Why Did the Persians Lose the Second Persian War - Essay Example

Why did the Persians Lose the Second Persian War (480 – 479BC)? Introduction The second Persian invasion of Greece was an ambitious military expedition carried out by the Persian army under the leadership of King Xerxes between 480 and 479 BC. King Xerxes, motivated on one hand by initial victories in earlier military expeditions in the larger Persian empire, and driven by the desire to complete the military incursions conceived by his late father on the other hand, revived, planned and executed the large scale campaign to occupy many city states of ancient Greece which, by then, were completely disorganized, fractious and locked in multiple local wars with each other. The expedition was characterized by three key battles: the battle of Thermopylae, the siege of Plataea and the final decisive battle of Salamis. The fact that the Greek armies managed to not only withstand the onslaught against many of the city states but also overturn the course of events and get on the offensive to drive Persian forces out of Europe shows that the Persians lost their second attempt at occupying Greece. Many factors have been suggested as being the reason behind the final outcome of the war. The aim of this paper is to examine some of these reasons in depth. A brief look at the historical background prior to the wars, followed by general differences between the two armies is given. This is followed by a detailed account of some major reasons that led the Persian army losing the war to the Greek forces. Background information The idea to invade Greece was conceived during the reign of King Darius. The early attack of Sardis by the Athenians coupled with a revolt in Egypt convinced Darius of the need to attack and subdue Greece. However, this plan was delayed, and later transferred to King Xerxes. An internal feud between the three sons of the king towards the throne made it difficult for Persia to launch the expedition. Additionally, King Darius passed on soon after solving the problem of inheritance, thus leaving the planned military expedition to be passed over to King Xerxes (Herodotus VII, 2). The political pressure for the war was led by Mardonius who, together with others and with the use of oracles and advice, urged King Xerxes to undertake the expedition against Greece. After Xerxes made up his mind to attack Greece, discordant voices from Artabanos were silenced by reference to edicts, dreams and oracles (Dillon & Garland 2010, p. 372). The Persian Empire then embarked upon a programme of preparing for the war. This took well over four years and largely involved assembling the soldiers, equipment and supplies. Xerxes, driven by the dream of dominating the world, led the greatest level of strategic and logistical preparations for the war, bringing together all nations in Asia to a single cause (Dillon & Garland 2010, p. 372). Reasons why the Persians lost the Second Persian War The first factor that contributed to the failure of the invasion lies in the fact that there were underlying differences between the two armies in terms of the morale of the soldiers, the type of equipment used and logistical processes prior to and during the war. These differences were many and contributed to the final outcome of the war in several ways. Hammond (1989, p. 501) observes that after the defeat of the Persians at Marathon during the early incursion, the North of the Aegean Sea still remained under the full control of the Persian Empire. This explains why King Xerxes encountered limited opposition during the initial logistical preparations for the second invasion. The Persian Empire established important logistical and strategic stations as part of preparations for the war. This was in contrast to the situation in the Greek city states which were disjointed and fractious. The alliance, an assembly of armies that was led by Athens and Sparta, was formed as a defensive strategy and its survival in the course of the war was highly unlikely (Souza 2003, p. 68). For instance, the empire was renowned for royal roads; a major example being one that was built from Sardis to Susa (Herodotus VII, 3). This road was built by a third of the army as a major transport route for wheeled transport and use of couriers. Guard posts, inns and courier stations were formed on major stations of the highway in order to facilitate logistical support during the march. There were also major fundamental differences between the Greek and Persian military in terms of the military kit, military techniques and attitudes. Gabriel (2002, p. 178) observes that the complete military kit of an elite Greek soldier (hoplite) comprised the following: the Argive shield as the primary weapon of defence, a helmet made of either leather or bronze, an armour also worn on the forearms, a wooden shaft spear which was used as the primary weapon of attack and a Greek sword that was used in the event of the spear being lost or broken. The hoplites were recruited from the middle and upper classes of the Greek society. Whereas the Greek army depended much on the use of the hoplites (who fought in units called phalanxes), the Persian military depended on the use of light infantry and cavalry in their military campaigns. The Greek armies’ extensive use of the phalanx had both advantages and disadvantages. Although it always proved to be a powerful military tactic of attacking and destroying the enemy lines, use of the hoplites was limited to open battles in plain terrain only. The phalanx would always perform dismally when engaged in warfare in a rugged terrain. This explains why during the battle at Plataea, the Persian army unsuccessfully attempted to lure the Greek armies into an open battle from the mountains (Gabriel 2002, p. 180). The second major factor that contributed to the final outcome of the war in favour of the Greek armies was the effect of the mistakes committed by the Persian army during the war. The first tactical mistake that was committed by the Persian leadership was to bank all hopes on the belief that a sea-borne attack against the Greek defences would guarantee them ultimate victory. According to Balcer (1989, p. 138), when the Persian commander, Mardonius, decided to directly attack the Greek naval forces within the Bay of Salamis, he was counting on the factors of internal friction within the Greek forces for a quick destruction of the Greek forces and an ultimate victory in the war. However, the offensive proved costly as the large number of Persian ships entering the bay encountered confusion and experienced difficulties in manoeuvring, thus giving the Greek forces an opportunity to win a decisive battle at Salamis. The second mistake committed by the Persian forces during the war was the failure to supplement supply by ships after Xerxes’ fleet had entered the European waters. According to Dillon and Garland (2010, p. 423), the decision to dismantle the two pontoon bridges that spanned the Hellespont destroyed the Persian communication lines and created resulting problems of supply and strategic movement during the war. Supply problems occasioned by this oversight started affecting the Persian army the moment it crossed Thessaly on its way towards the pass at Thermopylae. The dismal performance of the Persian forces at the battles of Plataea and Salamis was on one account as a result of rushed decisions to conclude the campaign because of biting shortages in food and general supplies after the initial encounter at Thermopylae. A little patience would have seen the small Greek forces crumble as a result of withdrawal from the alliance; this would have assured the Persian forces of success. The third factor that led to the Persians losing the war was the role played by the Greek army and the Greek political leadership during the course of the war. The Greek armies showed a considerable degree of tenacity and strength in the face of overwhelming attacks from the Persian army. For instance, Souza (2003, p. 57) observes that the tenacity of King Leonidas was best exemplified in leading the Spartan army to defend the pass at Thermopylae. King Leonidas was aware of the strength of the invading Persian army as well as the prophecy that predicted his death in the battle, yet he remained determined to defend the pass at Thermopylae. Moreover, his decision to remain with a little army of about 400 men showed the tenacity of the armies of the Greek city states during the invasion. This strong defence managed to slow down the pace of advance of the Persian army during the invasion and resulted into the loss of 20,000 Persian soldiers (Hammond 1989, p. 538). But of great importance was the role played by Themistocles in leading the resistance of the allies against the Persian invasion and their eventual victory over the Persian army. This was demonstrated on several occasions. First, it was his cunningness and eloquence that convinced the Peloponnesians not to withdraw behind the Isthmus of Corinth but to defend and attack the Persian fleets at the Straits of Salamis. This proved successful because on entry into the narrow Straits of the Salamis, the Persian fleets encountered confusion and difficulties in manoeuvring as a result of their large numbers (Souza 2003, p. 69). This made it possible for the allied forces to exploit the weakness resulting from the confusion and win a decisive battle of the sea. Themistocles was also behind the idea to build a strong naval force immediately after the victory at Marathon during the first Persian invasion. This move proved its usefulness during the second invasion. His efforts to build new ships (triremes) and strengthen the Athenian and Piraeus naval forces was an important move that enabled the allied forces to win the naval battle during the second invasion (Herodotus VII, 144). Although other leaders such as Eurybiades and Pausanias made valuable contributions to the eventual outcome of the war, it is argued that the role played by Themistocles was outstanding. He was generally responsible for developing and executing important military strategies throughout the war. Important general tactical and strategic moves undertaken by the Greek forces like avoiding open engagement with the Persian army, defending strategic northerly positions and luring the Persian forces into a naval battle that proved costly to the Persian army were developed and implemented by Themistocles (Souza 2003, p. 59). However, it is important to note that the accounts of Greco-Persian wars were recorded by three ancient historians: Aeschylus, Thucydides and Herodotus. Of the three, the accounts of Herodotus are widely regarded as an accurate portrayal of events of the time. However, several questions about the accounts of the Persian defeat during the war arise from reading the history of the war as presented by Herodotus. For instance, Balcer (1989, p. 128) states that the view of Greek victory is emphasised by the fact that the history was written by the Greeks and was calculated to portray the inherent superiority of the Greek armies which looked diminutive in the face of an overpowering Persian army, yet triumphed over them as a result of divine ordinance of things. Also, the work of Herodotus, together with other ancient Greek authors, can be seen to deliberately emphasise the perception of Greek superiority over the Persian forces. This is demonstrated in the way the number of invading Persian forces is dramatically exaggerated, yet more accurate historical examinations indicate that the number of the forces of the two armies involved in the war was more or less the same (Balcer 1989, p. 129). Conclusion Several reasons contributed to the Persians losing the second Persian War between 480 and 479 BC. To begin with, there were several fundamental differences between the Persian and the Greek approach to warfare. Whereas the Persian forces extensively used light cavalry and infantry in their military operations, the Greek forces depended on the hoplites who fought in formations known as phalanxes. The phalanxes proved to be a quite effective combat strategy as it took a relatively larger infantry to destroy a single phalanx. In addition, the Persian army lost the war as a result of committing several tactical and strategic mistakes during the course of the war. The decision to attack the Greek forces at the Bay of Salamis instead of staging a blockade allowed the Greek forces to win a decisive battle in the war. Further, the cunningness and eloquence of the leadership of the Greek forces was a contributing factor to the final outcome of the war. Commanders such as Themistocles and King Leonidas played a key role of showing bravery in resistance of the Persian forces and exploiting the mistakes committed by the invading army during the war. This assured Greek victory despite the fact that the invading forces looked overwhelming in terms of numbers and organisation. References Balcer, J M 1989, "The Persian Wars against Greece: A Reassessment", Historia 38 (1989) 127–143), viewed 18 May 2013, Dillon, M & Garland, L 2010, Ancient Greece: Social and historical documents from archaic times to the death of Alexander the Great, Routledge, London. Gabriel, R A 2002, The great armies of antiquity, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport. Hammond, N.G.L. "The expedition of Xerxes", in Boardman, J., Hammond, N.G.L., Lewis, D.M. & Ostwald, M. (eds), Cambridge Ancient History, vol. IV (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1988), pp. 518–91 (Thermopylae and Salamis) and pp. 491–517 (Marathon), viewed 18 May 2013, Herodotus, “Histories” in Trumbull, D & McNamara, P 2005, Herodotus: Histories, Agathon Associates, viewed 18 May 2013, Souza, P 2003, The Greek and Persian Wars 499 – 386 B. C., Osprey Publishing, London. Read More