Malaysia-Singapore Separation - Research Paper Example

Name : xxxxxx Tutor : xxxxxxx Title : Malaysia Singapore Separation Institution : xxxxxxx @2010 Malaysia Singapore Separation The separation of Singapore from Malaysia was a traumatic experience that particularly affected Singapore adversely. With a land area of only 682.7 square kilometres,1 newly independent Singapore in 1965 did not have the land and labour resources that any country requires for material progress. That Singapore managed to develop in spite of these difficulties is a testament to the work ethic, tenacity and resilience of its people, as well as the resourcefulness of its leadership. However, Singapore might have developed much faster if it had access to the resources within Malaysia. Therefore it is necessary to ask, what prompted Singapore to separate from Malaysia, when it potentially had more to gain by staying in the Malaysian Federation? This thesis will address this question. In order to fully understand the reasons for the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, it is necessary to examine their prior history at some length, including the ethnic tensions between the two largest ethnic groups in both countries, Malays and Chinese. The proportion of both ethnic groups varies in both countries, with Malaysia comprising a 58% ethnic Malay population with a 31% Chinese ethnic minority, while Singapore is composed of 77% ethnic Chinese and 14% ethnic Malays (The Economist, March 22nd-28th, 1997).2 According to Chua Beng Huat (2005), the racial distribution of Singapore’s population is 75 % Chinese, Malays 17 %, and 8 % South Asians. The island of Singapore, which was initially known as Temasek, was a minor trading post in Southeast Asia. An unusual feature of Singapore’s colonial history is that its colonization was not achieved by subjugation of an indigenous people, but by the development of settlements populated by immigrants. The British East India Company, through its officer, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, recognized the strategic importance of the island and, through a series of political maneouvres, acquired it on Britain’s behalf in 1819 and set up a free port. Consequently, the island’s political stability (a result of the Pax Britannica) attracted waves of immigrants from China and South Asia, who came in search of economic opportunities (Wang 1993, pp.44-45). By 1830, the Chinese immigrants had established themselves as the majority of the island’s population. Chinese immigration to Singapore and the Malay Peninsula continued through the 19th and early 20th centuries. Most Chinese immigrants were indentured servants, (coolies) who paid the cost of their passage by sending their wages to their labour brokers until their debts were fully repaid, a process which sometimes took years (Bastin & Benda 1968). Alternatively, many Chinese immigrants used the various clan, kin and hometown associations which had been established in Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. These organizations not only helped immigrants to travel to their destinations, but also helped them to secure employment. The new immigrants, once settled, would assist more of their compatriots to emigrate from China (Purcell 1967). The south Indian immigrants were initially brought to Singapore as convicts by the British, to fulfil the need for unskilled labour. This was because the Chinese immigrants showed a preference for trade, once they had bought their freedom (Suryadinata 2006). This also explains why Tamil is a recognized language in Singapore today, as most of the Indian immigrants came from Tamil speaking areas of India. The Malay population mainly came from the Peninsula and nearby islands. Because Singapore is right next to the Malay Peninsula, the Malays can be considered the indigenous population of both the peninsula and Singapore. Tan (2004) states that indigenous Malays closely identify with their homeland.3 This sense of Malay identity was crystallized in political expression after World War II. Ironically, rising Malay nationalism (particularly in Malaysia) grew out of the presence of Chinese immigrants, as a response to the fear of Chinese dominance in independent Malaysia (Liu 2005). Similarly, the ethnic Chinese feared that Malay political dominance would threaten their cultural heritage. It was in such an atmosphere of mutual mistrust that Singapore merged with, and later separated from, Malaysia. However, to fully comprehend the circumstances that led to the separation, it is necessary to look at the role played by the political leaders on both sides. By far the greatest influence on merger and separation was exerted by Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore. He took an interest in the political affairs of his homeland from an early age. As a law student in Britain in the 1940’s, Lee Kuan Yew was a member of a group of Malayan students who were in favour of an independent Malaya in which Singapore would be an integral part, provided there would be racial equality and fair distribution of wealth. The humiliation that Singapore suffered at the hands of the occupying Japanese in World War II totally destroyed the credibility of the British in the eyes of young Singaporeans. One of these disillusioned Singaporeans was Lee Kuan Yew. He decided that Singapore’s fate should be placed in the hands of Singaporeans themselves. Lee Kuan Yew articulated this belief in a biography: My colleagues and I are of that generation of young men who went through the Second World War and the Japanese Occupation and emerged determined that no one – neither the Japanese nor the British – had the right to push and kick us around. We are determined that we could govern ourselsves and bring up our children in a country where we can be proud to be self-respecting people. When the war came to an end in 1945, there was never a chance of the old type of british colonial system ever being re-created. The scales had fallen from our eyes and we saw for ourselves that the local people could run the country (Lee Kuan Yew 1962, p. 10-11).4 The Japanese Occupation helped to forge a strong sense of Singaporean nationalism. The self-determination which Singaporeans developed during the war was applied to the struggle for Singaporean self rule (Josey 1968). Britain’s post-war colonial arrangement separated Singapore from the Crown Colony known as the Malayan Union, due to the antagonism of the mainland Malays towards Singapore’s predominantly Chinese population (Allen 1967). Therefore, Singaporean politics developed separately from that of the mainland, which enabled Lee Kuan Yew to develop a power base. In anticipation of the general election of 1955, Lee Kuan Yew became one of the founding members of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in 1954. This party was to subsequently have a huge impact on Singaporean history. The PAP initially aimed at a merger between Singapore and Malaya in order to attain independence (Bellows 1970). The PAP was an alliance between Lee Kuan Yew, who was anti-communist, and two leaders affiliated to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan. The Singapore Labour Front (SLF), led by David Marshall, a Singapore Jew, won the 1955 elections, and Marshall became the first chief Minister of Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew became the de facto opposition leader, as the PAP had only 3 seats to the SLF’s 10 (Bellows 1970). However, the office of Chief Minister at that time had no real power. The effective governing power was still in the hands of the British governor. Thus Marshall was frustrated as his office was without substance (Bellows 1970). When Marshall eventually resigned in 1956, he was succeeded by Lim Yew Hock, who clamped down on the student and labour unrest which had begun during Marshall’s tenure. This unrest was largely backed by the communist wing of the PAP and the MCP. Lim Yew Hock’s crackdown resulted in the arrest of the entire leadership of the MCP, including Lee Kuan Yew’s influential ally, Lim Chin Siong, an event that enabled Lee Kuan Yew to consolidate his control of the PAP (Bellows 1970). The following year, 1957, Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock went to London for constitutional talks, which resolved that Singapore would become self governing within the framework of the British Empire. The 1959 election would be used to select the first self-governing Legislative Assembly in Singapore. This would have greater authority than the 1955 Legislative Council. The PAP set out to win the 1959 election in order to form this self-ruling government. It fielded candidates for all 51 seats, winning 43, due to its campaigns directed to all Singaporeans (Bellows 1970). Furthermore, the voter turnout of 89% gave Lee Kuan Yew a very strong electoral mandate as the first Prime Minister of self governing Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew used his new powers to secure the release of his former communist allies, who publicly supported the PAP’s non-communist position. Lee Kuan Yew was now able to focus his energies on independence in union with mainland Malaya, and on uniting the ethnically diverse population of Singapore. This is because he was convinced that the only viable future for Singapore was in a merger with the mainland, which had abundant natural resources. There were also other compelling reasons for a merger with Malaya. First of all, Singapore was dependent on entrepot trade. However Singapore could no longer depend on entrepot trade alone, due to its growing population, and because of increasing competition from other ports in the region, such as Kelang on the Peninsula (Rahim, 1998). To solve the problem of unemployment, Singapore needed a large market to sell its goods, as its own domestic market was too small to provide a sufficient market to sustain employment. A merger with Malaya would create a large enough domestic market, as well as a source of raw materials. In addition, Malaya had imposed duties on Singaporean goods, which restricted trade between Malaya and Singapore. The ruling PAP in Singapore hoped that with a merger, a common market would be set up. This would guarantee free trade, which would allow Singaporean industries to grow, thus easing unemployment (Rahim, 1998). Malay politicians on the mainland, most notably the Malayan Federation (and later Malaysian) Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, were opposed to a union with Singapore, due to its largely Chinese population (Roff 1967). Lee Kuan Yew’s new goals were to win the trust of Tunku Abdul Rahman on the mainland, and to overcome communist resistance in Singapore itself, which was led by his former ally, Lim Chin Siong. He first expelled the communists from the PAP, and held a referendum in 1962 to endorse the merger with Malaya. The PAP won the referendum with 71% of the vote, setting the stage for union with Malaya. As a result, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malayan Premier, began to see merging as a method of counteracting the communist menace in Singapore, and by extension, Malaya itself. He thus began to see Lee Kuan Yew as an ally against communism (Mohd 1974). However, Tunku Abdul Rahman wanted a union to take place within a federal Malaysia, which would include peninsular Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. On 27 May 1961, Tunku Abdul Rahman made a speech at Foreign Correspondents’ association of Southeast Asia, in which he proposed the idea of merging with Singapore, Sarah, Sarawak and Brunei. This federation, with a larger population, would diminish the importance of Singapore’s largely Chinese population. Brunei pulled out of the proposed union, and the remaining four states formed Malaysia on 16 September 1963 (Allen 1967). Tunku Abdul Rahman headed the Malaysian central government (in Kuala Lumpur). Each state also had its own state government. The initial agreement was that Singapore would retain its executive government, and pay 40% of its tax revenue to the central Malaysian government (Allen 1967). However, the terms of the merger were not clearly spelt out, and this led to dissatisfaction on the part of Singapore’s leaders, as they lost their political and economic freedom. To begin with, the central government was reluctant to set up a common market, which was Singapore’s chief reason for merging. The central government was also unwilling to promote new industries in Singapore, which soon realized that it did not gain much from the merger. Mainland politicians tried to extend their influence to Singapore by competing in Singapore’s 1963 general election, where they were defeated. In 1964, Singaporean politicians took part in the Malayan general election. They not only lost, but also raised a storm of protest from mainland politicians. These actions by both sides were in contravention of a mutual agreement before the 1963 merger between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew that political parties from the mainland and Singapore would keep out of each other’s territories. However, the PAP participated in the 1964 mainland elections because Lee Kuan Yew felt that Tunku Abdul Rahman had betrayed him by fielding mainland candidates in the Singapore elections the year before. Singapore was also underrepresented in the national parliament, and Lee Kuan Yew had not been given a position in the central government. These factors influenced the PAP’s participation in the 1964 mainland elections, which in turn precipitated the racial tension which led to the separation of Malaysia and Singapore (Clutterbuck 1973). In addition, while Singapore was safeguarding the rights of its Malay minority, the same could not be said for the Chinese on the mainland, who were being discriminated against. Consequently, Lee Kuan Yew refused to give any further concessions to Malay Singaporeans on housing rights, and mainland Malay politicians accused him of indifference towards Malays in Singapore. They instigated hate campaigns against Lee Kuan Yew which among other things, resulted in two race riots. On 21 July 1964, in a procession to celebrate Prophet Mohammed’s birthday, the tension between the Chinese and the Malays led to riots (Leifer 1964). More violence broke out in September in which many Malays and Chinese were killed. Tension still existed though the riots were eventually put down. Tunku Abdul Rahman and his Malay allies were intent on building a Malay dominated Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew, supported by politicians in Malaya and Sarawak, opposed this, and the mainland politicians accused him of trying to take control of Malaysia. At the same time, Lee Kuan Yew had become increasingly confrontational in parliament. In fact, Lee Kuan Yew narrowly avoided detention when the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, warned Tunku Abdul Rahman against such a move (Boyce 1968). When Tunku Abdul Rahman realized that Lee Kuan Yew would not relent in his campaign for a ‘Malaysian Malaysia,’ and that there were no other ways (constitutional or otherwise) to contain Lee Kuan Yew’s challenge to Malay supremacy, he engineered the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. Lee Kuan Yew, who had so fervently believed in the union of Singapore and Malaya, had to come to terms with the end of his dream. At the press conference that morning, he nearly broke down before he said the following words: For me, it is a moment of anguish. All my life, my whole adult life, I believed in merger and unity of the two territories. ... Now, I, Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, do hereby proclaim and declare on behalf on the people and the Government of Singapore that as from today, the ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty‐five, Singapore shall be forever a sovereign democratic and independent nation, founded upon the principles of liberty and justice and ever seeking the welfare and happiness of the people in a more just and equal society (Josey 1968, p.98). The second part of his statement, the actual proclamation of independence, was read directly from the text of the Independence of Singapore Agreement, 1965. It is interesting to note that the text of the 1965 Agreement was vague. Just as the ambiguities in the Malaysia Agreement of 1963 had led to the separation, the 1965 Agreement caused difficulties between the two sovereign states (Milne 1966). However, what is pertinent to this discussion is what led up to the separation. Lee Kuan Yew explained his feelings on 9 August 1965 in the following words: At that moment, my emotions overwhelmed me. It was only after another 20 minutes that I was able to regain my composure and resume the press conference. I was emotionally overstretched, having gone through three days and nights of a wrenching experience. With little sleep since Friday night in Kuala Lumpur, I was close to physical exhaustion. I was weighed down by a heavy sense of guilt. I felt I had let down several million people in Malaysia: Immigrant Chinese and Indians, Eurasians, and even some Malays….(Josey 1968, p. 103)5 Tunku Abdul Rahman’s determination to remove Singapore from Malaysia is revealed by a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur to the U.S. State Department, which reveals that the British High Commissioner learned of Singapore’s impending independence the previous night (August 8). He asked Tunku Abdul Rahman for a 24 hour postponement of the proclamation of independence, but he was met with a “completely adamant attitude.”6 Indeed, another U.S. Embassy telegram to the State Department makes it clear that the decision to separate Singapore from Malaysia was ….rammed through Parliament at the insistence of Tunku who told alliance MP’s in meeting preceding Parliament opening that he would not discuss matter and would resign government if he did not receive two-thirds vote necessary to carry constitutional amendment legalizing separation.7 This suggests that the personal relationship between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew had broken down irretrievably, and by expelling Singapore, Tunku Abdul Rahman was doing what he had to do to ensure Malay domination within Malaysia (Fletcher 1969). Therefore, the separation of Singapore and Malaysia was the culmination of years of mutual hostility and suspicion, not only between the Malay and Chinese populations, but between their leaders as well. References Allen, J. de V 1967, The Malayan Union, Yale University Press, New Haven. Bastin, J & Benda HJ 1968, A History of Modern Southeast Asia, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. Bellows, JT 1970, The People's Action Party of Singapore, Mimeograph Series No. 14, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies. Boyce, P 1968, Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy, The University Press, Sydney. Chua BH 2005 ‘Taking Group Rights Seriously: Multiracialism in Singapore’ Working Paper No.124 , October, Murdoch University, Perth. Clutterbuck, R 1973, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945.1963,London. 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