To What Extent Was the Bluff Cove the Result of Military Incompetence - Essay Example

Military incompetence Bluff Cove disaster (Name) (Institution) (Module) (Course) (Tutor’s Name) 7th April 2010 The Bluff Cove is a sea inlet at the former British Colonies of the Falklands Islands. The archipelago is recognised in history for the Bluff Cove Disaster where two British war ships were attacked and destroyed on June 8 1982 while offloading by Argentine air forces during the Falklands war. The war pitted British forces against argentine forces which had invaded and occupied the islands. Historically, Argentina had always refuted Falklands Islands’ sovereignty since 1833 after Britain had declared the islands independent. Britain was therefore forced to step in and protect the islands. The undeclared war lasted around 74 days with the Argentine forces finally losing to the UK forces though the British forces suffered a significant number of casualties (BBC News 1998). The geographic nature of the islands required joint operations to cover all the islands and land entry points. As is common in warfare, there is need for strategic planning to ensure proper execution of war tactics and the overall winning of war and aversion of casualties and extensive damages (Lutwak 2001). Historians and war analysts have been quick to suggest causes of defeats and victory in war by evaluating strategies used. However, due to the small magnitude and implication of the Falklands War, there has been much analysis (Johnson 2003). Although the UK won the war against Argentina, there remains a lot of unanswered questions on the military competence in regards to the attack and destruction of two military ships at the Bluff Cove. A review from a number of literature and historical accounts shows that attack could have been prevented and that it is squarely to blame for military incompetence in protecting the entry points by persons heading the war from the UK and military commanders on the ground. Military incompetence according to Johnson, Wrangman and Rosen (2001) is basically a psychological issue where the participant in war firmly believes that he or she stands a chance to win against the opponent. This occurs in both opponents as lack of such a belief would imply no war or conflict at all. While a belief in wining is a risk taken, optimism or positive illusion fuels the war. Johnson (2003.) argues that such optimism and positive illusion in war are prerequisites for military incompetence which Johnson et al (2001) define as a “phenomenon of enormous risk taking behaviour” (p. 2). Bolia (2004) claims during the war, relations between the Royal Navy and British army were strained. He cites Commodore Michael Clapp who had previously overseen a successful landing of three Commando Brigades who said that, “what I did not appreciate . . . was the lack of understanding of joint operations by the Army Brigade . . . nor the near nonexistent communications that were to dog that brigade” (Bolia, p. 66) The author continues and says that although British military incompetence in the Falklands War is best shown through the Bluff Cove disaster, there were other levels of military incompetence in the whole war from the on start. It is alleged that the British army was ill prepared and was incapacitated by amphibious conditions required in the war presented by the winter weather and the many tiny islands. Commodore Michael Clapp said that When the Brigade was dispatched it was without two of its three original major maneuver units, and it had no logistic backup and little significant training—certainly none in joint Navy/Army or amphibious operations. That they were to fight and not garrison in one of the most complicated of military roles in a sub-Antarctic winter must have been a disagreeable surprise to the Army staff” Bolia (p. 1). The Bluff Clove air disaster was therefore a culmination of poor/lack of proper military training for the army staff that could not seemingly cope with severe weather and amphibious conditions. Huber indicates that Britain’s lack of a Host nation during the war implied that the forces were somehow incapacitated to employ air strikes in the same intensity as their enemies. As a result, the forces had to settle for amphibious operations from two warring sides, the Royal Navy and the Military. Fortunately for the British forces, the argentine air power was not designed for long range operations have they could not execute war at full intensity that might have defeated the British forces at the onset. Consequently, the war is considered sluggish as compared to other wars. Huber says “the inability of either side to establish early, the decisive control of the air resulted in a war of attrition which proved costly to both.” It can thus be deduced from this that the Bluff Cove disaster which entailed air strikes from the Argentine forces was a making of Britain’s inability to employ fully air power capacity at the onset of the war. The British forces had underestimated Argentine air force superiority and thus did not put in place airborne early warning system. The British Carrier base was located more than 100 miles from the islands and as furthest away from the Argentine mainland in order to avoid air strikes from argentine forces. However, this also proved disastrous to the war on part of the UK as the carrier was the only one with a long range detection system but was too far away. Picket surface ships had minor detection system that could not even detect low flying objects at just more than a dozen miles away. Therefore, reaction time was very short and degraded the overall efficiency of Britain in the war. Huber (1995) says that this was the British Forces’ Achilles heel that prolonged the war and even caused huge loses of manpower and military equipment. Poor cooperation between the British Army and the Royal Navy gave the enemy opportunities and war advantages that should no have been granted in the first place. Prior to the war, the military command in Britain had assumed that the British Army and the Royal Navy could blend and work well together with no prior joint training Bolia (2004). The author cites one soldier’s sentiments regarding the composition and training of the forces “The Navy [is] well used to having the Royal Marines and other Green Beret-wearing members of Commando Forces on board. They therefore assumed the Welsh Guards would be the same—if not something similar. However, it had rapidly become clear even to the saltiest of sailors that the Welsh Guards were nothing like as well prepared as they needed to be (Bolia, p. 1). As evidence of this poor cooperation between these two sides, Bolia (2004) cites the cases of friendly fire casualties such as the shooting down of 5 Brigades Gazelle helicopters by HMS Cardiff on June 5th. According to Bolia this happened because the 5 Brigade did not have a naval liaison officer attached as they had no experience working with the Royal Naval. Ideally the brigade should have signaled the Royal Naval of their approach which could have avoided the incidence. In the same length, there was poor communication between the naval forces and the brigade during the Bluff Cove incident. The incidence resounds of poor communication over what unit to keep watch and which unit to carry out the offloading. Major General Jeremy Moore who was responsible for the Royal Naval is blamed for poor judgment and military incompetence in how he carried out the preparation for the coming and offloading of the two ships RFA Sir Tristram and RFA Sir Galahad. Bolia (2004) writes that the incompetence did not commence in the actual day of the attacks but is rather witnessed first with the stopping by of 3 Commando Brigade at San Carlos to secure the place. Three battalion units, 3 Parachute Battalion and 45 Commando Brigade and 2 Battalion (the Parachute Regiment) were moving towards the capital. While the units were within fifteen miles from the capital which by then was occupied by Argentine forces, the fourth unit, 5 Brigade had been left behind. Major Moore was thus faced with a dilemma over whether to leave the 5 Brigade behind to guard the beach and serve as a reserve or whether to open up a southern line of advance along the south coast of east Falkland and assign the unit to the right hand flank and make a final run for the capital, Stanley (Bolia 2004; Anderson 2004). Bolia (2004) claims that the idea of leaving behind the 5 Battalion to guard the beachhead and act as a reserve was more logical that the idea of incorporating the unit in the seizing of Stanley. He reasons that the three units that were already stationed outside Stanley were enough as they had proved their capacity by taking over Goose Green. Nonetheless, incorporating this fourth unit in the attack seemed logical in some sense as military reasoning would call for unity. The decision by Moore was largely political rather than military (Chant 2001). Major Moore acted in reaction to pleas from Wilson, who was the commander of the 5 Brigade for inclusion of the 5 Brigade in the quest for Glory in taking over Stanley. Wilson was concerned that the Julian Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade commander, would take all the Glory in taking over Stanley while his unit would not be accredited with anything. Freedman (2005) says Wilson’s pleas for inclusion in the attack weighed heavily on Major Moore who gave in to the pleas in the belief that he would appear democratic and fair b allowing the army to share in the glory of the navy. Major Moore sanctioned the southern thrust from 5 Brigade expecting the unit to land San Carlos and head south through Goose Green and take position on hills outside Stanley. Unfortunately, this plan was derailed by Wilson. Being in command of the 2 Parachute Regiment, which was already advancing towards Stanley, Wilson ordered them to leap forward using a hijacked Chinook helicopter to Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove. Although Wilson informed Major Moore, he did so as a fait accompli. Consequently, the unit was isolated and had no sufficient artillery, manpower or air support to handle any attacks from the Argentine forces. In fact the unit was 55 kilometers ahead of the 5 Brigade which was the nearest unit. This action captures the dire lack of cooperation between the navy and the military (Bolia 2004). In addition to this, the action by the 2 Parachute Regiment nearly resulted into a case of friendly fire, then labeled blue-on-blue incidence. Poor weather could not allow a British Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre observation post to identify the Chinook helicopter that the unit had used as friendly. Communication with Cadre Headquarters at Teal Inlet confirmed that the helicopter could not be friendly at such a location. Just before launching an attack, the weather cleared a bit to allow the staff at the observation post to recognize the helicopter as having British forces logo. Efforts to march the army units much faster to catch up with the 2 Parachute Regiment proved difficult as the army men were not accustomed to the Falklands weather which served Major Moore with two main options: to airlift the remaining units by air to catch up with the unit ahead or to call back the unit. While airlifting the other units would have been more reasonable, there were not enough helicopters to do thus leaving Major Moore with no other option but to recall the 2 Parachute Regiment which he did not (Chant 2001). As a sign of Major Moore’s military incompetence, he preferred to devise another way through which he would facilitate travel of the other units to catch up with 2 Parachute Regiment to avoid hurting Wilson who wanted the army to share the glory of victory (Bolia 2004: Anderson 2002). Moore reasoned that the next best alternative would be to move the units by sea from San Carlos to Fitzroy as it was safer due to the proximity of the Fitzroy to Stanley. The convenient way was to use either of the two landing platform decks (LDP), Intrepid or Fearless. However, the Fleet headquarters had prohibited the use of the two in such operations as they were highly valued. In contravening the law, Major Moore ordered Intrepid to be used to ferry the guards halfway from where the guards transferred to landing craft, utilities. This process also highlighted Major Moore’s military incompetence by failing to coordinate communication between the between the Carrier Battle Group and the Commander, Amphibious Warfare and 5 Brigade and the Royal Navy. This nearly caused more blue-on-blue incidences. For instance the Cardiff and Yarmouth almost fired on the LCUs as they were not aware of the friendly forces at sea in that location. Another case was the other LDP, Fearless, which was used to transport the navy halfway to Fitzroy and meet the returning LCUs and transfer theme there. However, this never happened as communication between the 5 Brigade totally broke down. It is apparent that Major Moore was not committed to following orders from his seniors back in the UK over the usage of equipment. While it might logical from a military point of view in case of an emergency or lack of otherwise, Major Moore had other less risky though “politically incorrect” options. The Navy instead followed commands not to use Fearless in transporting the guards to Bluff Clove but opted to use Sir Galahad which was ferrying a Rapier surface-to-air missile battery and a field hospital to Fitzroy hence would was scheduled to drop off the welsh guards at Bluff Cove later. Due to loading delays caused by communication failures between the involved units, the ship’s captain requested to postpone the voyage to the next day but his superiors declined only that he was to sail to Fitzroy only and not Bluff Cove something which was not communicated to the onboard guards. The ship thus arrived the following morning at Fitzroy in open daylight. The guards were thus required to walk the five miles distance from Fitzroy to Bluff Cove or use one available landing craft. The guards settled on the second option which delayed by a few hours due to problems with the loading ramp. By the time the guards disembarked at Port Pleasant, Sir Galahad and another ship Sir Tristam has been anchored at for over five hours. All this time, the Argentines around the hills were watching every move and reported this to their seniors who ordered and an immediate attack (Anderson, 2002). It is important to note at this point that there is not much evidence of British intelligence efforts to gather information on the state of Argentine forces or Stanley. Success at Goose Green may have led the British forces to underestimate the Argentine forces. Its is apparent that, despite the delay in transporting troops and equipments, Major Moore and other navy commanders made no effort to cover their backs. This is what Johnson (2003) defines as bloated positive illusion which has a tendency to cause illogical decisions and over confidence. Nonetheless, this gained level of confidence is an important tool in war. Johnson adds that An exaggerated assessment of one’s own confidence stemming from positive illusions increase the probability of winning via deception of the opponent, since it increases the chance of bluffing the enemy in to believing that he cannot, or is unlikely to win. Bluffs are more likely to be believed by your opponent if you are not aware of the fallacy yourself, so positive illusions, though self deceptive, serve to prevent betraying the bluff” (Johnson p. 12) The initial attack force consisted of Eight Argentine A-4B Skyhawks (four Dogos-Bulldogs and Mastines-Mastiffs) each loaded with three 250-kilogram (kg) bombs from Rio Gallegos, six Daggers, (three Perros-Dogs, and three Gatos-Cats) from Rio Grande followed by a Learjet. These were led by four Mirages from Río Gallegos which were supposed to serve as a distraction to the Harrier’s combat air patrol. However, the crafts were reduced from 14 to ten after three Skyhawks and one Dagger developed mechanical problems. The Daggers were distracted by the presence of another British warship, Plymouth whose presence in that place was in preparation for the attack on Stanley. Four bombs struck the ship but did not explode as they were dropped from a very low attitude. Nonetheless, the attack was successful with four crew members injured. Reports on the plight of the ship vary with argentine forces claiming it sank while British forces say it survived (Huber, 1995; Anderson 2002). Another five planes had to return to base to fuel through the remaining ones reached Port Pleasant and launched their attack. The remaining five planes formed a squadron and flew at low altitude over east Falkland amid small arms fire from the guards at Buss Cove. At Port Pleasant, the two ships were attempting to sail off the coast after recognizing attack. Sir Galahad was the first to be hit with two 250-kg bombs which exploded. Sir Tristam was also hit and the bombs exploded. Sir Galahad, which was loaded with fuel and ammunition, suffered the highest deaths at 48 and over a hundred casualties. All the Argentine planes returned safely to the mainland. All along, the British forces were earnestly trying to launch the missile battery launcher onboard but it was faulty. The two ships, Sir Tristam and Sir Galahad were not equipped with heavy artillery same as the LDP which had been prohibited from this mission (Anderson 2002; Bolia 2004). However, it is important to note that the British military was overly incompetent in this case. While the British contending was attacked, their plans had been to attack at night. Again, the UK had stuck to NATO regulations and was only acting to restore peace and sovereignty to the Falklands. Lutwak (2001) notes that the timing of war says a lot about war strategy and tactics. He says that “combat at night or in bad weather, is a common expression of tactical ingenuity—and for a reason that derives from the essential nature of war” Lutwak, p. 3). The British Army had chosen to go to war during Falklands winter though this is more an issue of coincidence than planning. From Lutwak’s (2001) interpretation, this is strategy but going by the history of the war, the timing is indicative of military incompetence as it served to inconvenience the forces. Much of the blame has been directed to the Marines commander, Major Moore pertaining to a number of decisions he made in the course of the war and more specifically the bombing of the two ships. However, his desire to use the two heavily armed ships in the attack on Stanley was prohibited by the fleet managers back in the UK. The army headquarters in the UK underestimated the Argentine forces as not worth of heavy equipment and artillery to subdue their attacks. According to some of the survivors of the attacks, the soldiers just watched in horror as they were attacked as they had faulty equipment (Bolia 2004). Johnson (2003) says that the cost of underestimation and over estimation in war is very costly. In the case of Bluff Clove, the British Forces, going by senior officers back in the UK decisions, underestimated the potential of the Argentine forces which it seems they assumed were not worth of heavy artillery despite it being at location and in proper working condition. In the same length therefore, the UK had overestimated its potential in winning the war while the same applied to Argentina. Although the UK finally won the war, it is obvious that several people in command stand guilty of being over confident to the point of being unreasonable. The commander of the 5 Brigade, Wilson is one man who military incompetence is most visible in the Bluff Cove incident. He deviated from military strategy and reasoning to serve his political and personal interests. He sought to market the military as an importance and effective force in the UK forces by making a visible contribution in Falklands war. On the other hand, Major Moore displayed military incompetence by failing to identify the weaknesses in Wilson’s advice over how to handle the 2 Parachute regiment advancement into enemy territory. Though Wilson made a wrong decision in ordering the 2 Parachute Regiment to move ahead of other troops, Major Moore as the senior one had the authority to reject such wrong advice. His decision to follow Wilson’s advice changed the outcome of the war in terms of history and casualties. Nonetheless, the fleet managers and other officers in the department of defense did not possess the military competence to direct such a war References Anderson, D. (2002). The Falklands war 1982. London: Osprey Publishing, Bolia, R. S. (2004). The Falklands War: The Bluff Cove Disaster. Military review. March-April p. 66-72. Retrieved online on 7/04/10 from http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/bolia1.pdf BBC News. 1998. The battle over the Falklands. Retrieved online on 7/04/10 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/199850.stm Chant, C. (2001). Air War in the Falklands 1982. London: Osprey Publishing, Freedman, L. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: War and diplomacy. London: Routledge, 2005 Huber, J. L. The Falklands air war: lessons revisited. Retrieved online on 7/04/10 From http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA293335&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Johnson, D. P. (2003). Do positive illusions promote war? Retrieved online on 7/04/10 from www.dklevine.com/archive/johnson-positive_illusions.pdf Johnson, D.P. Wrangman, R. W. & Rosen, S. P. (2001). Is military incompetence adaptive?An empirical test with risk-taking behavior in modern warfare Evolution and Human Behavior 23 (2002) 245–264. Lutwak, E. 2001. Strategy: the logic of war and peace 2nd ed. New York: Harvard University Press, Read More