in terms of food supply, machinery maintenance, transport and technical support were caused by an oversight in the planning stages, which based their estimates on two things: perceived speed of the operation and the transport capability rather than actual operational requirements. The ensuing logistical problems caused a serious loss of time for the armies. This allowed the Soviet army adequate time to regain composure to not only hold on the attack for extended long periods of time, but also plan a major counteroffensive to drive back the invasion before reaching Moscow. According to Edwards and Olive, the last major factor that contributed to the failure of the operation despite its early success was the weather during the operation. Although it had been estimated that the invasion would end long before the onset of winter, fierce Soviet resistance forced the operation to extend into the severe Russian winter. Extremely low winter temperatures of as low as 40 degrees Fahrenheit caught the Axis armies unprepared (Stahel, Operation Barbarossa 196), unlike the Soviet soldiers who had been used to such severe weather. From immobility of the machinery to amputations resulting from frostbite, the winter weather strongly affected the morale of the soldiers of the Axis armies. On top of this, the severe weather made the roads virtually impassable and this put a strain on the already heavily used railway system. It has been stated that heavy reliance on the railway system was not tenable since the Russian railway system was incompatible with the one used in Western European countries in terms of gauge measurements (Stahel, Operation Barbarossa 221). This situation contributed to the already affected morale of the soldiers to cause a drag in field operations thus resulting in the eventual failure of the operation. Conclusion In conclusion, Operation Barbarossa failed to deliver victory for the Germans against Russians because of several factors. Logistical mistakes in the planning stage of the operation resulted from oversight by the commanders of the Axis armies. This is largely because after having unprecedented victory in the earlier operations in France, the Axis forces were buoyed with the feeling of invincibility. Hitler had believed that an invasion of the USSR was not only the solution to the economic problems of Germany but also a prime target after Western Europe. Hitler, in all his planning, underestimated the strength and capacity of the Soviet Union military. This proved costly in the long run during the war as the Soviet military managed to launch fierce resistance battles which stifled the advance of the invasion. Also, severe winter conditions during the operation found the Axis army unprepared for such an eventuality. This left them vulnerable as the tempo of the battle was lost. During the invasion, there was confusion as to the actual progress of the operations. Hitler ordered the northern front to advance southwards in aid of the southern forces. This was against the wish of generals in the field who felt that such a decision would compromise the speed of advance. There were also major logistical problems in transportation and resupply of food, fuel and ammunition. This confusion in tactical decisions, coupled with logistical hitches, left the Axis armies in a precarious position such that by the end of the operation, they had been successfully repulsed by the Soviet forces, forcing a surrender at Stalingrad in January 1943. Works Cited Edwards, Robert and Michael Olive. Operation Barbarossa 1941. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2012. Forczyk, Robert. Moscow 1941: Hitler’s First Defeat. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2006. Kirchubel, Robert. Operation Barbarossa: 1941(3). Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2007. Lemay, Benoit. Erich von Manstein: Hitler’s Master Strategist. New York: Casemate Publishers, 2011. Stahel, David. Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Stahel, David. Operation Typhoon: Hitler’s March on Moscow, October 1941. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Wiest, Andrew, A. and Barbier, M. K. Infantry Warfare: Strategy and Tactics. Osceola: MBI Publishing, 2002. Read More